The interaction of corporate dividend policy and capital structure decisions under differential tax regimes

We develop a valuation model that integrates corporate capital structure and dividend payout policies. The resulting “extended” Miller (J Financ 32:261–297, 1977) model explicitly incorporates the different tax rates on corporate income, personal interest, dividends, and capital gains. We apply the model to ten different U.S. tax regimes since 1979 and generate several testable predictions. When the dividend tax rate exceeds the capital gains tax rate, dividend payout can partially offset value-enhancing effects of leverage. When the two rates are close, dividend payout loses its moderating influence. Using the S&P 1500 universe, we obtain empirical results that are consistent with the model’s predictions.     

Are Corporate Tax Reductions Real Benefits under Imputation Systems?

Imputation systems integrate corporate and shareholder personal income taxes to alleviate double taxation of dividend income. In this study, we empirically examine whether a corporate tax rate reduction under an imputation tax system benefits shareholders. Using Taiwan as a setting, our analyses indicate that decreasing the corporate tax rate is associated with an increase in dividend payout ratio and foreign investment. Moreover, the increase in dividend payout ratio is even greater for firms that have a higher increase in foreign ownership. Additionally, the market reacts positively to an announcement of a tax rate reduction; specifically, positive stock price reactions are stronger for firms that experienced a greater increase in foreign ownership in response to the tax rate reduction, for firms with greater liquidity constraints and more growth opportunities before the tax rate reduction, and for firms with a bigger decrease in effective tax rates after the tax rate reduction. Overall, we provide evidence that a tax rate reduction is associated with economic impacts and that foreign shareholders appear to be the main beneficiaries of a tax rate reduction under an imputation tax system.     

Vertical externalities in cigarette taxation: Do tax revenues go up in smoke?

In federal systems, where tax bases are joint property, the tax policy of one level of government affects the tax base of the other. This paper examines the interdependence of US federal and state cigarette tax rates. Our results suggest that states may reduce their cigarette tax rate by as much as 48 cents per dollar increase in the federal tax rate. Thus, a federal tax hike may reduce the amount of generated state tax revenues both directly (the overall tax rate rises and the state tax base declines), and indirectly (the state tax rate declines).     

Is corporate payout taxation a long run phenomenon? Evidence from international data

This paper examines whether dividend and capital gains taxation influences corporate payout policy using the country level data of 21 countries in panel versions of time series models. We find that dividend relative to capital gains tax penalty is cointegrated with corporate payouts (dividends and share repurchases) i.e. corporate payout taxation may be a long run phenomenon. Further, the cointegrating vector estimates are largely consistent with the traditional view of dividend taxation whereby the tax penalty discourages dividends, while the estimates give limited support to the premise that firms substitute dividends for share repurchases in response to an increase in dividend tax penalty. Long run causality also operates between the tax penalty and payouts in the error correction models. Additionally, dividend tax appears to be more influential than capital gains tax on dividend payout decisions. Lastly, taxation affects dividends more significantly in countries with high investor protection.     

Estimating the sensitivity of state tax revenue to cyclical and wealth effects

In this study, we estimate the elasticities of alternative sources of state tax revenue relative to the economy, as measured by GSP, and to wealth, as measured by the S&P500. Next, efficient tax frontiers are estimated for each state by minimizing the standard deviation, given the current average growth rate of revenues. It is shown how states could attain the same expected growth rate of tax revenues with less volatility by modifying the composition of their existing tax structures. In most cases, corporate income taxes are found to reduce efficiency due to their high volatility without a correspondingly high growth rate.     

Income taxes and the destination of movers to multistate MSAs

We examine how differences in state income tax rates, as well as other state and local taxes and public service expenditures, influence the choice of state of residence for households (federal tax filers) moving into multistate metropolitan areas (MSAs) using data from the IRS on the migration of taxpayers. MSAs that are on borders provide a spatial discontinuity—discrete differences in state tax rates within a single labor market. These MSAs allow residents to live in one state and work in another state. We find that differences in state income tax rates have a significant impact on the relative rate of migration to the states within an MSA. However, contrary to what would be expected, this impact is only significant in MSAs in which the filing state is based on employment (states without reciprocity) and not for those states in which the filing state is the state of residence (states with reciprocity). In MSAs where states do not have reciprocity agreements, a difference of ten percent in tax rates leads to a 4.1 percent difference in the relative rate of incoming taxpayers. Analogously, we find that a ten percent difference in state tax rates in these MSAs results in a 3.3 percent difference in the rate of tax base inflow (AGI). Our results suggest that one reason that differences in state income taxes appear to have more impact in multistate MSAs without reciprocity is that only relatively large differences in state income tax rates have any impact on migration and these differences are much more pronounced in MSAs without reciprocity.     

Who offers tax-based business development incentives?

