Voter decisions on eminent domain and police power reforms

One unresolved issue arising from the use of eminent domain power involves how the perceived benefits and costs of eminent domain power affect people’s positions on the reform of eminent domain and police power law. The paper addresses this issue by estimating a voting model that explains voters’ decisions on eminent domain and police power reform referenda in the US. Estimates indicate that eminent domain referendum outcomes hinged on voters’ fundamental values and ideology, and voters’ immediate self-interest. Voters’ fundamental values and ideology affects referendum outcomes insofar as educational attainment in a county has a statistically significant effect on support for reform. Despite the greater incidence of eminent domain in low income and poorer communities, success of reform referenda in this study was found to be greater in counties with higher incomes and lower unemployment rates. This implies that whatever asymmetry exists in the exercise of eminent domain law across income groups does not affect voter reaction to eminent domain reforms. Moreover, counties with high unemployment rates consider the larger potential benefits from urban renewal projects in vote decision-making providing a link between self-interest and voting behavior.     

Can People Explain Their Own Vote? Introspective Questions as Indicators of Salience in the 1995 Quebec Referendum on Sovereignty

Most scholars doubt that voters are able to explain their own vote. We argue that introspective questions whereby respondents are invited to tell, in their own words, the reasons why they vote the way they do, provide useful information on which considerations are most salient in their voting decisions. We show that open-ended questions about reasons for voting Yes or No in the 1995 Quebec referendum on sovereignty help us to sort out subgroups of voters for whom a given consideration is more salient.     

Capitalization and the Voucher: An Analysis of Precinct Returns from California''s Proposition 174

In 1993, Californians voted on a school voucher initiative. We hypothesize that homeowners in good school districts understood the voucher to be a threat to their property values and thus voted against it. Precinct returns from Los Angeles County confirm this hypothesis. We also examine an alternative hypothesis explaining the relationship between school quality and precinct returns. According to the alternative, voters perceived the initiative to be a referendum on public school quality. To distinguish between the two hypotheses, we compare the voting patterns of homeowners and renters. The comparison does not favor one hypothesis over the other.     

Weighted representative democracy

We propose a new system of democratic representation. Any voter can choose any legislator as her representative; thus, different legislators can represent different numbers of voters. Decisions in the legislature are made by weighted majority voting, where the weight of each legislator is determined by the number of voters she represents. We show that, if the size of the electorate is very large, then with very high probability, the decisions obtained in the legislature agree with those which would have been reached by a popular referendum decided by simple majority vote.     

Affect versus cognition: Wishful thinking on election day: An analysis using exit poll data from Belgium

Citizens tend to overestimate the electoral success of their preferred party. We investigate the extent to which Belgian voters overestimate the result of the party that they vote for and the factors that explain which voters do so more than others. Our focus is on the impact of educational attainment and partisan attachment on the overestimation of one’s party’s result. Previous research in this field has relied on data gathered in the months before the elections, which introduces a substantial amount of uncertainty and variation over time into the measurements of citizens’ vote share estimations. As an alternative, we investigate voters’ estimations of their party’s electoral success by means of data gathered in an exit poll survey. Our results show partisan attachments to have a strong impact on overestimations, which suggests that a wishful thinking mechanism is in play. Furthermore, we find that the extent to which partisan attachments increase citizens’ overestimations depends on a voter’s level of education.     

Voter turnout in a multidimensional policy space

Many factors influence the likelihood of citizens turning out to vote. In this paper we focus our attention on issue voting, that is, on the likelihood that different policies offered by politicians affect the probability of voting. If voters consider both the benefits and the costs of voting, rational voters will only vote when politicians offer differentiated policies. In a multidimensional policy space this implies that citizens only vote when they perceive enough difference on the issues they care about the most. We investigate the role of voter abstention due to indifference in a unidimensional and a multidimensional policy setting using data from the US National Election Studies for 1972–2000 and find support for our predictions: voters perceiving a small difference between the platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties are less likely to vote; and voters who perceive the two parties as more different on a larger number of issues are significantly more likely to vote.     

