Some Surprising Properties of Power Indices

While it is troubling when power-index values change with the index, the problem is more severe: Different indices can generate radically different rankings. For example, a 15-player game exists with over a trillion different strict index rankings of the players. In contrast, with a fixed number of players certain indices always share the same ranking: e.g., the Shapley and Banzhaf rankings agree with three players, but they can have opposite rankings with more players. It is explained why index outcomes can be sensitive to assumptions and to when players leave a game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, D71.     

Community standards

I introduce a model of community standards relevant to the judicial determination of obscenity. Standards are defined as subjective judgments restricted only by a simple reasonableness condition. Individual standards are aggregated to form the community standard. Several axioms reflect legal concerns. These require that the community standard (a) preserve unanimous agreements, (b) become more permissive when all individuals become more permissive, and not discriminate, ex ante, (c) between individuals and (d) between works. I show that any rule which satisfies these properties must be “similar” to unanimity rule. I also explore the relationship between the model and the doctrinal paradox of Kornhauser and Sager [12].     

Unit-Consistent Poverty Indices

This paper characterizes unit-consistent poverty indices. The unit consistency axiom requires that poverty rankings (not poverty indices) remain unaffected when all incomes and the poverty lines are expressed in different measuring units. We consider two general frameworks of poverty measurement: the semi-individualistic framework that includes all decomposable indices and all rank-based indices; and the Dalton–Hagenaars framework that contains a subset of decomposable indices. Within the semi-individualistic framework, classes of unit-consistent poverty indices can be characterized for different value judgements about poverty measurement. Within the Dalton-Hagenaars framework, unit-consistent poverty indices are completely characterized without invoking any value judgement a priori. I thank Peter Lambert, Mike Hoy, Thesia Garner and an anonymous referee for their very helpful comments and suggestions.     

Nest-monotonic two-stage acts and exponential probability capacities

This paper examines conditions for Choquet expected utility (CEU) to satisfy both the reduction of two-stage acts and the recursion axioms, which are taken for granted in economics. A key idea of this paper is to consider nest-monotonic two-stage acts, which share their rankings of states with those of their reduced one-stage acts. Our main theorem shows that the axioms, one of which is restricted to nest-monotonic two-stage acts, and consequentialism are satisfied if and only if the preference is exponential CEU, which is such that the probability capacity is an exponential transformation of a probability measure. This result indicates that within a specified range of decision problems, exponential CEU is the only form of CEU that derives indifference to the timing of information resolution. Furthermore, the relation between first- and second-stage exponential CEU is characterized both by the f*-Bayesian updating rule and by comonotonic dynamic consistency. Conditions to establish the law of iterated expectation for CEU are also discussed.     

The measurement of income mobility: A partial ordering approach

Summary. Given a set of longitudinal data pertaining to two populations, a question of interest is the following: Which population has experienced a greater extent of income mobility? The aim of the present paper is to develop a systematic way of answering this question. We first put forth four axioms for income movement-mobility indices, and show that a familiar class of measures is characterized by these axioms. An unambiguous (partial) ordering is then defined as the intersection of the (complete) orderings induced by the mobility measures which belong to the characterized class; a transformation of income distributions is “more mobile” than another if, and only if, the former is ranked higher than the latter for all mobility measures which satisfy our axioms. Unfortunately, our mobility ordering depends on a parameter, and therefore, it is not readily apparent how one can apply it to panel data directly. In the second part of the paper, therefore, we derive several sets of parameter-free necessary and sufficient conditions which allow one to use the proposed mobility ordering in making unambiguous income mobility comparisons in practice. Received: July 12, 1995; revised version: May 13, 1997     

Join hands or walk alone? Evidence on lobbying for trade policy in India

Using primary evidence for 146 Indian manufacturing firms, I examine single and dual lobbying strategies for trade policy influence, and the factors driving firm's choice of these strategies. Firms can adopt a single strategy, by lobbying collectively as a group (Join Hands), or lobbying individually as a firm (Walk Alone). Firms can also adopt a dual strategy, that is, a combination of collective and individual lobbying. The choice of strategy is affected by sector concentration and by tradeoffs between lobbying intensity for sector‐wide and firm‐specific outcomes. The following findings are new for India: First, majority of Indian firms (more than 64% in the sample) use a dual strategy, suggesting the importance to better understand what drives dual strategies. Second, the likelihood of adopting a dual lobbying is higher in sectors that are characterized by low concentration (dispersion is higher), indicating a strong competition effect over free‐riding. Third, relative to the single strategy of collective lobbying, Indian manufacturing firms are likely to join hands while walking alone when targeting firm‐specific outcomes, but prefer to walk alone (single strategy of individual lobbying) when there are tradeoffs between different outcomes, to react quickly. Finally, the availability of resources and firm's perceived effectiveness of its lobbying are significant drivers for the strategy choice.     

