国际关系中的网络政治及其治理困境

在网络化进程蓬勃发展的国际背景下,网络政治借助互联网的传播与组织功能,通过蝴蝶效应以及网络活动主义途径作用于国际关系。除了财富外,网络政治在国际关系的权力、身份、规则象限中都有其存在形式。国际关系中的网络政治并未超越权力政治,但网络时代的权力分配、权力范畴与权力性质却发生了一定改变。互联网使人们的思维结构与身份认同发生改变,世界不再仅仅以国界划分,而是辅之以认同划分。传统民族国家作为主要政治忠诚对象的地位被弱化,国家、市场和市民社会的各种行为体在重新平衡。信息网络还对国际制度转制、改制和创制形成了巨大的压力。信息革命中崛起的各种国际政治行为体不再屈服于强权政治,国际关系民主化的呼声越来越高。互联网的无政府状态特性、主权超越性以及技术影响不确定性都呼唤着网络政治的全球治理的出现,但是制度行动者、组织结构以及制度文化的限度决定了信息技术与制度互动的有限化以及网络政治的全球治理困境。     

从中国历史中学习企业文化的组织社会化方法

企业文化建设是现今众多企业面临的重要课题,也是众多文献所探讨的问题之一.文章从中国历史的文献出发,结合现实企业的案例,探讨了如何完成企业文化的组织社会化的四种方法.     

The challenges of policy coordination at a programme level: Why joining-up is hard to do

This article examines obstacles to policy coordination to promote development at a programme level. Contemporary efforts to promote coordination or ‘joined-up’ working across government entities highlight attempts to promote policy synergy and resource maximisation for achieving objectives that straddle the sector-specific boundaries of multiple departments. This paper assessed efforts to coordinate the actions of multiple departments towards achieving a single cross-cutting policy objective. Programme-level analysis of the Expanded Public Works Programme in South Africa revealed various reasons why joining-up is difficult to negotiate in practice. This consisted of policy goal and operational incompatibility between specialised entities, which appears sensitive to the specificity and stringency of policy goals and implementation regimens; as well as a host of difficulties related to how coordination is formally defined and designated. This included role definition and confusion, as well as the nature and locus of coordination mandates across and within individual departments.     

基于农村信息化基础设施建设出资问题的博弈分析

信息化基础设施建设是实现信息化的先决条件。在农村信息化市场体系尚未形成的情况下,解决农村信息化问题,加强农村的信息化基础设施建设是关键。而基础设施建设需要大量的资金注入,文章就政府和企业的出资问题运用完全信息静态博弈理论进行分析,提出在信息化进程的不同阶段,政府应充当的角色以及政府应该采取的政策措施。     

非对称信息下闭环供应链收益共享协调契约设计

以博弈论为基本研究方法,研究了闭环供应链系统协调契约的设计问题。结果表明：在制造商生产成本信息对称情况下,简单的收益共享协调契约可以实现供应链的协调。在信息非对称情况下,如果制造商的真实生产成本和其他外生参数满足一定条件时,收益共享协调契约同样可以实现供应链的协调;否则,销售商通过把收益共享契约中的利润分配比例设计为制造商宣布成本的函数,那么在该机制下仍可实现供应链的协调。     

物流服务创新网络的多代理人协同策略分析

多元主体行为的协同是提高物流服务创新网络绩效的有效途径,而信息不对称性降低了创新网络应有的协同放大效应。文章在假设多个创新主体所承担的任务具有互补性的条件下,将协同努力水平向量引入努力成本系数中,构建了物流服务创新网络的多代理人委托代理模型。分析结果表明,代理人努力成本、协同努力水平向量和创新绩效系数等参数对网络创新机制具有重要的影响,进而提出了整合多种创新资源,加强多元主体协同创新的策略建议。     

Coordinating Effort under Team‐Based and Individual Incentives: An Experimental Analysis*

This paper explores the behavior of workers in an environment where it is efficient to engage in the mutual exchange of help. Experimental data show that output and workers' payoffs are greater under team‐based incentives than under individual incentives in an environment where coordination is difficult. However, when the environment is more conducive to coordination (that is, a setting where agents interact repeatedly), output and payoffs are greater under individual incentives. Manipulation of the amount of mutually observable information provides evidence that team‐based incentives, relative to individual incentives, create a more difficult coordination problem for workers and that cooperation requires a richer informational environment.     

