TALKING,SEARCHING, AND PRICING*

I study the implications of interpersonal communication for incentives for consumers to acquire information and firms’ pricing behavior. Firms market a homogeneous product and choose its price; consumers acquire price information at some cost to themselves. Also, each consumer accesses the information acquired by a sample of other consumers—interpersonal communication. An exogenous increase in the level of interpersonal communication decreases the information that consumers acquire, and, when search costs are low, firms price less aggressively. In an extension, consumers may choose to invest in interpersonal communication at some cost. A decrease in the costs of interpersonal communication decreases firms’ competition.     

Public Sector Rationing and Private Sector Selection

We study the interaction between nonprice public rationing and prices in the private market. Under a limited budget, the public supplier uses a rationing policy. A private firm may supply the good to those consumers who are rationed by the public system. Consumers have different amounts of wealth, and costs of providing the good to them vary. We consider two regimes. First, the public supplier observes consumers’ wealth information; second, the public supplier observes both wealth and cost information. The public supplier chooses a rationing policy, and, simultaneously, the private firm, observing only cost but not wealth information, chooses a pricing policy. In the first regime, there is a continuum of equilibria. The Pareto dominant equilibrium is a means‐test equilibrium: poor consumers are supplied while rich consumers are rationed. Prices in the private market increase with the budget. In the second regime, there is a unique equilibrium. This exhibits a cost‐effectiveness rationing rule; consumers are supplied if and only if their cost–benefit ratios are low. Prices in the private market do not change with the budget. Equilibrium consumer utility is higher in the cost‐effectiveness equilibrium than the means‐test equilibrium.     

A Theoretical Reexamination of Privatization: Assessing its Welfare Impacts

Privatization has been one of the significant public policies adopted in the last two decades. Previous studies have focussed on efficacy gains at the firm and industry levels. This paper intends to reconsider the distributive impacts of privatization on the economy as a whole from a theoretical perspective. Specifically, it supposes an economy with two goods, two producers and two consumers, in which it is assumed that one of the consumers is not able to obtain one good that is regarded as a necessity. Since one basis of government intervention is to provide necessity to people who would not otherwise be able to obtain it, government intervention into production is assumed to satisfy this purpose. Using comparative statics, the paper analyzes how the welfare of two consumers is affected by this intervention, and shows that intervention can increase the welfare of some consumers and social welfare in general.     

Quantitative versus qualitative measures of price expectations: The evidence from Australian consumer surveys

This letter analyses price expectations data derived from the quarterly Australian Survey of Consumers. The survey asks both qualitative and quantitative price expectations questions. The information loss arising from using the more readily available qualitative based series as approximations to the quantitative series is assessed. Qualitatively based series are found to greatly exaggerate changes in consumer price expectations in times of high inflation.     

Consumer choice and information : New experimental evidence

Many laws and regulations aimed at safeguarding consumers deal with the amount and kind of product information that consumers receive. Implicit in these regulations is the belief that consumers can make use of the appropriate information, provided only that it is made available. Recently a number of authors have argued that consumer decisionmaking is subject to consistent biases, suggesting poor purchase decisions may result even with access to the relevant information. Indeed some critics have argued that consumers may be subject to information overload so that they may make worse decisions with extra information than without it. The experimental results presented in this paper address some of these issues. The results suggest that untrained people can use simplifying strategies in quite complicated decision problems. Also, while information overload clearly can occur, the subjects in our experiments appeared able to ignore unnecessary or unwanted information.     

The value of information in a simple duopoly model

This paper is concerned with the evaluation of information in a duopoly model in which the cost functions are subject to uncertainty. It explores how changes in information about the costs available to either firm affects the welfare of both firms along with the welfare of consumers. By comparing the ten possible types of information structures, it is shown that information may be detrimental, that improved information for one firm may or may not benefit the other firm and/or the consumer, and that it may be more desirable for a firm to gather information about the rival's cost rather than its own. All of these “irregular” results depend on the values of the variances of the costs and their correlation coefficient.     

