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1.
Summary. Suppose that an economic agent is
100% certain that uncertainty she faces is characterized by a particular probability measure, but that she has a fear that, with
100% chance, her conviction is completely wrong and she is left perfectly ignorant about the true measure in the present as well as in the future. This situation is often called
-contamination of confidence. The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple set of behavioral axioms under which the decision-makers preference is represented by the Choquet expected utility with the
-contamination of confidence.Received: 25 November 2002, Revised: 15 November 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D81.
Correspondence to: Hiroyuki OzakiWe are grateful to an anonymous referee. The referees comments greatly improved the exposition of the paper. The work reported here is partially supported by a grant from the Economic and Social Research Insitute, the Cabinet Office, the Government of Japan. 相似文献
2.
Overlapping generations model of fiat money yields an infinity of competitive equilibrium solutions, only one of which is stationary. Economies reported in this paper involved a sequence of overlapping generations of three or four individuals; each individual lived for two periods. In their young age individuals were endowed with chips that could be traded for fiat money wish the individuals of the old generation. In their old age, individuals could exchange their units o flat money for the consumption good. Results of the experiments exhibit some support for the stationary solution. The results are robust to two designs of exchange institutions (double oral auctior and supply schedule auction) and to two different endogenous ways of converting money into chips at the end of the game (average price prevailing during the last period the game is actually played and the average price forecast made during the last period the game is actually played).A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the meeting of the Economic Science Association and at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. The authors are grateful for comments received from various participants at both presentations. Financial support was provided by the McKnight Foundation, the Honeywell Foundation, National Science Foundation (SES 89-12552), and Richard. M. and Margaret Cyert Family Funds. 相似文献
3.
This paper attempts to analyze the strategic use of optimal tariffs and to examine the effects of national bias on the optimal trade policy and social welfare in a two-country, two-good, price competition model derived from Neven et al. (1991). The major findings are as follows. (1) If all consumers prefer the domestic good, then buy domestic campaigns will decrease the prohibitive tariff rate and increase local welfare. (2) If at least some consumers prefer the foreign good, but not to a great extent, then buy domestic campaigns will not change the optimal tariff rate, but may improve local welfare. (3) When all consumers greatly prefer the foreign good, then promotion of buy domestic decreases the optimal tariff rate, but it cannot improve social welfare. With this framework, we also prove that buy domestic campaigns serve as a substitute for tariffs with respect to a strategic trade policy. 相似文献
4.
Summary. We show that Nash Equilibrium points can be obtained by using response maps or reply functions that simply use better responses rather than best responses. We demonstrate the existence of a Nash Equilibrium as the fixed point of a better response map and since the better response map is continuous the fixed point can be established by simply using Brouwers fixed point theorem. The proof applies to games with a finite number of strategies as well as to games with a continuum of strategies. In case the games have a continuum of strategies the payoff functions have to be continuous on the action sets and quasi concave on the players action set.Received: 22 September 2003, Revised: 31 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
C72, D00, D40.
Correspondence to: Robert A. BeckerWe have benefited from comments on an earlier draft made by participants at Indiana Universitys Microeconomics workshop (October 2002) and the Midwest Economic Theory Conference held at the University of Pittsburgh (May 2003). We also thank Roy Gardner for comments on earlier versions. We thank the Associate Editor, Mark Machina, for his detailed comments and suggestions. This project began when Subir Chakrabarti was a visitor in the Department of Economics, Indiana University, Bloomington in the Spring of 2002. He thanks that department for its support. 相似文献