An economic offer they cannot refuse! Economic expectations on incumbent government support in Core and periphery European countries

The importance of economic conditions on election outcomes is well established. This paper supplements the standard approach to economic voting by assessing government support from a highly debated perspective of European spaces: Core countries and Periphery countries (Central Eastern European and Southern countries). The paper reveals that the economic conditions perceived by voters in the future are expected to differently affect incumbent government support depending on the macroeconomic position of the country. This paper finds that, contrary to Core countries' electors, voters in periphery countries are keener to support the incumbent governments if the economic outputs are positive. It concludes that positive economic expectations are strongly and positively associated with incumbent government support, regardless of previous vote choice, while negative economic expectations are strongly and negatively associated with government support.     

Maximizing political vote in multiple districts

This paper models a resource allocation problem in the political context. Voters and political candidates of two parties are positioned in each of n given electoral districts. We assume that each voter will vote for the candidate he is more attracted to. This attraction is modeled by an attraction function. Each of the parties now attempts to allocate a finite budget to maximize their objective, which is either the popular vote or the number of districts, in which the party has a majority. Individual scenarios are examined with respect to leader-follower solutions and Nash equilibria. The paper then describes a dynamic model that successively allocates existing funds plus additional donations to candidates in different electoral districts.     

Intergenerational conflict and the political economy of higher education funding

We examine how a population's age distribution and a growing divide between the ethnic composition of older and young generations is likely to affect support for higher education funding. Using detailed survey data on voter preferences for higher education funding and precinct-level vote returns from locally-funded community college bond referenda in California, we find that older voters are significantly less supportive of higher education funding than younger voters and that support among older non-Hispanic white voters is particularly weak when those voters reside in a jurisdiction where the college-age population is more heavily Hispanic.     

Has Brexit affected employment in Japanese affiliates in the UK?

On 23 June 2016, a referendum was held in the United Kingdom (UK) to decide whether the country should leave or remain a member of the European Union (EU). The ‘Leave’ vote won by 52 per cent to 48 per cent of voters, leading to the EU–UK Withdrawal Agreement that came into force in 2020 and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement that came into force in 2021. Brexit is not exclusively a European matter; it affects third parties as well. In this article we examine the presence of Japanese affiliates in Europe during 2000–21 by analysing data obtained from the Toyo Keizai's Overseas Japanese Companies database. While the UK has been a major beneficiary of Japanese investments in Europe, its share of Japanese affiliates in Europe has decreased, especially during 2000–10. Brexit has had no negative impact on direct employment created by Japanese affiliates in the UK in the short term, but its impact in the long term could be exacerbated by any further policy divergence between the UK and the EU.     

Problems in Quantifying the Social Costs and Benefits of Gambling

A bstract .   As casinos and other forms of gambling spread across the United States, voters and policymakers are becoming increasingly interested in the potential costs and benefits from expansion in gambling industries. Since the mid-1990s, a variety of cost-benefit research has been published, much of it using flawed methodologies. This paper examines some of the most important areas of debate and disagreement among gambling researchers, and explains why the quantification of the costs and benefits of gambling is problematic.     

Incumbency preservation through electoral legislation: The case of the secret ballot

The secret ballot was designed to eliminate the incentive for candidates to purchase votes through direct vote buying. When voters have private information on their candidate preferences, incumbent candidates will generally be less efficient in purchasing votes than their challengers. Incumbent candidates may therefore benefit from the elimination of direct vote purchasing. Viewed in this vein, passage of secret ballot laws by state legislatures can be seen as an institutional mechanism to protect their incumbency advantage, rather than as an act of necessary electoral reform to create fair elections and protect democracy. Submitted: May 25, 1999 / Accepted: July 24, 2000     

The demand for judicial sanctions: voter information and the election of judges

We examine 20 partisan judicial elections over an 8-year period to determine whether judge specific information shows in election results. We find demand for judicial sanctions looks much like other voting processes. Among voters, Democratic incumbent judges, who tend to be lenient, are rewarded for being harsh, while Republican incumbent judges, who generally are harsh, are rewarded for being lenient. Voters are not found to be a random sample of the population, and we find that straight ticket votes obscure information from selective voters. This paper benefitted from comments received by participants at the Public Choice Meetings, and from useful comments from Aimee Chin, Janet Kohlhase, an anonymous referee and the editor.     