Economic indices of absolute and relative riskiness

Following Aumann and Serrano (J Polit Econ 116:810–836, 2008) who characterize by axioms an index of riskiness defined on absolute returns, we characterize a new index of riskiness defined on relative returns. Both indices are characterized by a similar principle of duality between risk and risk aversion, but while the index of absolute riskiness refers to absolute risk aversion, the index of relative riskiness refers to relative risk aversion. The similarities and differences between the two indices are studied.     

Group identification

I study a model of group identification in which individuals' opinions as to the membership of a group are aggregated to form a list of group members. Potential aggregation rules are studied through the axiomatic approach. I introduce two axioms, meet separability and join separability, each of which requires the list of members generated by the aggregation rule to be independent of whether the question of membership in a group is separated into questions of membership in two other groups. I use these axioms to characterize a class of one-vote rules, in which one opinion determines whether an individual is considered to be a member of a group. I then show that the only anonymous one-vote rule is self-identification, in which each individual determines for himself whether he is a member of the group.     

A note on the Bourguignon–Fields class of poverty indices

Current poverty measurement methodology does not allow a definitive analysis of changes in distribution, through time or between countries, which involve changes in the number or proportion of poor people. By revisiting the continuity and transfer axioms, we show that within the Bourguignon and Fields (1997) class of poverty indices a range of value judgements can be accommodated as to what happens (or should happen) in the case that poverty-line crossings result from regressive transfers. In exposing this, we hope to provide empirical analysts with wider scope to use the Bourguignon–Fields poverty indices in an informed way.     

DOES ATHLETIC SUCCESS INFLUENCE PERSISTENCE AT HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS? NEW EVIDENCE USING PANEL DATA

This study examines the relationship between athletic success and student persistence toward a degree. We build an updated panel of National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I institutions and utilize within‐institution variation to identify the effects of athletic success. Using a ranking of all institutions, we find that having more successful men's basketball and football teams has a significant positive effect on first‐year retention rates. We also find some evidence that improved basketball rankings increase graduation rates, and that success in the NCAA tournament may have a sizable impact on retention. Although the estimated effects are generally modest in scale, we find rather limited evidence of other institutional factors affecting persistence, suggesting that athletics can be one avenue for institutions of higher education to engage and retain students. (JEL I23, Z20, L83)     

Social indicators and comparisons of living standards

Construction of an international index of standards of living, incorporating social indicators and economic output, typically involves scaling and weighting procedures that lack welfare-economic foundations. Revealed preference axioms can be used to make quality-of-life comparisons if we can estimate the representative household's production technology for the social indicators. This method is applied to comparisons of gross domestic product (GDP) and life expectancy for 58 countries. Neither GDP rankings, nor the rankings of the Human Development Index (HDI), are consistent with the partial ordering of revealed preference. A method of constructing a utility-consistent index incorporating both consumption and life expectancy is suggested.     

CONSISTENCY-IN-AGGREGATION AND STUVEL INDICES

In the National Accounts framework a frequent use is made of value, price, and quantity indices. Three requirements appear to be of vital importance. (i) For each aggregate the price index multiplied by the quantity index must be equal to the value index. (ii) The indices must be consistent-in-aggregation (which means something more than that a single-step calculation yields the same outcome as a two-or-more-step calculation). (iii) The indices must satisfy the equality test (defined in this paper). In this paper it is shown that the only indices satisfying these three requirements are the generalized Stuvel (1957) indices. These indices satisfy the Eichhorn and Voeller (1983) axioms for price and quantity indices. However, if one also requires that the indices be linearly homogeneous in current period prices and quantities then the only admissible indices are those of Laspeyres and Paasche.     

