Relative importance of sticky prices and sticky information in price setting

The relative importance of price and information stickiness in price setting to model and explain inflation dynamics is investigated in this study. A structural model of inflation is developed and used which combines two different models of price setting behavior: the sticky price model of the New Keynesian literature and the sticky information model of Mankiw and Reis. In a framework similar to the Calvo model, I assume that there are two types of firms. One type of firm chooses its prices optimally through forward-looking behavior—as assumed in the sticky price model. It uses all available information when deciding on prices. The other type of firm sets its prices under the constraint that the information it uses is “sticky”—as assumed in the sticky information model. It collects and processes the information necessary to choose its optimal prices with a delay. This leads to the sticky price–sticky information (SP/SI) Phillips curve that nests the standard sticky price and sticky information models. Estimations of this structural model show that both sticky price and sticky information models are statistically and quantitatively important for price setting. However, the sticky price firms make up the majority of the firms in the economy. The results are robust to alternative sub-samples and estimation methods.     

Firm routines,customer switching and market selection under duopoly

This paper explores the dynamics of market selection for an industry in which firms employ relatively simple pricing, production and investment routines and in which consumers switch between rival firms in response to price differentials but do not all do so instantaneously. The key issue is whether market processes result in the elimination of less efficient firms by their more efficient rivals. That is to say, do such processes unfailingly increase the efficiency with which available economic resources are used? In the context of duopoly, we show that the survival of the more efficient firm is not guaranteed and that, more generally, the outcome depends upon the speeds with which firms adjust prices and capacities and with which customers switch between rival firms.     

企业差异化战略对价格和质量竞争博弈均衡解的影响研究

消费者在购买商品时不仅考虑商品价格而且还要考虑商品质量水平的需求市场,如果存在两寡头企业提供某商品,必然会导致价格和质量的竞争博弈。本文研究表明:为了达到纳什均衡状态,两企业必须采取一定的差异化策略。而且在均衡状态下,如果市场是价格敏感市场,企业的差异化程度越高,对企业和消费者都越有利;如果市场是质量敏感市场,当敏感程度相对很低时,企业的差异化程度越高,对企业和消费者也都越有利;当敏感程度一般时企业可选择适当的差异化程度使得企业和消费者同时达到最大的均衡利润;但当敏感度非常高,企业差异化程度越高对企业的均衡利润越大,可对消费者的均衡利润却越小。     

Land collateral and labor market dynamics in France

The value of land in the balance sheet of French firms correlates positively with their hiring and investment flows. To explore the relationship between these variables, we develop a macroeconomic model with firms that are subject to both credit and labor market frictions. The value of collateral is driven by the forward-looking dynamics of the land price, which reacts endogenously to fundamental and non-fundamental (sunspot) shocks. We calibrate the model to French data and find that land price shocks give rise to significant amplification and hump-shaped responses of investment, vacancies and unemployment that are in line with the data. We show that both the endogenous movements in the firms׳ discount factor and the sluggish response of the land price are key elements that drive the results.     

Market share dynamics in a duopoly model with word-of-mouth communication

We analyze dynamic price competition in a homogeneous goods duopoly, where consumers exchange information via word-of-mouth communication. A fraction of consumers, who do not learn any new information, remain locked-in at their previous supplier in each period. We analyze Markov perfect equilibria in which firms use mixed pricing strategies. Market share dynamics are driven by the endogenous price dispersion. Depending on the parameters, we obtain different ‘classes’ of dynamics. When firms are impatient, there is a tendency towards equal market shares. When firms are patient, there are extended intervals of market dominance, interrupted by sudden changes in the leadership position.     

Price search and spatial competition

In this paper we study a model where two spatially scattered sellers face a population of consumers dispersed over a given geographical area; they have to incur a transaction cost to place their purchase order. Moreover these consumers have imperfect knowledge of prices, but obtain full information about prices at the first shop they solicit. We study price competition between these firms. The main outcomes of our analysis are as follows. First we show that whenever a price equilibrium exists for given locations of firms, it will necessarily display price dispersion. Second we study location configurations which ensure the existence of a price equilibrium. Furthermore we show that when it exists, a price equilibrium is unique. Finally we analyze firms revenues when merchants anticipate the consequences of their locational choice on subsequent price competition. Then we find that there is an incentive for a firm to get as close as possible to its competitor.     

