The effect of relative performance evaluation on earnings management: a game-theoretic approach

Because investors and creditors often compare the financial statements of similar or competing firms when deciding how to allocate their funds, it is likely that a firm's financial well-being depends on how well it performs relative to its rivals. In this paper, we consider the problem of earnings management as a non-cooperative game among several firms, in which each firm seeks a comparison advantage through its financial statement numbers. Our model indicates that firms may exaggerate their earnings in a world driven by multi-firm-comparisons simply because they expect other firms to do so. Thus, very little may be needed for earnings management to emerge in the Nash equilibrium. Our results hold under the following conditions. First, investors and creditors are not able to unravel the earnings management, thus ensuring that some information asymmetry remains. Second, investors and creditors make inter-firm comparisons when assessing firm value. Third, firms care about their own fundamental value as well as the market's perception about firm value. We also show that the equilibrium amount of earnings management depends on the characteristics of the earnings management technique itself and on the proportion of stockholders who are long-term investors in the firm.     

Firms' Off-Balance Sheet and Hybrid Debt Financing: Evidence from Their Book-Tax Reporting Differences

We match large U.S. corporations' tax returns during 1989–2001 to their financial statements to construct a firm‐level proxy of firms' use of off‐balance sheet and hybrid debt financing. We find that firms with less favorable prior‐period Standard & Poor's (S&P) bond ratings or higher leverage ratios in comparison to their industry report greater amounts of interest expense on their tax returns than to investors and creditors on their financial statements. These between‐firm results are consistent with credit‐constrained firms using more structured financing arrangements. Our within‐firm tests also suggest that firms use more structured financing arrangements when they enter into contractual loan agreements that provide incentives to manage debt ratings. Specifically, we find that after controlling for S&P bond rating and industry‐adjusted leverage, our sample firms report greater amounts of interest expenses for tax than for financial statement purposes when they enter into performance pricing contracts that use senior debt rating covenants to set interest rates. Furthermore, we find that the greatest book‐tax reporting changes occur when firms become closer to violating these debt rating covenants. These latter findings are consistent with firms' contractual debt covenants influencing their use of off‐balance sheet and hybrid debt financing.     

中国的金融市场开发与贷款证券化

随着金融市场竞争压力的加大,传统的融资方式已经不能满足投资者的需要。贷款证券化可以使资金拥有者通过这一渠道将资金转移到贷款者手中,能很好地解决当今社会许多融资难的问题。这种形式如果能够在我国的金融体系中得到完善,会极大地促进我国的经济建设,也能较好地解决投融资体系的现实问题。     

Taxes and the growth in mutual funds: Evidence from OBRA 93

In recent years, individuals have steadily moved from direct ownership of equities to holding securities through mutual funds. Prior research has attributed this phenomenon to tax incentives to hold mutual funds in tax-preferred retirement accounts. In contrast, employing household-level microdata and using OBRA 93 as a quasi-natural experimental setting, we find that on average, investors reduced their mutual fund holdings within tax-preferred accounts following a tax rate increase. However, we also observe that this effect is primarily driven by investors with relatively high trading activity within their tax-preferred accounts; investors exhibiting relatively low trading activity generally increased their mutual fund investments in these accounts after OBRA 93. Investors who increased their mutual fund holdings did not do so by rebalancing away from other asset classes. Collectively, our results suggest that taxes are not driving the growth in mutual funds. This finding has important public policy implications because of the growing popularity of using mutual funds as a retirement savings vehicle, the dwindling number of individuals covered by defined benefit plans, the dramatic increase in the importance of mutual funds as a financial intermediary, and the continued state of flux in U.S. tax policy.     