Managed Futures for Long‐Term Investors: A DEA Ranking Analysis

This study proposes an alternative Data Envelopment Analysis ranking model to evaluate the relative performance efficiency of commodity‐trading advisors. I measure the performance efficiency using the decision‐making process quality/trading skills framework and depart from the traditional risk–return framework. The Data Envelopment Analysis rankings produced some interesting results. First, similarly to the previous studies, I successfully isolated two ‘superstar’ commodity‐trading advisors with the highest Sharpe ratios as the Grade A commodity‐trading advisors. However, as an improvement over the similar studies that used the traditional risk–return framework, I also isolated two commodity‐trading advisors with average and below‐average Sharpe ratios as Grade A commodity‐trading advisors.     

STRATEGIC CANDIDACY AND SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS*

In elections, the voting outcomes are affected by strategic entries of candidates. We study a class of voting rules immune to strategic candidacy. Dutta et al. (2001 ) show that such rules satisfying unanimity are dictatorial if all orderings of candidates are admissible for voters’ preferences. When voters’ preferences are single‐peaked over a political spectrum, there exist non‐dictatorial rules immune to strategic candidacy. An example is the rule selecting the m‐th peak from the left among the peaks of voters’ preferences, where m is any natural number no more than the number of voters. We show that immunity from strategic candidacy with basic axioms fully characterizes the family of the m‐th leftmost peak rules.     

An ordinal ranking of economic institutions

We provide the first ranking of countries’ economic institutions using an ordinal methodology. Using the five areas of the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index, we find that final rankings of a country’s institutions are sensitive to the importance-ordering of Area 1 (Size of Government). When Areas 2–5 are in the most important position, we find that there is no significant difference between the EFW rankings and our rankings. When Area 1 is placed in the most important position, however, a number of European countries with large welfare states but good governance do poorly.     

The economic growth impact of natural disasters in developing countries: Evidence from hurricane strikes in the Central American and Caribbean regions

In this paper we investigate the macroeconomic impact of natural disasters in developing countries by examining hurricane strikes in the Central American and Caribbean regions. Our innovation in this regard is to employ a wind field model on hurricane track data to arrive at a more scientifically based index of potential local destruction. This index allows us to identify damages at a detailed geographical level, compare hurricanes' destructiveness, as well as identify the countries that are most affected, without having to rely on potentially questionable monetary loss estimates. Combining our destruction index with macroeconomic data we show that the average hurricane strike caused output to fall by at least 0.83 percentage points in the region, although this depends on controlling for local economic characteristics of the country affected and what time of the year the storm strikes.     

Petrol Price Cycles

This article provides an overview of the burgeoning academic literature on price dynamics and price cycles in retail petrol markets. I first present evidence of petrol price cycles and studies that describe what types of petrol markets tend to exhibit price cycles. I further discuss empirical investigations of firms’ pricing strategies in cycling markets. In light of the empirics, I outline theories of competition and consumer demand in petrol markets that help us understand various facets of petrol price cycles.     

No-envy in queueing problems

We explore the implications of no-envy(Foley 1967) in the context of queueing problems. We identify an easy way of checking whether a rule satisfies efficiencyand no-envy. The existence of such a rule can easily be established. Next, we ask whether there is a rule satisfying efficiency and no-envytogether with an additional solidarity requirement how agents should be affected as a consequence of changes in the waiting costs. However, there is no rule satisfying efficiency, noenvy, and either one of two cost monotonicity axioms. To remedy the situation, we propose modifications of no-envy, adjusted no-envyand backward/forward no-envy. Finally, we discuss whether three fairness requirements, no-envy, the identical preferences lower bound, and egalitarian equivalence, are compatible in this context.     

Development of a national competitiveness index based on a structural equation model

In this paper, we propose a national competitiveness index using raw Institute of Management Development (IMD) data and try to overcome a shortcoming in the IMD's own ranking system. The IMD world competitiveness ranking considers 20 factors to define an index, but it does not consider the structural relationships among various factors. We utilise a structural equation model to derive a national competitiveness index that reflects such structural relationships. We then reveal new rankings of world competitiveness. In addition, we conducted a comparison analysis by economy level and identified improvement points in terms of measurement variables as well as latent variables. Our work is expected to promote a new era of national competitiveness rankings and indices.