Many American communities seek to attract or retain businesses with tax abatements, tax credits, or tax increment financing of infrastructure projects (TIFs). The evidence for 1999 indicates that communities are most likely to offer one or more of these business development incentives if their residents have low incomes, if they are located close to state borders, and if their states have troubled political cultures. Ten percent greater median household income is associated with a 3.2% lower probability of offering incentives; 10% greater distance from a state border is associated with a 1.0% lower probability of offering incentives; and a 10% higher rate at which government officials are convicted of federal corruption crimes is associated with a 1.2% greater probability of offering business incentives. TIFs are the preferred incentive of communities whose residents have household incomes between $25,000 and $75,000; whereas TIFs are much less commonly offered by communities whose residents have household incomes below $25,000. The need to finance TIFs out of incremental tax revenues may make it infeasible for many of the poorest of communities to use TIFs for local business development.     

Lowering the Marginal Corporate Tax Rate: Why the Debate?

In an effort to attract new investors and retain existing producers, governments use corporate tax rates as a policy tool for industrial recruitment, resulting in inter‐state tax competition. Foreign direct investment (FDI) growth and GDP growth are the two policy outcomes gauged in inter‐state tax competition. The assumption is that lower corporate taxes lead to increases in FDI, which results in capital formation that generates GDP growth. This 60‐nation panel study tests that assumption through examining economic indicators contingent on taxation, such as FDI and mergers and acquisitions among multinational corporations between 1999 and 2009. The results suggest that reduced corporate tax rates can increase FDI but decrease annual GDP growth. The main policy implication is that tax competition may attract investment, but may not promote overall economic growth, offering support for value‐extraction theories.     

Local business taxation and competition for capital: the choice of the tax rate

A theoretical model describes the local choice of the tax rate on capital income. It establishes preferences and various fiscal conditions — including the tax rates of competing jurisdictions — as determinants of the tax rate. The empirical implications are tested using a large panel of jurisdictions in Germany, which have discretion in setting the local rate of the business tax. Tax competition is identified by means of instrumental variables techniques. Despite significant competition effects between local neighbors, where tax rates are strategic complements, jurisdictions are found to have some leeway in using the tax rate as an instrument of their policy. In particular, large jurisdictions set higher tax rates in interjurisdictional competition.     

Interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition: The optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy

This paper explores the implications of the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition for the optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy à la (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996) and (Besley and Coate, 1997). As an extension of Hoyt’s (1991) finding that intensified tax competition is always harmful and aggravates the extent to which public goods are undersupplied in a region, we show that intensified tax competition can be beneficial if political as well as tax competition is considered. In particular, we identify plausible conditions under which (i) there is an optimal intensity of tax competition such that the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition will result in the optimal provision of public goods and (ii) intensified tax competition will be beneficial if and only if the degree of tax competition is less than this optimal intensity.     

Lobbying and tax competition in an oligopolistic industry: a reverse home-market effect

This paper studies tax competition between two asymmetrical countries for an oligopolistic industry with many firms. Each government sets its tax rate strategically to maximize the weighted sum of residents’ welfare and political contributions by owners of firms. It is shown that if the governments care deeply about contributions and trade costs are low, the small country attracts a more than proportionate share of firms by setting a lower tax rate. The well-known home-market effect, which states that countries with a larger market attract a more-than-proportionate share of firms, may be reversed as a result of tax competition by politically interested governments.     

Interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition: The optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy

This paper explores the implications of the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition for the optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy à la Osborne and Slivinski, 1996, Besley and Coate, 1997. As an extension of Hoyt’s (1991) finding that intensified tax competition is always harmful and aggravates the extent to which public goods are undersupplied in a region, we show that intensified tax competition can be beneficial if political as well as tax competition is considered. In particular, we identify plausible conditions under which (i) there is an optimal intensity of tax competition such that the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition will result in the optimal provision of public goods and (ii) intensified tax competition will be beneficial if and only if the degree of tax competition is less than this optimal intensity.     

Property Tax Circuit Breakers Reconsidered: Continuing Issues Surrounding a Popular Program

A bstract . Property tax circuit-breaker programs—provision for tax relief for selected groups of the population believed to be adversely affected by rising state and local taxation on residences—exist in 30 states and the District of Columbia. They are still in controversy. The best available evidence on some of the basic issues being debated is considered in an effort to evaluate their policy implications. The device is found to be desirable and, if the residential property tax were regressive in certain respects, a move in the direction of tax equity. "Current income" is found more useful in determining eligibility; net worth tests would be difficult to apply. Relief for tax burdens above an acceptable share of household income is preferable to one based on a sliding scale formula. However, the tendency dearly is to liberalize benefits. This creates the danger of eroding the tax base.     