Strategic debt restructuring

We analyze a distressed firm indebted to many creditors. Thefirm's owners have the option of choosing the sequence of restructuringnegotiations with the creditors. We show that sequencing flexibilityis beneficial to firm owners, and that the optimal sequencingof restructuring negotiations involves exploiting the firm'sliabilities to some creditors so as to moderate the demandsof others. Moderately distressed firms will extract concessionsfrom all creditors. In this case, owners can gain if they cancredibly commit to conditional restructuring agreements thatlink the concessions of one creditor to concessions by others.     

REIT Institutional Ownership Dynamics and the Financial Crisis

Collectively, institutional investors hold large ownership stakes in REITs. The traditional view is that institutions are both long-term and passive investors. The financial crisis beginning in 2007 provides an opportunity to analyze the investment choices of institutional investors before, during, and after the crisis. Our results indicate that institutional ownership increased prior to the financial crisis, declined significantly during the period of market stress, but rebounded after. These results hold for four institutional investor subtypes: mutual funds/investment advisors, bank trusts, insurance companies, and other institutions, with mutual funds/investment advisors and bank trusts most clearly exhibiting this pattern. We also find evidence that institutions actively manage their REIT portfolios, displaying a “flight to quality” after the market downturn by reducing beta and individual risk exposure, and by increasing ownership in larger REITs.     

Stockholding: Participation, location, and spillovers

This paper provides the first joint analysis of household stockholding participation, location among stockholding modes, and participation spillovers. Our model matches observed participation, conditional and unconditional, and asset location patterns. We find that financial sophistication correlates strongly only with direct stockholding and mutual fund participation, while social interactions mainly influence stockholding through retirement accounts. Whether retirement account owners include stocks in their accounts strongly depends on owner characteristics, which is not the case with mutual fund owners and investment in stock funds. Stockholding is more common among retirement account owners, but mainly because of owner characteristics rather than of any participation spillovers from retirement account ownership.     

On the exposure of insurance companies to sovereign risk—Portfolio investments and market forces

A sovereign debt crisis can have significant knock-on effects in the financial markets and put financial stability at risk. This paper focuses on the transmission of sovereign risk to insurance companies as some of the largest institutional investors in the sovereign bond market. We use a firm level panel dataset that covers large insurance companies, banks and non-financial firms from nine countries over the time period from 1 January 2008–1 May 2013. We find significant and robust transmission effects from sovereign risk to domestic insurers. The impact on insurers is not significantly different from that on banks but larger than for non-financial firms. We find that systemically important insurers are more closely linked to the domestic sovereign. Based on European data, we show that risks in sovereign bond portfolios are an important driver of insurer risk, which is not reflected in current insurance regulation (incl. Solvency II in Europe).     

Payoff complementarities and financial fragility: Evidence from mutual fund outflows

The paper provides empirical evidence that strategic complementarities among investors generate fragility in financial markets. Analyzing mutual fund data, we find that, consistent with a theoretical model, funds with illiquid assets (where complementarities are stronger) exhibit stronger sensitivity of outflows to bad past performance than funds with liquid assets. We also find that this pattern disappears in funds where the shareholder base is composed mostly of large investors. We present further evidence that these results are not attributable to alternative explanations based on the informativeness of past performance or on clientele effects. We analyze the implications for funds’ performance and policies.     

Bankruptcy law and financial structure: The impact of managerial incentives

Abstract

Providing the manager of a firm with suitable incentives to act in the investors’ interest may be socially efficient, but not individually rational for the investors themselves. This paper specifies a second-best arrangement and shows how investors can be induced to implement it by means of an optimal bankruptcy code in the case where only standard financial contracts are available. It explains why bankruptcy law should, in some states of nature, let shareholders and senior creditors decide jointly, and provides a rationale for the existence of junior debt, which never enjoys any power of decision.     

Is corporate governance risk valued? Evidence from directors' and officers' insurance

We find that common equity firms pay lower D&O insurance premiums than income trusts, an alternative and riskier ownership form. This result has wide-ranging implications for investors insofar as the information provided by D&O insurers provides investors with an unbiased signal of the firm's governance risk. The signal is unbiased because it comes from an entity (i.e. the insurer) that has a direct financial incentive to correctly assess an organization's governance risk, in contrast to other ad hoc governance measures and indices.     

