Corporate Lobbying and Firm Performance

Corporate lobbying activities are designed to influence legislators, regulators and courts, presumably to encourage favorable policies and/or outcomes. In dollar terms, corporate lobbying expenditures are typically one or even two orders of magnitude larger than spending by Political Action Committees (PAC), and, unlike PAC donations, lobbying amounts are direct corporate expenditures. We use data made available by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 to examine this more pervasive form of corporate political activity. We find that, on average, lobbying is positively related to accounting and market measures of financial performance. These results are robust across a number of empirical specifications. We also report market performance evidence using a portfolio approach. We find that portfolios of firms with the highest lobbying intensities significantly outperform their benchmarks in the three years following portfolio formation.     

The Informational Effect of Corporate Lobbying Against Proposed Accounting Standards

Accounting standard setting has been described as a highly political process. Different interest groups are often quite ready to criticize any proposed accounting standard and lobby the accounting standard setting body. This study explores the possibility that certain information might be revealed through corporate lobbying behavior. A game-theoretic model is formulated to examine the implications of a proposed accounting standard which, if passed, would require the financial statement recording of some previously undisclosed liabilities. In this model, management has incentive to lobby against the standard and prevent the mandatory reporting of the liabilities. Lobbying against the standard, however, may itself reveal to the market information about the liabilities. Results of the equilibrium analysis show that, because of this informational effect, a company may choose not to lobby even though the company may have a high liability and can be adversely affected by the proposed standard. On the other hand, a company may avoid revealing its liability level if it can adopt the "always-lobby" strategy. Furthermore, a company may not have to lobby at all if it can "free-ride" on other companies' lobbying effort. Companies may even be able to enjoy "free-riding" at least some of the time if each company can share the responsibilities and lobby on a probabilistic and what otherwise may seem like a random basis.     

Lobbying and Audit Regulation in the EU

In this paper, we analyze comment letters submitted in response to the European Commission (EC) Green Paper on audit policy. We find that consistent with the theory of incentives and the presence of information asymmetries between rule-making bodies and interest groups, the highest participation within the consultation process came from auditors and preparers of financial statements. Additionally, our results suggest that these interest groups exhibit different strategic lobbying behaviors in terms of employing more self-referential arguments than other interest groups. Moreover, we provide evidence that self-referential argumentation strategies are more influential when expressing opposing views, whereas conceptually based argumentation strategies are more influential when expressing supporting views. We contribute to a more detailed understanding of the role that lobbyists and argumentation strategies played in the recent EU audit policy reform, and we infer that lobbying activities might have led the EC to moderate its proposals to obtain interest groups’ support.     

Lobbying and Uniform Disclosure Regulation

This study examines the costs and benefits of uniform accounting regulation in the presence of heterogeneous firms that can lobby the regulator. A commitment to uniform regulation reduces economic distortions caused by lobbying by creating a free‐rider problem between lobbying firms at the cost of forcing the same treatment on heterogeneous firms. Resolving this tradeoff, an institutional commitment to uniformity is socially desirable when firms are sufficiently homogeneous or the costs of lobbying to society are large. We show that the regulatory intensity for a given firm can be increasing or decreasing in the degree of uniformity, even though uniformity always reduces lobbying. Our analysis sheds light on the determinants of standard‐setting institutions and their effects on corporate governance and lobbying efforts.     

Discretionary write-downs,write-offs,and other restructuring provisions: a signaling approach

This paper introduces a model seeking to explain the discretionary write-downs, write-offs, and other restructuring provisions reported by managers. The model comprises a firm, a manager, and a financial market. The firm is about to be restructured. The manager has some private information about the likelihood of success of his restructuring action. The manager may recognise all or part of the expenditure associated with his future restructuring action by reporting a discretionary restructuring provision. The manager chooses whether or not to report a provision, recognising the impact of the provision on his compensation. The paper shows how, under certain conditions, the manager may credibly communicate his private information to investors through his provision policy. Testable implications are consistent with the empirical evidence reported by Strong and Meyer (1987), Elliott and Shaw (1988), and Zucca and Campbell (1992).     

Does Centralization Increase the Size of Government? The Effects of Separation of Powers and Lobbying

Difficulties faced by the Economic and Monetary Union have strengthened the position of those who advocate a process of (further) political integration in the European Union (EU). A widespread fear is, though, that such a process would favor powerful interest groups able to lobby the EU policymakers. Persson and Tabellini (1994) argue that political centralization will increase the size of the government through lobbying because of free-riding incentives created by federally funded programs with localized benefits. We extend their analysis by presenting a model where the budgeting process is divided into two stages, instead of one, which better captures the EU institutional framework. A federal legislator (the Council) chooses the size of the budget at one stage, while a federal agency (the Commission) chooses the allocation of the budget at the next stage. We show that separation of powers in the budgeting process restricts free riding and, therefore, reduces the incentives to lobby. The result is an unchanged budget under centralization. Moreover, it is shown that if the lobbying activity is directed to both policymakers, competitive lobbying may actually reduce the size of the public sector under centralized policymaking.     

