发展中国家内、外资银行信贷行为差异分析

众多发展中国家的金融改革实践表明,银行业开放的正负效应并不具有显著的国别一般性,特别是在信贷稳定性上,在东道国和外资银行母国经济运行的不同时期,外资银行与东道国国内银行的信贷行为可能存在较大的差异性,进而对东道国的经济金融稳定带来不同的影响。本文从全球范围内抽取了21个发展中国家（地区）和转轨国家中的400余家内、外资银行为样本,以其在2002～2010年间的相关数据构成面板数据集,来对内、外资银行在此期间的信贷行为差异进行检验。研究发现,外资银行的信贷行为确实与国内银行存在着差异性,主要表现在外资银行的信贷增长既表现出与东道国的经济增长显著正相关,又明显受到母国经济状况的影响;在经济正常的年份里,外资银行的信贷表现更多的取决于东道国的经济状况,而当外资银行母国发生经济危机时,却会对外资银行的信贷增长造成较大的负向冲击。     

外资银行对国内银行业"组合绩效"的影响机制

文章梳理了外资银行的进入对东道国银行业绩效的影响机制,并以我国银行业中全国性商业银行、地方城市商业银行、信用社以及中外合资银行为样本,就外资银行进入对样本银行的经营费用、盈利能力和银行效率等"组合绩效"指标的影响进行实证分析。在对1998-2005年79家国内银行的面板数据进行了分类估计后发现:(1)外资银行进入的增加导致国内银行管理费用增加;(2)外资银行进入的增加促使国内银行的盈利能力提高;(3)伴随着外资银行的进入,银行竞争不断加剧银行效率也呈现出降低的趋势。     

外资银行进入对我国信贷资本配置效率的影响——基于面板门限模型的实证分析

本文在考察中国各行业和地区信贷资本配置效率的基础上,分别选取外资银行机构数量份额和资产份额作为门限变量,构建面板门限模型,检验外资银行进入对中国信贷资本配置效率的影响.研究结果表明:中国信贷资本配置效率总体较低,波动幅度比较明显,各行业之间的信贷 自发投资水平存在显著差异,区域之间差异较大.选取外资银行机构数量份额为门限变量时,存在正向单门限效应,机构数量增加有利于信贷资本配置效率提升;选取外资银行资产份额作为门限变量时,存在双重门限效应,且资产份额与信贷资本配置效率先负相关,再正相关.外资银行进入带来的竞争效应、溢出效应会促使信贷资金流向效益更高的行业或地区,从而进一步提升信贷资本配置效率.     

外资银行进入的动机、形式及其影响述评

外资银行进入可能会基于不同的动机.母国与东道国之间经济关系的密切程度、东道国中存在的市场机会、准入制度限制是影响外资银行进入模式选择和时间安排的三个重要因素.进入东道国后,大多数外资银行都会采取分行或子公司的组织形式来经营.在东道国经济政策和金融监管等条件到位的情况下,外资银行进入对东道国经济金融发展的正面影响,总体上要超过其负面作用.     

外资银行进入对东道国银行业竞争度的影响——基于跨国面板数据的实证研究

银行业对外开放是金融业对外开放的重要组成部分,外资银行进入不仅可以拓宽企业融资渠道,也可以引入外部竞争,通过鲶鱼效应促进本国银行业提升经营效率。以62个国家和地区的跨国数据为样本,采用动态面板数据模型量化分析外资银行进入对银行业市场竞争度的影响,并通过分组回归的方法检验影响程度的异质性。实证研究表明,从总体上看,外资银行进入程度越高,银行业竞争度反而越低;分组回归表明,外资银行进入对银行业市场竞争度的影响,会因国家的经济发展水平差异而不同。对于中、低收入国家而言,外资银行的数量与资产占比提升会显著降低银行业市场竞争度;而对于高收入国家,则会显著提升银行业市场竞争度。因此,外资银行进入程度应与东道国银行业发展水平相匹配,既要通过引入外部竞争提升东道国银行业竞争度,同时也要维护东道国金融自主权。     

跨国公司在我国研发投资的区位决定因素研究

基于我国数据运用逐步回归法进行分析,探寻影响跨国公司在我国加大研发投资力度的决定因素:经济发展水平、市场规模潜力、人力资源可得性、劳动力成本优势与知识产权保护力度等均为影响研发投资的决定因素。我国作为投资东道国应从以上方面优化投资环境,努力提高吸引研发投资的力度和效率,并为其它发展中国家东道国提供借鉴。     

外资银行进入的理论效应与国际经验

近些年来,随着外资银行对转轨国家、新兴市场国家进入范围的扩展和控制程度的不断提高,越来越多的理论研究开始关注外资银行进入对东道国金融发展所产生的效应和影响。因为发达国家与发展中国家在经济发展水平、金融制度效率、市场发展机会和金融开放程度等方面存在较大差异,所以,外资银行进入所产生的效应也是不同的。     