基于海外投资商与东道国动态博弈的税收风险研究

海外投资商遭受的东道国税收风险对投资成败具有关键影响作用,如何更好地规避税收风险,实现海外投资收益最大化,是投资者面临的难题。在综合考虑海外投资商对东道国本地企业的技术溢出效应和竞争效应基础上,构建海外投资商与东道国之间的动态博弈框架,分析海外投资商与东道国的策略互动,寻求海外投资商应对税收风险的最优投资策略。研究结果表明：东道国政府通常会给予海外投资商特定免税期,不过达到稳定状态后,均衡税率和海外投资商的资本存量会受技术溢出影响。     

The Effectiveness of Tax-Expenditure Limitations: A Re-evaluation

A bstract . A 1982 study of the efficacy and impact of tax and expenditure limitations (TEL) is updated. Utilizing various statistical comparisons, growth in expenditures and revenues in states with TELs is compared to growth in states without a TEL in place. This comparison matches growth in the pre tax revolt years with growth in the post revolt years. In all cases the statistical tests show that the existence of a TEL has had virtually no impact on the growth of statewide expenditures or revenues. Additionally, while aggregate state expenditures and revenues exhibited some decline during the tax revolt years, this decline was short-lived and has since been reversed. Thus, the primary implication is that TELs as presently construed are an ineffective means of limiting growth in state budgets     

Lessons for Economic Reform Based on Pennsylvania's Experiences with the Two-Tiered Property Tax

A bstract .   Although economic theory indicates that the imposition of a two-tiered property tax system facilitates urban revitalization, localities in most states have not been authorized to institute a two-tiered property tax. The authority to implement such a tax is partially determined by a state constitution's uniformity and equal protection clauses and tax rate ceilings. An analysis of these provisions reveals 23 states may establish a two-tiered tax, but implementation in 20 of the states must await the passage of state-enabling legislation. Because of the dearth of experience in enacting legislation and the absence of literature that provides guidance for securing its passage, the politics of enacting Pennsylvania's 1998 statute are assessed. The case study clearly indicates that enabling legislation enjoys bipartisan support as well as the backing of urban and rural representatives. However, the legislation's fate is primarily determined by the composition of local electorates and the political power of farm lobbies.     

Estimating cigarette-tax revenue

This paper presents a cigarette-tax revenue model which predicts potential tax revenues. The model is unique in that revenues are estimated in a two-stage process which is invariant to the type of state sales/excise tax regime. The model also controls for cross-state spillover effects. The empirical model was estimated using data from Alabama and surrounding states from 1955 to 1990. The results suggest the demand for cigarettes in Alabama is relatively inelastic; spillover effects are found but are small in scale; and additional revenue potentials can be realized by changes in the tax regime.     

Is it tax competition or tax exporting?

This paper extends the basic tax-competition model to a framework in which jurisdictions have market power over the price of the output produced within their borders. If firms within the jurisdiction are competitive, the jurisdiction can play the role of monopoly-rent collector by using taxes to restrict the level of output. It is shown that the basic tax competition model can be thought of as a special case of this more general framework. In this framework, the opportunity to export the tax burden can partially or fully offset the well-known effects identified by the tax competition model.     

Tax Competition with Heterogeneous Firms

Abstract

This paper studies tax competition in an economic geography model that allows for agglomeration economies with trade costs and heterogeneous firms. We find that the Nash equilibrium involves a large country charging a higher tax than a small nation. Lower trade costs lead to an intensification of competition, a drop in Nash tax rates and a narrowing of the gap. Since large, productive firms are naturally more sensitive to tax differences in our model, large firms are the crux of tax competition in our model. This also means that tax competition has consequences for the average productivity of big and small nations' industries; by lowering tax rates, a small nation can attract high-productivity firms.     

Urbanisation,fiscal decentralisation and economic development: A time series evidence

Several empirical tests using Multiple Regression Analyses were conducted on several hypotheses using time series data obtained from the federal and state governments. The results of our analyses establish that the degree of fiscal decentralisation is dependent on intergovernmental transfers and states income per capita. However intergovernmental transfers were not dependent on expenditure decentralisationper se. The degree of urbanisation was found to be inversely related to fiscal decentralisation. The variable measuring the degree of openess was found not statistically significant as an explanatory variable for fiscal decentralisation. However, the share of agriculture was found significant in revenue decentralisation but loses its importance in expenditure decentralisation.The policy implications of the study are that: (i) There is need for the states to develop plans to increase their per capita income, improve their tax collection system, introduce new tax bases and reduce the high degree of free ridership in public goods and services exhibited by the urban population. (ii) The Federal Government should provide specific grants to state governments for urban development, because of the high per capita cost of public goods and services. (iii) The existing Revenue Allocation Act should be reviewed to reflect state government efforts in generating their own revenue from internal sources.