The economic determinants of depreciation accounting in late nineteenth-century Britain

This paper examines the economic incentives for unregulated companies, in late nineteenth-century Britain, to disclose in their published accounts the fact that they had charged depreciation. We argue that the disclosure will be positively associated with whether a company has outside shareholders and long-term debtholders, profitability, extent of depreciable assets, appointment of a professional auditor, and size. These hypotheses are tested using 150 British companies from the years 1880/81, 1889/90 and 1899/01. Our results indicate that whether depreciation was charged is related to profitability and, to a lesser extent, to the presence of outside shareholders, long-term debt holders and the appointment of a professional auditor. However, the amount of depreciation charged is related only to profitability and appears to be opportunistically determined.     

Canadian Evidence on the Constructive Capitalization of Operating Leases*

One type of relevant ex ante research supporting the accounting standard‐setting process is the study of a proposed standard's impact on reported figures. The International Accounting Standards Board recently decided to review the lease accounting standard, which will naturally involve consideration of the G4 + 1 recommendation to capitalize all noncancellable lease contracts, including operating leases. National evidence of the impact of the G4 + 1 proposals provides feedback for the international standard‐setter. This study developed and used a refined constructive capitalization method, in which company‐specific assumptions — interest rate, total/expired/remaining lives of leased assets, and tax rate — were used to compute the impact of operating‐lease capitalization on key financial indicators for a sample of Canadian public companies. The results indicate that capitalizing operating leases would lead to the recognition of important additional assets and liabilities on the balance sheet. It would therefore significantly increase the debt‐to‐asset ratio and significantly decrease the current ratio. These results were noted across all industry segments in the sample. Income statement effects were generally less material. Significant impacts on return on assets, return on equity, and / or earnings per share were noted in only three industry segments: merchandising and lodging, oil and gas, and financial services. Intercompany comparability would not be affected overall nor within industries, because of similar rankings for each financial indicator before and after operating‐lease capitalization.     

Splitting Accountability Hairs: Anomalies in the Adaptation of IFRS for SMEs in the UK and Ireland

Abstract

Recent years have witnessed a significant shift in the financial reporting frameworks available in the UK and Ireland affecting entities of all sizes with the Financial Reporting Council issuing three financial reporting standards replacing the extant UK GAAP. This paper reports the results of a content analysis of 151 comment letters sent to the standard-setter in response to its policy proposal. The paper explains why the standard-setter stepped back from its controversial proposal to enforce IFRS for SMEs based on the absence of public accountability. Additionally, the standard-setter addressed all concerns positively apart from two, representing two anomalies. First, despite being opposed by the majority of the respondents, the standard-setter published a new framework for wholly-owned subsidiaries of listed companies allowing them to make substantially less disclosure. Second, the standard-setter is yet to respond to the call by the accounting profession and the Not-for-profit sector to publish a sector-specific framework.     

Capitalization of R&D costs and earnings management: Evidence from Italian listed companies

The capitalization of research and development (R&D) costs is a controversial accounting issue because of the contention that such capitalization is motivated by incentives to manipulate earnings. Based on a sample of Italian listed companies, this study examines whether companies' decisions to capitalize R&D costs are affected by earnings-management motivations. Italy provides a natural context for testing our hypothesized relationships because Italian GAAP allows for the capitalization of R&D costs. Using a Tobit regression model to test our hypotheses, we show that companies tend to use cost capitalization for earnings-smoothing purposes. The hypothesis that firms capitalize R&D costs to reduce the risk of violating debt covenants is not supported.     

Value to the Owner: A Review and Critique

This paper examines the conceptual basis underlying the concept of value to the owner and the contributions to the debate by Solomons (1966) and Baxter (1971, 1975). It is argued that the concept is deficient in a number of respects and it is therefore not surprising that it has been rejected by businessmen. The paper argues that the concept is an unnecessary appendage to the case for reporting some form of replacement cost information. The paper then examines the merits and more general limitations of replacement cost data.     

On the emergence of strategic management accounting: An institutional perspective

Strategic management accounting (SMA) has been presented as an efficacious approach to strategy formulation and implementation. It also suggests accountants move away from purely financial concerns to give consideration to wider business issues. Management accounting change has attracted significant research attention in recent years. This case study explores the issues which surround change and which enable the adoption of SMA and the repositioning of management accountants to become more strategic. The empirical enquiry is based in one company through a prolonged series of interviews and meetings which enabled activities over a number of years to be reviewed. This revealed an increasing strategic role for management accountants in informing strategic decision‐making and how this role came into being. The research is informed by institutional theories and neoinstitutionalism in particular, to interpret the external and internal influences on the change in roles of some management accountants and the outputs of their work.     