外资银行股权进入和银行绩效的联动效应——基于面板数据的分析

文章从微观角度研究外资股权进入对东道国银行绩效的影响,发现外资银行进入对东道国银行绩效的影响与母国和东道国所处的发展阶段密切相关,存在典型的不对称效应,并不是所有的外资股权进入都对国内银行有利.实际上,只有来自于高收入国家的外资股权进入才是有利的.从经济效率的角度来看,我们的研究没有为发展中国家的银行以持股方式进入发达国家提供支持,相反,支持发达国家的银行以持股方式进入发展中国家.这与目前外资银行股权进入的实际情况是比较一致的.     

外资银行进入能促进中国银行业效率的提高吗?

按照加入世界贸易组织的协议,中国于2006年12月11日全面开放了银行业,外资银行大规模进入中国金融市场将是必然的趋势.但外资银行进入能改善国内银行业效率低下的现状吗?通过DEA模型我们测算了中国14家主要商业银行1996-2004年的全要素生产率指数Malmquist,并将其分解为技术效率提高和技术进步两类指数;同时在模型中我们还特别设置了一个表征外资银行进入的环境变量.我们的研究发现,1996-2001年,14家商业银行的技术效率提高指数、技术进步指数以及全要素生产率指数平均都略低于1,说明大多数银行在技术效率提高、技术进步以及全要素生产率方面并没有明显进步,因此外资银行进入对中国银行业效率的促进作用并不明显.不过,2001-2004年,上述三个指数均略大于1,说明外资银行加速进入后,其促进中国银行业效率提高的积极作用正逐步发挥出来.     

论信贷配给作用于宏观经济波动的机理

当宏观经济进入衰退阶段,由于商业银行的资本充足率下降、信贷环境恶化,商业银行为实现自身利益最大化目标,其最优选择行为是发生较为严重的信贷配给行为,这将导致融资企业的信贷可得性下降。由于融资企业信贷可得性的直接影响和间接影响,将会引起融资企业及其相关企业的投资下降,在投资乘数效应的作用下,其结果是宏观经济衰退更加严重,宏观经济陷入经济衰退与信贷配给相互作用的恶性循环中,宏观经济衰退的程度会进一步加大。当宏观经济进入繁荣阶段,具有与上述相类似的过程。可见,信贷配给是宏观经济波动的加速器。我国商业银行的信贷配给虽呈现关系型信贷配给的特征,但也具有上述功能。     

Privatization and optimal share release in the Chinese banking industry

This paper establishes a mixed oligopoly model to explore how the government determines the percentage of shares of the state-owned banks to be released to foreign investors under the goal of seeking to maximize social welfare. The theoretical model finds that the release of shares of state-owned banks to foreign investors will reduce the outputs of the state-owned banks. The direction of the change in the profitability of the state-owned banks depends on the percentage of the shares released. The direction of the changes in the levels of social welfare also varies. If the gap in production efficiency between the state-owned banks and private banks is not large enough, we can be certain that a partial release of shares is the government's best policy.     

Information production, banking industry structure and credit allocation

We analyse credit allocation when limited-liable banks can engage in costly information production about borrowers. When perfectly diversified credit portfolios cannot be constructed, we show that credit allocation depends on bank capital and the number of banks that can operate in the same market. A concentrated banking industry, one where bank capital is held by few banks, is shown to lead to credit allocation closer to the social optimum. Moreover, in the absence of banking industry consolidation, we find that the removal of intra-state entry barriers reduces welfare and not all independent banking organizations that were viable in formerly protected markets remain so when markets are integrated.     

战略引资和网点规模对银行信贷竞争的影响

以网点规模表征银行规模,从网点吸收存款以支撑贷款业务的角度构建有信贷资金约束的贷款竞争模型,研究外资银行入股对引资银行以及本地信贷竞争的影响。结果表明:只要外资银行改善引资银行的技术水平,贷款市场竞争就会加剧;大银行的市场份额较多,贷款市场竞争加剧对其利润的负面影响较大,大银行为避免这种影响不会过度参与竞争。最后指出,决策层应制定政策以引导优质外资银行入股本地小银行以促进贷款竞争。     

Privatization,foreign bank entry and bank efficiency in Croatia: a Fourier-flexible function stochastic cost frontier analysis

Using bank balance sheet data for Croatia for 1994 to 2000, this study estimates a Fourier-flexible frontier cost function. Specification tests indicate that the stochastic frontier model with a Fourier-flexible form with a truncated normal distribution of the inefficiency term allowing for time varying cost efficiency is preferred. The results show that new private and privatized banks, contrary to some expectations, are not the most efficient banks through most of the period. Privatization also does not seem to have an immediate effect on improved efficiency. However, better cost efficiency is associated with a lower likelihood of failure, suggesting that better risk management and better cost management are signs of better management in general. Finally, foreign banks have substantially better efficiency scores than all categories of domestic banks.     