Long run equilibria in an asymmetric oligopoly

Summary. Consider an oligopolistic industry composed of two groups (or populations) of firms, the low cost firms and the high cost firms. The firms produce a homogeneous good. I study the finite population evolutionarily stable strategy defined by Schaffer (1988), and the long run equilibrium in the stochastic evolutionary dynamics based on imitation and experimentation of strategies by firms in each group. I will show the following results. 1) The finite population evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) output is equal to the competitive (or Walrasian) output in each group of the firms. 2) Under the assumption that the marginal cost is increasing, the ESS state is the long run equilibrium in the stochastic evolutionary dynamics in the limit as the output grid step, which will be defined in the paper, approaches to zero. Received: September 19, 1997; revised: June 18, 1998     

Dynamic Pricing in Declining Demand: The Case of Duopoly

The purpose of this study is to investigate what theory predicts about price dynamics when firms face a decline in demand for their product due to an arrival of a new substitutable product. To this end, this paper constructs a dynamic duopoly model and simulates price paths. The study demonstrates that the price path is nonmonotonic and could be divided into three stages. The basic mechanism of generating the path is a tradeoff between two counteracting motives to set the price: pricing lower to delay the adoption of the new product, and pricing higher to exploit price‐insensitive consumers.     

反垄断调查的一个鉴别：一致性定价行为背后的差异与合谋

如何区分成本上涨时企业同时涨价的行为究竟是价格合谋还是寡头竞争的企业正常的价格调整行为？这是反垄断执法机构面临的一个难题。本文通过数理模型证明了无论企业进行伯川德竞争还是古诺竞争，寡头竞争的企业的定价随着成本的变化存在一个连续调整路径，而组成卡特尔的企业的定价则会随着成本的变化出现一个不连续的跳跃。因此反垄断执法机构在观察到企业的一致性定价行为之后，如果能从以往的价格监测纪录中发现这些企业在成本下跌时，价格存在着更大幅度的下调，则可以据此怀疑这些企业存在着价格合谋，应开展更深入的调查来搜集这些企业违反《反垄断法》的全面证据。     

Monetary transmission mechanism with firm turnover

An expansionary monetary policy shock increases the entry rate and the number of firms in the US. A pure sticky price model predicts that the number of firms in the economy should go down after a monetary expansion, but this prediction is at odds with the empirical findings. In marked contrast, the cost channel mechanism generates an increase in the number of firms that is consistent with the data. A key insight is that the greater price stickiness is, the stronger the cost channel needs to be to generate firm dynamics that are consistent with the data.     

Vertical Product Differentiation When Quality is Scarce: The Case of n > 2 Firms

This paper describes a model of vertical product differentiation in which more than two firms compete in quality and price. Quality is of fixed supply, so firms participate in an auction to attain it. Firms then simultaneously choose prices. The paper determines equilibrium bids in the quality auction and the Bertrand equilibrium prices. In equilibrium one firm attains all the units of quality, but pays a price such that it, like the minimum-quality firms, earns zero profits. Aggregate welfare is computed, and is shown to decrease as competition increases.     

The market response to corporate scandals involving CEOs

This article examines corporate scandals of both a financial and nonfinancial nature between 1993 and 2011 which is expressly linked to a firm’s CEO. Findings suggest that in the short run, investors react adversely to such events and that recalcitrant CEOs end up costing their shareholders dearly. Such scandals are more likely to occur among large firms, firms with insiders on the board and where the value of options granted to a firm’s managers is substantial. However, firms with more cash flows are less likely to be mired in such scandals, and their stock returns are less likely to be affected. There is an increase in stock price volatility of affected firms in the days following the announcement of the scandal. A point of respite for investors is the damage being confined to the short run. The stock price performance of the firms affected by the scandals matches the performance of control firms in the long run post-announcement. However, the operating performance of the sample firms is better than their matched counterparts in the years after the scandal. We contribute to the extant literature by considering corporate scandal events that are the doings of a firm’s CEO and not necessarily financially motivated.     

Housing prices and population dynamics in urban China

In this study, a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model is used to investigate the influence of population on housing price dynamics in urban China. The contribution of population growth to the housing price trend and the contribution of population shocks to housing price fluctuations are quantitatively measured. The empirical results indicate that the ongoing policy to control the population size in large cities in China can decrease the growth rate of housing prices by 0.49% every year, which accounts for 1/10 of the total housing price trend. Furthermore, this policy cannot stabilize housing prices because population shocks have negligible effects on the housing price cycle. Housing technology shocks and housing preference shocks are responsible for most of the housing price fluctuations.     