Assigning Intentions when Actions Are Unobservable: The Impact of Trembling in the Trust Game

This article reports laboratory experiments investigating behavior in which players may make inferences about the intentions behind others' prior actions based on higher- or lower-accuracy information about those actions. We investigate a trust game with first mover trembling, a game in which nature determines whether the first mover's decision is implemented or reversed. The results indicate that second movers give first movers the benefit of the doubt. However, first movers do not anticipate this response. Ultimately, it appears that subjects are thinking on at least three levels when making decisions: they are concerned with their own material well-being, the trustworthiness of their counterpart, and how their own actions will be perceived.     

中间组织的成因:一个交易费用经济学视角的扩展分析

协调经济活动有不同的制度形式：经济理论主要关注通过价格机制这只“看不见的手”来进行的市场协调；组织理论则更注重通过等级制这只“看得见的手”来协调企业的内部行为，市场和企业被视为两种最重要的协调制度形式。但事实上，在市场和企业之间并不存在明确的界限，它们之间相互渗透，产生了复杂多样中间组织，正如威廉姆森所说，大量的交易是在中间组织中进行，中间组织才是普遍的形式。本文试图在探讨中间组织的内涵特征、性质等问题的基础上，用交易费用经济学的分析方法对其成因进行扩展分析。     

Managerial Discretion and Task Interdependence in Teams

This study investigates whether task interdependence in teams alters the effectiveness of managerial discretion in motivating team performance. Teams are particularly useful when employees' tasks are interdependent—that is, when the degree to which the increase in team performance resulting from a team member's effort depends on the effort and skills of the other team members. The reason is that the more interdependent tasks are, the more employees need to coordinate their actions and help one another to achieve their objectives. Prior research analyzing settings where task interdependence is absent suggests that providing managers with discretion over team bonus allocation can improve team performance relative to equal team bonus allocations because it strengthens the link between contributions to team output and rewards. Economic theory suggests that managerial discretion will also improve team performance when task interdependence is present and information is efficiently used. However, we use behavioral theory to predict that managerial discretion is less effective in the presence of task interdependence, because managers do not fully incorporate all relevant information into bonus decisions and because managerial discretion hurts coordination and helping, which is particularly problematic under task interdependence. We find that while discretion over compensation has a positive effect on team performance relative to equal bonus allocation when task interdependence is absent, it has a negative effect when task interdependence is present. Additional analyses provide support for our underlying theory. Results of our study contribute to both theory and practice by suggesting that, ironically, managerial discretion may be most useful when the potential benefits of employing teams are lowest and least useful when the potential benefits are highest. Our results help explain why firms often grant managers only partial or no discretion over team members' compensation.     

Resource Allocation Effects of Price Reactions to Disclosures*

Capital market participants collectively may possess information about the valuation implications of a firm's change in strategy not known by the management of the firm proposing the change. We ask whether a firm's management can exploit the capital market's information in deciding either whether to proceed with a contemplated strategy change or whether to continue with a previously initiated strategy change. In the case of a proposed strategy change, we show that managers can extract the capital market's information by announcing a potential new strategy, and then conditioning the decision to implement the new strategy on the size of the market's price reaction to the announcement. Under this arrangement, we show that a necessary condition to implement all and only positive net present value strategy changes is that managers proceed to implement some strategies that garner negative price reactions upon their announcement. In the case of deciding whether to continue with a previously implemented strategy change, we show that it may be optimal for the firm to predicate its abandonment/continuation decision on the magnitude of the costs it has already incurred. Thus, what looks like “sunk‐cost” behavior may in fact be optimal. Both demonstrations show that, in addition to performing their usual role of anticipating future cash flows generated by a manager's actions, capital market prices can also be used to direct a manager's actions. It follows that, in contrast to the usual depiction of the information flows between capital markets and firms as being one way — from firms to the capital markets — information also flows from capital markets to firms.     

环境信息披露质量与财务绩效互动效应研究

通过选取480家上市公司2015—2019年的数据，并进行标准化处理，运用综合评价指数、耦合协调度模型，构建环境信息披露质量和环境绩效指标体系。在对环境信息披露质量和财务绩效耦合协调关系研究的基础上，运用PVAR模型、格兰杰因果检验、脉冲响应函数等方法，选取三大行业为代表，分别为采矿业、电力/热力/燃气及水生产和供应业、制造业，研究环境信息披露质量与财务绩效两者之间的相互作用关系，以此说明环境会计信息披露的重要性。实证结果表明，环境信息披露质量和财务绩效之间存在显著的促进作用，但在不同的行业有所区别。     

Conventions and institutions in coordination problems

Summary This survey article starts with a game-theory interpretation of coordination problems that occur in an economy. Three types of games are discussed in which the degree of coordination versus conflict varies. It is shown that game-theoretic techniques for equilibrium selection or securing the highest pay-off outcome do not always suffice, which raises the need for exogenous information. Norms, such as conventions and institutions, may provide this information. The emergence and persistence of norms as well as the relationship between the type of game and the type of norm are discussed. After a discussion on conventions and rationality, some notions from Institutional Economics are introduced, in which institutions are explained as a way to deal with limited and costly information. Some applications are given in the last section.The author gratefully acknowledges comments given by Simon Kuipers, Hans van Ees, Elma van de Mortel and an anonymous referee without implicating them in remaining errors.     

