Controlling Illegal Immigration: On the Scope for Cooperation with a Transit Country

We consider the implications of cooperation with respect to immigration control between a final‐destination country (D) and its poorer neighbor (T). Assuming that the latter serves as a transit country for undocumented immigrants, a key question is how much aid should D provide to T for the purpose of strengthening its immigration controls. The problem for T is to determine what proportion of aid to use strictly for immigration control rather than trying to meet other border‐security objectives. We examine the Nash equilibrium values of the policy instruments of both countries and compare them with those which are optimal when international cooperation on immigration control extends to maximization of joint welfare. We also consider a two‐stage game in which D first decides on how much aid to transfer to T, with the latter subsequently choosing how to use it.     

A Crook is a Crook … But is He Still a Crook Abroad? On the Effect of Immigration on Destination‐Country Corruption

This paper analyzes the impact of migration on destination‐country corruption levels. Capitalizing on a comprehensive dataset consisting of annual immigration stocks of OECD countries from 207 countries of origin for the period 1984–2008, we explore different channels through which corruption might migrate. We employ different estimation methods using fixed effects and Tobit regressions in order to validate our findings. Moreover, we also address the issue of endogeneity by using the Difference‐Generalized Method of Moments estimator. Independent of the econometric methodology, we consistently find that while general migration has an insignificant effect on the destination country's corruption level, immigration from corruption‐ridden origin countries boosts corruption in the destination country. Our findings provide a more profound understanding of the socioeconomic implications associated with migration flows.     

Government ideology and international migration*

We provide the first empirical evidence that government ideology affects the choice of migration destinations. As ruling political parties differ in their discourse, policies, and positions on migration, the ideology differential between the host and home country governments can shape the relative generosity of the welfare system, the degree of tolerance towards out-groups, and the restrictiveness of migration policies, all acting as important drivers of international migration. Using data on bilateral migration and government ideology for OECD countries between 1990 and 2016, we show that migration flows increase when the government at the destination becomes more left-wing relative to the government at the origin, particularly when both countries are members of the European Economic Area.     

Income maximization and the selection and sorting of international migrants

Two prominent features of international labor movements are that the more educated are more likely to emigrate (positive selection) and more educated migrants are more likely to settle in destination countries with high rewards to skill (positive sorting). Using data on emigrant stocks by schooling level and source country in OECD destinations, we find that a simple model of income maximization can account for both phenomena. Results on selection show that migrants for a source-destination pair are more educated relative to non-migrants the larger is the absolute skill-related difference in earnings between the destination country and the source. Results on sorting indicate that the relative stock of more educated migrants in a destination is increasing in the absolute earnings difference between high and low-skilled workers. We use our framework to compare alternative specifications of international migration, estimate the magnitude of migration costs by source-destination pair, and assess the contribution of wage differences to how migrants sort themselves across destination countries.     

Foreign Direct Investment and External Financing Conditions: Evidence from Normal and Crisis Times

In this paper, we investigate the effects that external financing conditions in source and destination countries have on foreign direct investment (FDI) in normal and crisis times, using a difference‐in‐differences approach. We find that the financial development of the source and destination countries has a strong positive impact on the relative volume of FDI in financially vulnerable sectors in normal times. However, during the 2008–2010 global financial crisis, the relative volume of FDI in financially vulnerable sectors fell relatively more in financially developed source and destination countries, most notably if these countries experienced a credit crisis.     

Interregional Migration of Human Capital and Unemployment Dynamics: Evidence from Italian Provinces

Since the mid‐1990s interregional migration flows in Italy have dramatically increased, especially from the South to the North. These flows are characterized by a strong component of human capital, involving a large number of workers with secondary and tertiary education. Using longitudinal data for the period 2002–2011 at NUTS‐3 territorial level, we document that long‐distance (i.e., South‐North) net migration of high‐skill workers has increased the unemployment at origin and decreased it at destination, thus deepening North–South unemployment disparities. On the other hand, long‐distance net migration of low‐skill workers has had the opposite effect, by lowering the unemployment at origin and raising it at destination. Further evidence also suggests that the diverging effect of high‐skill migration dominates the converging effect of low‐skill migration. Thus, concerns for an ‘internal brain drain’ from Southern regions look not groundless.     