环境技术转移的最优社会福利选择——以发展中国家为视角

本文以发展中国家为视角,构建一个基本的双寡头Cournot模型,来分析环境技术从发达国家转移至发展中国家,对发展中国家商品生产和社会福利产生的影响.本文认为环境技术从发达国家无偿转移至发展中国家,对发展中国家社会福利的影响具有不确定性.通过引入福利函数并求解最优的社会福利,发现对发展中国家而言,最优的社会福利选择是:当国内企业生产成本等于国外企业生产成本与环境技术的产量溢出之差时,环境技术的完全转移才是发展中国家的最优社会福利选择.并据此推导出社会福利最优的环境技术转移路径.     

Bank efficiency in South‐Eastern Europe

This study examines the cost and profit efficiency of banking sectors in six transition countries of South‐Eastern Europe over the period 1998–2008. Using a stochastic frontier approach, our analysis reveals that the average cost efficiency of South‐Eastern European banks is 68.59 percent, and the average profit efficiency is 53.87 percent. Regressions on the determinants of bank efficiency show that foreign banks are characterized by higher profit efficiency but lower cost efficiency, and government‐owned banks are associated with lower profit efficiency than domestic private banks. However, the efficiency gap between foreign‐, domestic private‐ and government‐owned banks narrows over time. We also find that the market power of a bank has a positive association with both cost and profit efficiency. Institutional development, proxied by progress in banking regulatory reforms, privatization and enterprise corporate governance restructuring, also has a positive impact on bank efficiency.     

Bank reforms and efficiency in Vietnamese banks: evidence based on SFA and DEA

This study examines the cost efficiency of Vietnamese banks from 2000 to 2014 in the first stage, and the selection and dynamic effects of two governance reforms, foreign partial acquisition and listing on the stock exchange, on the efficiency in the second stage. Empirical results from the two-stage Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) are highly consistent with those from the two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) . Specifically, the first-stage efficiency estimation indicates that the cost efficiency shows a slightly upward trend over the period 2000–2014, with the cost efficiency score being 0.93 and state-owned banks outperforming joint-stock banks (JSBs). The mixed process seemingly unrelated regression estimator which controls the potential endogeneity of public listing and foreign acquisition in the second stage shows that selection effects occur in the Vietnamese banking system: banks selected by the strategic foreign investors for partial acquisition and banks selected for public listing are more cost-efficient than those not selected. The short-term and long-term dynamic effects of foreign partial acquisition are documented: the cost efficiency of the Vietnamese banks post-partial acquisition is lower than prior-partial acquisition, and it experiences a decreasing trend since partial acquisition. However, the short-term and long-term dynamic effects of public listing are not evidenced: the cost efficiency of the banks after public listing is not statistically different from that before public listing, and it also reveals an unclear trend since public listing.     

Explaining foreign bank entrance in emerging markets

This paper provides a theoretical framework that can explain the empirical observation that foreign banks from industrialized countries tend to increase their involvement in emerging markets in periods of market instability. In this model, domestic banks have (through past lending operations) more soft information on their borrowers available compared to foreign banks. Foreign banks, however, have a superior screening technology that allows them to obtain more hard information about their borrowers’ investment projects. The model has an important implication: Foreign banks increase their market share when credit market conditions deteriorate. The rationale for this finding is that the comparative advantage of the domestic bank loses value in unstable credit market conditions. Thus, the advantage of having a screening technology becomes more important and allows the foreign bank to increase market share. In times of crisis hard information on projects is relatively more important than soft information on the borrower’s history.     

Why are credit card rates sticky?

Summary This paper investigates credit card rate stickiness using a screening model of consumer credit markets. In recent years, while the cost of funds has fallen, credit card rates have remained stubbornly high, spurring legislators to consider imposing interest rate ceilings on credit card rates. The model incorporates asymmetric information between consumers and banks, regarding consumers' future incomes. The unique equilibrium is one of two types: separating (in which low-risk consumers select a collateralized loan and high-risk consumers select a credit card loan), or pooling (in which both types of consumers choose credit card loans). I show that a change in the banks' cost of funds can have an ambiguous effect on the credit card rate, so that the credit card rate need not fall when the cost of funds does. Usury ceilings on credit card rates are detrimental to consumer welfare, so would be counter to their legislative intent.I thank George Mailath, Paul Calem, Gerhard Clemenz, Sally Davies, George Kanatas, Leonard Nakamura, Tony Santomero, Tony Saunders, participants in the 1990 Financial Management Association Meetings, and co-editor Michael Woodford for helpful comments.The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve System.