Coordination Failures,Cluster Theory,and Entrepreneurship: A Critical View

In the last decades, more and more economists have advanced the idea that significant obstacles impeding economic growth (especially in less developed regions) consist in different market failures, preventing entrepreneurs from taking the necessary actions to exploit profit opportunities: coordination failure. This paper provides a refutation of the idea that coordination failures as manifested in the inability of clusters to emerge can serve as a ground for government intervention. It uses the Porter, Rodrik and Rodriguez-Clare thesis as an example of this approach and criticizes the claim that coordination externalities prevent the market process to allocate resources optimally.

论政府经济行为中的委托—代理关系

政府经济行为与私有部门中的经济行为一样广泛地存在着委托——代理关系,由于信息不对称、激励不相容等原因,政府经济活动中出现了败德行为和逆向选择等代理问题。本文运用委托——代理理论对我国政府经济行为中的委托——代理关系及其代理问题进行剖析,并对其代理问题的解决提出了一些思路,以保证政府经济行为的有效性。     

Monetary integration in ASEAN+3: A perception survey of opinion leaders

Recently, the ASEAN+3 countries have taken a number of measures to bolster monetary integration. These include the establishment of the ASEAN+3 Economic Review and Policy Dialogue and the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM). More recently, the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) was also established as an independent surveillance unit. Also, business cycles in the region are starting to become more synchronized. Policymakers have, however, not heeded to calls for introducing a regional monetary unit (RMU) to strengthen regional surveillance and to promote greater exchange rate coordination. Why and what are the practical issues and constraints in introducing the RMU? What actions could be taken in the short and the longer term to promote exchange rate coordination? This paper assesses the views of ASEAN+3 opinion leaders through a perception survey. The opinion leaders feel that RMU, CMIM, and AMRO could go a long way in deepening monetary integration in the region.     

黄河流域数字经济与高质量发展耦合协调研究

数字经济作为新一轮信息产业革命的重要起点,对高质量发展有着巨大影响。采用耦合协调度及障碍度模型对2011—2020年黄河流域数字经济与高质量发展的耦合协调关系及障碍因子进行研究。研究发现,黄河流域数字经济与高质量发展处于高水平耦合阶段,下游地区的耦合协调度高于中上游地区,绿色生态及数字产业规模等指标制约两系统协调发展。地区应发挥数字经济作用,促进数字经济与高质量协调发展。     

Rules versus discretion in Central Bank communication

We propose a theoretical framework to study Central Bank communication and to assess the benefits of commitment to a disclosure rule. Our model features a coordination environment, where agents have dispersed private information and their interests are not aligned with those of the Central Bank. Public information can lead to undesirable coordination among agents. We show that anything goes when the Central Bank cannot commit; both its most and least preferred outcomes can be supported in equilibrium, and so can anything in between. We find that commitment does not necessarily implement the Central Bank's most preferred outcome. However, the Central Bank can avoid the least desirable outcomes by choosing an information structure with only two messages that act as action recommendations for agents. Furthermore, our results suggest a higher correlation between fundamentals and outcomes under commitment.     

分散式供应链的协调策略

分散式供应链中各成员企业有较强的独立性,各自以自身利益最大化为目标进行决策。有效协调成员企业间的物流、信息流和资金流,才能增强供应链的整体竞争力。文章先讨论了分散式供应链中失调会导致的问题,接着分析了影响协调的因素,最后给出了可以采用的三种协调策略,即合作伙伴策略、信息共享策略、激励机制策略。     

循环经济中企业行为的协调博弈分析

当前循环经济的研究已经进入理论体系的建构阶段.文章运用协调博弈理论,从支付占优和风险占优两个方面,分析了企业间发展循环经济的相互作用关系.分析表明,政府作为协调者可以提高循环经济中企业的博弈支付,政府还可以运用其他手段降低合作风险促进循环经济的发展.