LARGE FIRMS AND PRICE CONTROL

With the increase in the rate of inflation in recent years, most economists have probably come to accept the need for price control, even though they might oppose it in more normal circumstances. However the view is still very wide- spread -among economists and probably among politicians and the general public – that for an effective system of price control to exist, it is only necessary to control the prices charged by large firms. It is believed that smaller firms will then follow suit, either because they are forced to by the competition of large firms or for some other reason. Recent experience in the U.K. seems to refute this thesis conclusively. It is in the sectors in which small firms predominate that prices rose most rapidly during the two or three years preceding the imposition of price control; this has continued since price control was imposed in November 1972. No explanation of this is attempted, but it is argued that if price control is to be effective it must be extended to all firms irrespective of size. This would raise administrative problems, but it is suggested that these could be dealt with. The character of inflation, like other aspects of the economic situation, can change rapidly. It is possible that with the introduction of the three-day week in British industry in February 1974 (as a consequence of the miners’strike) and the continued rise in import prices (especially the price of oil) the high profits which characterised the years 1971, 1972 and 1973 in Britain will prove to be temporary. However the basic point remains. During these years, the rise in profits added significantly to the increase in retail prices, and this rise took place not only in sectors where large firms are found but also in sectors characterised by the predominance of small and medium-size firms.     

Price and nominal wage Phillips curves and the dynamics of distribution in Japan†

This study estimates two types of Phillips curves – the price Phillips curve and nominal wage Phillips curve – for the Japanese economy and analyses the institutional structure of the dynamics of effective demand and income distribution in each period from 1977 to 2007. The estimated results allow us to make the following three findings. First, the Japanese economy was a profit-led regime and a counter-cyclical wage share regime. The combination of regimes can make the dynamics of effective demand and income distribution unstable. Second, the dynamics of price and nominal wage do not reflect each other in Japan by labour–management cooperation. Finally, after 1997, the distributive regime in Japan switched from a counter-cyclical wage share to a pro-cyclical wage share regime because Japanese firms quickened their speeds of employment adjustment. As a result, the dynamics of effective demand and income distribution were stabilised.     

消费者寻求多样化与企业定价竞争

消费者寻求多样化的购买行为会对寡头企业之间的价格竞争和经济效率产生重要影响。文章研究发现,针对消费者寻求多样化的购买行为,企业会对忠诚的消费者给予价格优惠,而对新顾客索取高价;消费者寻求多样化购买行为弱化了企业两期价格竞争,导致"默契合谋";而以两期统一定价为基准的经济效率分析显示,歧视定价机制促进了企业间竞争,导致消费者剩余增加,企业利润减少。     

Inflation and growth in a disequilibrium macroeconomic model

The purpose of this paper is to study the dynamics of temporary equilibria in a disequilibrium growth model. Dynamics rests upon adjustment mechanisms of prices, capital stock, money balances, and labour supply. Wage dynamics is supposed to be influenced by indexation processes, and this question is related to the investment behaviour of firms. We give sufficient conditions for existence, unicity, and asymptotic stability of steady states of this model. We also show that steady states correspond to a long-run Phillips curve, which is vertical when inflationary expectations are fully reflected in wage and price changes.     

CHOOSING ROLES IN A DUOPOLY FOR ENDOGENOUSLY DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS*

The choice of the roles by firms in a vertically differenitated duopoly is analysed introducing a preplay stage where firms set the timing of moves, under the alternative assumptions of full or non full market coverage. Under the first, it turns out that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium entails simultaneous play in the quality stage, followed by sequential play in the price stage, where both firms would prefer to be price leader, contrarily to the results obtained by previous literature. Under partial market coverage, it is possible to analyse both price and quantity competition. In such a case, simultaneous play in both stages emerges as the optimal behaviour. Overall, contrarily to the conclusions reached by the previous literature, it is not possible to claim that the choice of the strategy space dominates the distribution of roles.     

Optimality and Natural Selection in Markets

We ask if natural selection in markets favors profit-maximizing firms and, if so, is there a difference between the predictions of models which assume all firms are profit maximizers and the predictions of models which explicitly take account of population dynamics in the market. We show that market selection favors profit maximizing firms, but we also show that the long-run behavior of evolutionary market models is nonetheless not consistent with equilibrium models based on the profit-maximization hypothesis. Dynamic equilibrium paths with market selection are not Pareto optimal, nor even asymptotically optimal. The discrepancy arises because the dynamics created by firm evolution causes prices to vary over time and the resulting dynamical system need not have stable steady states.     

Why Do Prices Remain Stable in the Bubble and Bust Period?

In spite of a large swing in real output growth in the bubble and bust period, aggregate prices remained relatively stable in Japan. Empirical results show that such price rigidity can be explained by the customer market model combined with financial constraints. The degree of financial constraints that firms face in the bubble and bust period fluctuates significantly, and the impact of financial positions on firms’ prices is counter-cyclical. In booms, liquidity-abundant firms invest in market share by keeping prices down, while in a recession financially constrained firms charge a high price to locked-in customers who remain loyal. Such counter-cyclicality is clearly observed in the pricing behavior of large firms that produce differentiated goods. In contrast, small firms whose product brand is not well established in the market cannot lock in customers, and hence financial constraints do not affect their pricing decisions.