Pane e Cioccolata: The Impact of Native Attitudes on Return Migration

This paper addresses the link between native attitudes and return migration. We exploit the variation in xenophobia using information on media consumption by migrants in Italy. A widely documented crime provides a quasi‐experimental setting to identify the impact of Italian attitudes on migrants’ settlement intentions. Our results suggest a significant effect of anti‐immigrant attitudes on the intended duration of stay in the host country. The impact is more pronounced for low‐skilled migrants, which has consequences for how migration affects the long‐run convergence between sending and destination countries.     

National Borders, Trade and Migration

The paper confirms a strikingly large effect of national borders on trade patterns. Estimates comparing trade among Canadian provinces with that between Canadian provinces and US states show interprovincial trade in 1988–90 to have been more than 20 times as dense as that between provinces and states, with some evidence of a downward trend since, owing to the post-FTA growth in trade between Canada and the USA. Using approximate data for the volumes and distances of internal trade in OECD countries, the 1988–92 border effect for unrelated OECD countries is estimated to exceed 12. Estimates from a census-based gravity model of interprovincial and international migration show a much higher border effect for migration than for trade, with interprovincial migration among the Anglophone provinces almost 100 times as dense as that from US states to Canadian provinces.     

On the determinants of optimal border enforcement

We extend the current immigration-enforcement literature by incorporating both the practice of people smuggling and a role for non-wage income into a two-country, dynamic general equilibrium model. We use the model economy to examine three questions. First, how does technological progress in the smuggling industry affect the level of migration and capital accumulation for a given level of enforcement? Second, do changes in border enforcement affect the level of migration, capital accumulation, and smuggling activity? Third, is the optimal level of enforcement sensitive to technological progress in the smuggling industry? We show that the government chooses to devote resources to border enforcement only if the deterrent effect on smugglers is large enough. Otherwise, it is not worth taxing host-country natives as the taxes paid will more than offset any income gain resulting from fewer migrants.     

A Model of Smuggling and Trafficking of Illegal Immigrants with a Host Country Policy

This paper deals with illegal immigration via two distinct activities—smuggling and trafficking of workers. A destination–source model determines economic pay‐offs and a standard labor market policy works as a deterrent. Tax paid by legal unskilled workers at the destination is determined endogenously and it finances inland monitoring against illegal immigration, holding the border patrol at a given level. The tax also finances unemployment benefit to legal workers at the destination. The number of immigrant smugglers and traffickers is also determined endogenously along with employer penalty and market wage for illegal immigrants. Higher unemployment benefits may reduce illegal wages, raise traffickers’ rent and reduce flow of illegal immigrants from the source countries.     

Do potential migrants internalize migrant rights in OECD host societies?

This paper analyzes how countries’ provision of migrant rights affects potential migrants’ destination choice. Combining data on bilateral migration desires from over 140 origin countries and data on migrant rights in 38 mainly OECD destination countries over the period 2007–2014, we find that potential migrants tend to favour destinations that are more open to the inclusion of immigrants into their society. In particular, better access to and conditions on the labour market as well as access to nationality and to permanent residency significantly increase the perceived attractiveness of a destination country. These results are robust across different specifications and hold for subsamples of origin countries as well as of destinations. Moreover, some results vary across types of respondents. Educational opportunities for migrants, for instance, affect the migration desires of individuals aged 15 to 24, but less so of individuals in other age groups.     

Local Labor Supply Responses to Immigration

How natives adjust is central to an understanding of the impact of immigration in destination countries. Using detailed labor force data for Malaysia for 1990–2010, we provide estimates of native responses to immigration on multiple extensive margins and rare evidence for a developing country. Instrumental variable estimates show that increased immigration to a state causes substantial internal inward migration, consistent with the fact that immigration increases the demand for native workers. Relocating Malaysian workers are accompanied by their spouses (three‐quarters of whom are housewives) and children who attend school. We find that these effects are concentrated among middle‐ and lower‐skilled Malaysians.     

Controlling Illegal Immigration: Border Control vs. Domestic Enforcement

This paper presents a two-country general equilibrium model where international mobility of labor is prohibited. Illegal immigration nevertheless occurs. The probability of success at illegal immigration depends on resources allocated to border control and domestic enforcements. We examine the effects of switching resources form border control to domestic enforcement on illegal immigration and on welfare levels. We characterize the allocation of resources between the two methods of immigration control, that minimizes illegal immigration, and find that, starting from this allocation, moving resources from border control to domestic enforcement is unambiguously welfare improving for the destination country.