A note on managing deposit flows with cash and futures market decisions

As deposit market become less regulated, financial intermediaries must focus more of their attention on the explicit pricing of deposit accounts. An implication of pricing deposits is that the intermediary faces a random source of funds when future deposit supplies are unknown. This note shows that financial futures contracts can be used to hedge the risk of deposit withdrawals, allowing the financial firm to set lower deposit rates than it would without futures trading. A model of risk averse banking behavior is constructed to determine the relationship between hedging deposit withdrawals and setting deposit rates. Using the certificate of deposit futures contract to hedge demand and savings deposit withdrawals, an empirical application of the model reveals that the possible gains in profitability from setting deposit rates and hedging withdrawals are small but statistically significant.     

Is trading behavior stable across contexts? Evidence from style and multi-style investors

In this paper we study priming of identity within the context of inherent vs. contextual financial decision making. We use a sample of individual trading accounts in equity-style funds taken from one fund family to test the hypothesis that trading styles are inherent vs. contextual. Our sample contains investors who invest either in a growth fund, a value fund, or both. We document behavioral differences between growth fund investors and value fund investors. We find that their trades depend on past returns in different ways: growth fund investors tend towards momentum trading and value fund investors tend towards contrarian trading. These differences may be due to inherent clientele characteristics, including beliefs about market prices, specific personality traits and cognitive strategies that cause them to self-select into one or the other style. We use a sample of investors that trade in both types of funds to test this proposition. Consistent with the contextual hypothesis, we find that investors who hold both types of funds trade growth fund shares differently than value fund shares.     

Corporate governance,life cycle,and payout precommitment: An emerging market study

We analyze the role of firm‐level corporate governance in determining the precommitment payout policy of emerging market firms and investigate whether there is a precommitment life‐cycle effect. Unlike previous studies of U.S. firms, we find evidence of precommitment only among relatively well‐governed firms, which combine good governance with large dividend payouts to shareholders and large debt‐related repayments to creditors. We also document a strong precommitment life‐cycle effect. Firms in the growth and mature stages of their life cycle tend to use both debt and dividends to precommit to investors, with an increasing proportion of dividends in total payout measures. Our results are robust to an array of control variables, alternate payout proxies, market setting, and firm‐level corporate governance, and it addresses potential endogeneity concerns in the sample.     

Dynamic Contracting with Intermediation: Operational,Governance, and Financial Engineering

Private equity funds intermediate investment and affect portfolio firm performance by actively engaging in operational, governance, and financial engineering. We study this type of intermediation in a dynamic agency model in which an active intermediary raises funds from outside investors and invests in a firm run by an agent. Optimal contracting addresses moral hazard at the intermediary and firm levels. The intermediary's incentives to affect firm performance are strongest after poor performance, while the agent's incentives are strongest after good performance. We also show how financial engineering, that is, financial contracting with outside investors, interacts with operational and governance engineering.     

Debt contract strictness and auditor specialization

The conflicts of interest among managers, shareholders and creditors resulting in agency costs, can be mitigated by restricting managers’ adverse behavior, through financial covenants to better align the various stakeholder interests. Thus, debt contract strictness represents an important aspect of agency costs between creditors, shareholders, and management that is not always captured by interest rates. The contract setting provides a unique opportunity to investigate how creditors may rely on auditors to alleviate information uncertainty stemming from reliance on management's financial reporting and thus alleviate the creditor's potential loss of invested capital. After controlling for borrower risks, loan characteristics, and audit factors, we show that auditor industry specialization is significantly associated with a reduction in the strictness of debt contracts, consistent with creditors viewing certain industry expert auditors as effective monitors against financial reporting manipulation aimed at the avoidance of debt covenant triggers that protect creditors against potential loss. Further, we find that the association between loan strictness and auditor specialization is attenuated by stronger corporate governance systems, external monitors, and prior lender relationships.     