The behaviour of betting and currency markets on the night of the EU referendum

We study the behaviours of the Betfair betting market and the sterling/dollar exchange rate (futures price) during 24 June 2016, the night of the EU referendum. We investigate how the two markets responded to the announcement of the voting results by employing a Bayesian updating methodology to update prior opinion about the likelihood of the final outcome of the vote. We then relate the voting model to the real-time evolution of the market-determined prices as the results were announced. We find that, although both markets appear to be inefficient in absorbing the new information contained in the vote outcomes, the betting market seems less inefficient than the FX market. The different rates of convergence to the fundamental value between the two markets lead to highly profitable arbitrage opportunities.     

Modeling undecided voters to forecast elections: From bandwagon behavior and the spiral of silence perspective

Forecasting election results has been a highly attractive activity among political and social scientists. Different forecasting methods have been proposed, but those based on public opinion polls are the most common. However, there are challenges to using opinion polls, especially because they neglect undecided voters. Due to the significant number of undecided participants and their impact on voting outcomes, we analyze the potential behavior of undecided voters by considering opinion polls and sentiment based on voter expectation from the perspective of the bandwagon effect and the spiral of silence. We establish a hierarchical Bayesian forecasting model to predict voting results, and apply it to the 2016 United States presidential election and the 2016 Brexit referendum. The results of our model suggest that voting outcomes are more predictable when fully utilizing the impact of undecided voters. The results indicate that integrating aggregated polls into the hierarchical Bayesian framework is a strong predictor for forecasting outcomes, and they provide evidence for the influence of sentiment based on voter expectation in forecasting election results.     

Dynamics in the fragmentation of political party systems

Fragmentation is an important dimension of political party systems. It concerns the proliferation of minor parties and the willingness of voters to vote for them. Past research relates party fragmentation to the voting system in a country; by Duverger's hypothesis, fragmentation should be highest in counties with proportional representation. The entropy measure is used to quantify fragmentation. The upper limit of fragmentation is analyzed in 24 countries, and the patterns of change in fragmentation are identified with mathematical difference equations, testing the idea that voters and parties evolve toward an equilibrium in fragmentation. The highest level of fragmentation is found comparable with a psychological limit on human information processing. In 17 of 22 countries, fragmentation moves toward an equilibrium, regardless of the type of voting system, and countries with higher equilibrium levels usually evolve more slowly. The results affirm the stability of democratic governments but raise questions about voters' strategies and suggest that some voters may try to control fragmentation when they vote.     

Endogenous party structure

This paper proposes a model of two-party representative democracy on a single-dimensional political space, in which voters choose their parties in order to influence the parties’ choices of representative. After two candidates are selected as the median of each party’s support group, Nature determines the candidates’ relative likability (valence). Based on the candidates’ political positions and relative likability, voters vote for the preferable candidate without being tied to their party’s choice. We show that (1) there exists a nontrivial equilibrium under natural conditions, and (2) the equilibrium party border and the ex ante probabilities of the two-party candidates winning are sensitive to the distribution of voters. In particular, we show that if a party has a more concentrated subgroup, then the party tends to alienate its centrally located voters, and the party’s probability of winning the final election is reduced. Even if voter distribution is symmetric, an extremist party (from either side) can emerge as voters become more politically divided.     

Does the World Economy Swing National Elections?*

Do voters reward national leaders who are more competent economic managers, or merely those who happen to be in power when the world economy booms? Using data from 268 democratic elections held between 1978 and 1999, I compare the effect of world growth (luck) and national growth relative to world growth (competence). Both matter, but the effect of luck is larger than the effect of competence. Voters are more likely to reward competence in countries that are richer and better educated; and there is some suggestive evidence that media penetration rates affect the returns to luck and competence.     

Homevoters vs. leasevoters: A spatial analysis of airport effects

We use a public referendum on a new aviation concept in Berlin, Germany, as a natural experiment to analyze how the interaction of tenure and capitalization effects influences the outcome of direct democracy processes. We distinguish between homevoters, i.e., voters who are homeowners, and leasevoters, i.e., voters who lease their homes. We expect that homevoters would be more likely to support initiatives that positively affect the amenity value of a neighborhood because some of the related benefits of leasevoters are neutralized by adjustments in market rents. Likewise, homevoters would be more likely to oppose initiatives that negatively affect the amenity value of a neighborhood. Our empirical results are consistent with these expectations, implying that public votes on local public goods do not necessarily reflect the spatial distribution of welfare effects in mixed-tenure environments.