     

Demographic and Economic Pressure on Emigration out of Africa*

Two of the main forces driving European emigration in the late nineteenth century were real wage gaps between sending and receiving regions and demographic booms in the low‐wage sending regions. Our new estimates of net migration for the countries of sub‐Saharan Africa show that exactly the same forces driving African across‐border migration are at work today. The results suggest that rapid growth in the cohort of potential young emigrants, population pressure on the resource base, and slow economic growth are likely to intensify the pressure for migration out of Africa and into high‐wage OECD countries over the next two decades.     

Effects of enforcement on illegal markets: Evidence from migrant smuggling along the southwestern border

The paper analyzes the effects of tighter border control on the illegal crossing market between Mexico and the United States. Combining panel data on illegal migrants with enforcement statistics, the effects of enforcement are found to be moderate: prices of border smugglers (‘coyotes’) increased by only 17%, while the demand for smugglers has remained unchanged. Enforcement has however shifted illegal migrants to remote crossing places. Border crossing is now more time-intensive with higher prices for coyotes and risk of death. This geographic substitution raised migration costs by $140, more than twice the effect of enforcement on smuggling prices.     

The Border Effect and the Nonlinear Relationship between Trade and Distance

The border‐effect literature confirms that sub‐national units tend to trade more with the rest of their country than with foreign markets. However, it is likely that ongoing processes of trade integration will generate a trade‐off between internal and external integration for sub‐national units within countries. In this paper we estimate the internal and external border effect, using a novel dataset that captures intra‐ and international shipments between Spanish regions and regions in eight European countries with alternative treatments of the nonlinear relationship between distance and trade.     

Heaven's Swing Door: Endogenous Skills,Migration Networks,and the Effectiveness of Quality‐Selective Immigration Policies

A growing number of OECD countries are leaning toward the adoption of selective immigration policies, which are expected to raise the quality (or education level) of migrants. This view neglects two important dynamic effects: the role of migration networks, which could reduce the quality of migrants, and the responsiveness of education decisions to the prospect of migration. We propose a model of self‐selection into migration with endogenous education choices, which predicts that migration networks and the quality of migrants can be positively associated when destination countries adopt sufficiently selective immigration policies. Empirical evidence, presented as background motivation, suggests that this is indeed the case.     

Government policy under price uncertainty: A source of volatility in illegal immigration

This paper provides an alternative explanation for why illegal immigration can exhibit substantial volatility. We develop a model economy where migrants make decisions in the face of uncertain border enforcement and transfers from the host country. The uncertainty is extrinsic, a sunspot, and arises due to ambiguity regarding government policy; the sunspot manifests itself as uncertainty in the commodity price of money. Immigration volatility stems from both the trade‐off between the marginal benefits and costs (transfers and enforcement) to migrating and the existence of a sunspot. Finally, we examine the impact of changes in government policies on migration levels.     

Bilateral real exchange rates and migration

Migrants who move across borders are, to a large extent, motivated by the prospect of earning higher incomes at destination, which can be partly transferred back to their countries of origin via remittances. This suggests that the real exchange rate can influence the incentives to migrate, as it determines the purchasing power of expected income in terms of the currency of the origin country. This article investigates empirically how bilateral real exchange rate fluctuations influence international migration flows. To do so, we build a dataset of 30 OECD destination countries and 165 origin countries over the period 1980–2011 and estimate an equation derived from a micro-founded random utility maximization model that allows for unobserved heterogeneity between migrants and non-migrants. Our results show that migration flows are highly responsive to bilateral real exchange rates: A 10% real appreciation of the currency of the destination country is associated with an 18.2–19.4% increase in migration flows.     

Remittances and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid

We argue that donors could improve the effectiveness of foreign aid by pursuing complementary and coherent non‐aid policies. In particular, we hypothesize that aid has stronger growth effects if recipients receive more aid from donors who allow for (temporary) worker mobility and (more permanent) migration. We focus on overall remittances paid by the donor countries to proxy for worker mobility and migration. Our empirical results support the hypothesis that higher remittances paid by donor countries strengthen the growth effects of foreign aid.