机构投资者能抑制上市公司商誉减值风险吗？——基于中国A股市场的经验证据

巨额商誉减值风险是资本市场系统性风险的重要诱因之一。本文以2011—2018年中国A股上市公司为样本,检验机构投资者持股对上市公司商誉减值风险的影响。研究发现,机构投资者持股能够显著抑制上市公司计提商誉减值的风险。分类来看,相比非独立机构投资者,以证券投资基金、社保基金及QFII为代表的独立性机构投资者持股对商誉减值风险的抑制作用更显著。机制检验发现,机构投资者通过提供并购前咨询服务和改善公司并购后绩效来抑制商誉减值风险。本文研究揭示了机构投资者发挥了有效的监督治理功能,对防范商誉减值风险具有一定的启示意义。     

How do financial analysts implement the Sum-of-the-Parts (SOTP) valuation framework?

In this study, we investigate how financial analysts implement the Sum-of-the-Parts (SOTP) valuation framework. Although SOTP constitutes a popular valuation approach among sophisticated practitioners and investors, it is mostly ignored by researchers and academics. We adopt a structured content analysis of 265 equity research reports written by 33 investment brokerage houses for 140 UK-based firms. We find that analysts typically use EBITDA multiples to implement SOTP. Furthermore, financial analysts are more likely to consider SOTP the dominant or preferred valuation model in their report. We show that managers disclose a greater quantity of segmental information if their firms are considered difficult to analyze and value by investors and creditors, thereby decreasing the information asymmetry with their capital providers. In specific circumstances, we document that financial analysts identify more segments in their SOTP analysis compared to the reportable segments in the firms' annual reports based on IFRS 8. We argue that the financial analysts' choice to employ a greater number of segments in their SOTP models might be primarily driven by their effort to support their reports' optimistic target prices. Finally, although SOTP seems theoretically ideal to estimate the value of a multi-segment firm, we do not find empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that SOTP significantly outperforms a full-blown Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) model, when the latter is used separately to value the company as a whole.     

Financial Gatekeepers and Investor Protection: Evidence from Criminal Background Checks

We examine whether financial advisors with pre‐advisor criminal records pose a greater risk to investors than those without. We find that financial advisors with pre‐advisor criminal records are more likely to receive future customer complaints. Their complaints are more likely to receive arbitration awards or settlements and are more likely to involve large settlements exceeding $100,000. Finally, clients are more likely to suffer service disruptions from engaging advisors with pre‐advisor criminal records, even incremental to the brokerage firm being high‐risk. Although we do not have performance data of individual advisors, mutual funds of those firms that employ advisors with criminal records do not provide their clients with superior returns nor charge lower fees, suggesting that there are not compensating benefits to offset the investor harm. Overall, pre‐advisor criminal record serves as an important ex ante characteristic available to regulators, investors, and employers for risk‐assessment purposes.     

Meeting new peers: The effects of Morningstar category reassignment on fund flows and star ratings

We investigate how the reassignment of a fund's Morningstar category affects fund flow and Morningstar star rating. We find that funds assigned to a different category gain positive abnormal flows and this effect is significant mainly for high-rated funds. Category reassignment does not improve a fund's star rating on average, and flows are less responsive to a star-rating change if the rating change is likely to be driven by category reassignment. The positive abnormal flows captured by high-rated funds after category reassignment are consistent with a visibility story: some investors filter funds by Morningstar category and star rating, and category reassignment makes a fund more visible to a new group of investors if the fund is highly rated. In contrast, a low-rated fund is likely to be selected only by investors who do not refer to the fund's Morningstar information and, hence, gains little visibility from category reassignment. We also find evidence that more sophisticated investors are more likely to consider not only fund rating but also fund category when evaluating fund performance.