A general theory of demand for information about product quality

The purpose of this paper is to construct a general theory—analogous to the neoclassical theory of consumer demand—of demand for information about product quality. The model proposed here introduces uncertain product quality by assuming that commodities possess attributes which consumers desire and that an uncertain commodity possesses are unknown quantity of some attribute. It is assumed that information about the quality of uncertain products is available. The consumer's utility function of information is derived and his information demand function is obtained.Partial analogues of the neoclassical theorems are proved for information demand. Roughly, we find that the Slutsky matrix is symmetric and that a submatrix is negative definite. The negative definite submatrix contains those terms which measure the effect of (income compensated) changes in information prices on information demand.The analysis employed to obtain these results parallels—with some important modifications—the neoclassical analysis of commodity demand. The method used to obtain expressions for the Slutsky substitution terms is an extension of the approach introduced by McKenzie [10] and later used by Hurwicz and Uzawa [6]. This approach uses an “income compensation” function to arrive at an “income compensated” demand function.     

Geographical separation of oligopolists can be very competitive

A given number of single, differentiated product oligopolists locate in one of two separate market-places, which consumers access at a cost. Firms set prices and the CES consumers choose purchases at one or both market-places. Firm agglomeration in one market-place produces positive profits because of product differentiation. But if consumer access costs are homogeneous and products are sufficiently good substitutes, geographical separation of firms produces prices analogous to homogeneous product Bertrand, and is “very competitive”, the reverse of textbook Hotelling. Hence a novel explanation emerges for the geographical agglomeration of firms producing very similar products.     

ENDOGENOUS CONSUMER PARTICIPATION AND THE RECYCLING PROBLEM*

We endogenise the extent of consumer participation in the recycling process, and analyse its effect on the ‘recycling problem’. When recycling requires consumers to undertake costly sorting activities to separate scrap from household waste, they will participate only if the net reward from sorting is positive. Consumers' sorting cost is subject to a network effect arising due to social norms. With heterogeneous consumers differing in terms of their sorting cost, the entire output of the recyclable product may not be subsequently available as scrap to the recycling firms. This increases the virgin producer's monopoly power, and may also lead to multiple equilibria if the network effect of sorting is sufficiently large. The latter result suggests a role for the government in influencing equilibrium selection to improve social welfare. Depending on the fraction of consumers that participate in recycling, increased societal pressure on consumers to recycle may decrease consumer participation and increase the virgin producer's market power.     

品牌的经济学分析:一个比较静态模型

现有的经济学理论和模型中缺少全面针对品牌的分析,导致品牌理论与实践的双重混乱.在选择爆炸式增长的经济条件下,品牌对消费者的选择行为产生了巨大影响,因此对品牌选择的经济学分析显得更为迫切.品牌的经济学本质是降低消费者的选择成本,进而影响消费者对品牌的选择,而消费者选择又决定了厂商的销售量和利润.我们在经济学的框架下,以品牌为研究对象,建立起一个比较静态模型,对品牌进行经济学分析,得出消费者均衡和厂商均衡的条件.     

Analysis of Components of Online Shopping and Their Relative Value

Empirical exploration of how online consumers interpret and value the marketing communication embedded in shopping components has the potential to advance knowledge of online consumer behavior and to inform design decisions concerning consumer-oriented Web sites. To date, little research has been completed regarding how components hinder or aid consumer perceptions of the online marketing message. This paper investigates the relative importance of online shopping components for online consumer shopping. The important and relative issues surrounding online shopping are explored, finding the core components of convenience, access to information, and trust. These components were then implemented in an online shopping task. Respondents considered thoughtfully marketing messages that involved issues of minimizing travel, information access.     

Market frictions: A unified model of search costs and switching costs

It is well known that search costs and switching costs can create market power by constraining the ability of consumers to change suppliers. While previous research has examined each cost in isolation, this paper demonstrates the benefits of examining the two types of friction in unison. The paper shows how subtle distinctions between the two costs can provide important differences in their effects upon consumer behaviour, competition and welfare. In addition, the paper also illustrates a simple empirical methodology for estimating separate measures of both costs, while demonstrating a potential bias that can arise if only one cost is considered.     

State capacity and the quality of policies. Revisiting the relationship between openness and government size

Countries with different levels of state capacity have access to different sets of policies. In particular, countries with strong state capabilities are able to draw from a broader menu of policies than countries with lower capabilities. We apply and test this insight to the case of exposure to trade‐related risk. So far, most of the literature has considered that only one type of policy—the one that increases government size—can help to overcome the challenge imposed by openness. However, there are a number of policies that can mitigate trade‐induced risks, many of which do not have the necessary implication of increasing public spending. Yet, many such policies require governmental capabilities not available to any country. For that reason, while the choice of a particular policy within a menu depends on political conditions, the relationship between openness and the size of government might be mediated by the capabilities of states. This paper provides reduced form evidence confirming that the empirical relationship between openness and government size is conditional on state capabilities. Therefore, public policies cannot be assessed independently of the capacity of the State that would have to implement them.     