Financial Statements and Positive Accounting Theory: The Early Contribution of Aldo Amaduzzi

This paper examines some of the accounting ideas that were developed in the late 1940s by an Italian professor, Aldo Amaduzzi, with regards to positive accounting studies and the content of financial statements. The paper briefly reviews the aim, methodological assumptions and key findings of the so-called 'positive accounting theory' based on the works of the Rochester school of accounting. A content analysis of the early work of Amaduzzi, in relation to his view that the contents of financial statements can be seen as the equilibrium outcome of a conflict of interests between corporate stakeholders, shows that many of the methodological issues on accounting theory stressed by the 'Rochester school of accounting' were raised by Amaduzzi (1947, 1949). The paper concludes that although some key differences between the two approaches do exist, Amaduzzi may be considered as a forerunner of positive accounting theory.     

Theoretical studies of the historical development of the accounting discipline: A review and evidence

Many existing studies of the development of accounting thought have either been atheoretical or have adopted Kuhn's model of scientific growth. The limitations of this 35-year-old model are discussed. Four different general neo-Kuhnian models of scholarly knowledge development are reviewed and compared with reference to an analytical matrix. The models are found to be mutually consistent, with each focusing on a different aspect of development. A composite model is proposed. Based on a hand-crafted database, author co-citation analysis is used to map empirically the entire literature structure of the accounting discipline during two consecutive time periods, 1972-81 and 1982-90. The changing structure of the accounting literature is interpreted using the proposed composite model of scholarly knowledge development.     

关于会计计量理论结构之认识

社会环境是构建会计计量理论结构的逻辑起点。会计计量理论包括会计计量基础理论和会计计量应用理论。探索会计理论结构,能够促进我国会计理论的发展,为会计工作者理解和掌握会计准则、会计制度提供帮助,从而使会计理论更好地为我国经济服务。     

管理会计的发展与展望

我国管理会计的发展呈现出以下特点:大多数企业的信息系统依然是为财务会计而非管理会计设计的。而在管理会计的教育界,这种局限性体现在:一方面,对已有的管理会计应用经验缺乏总结和提高。另一方面,学术界投入的力量比较少,学者们不肯深入实践去调查,去总结经验。甚至可以说,长期以来理论界过于偏重财务会计。21世纪我国管理会计发展的关键是要充分发挥管理会计的作用,提高企业经济效益,因此,必须从推动管理会计发展的原动力出发,立足于我国的国情。现代管理会计具有系统化、规范化、职业化、社会化和国际化的发展趋势。     

The Impact of New Zealand's Public Sector Accounting Reforms on Performance Control in Museums

Accounting by most New Zealand museums was subject to public sector reforms requiring private sector -style financial reporting, and service performance reporting. This study into the impact of the reforms on how museum managements pursue successful performance found museums adopting a more accounting-oriented approach to planning and evaluation. Service performance reporting has facilitated the periodic evaluation of non-financial targets by managements, but as currently constituted the reporting model is flawed, particularly in its implications for essential long-term resource capacity of museums. This threatens its effectiveness for promoting good performance. Non-accounting based professional practices also have a role in museum success.     

Broadening management accounting education: more theory,more practicality ∗

There are two widespread beliefs among management accountants. Management accounting should be practical, and education for doing the job the management accountant actually does should include topics which would require extensive training in theory. The two beliefs are not inconsistent. Management accounting education starting from theory and moving to its application could be far more practical than education without theory in applying predefined techniques.     

Financial industry lobbying and shareholder litigation outcomes: implications for managers and regulators

We examine the relationship between financial firm corporate lobbying, shareholder-based litigation outcomes, and firm value. We show that political lobbying lowers federal class action securities litigation likelihood for public financial institutions. Secondly, lobbying firms experience a higher likelihood of having litigation dismissed, and the average settlement amount is significantly lower for lobbying institutions. In addition, shortly after a litigation announcement, lobbying firms experience significantly higher cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), compared to non-lobbying firms. Finally, we show that lobbying firms have higher long-run buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns (BHARs) following lobbying activities. Our results link financial institution lobbying activity with improved legal outcomes and relatively higher firm value. While lobbying improves financial firm value, our results also imply that lobbying creates a disadvantage for non-lobbying firms within the industry. Our results provide insights, not only to corporate managers, but to regulators and policymakers interested in the impact of lobbying on the efficacy and objectivity of regulation and enforcement in the financial services industry.