Collusive intra-industry trade in identical commodities

Collusive Intra-Industry Trade in Identical Commodities. — A homogenous-goods Cournot model with two countries and two firms is analyzed. Firms may collude by monopolizing their domestic markets, but they may also engage in collusive intra-industry trade. It turns out that, though such trade is costly because of transportation costs, firms might indeed trade since this enlarges the scope of successful collusion. Hence, intra-industry trade in homogenous goods is not a reliable indicator of competition.     

The Determinants of Corruption: Cross‐Country‐Panel‐Data Analysis

This study explores the determinants of corruption, utilizing the Hausman and Taylor's technique to estimate a random effects model that incorporates both the effects of corruption determinants that vary over time and those that are time‐invariant, and using a larger panel dataset and a comprehensive set of corruption determinants. The first interesting result is that perception of strong support for rule of law is strongly correlated with reduced corruption, suggesting that a better quality of law enforcement reduces corruption. Rich countries have lower corruption, and the perception of free expression and accountability strongly decreases corruption, indicating that providing greater opportunities for citizens to participate in selecting their government, more freedom of expression, and free media are effective ways of curbing corruption. Conversely, natural resource abundance, country population size, country's dominant religious tradition, ethnic fractionalization, and political stability are unimportant determinants of corruption, while previous research has suggested they are important.     

Globalisation,poverty and corruption: Retarding progress in South Africa

ABSTRACT

Poverty and corruption can both immiserate a nation. Globalisation through open trade can potentially increase economic growth, providing employment and increased incomes to the poor. Corruption can dampen or even reduce these positive developments. Although globalisation is considered instrumental in development strategies, theoretically, the impact of globalisation on poverty reduction is ambiguous, an ambiguity that is also reflected in the empirical literature. The corruption-poverty literature clearly reveals that empirical findings on such association are at best heterogeneous. This article examines the effects of globalisation and corruption on poverty using time series data for South Africa for the period 1991–2016. Three indicators of poverty and recently developed measures of globalisation and corruption were employed in the logistic regression model used for estimation. The results confirm that globalisation reduces poverty while corruption intensifies it. The globalisation findings are robust across the different measures of poverty while unidirectional results show corruption increases poverty.     

非正规金融、制度变迁与经济增长:一个文献综述

本综述在剖析非正规金融交易微观运作机理的基础上,揭示了非正规金融对中小企业融资、经济增长的重要性以及对金融制度变迁的导向意义;在进行正规金融机制设计、改善中小企业融资与金融体制改革时,要利用非正规金融的优势和正面效应。     

New Products and Corruption: Evidence from Indian Firms

It has been shown that corruption has a negative effect on firm growth, but what about its impact on product innovation? I find that corruption, functioning as a bribe tax, diminishes the probability of new products being introduced. I use a World Bank Enterprise Survey conducted in India in 2005, with 1,600 firms answering both whether they introduced a new product to the firm, and whether and how much was paid in bribes. Controlling for innovation determinants and firm characteristics, sector‐state bribery averages have a negative and significant impact on product innovation.     

DID GOOD INSTITUTIONS PRODUCE GOOD TARIFFS? EVIDENCE FROM TARIFF PROTECTION IN COLONIAL VICTORIA

Were tariff rates in the Australian colony of Victoria directed towards growth‐enhancing industries or rent seekers? Recent research suggests tariffs may be welfare enhancing if they are directed at industries with positive externalities; something more likely when institutions are strong. Using disaggregated tariff data for the years 1872, 1880, and 1890, we analyse the relationship between industry characteristics and tariffs, finding little evidence that Victorian industries with positive externalities received tariff protection. Our results throw doubt on good institutions necessarily producing good tariff outcomes and suggest the relationship between tariffs and growth is more complex than current studies assume.     

AID US TO WIN THE ELECTIONS: FOREIGN AID AND VOTER TURNOUT

We use an innovative procedure to determine the effect of foreign aid on institutions of governance. We use voter turnout as an indicator variable which allows us to identify whether political competition in a country is based on private goods, such as vote‐buying, or on public goods. We suggest that the marginal effect of foreign aid on voter turnout depends on the wider underlying institutional setting. Contrary to popular belief, the theoretical model implies that a higher voter turnout in response to foreign aid can be undesirable when the increase is a consequence of vote‐buying in the electoral campaign. The empirical evidence we examine is consistent with private‐goods political competition, i.e., political parties use foreign aid for vote‐buying and similar electoral tactics, particularly when the underlying institutions are sufficiently bad. This is consistently estimated across specifications which address a range of endogeneity sources.     

PRICE ELASTICITIES AND PRICING POWER IN EMERGING MARKETS: THE CASE OF PETROCHEMICAL‐DERIVED PLASTICS IN SOUTH AFRICA1

This paper examines whether there necessarily exists a conflict between allocative and productive efficiency in small open economy markets. That productive efficiency favours market concentration is not in dispute, and the sole question we face is whether allocative efficiency suffers under high market concentration. We proceed theoretically and econometrically. We find that the conflict between productive and allocative efficiency is not necessarily as stringent as the international competition policy literature suggests should be the case. In particular, we note that the strategic interaction between the large domestic producer and its competitors makes feasible a range of alternative price elasticities of demand, and empirically that all price elasticities of demand are less than or equal to unity. Nevertheless, the impact of market structure is such as to render feasible a wide range of possible levels of pricing power.     

The Political Economy of Middle‐Income Traps: Is South Africa in a Long‐Run Growth Trap? The Path to “Bounded Populism”

The current literature on middle‐income traps has been dominated by economists who have relied on economic explanations mainly around stages of development and the structural transformation of economies. But there is an equally vigorous literature from political science which speaks to the political economy of transitions. We look at the dynamics of how economic modernisation triggers structural changes with winners and losers and how this is reflected in the polarisation of the political sphere amongst middle‐income countries. This paper asks the question of whether South Africa is an archetypical example of a country stuck in a trap and how this has affected the policy choices that it has made. South Africa needs to move up the value chain with a viable value proposition, and this requires a very different policy set and human capital plan.