When Competition is Not Enough: Consumer Protection

Rather than market structure, it is the nature of the goods and services and the cost of obtaining and processing information that may place consumers in a poor bargaining position. The article outlines the key provisions for consumer protection in Australia, Part V of the Trade Practices Act. It discusses search costs, and the factors that limit search, and explains how the conduct of suppliers (or others) may reduce search costs. Asymmetry of information is identified as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for misleading consumers. When products are sub standard or are used incorrectly, they may harm consumers or cause property damage and in some circumstances this may be best addressed via product liability laws. The article concludes by considering how firms or industries can be more pro-active in relation to consumer protection.     

中国公用事业价格听证中消费者参与的调查分析

价格听证是实现有效公用事业价格管制的重要内容,科学的价格听证要求消费者充分有效的参与。信息、能力和制度模型能系统解释公用事业价格听证中的消费者参与。调查数据显示,中国公用事业价格听证中的消费者参与在这三个方面都存在问题,这也是完善未来中国公用事业价格听证中消费者参与的重点所在。     

An experimental study of price dispersion

We report an experiment examining a simple clearinghouse model that generates price dispersion. According to this model, price dispersion arises because of consumer heterogeneity—some consumers are “informed” and simply buy from the firm offering the lowest price, while the remaining consumers are “captive” and shop based on considerations other than price. In our experiment we observe substantial and persistent price dispersion. We find that, as predicted, an increase in the fraction of informed consumers leads to more competitive pricing for all consumers. We also find, as predicted, that when more firms enter the market, prices to informed consumers become more competitive while prices to captive customers become less competitive. Thus, our experiment provides strong support for the model's comparative static predictions about how changes in market structure affect pricing.     

Consumer support for environmental policies: An application to purchases of green cars

This paper focuses on how consumer motivation can be tapped in order to encourage the adoption of cleaner technologies. Consumers are heterogeneous — they may be guided by intrinsic motivation or extrinsic motivation. While information provision policies (such as the energy label for cars) may be effective in encouraging certain consumers to adopt green cars, financial incentive schemes (such as subsidies or fines) may be more persuasive for extrinsically-motivated consumers. We develop a dynamic theory of adoption of environmental innovations, in which information-provision policies are followed by financial incentives (first ‘carrot’, then ‘stick’ incentives). Analysis of a survey dataset of Swiss households observes considerable heterogeneity in terms of support of information-provision or financial incentive policies, in line with our conjectures. Our results will be of particular interest to policymakers interested in guiding consumers towards cleaner technologies.     

A WELFARE COST OF THE LOST DECADE IN JAPAN

This paper measures the welfare cost of the Japanese economy in a 'lost decade' from 1990 to 2002, by using panels of different consumer groups. The paper finds that the costs for consumers in the lower and middle income quintiles and in urban districts are much higher, while there exists a benefit for consumers in rural districts. We suggest that such cost disparities express the business slump related to districts and income quintile group with high costs. Also, there exist consumers feeling this stagnation to be low-cost and the seriousness of stagnation is not recognised unanimously.     

Consumer perception,information provision,and regulation of insurance markets

Available evidence shows that consumers overinsure against modest risks. For instance, a majority of consumers tend to choose too low a level of deductible for homeowners insurance and automobile insurance, and purchase excessive warranties for electronics and other durable products such as automobiles and furniture. The analysis demonstrates that overinsurance decreases consumer welfare and increases insurers’ profits. This tendency of overinsurance stems from lack of information about the probability and magnitude of loss, and it calls for policies that require insurers or third-party organizations to provide more, albeit not perfect, information and data for consumers before they make insurance-purchase decisions. The implications of the analysis for other financial products such as stocks and deposits are discussed.     

THE REAL RATE OF U.S. NATIONAL SAVING

The conventional measure of national saving in U.S. accounts does not include saving in consumer durables, public investment, or intangible capital. It reflects a measure of net foreign investment that relates in considerable part to original cost rather than market values. It also does not include real capital gains.
Comprehensive, adjusted measures of national saving are calculated for as many of the years from 1946 to 1989 as relevant components are available. They generally suggest much larger rates of national saving than are usually recognized. They also cast a sharp and substantially different light on the likely effects of policies designed to increase provision for the future.