Hungary's entry into the euro area: Lessons for prospective members from a monetary policy perspective

This paper evaluates the conduct of monetary policy in Hungary using standard Taylor rules as well as extended rules that incorporate real exchange rate effects. Moreover, we explicitly consider the impact of future euro area entry by estimating instrument rules that permit an influence from Maastricht Treaty inflation requirements via the estimation of Markov switching models as well as by estimating a differential rule vis-à-vis the existing euro area. Lastly, the paper also considers the impact on policy rules from the large data revision that affects real exchange rate and output estimates. I find that interest rate setting behavior in Hungary does not resemble that of the euro area. Also, counterfactual experiments reveal that the potential macroeconomic costs of entry into the euro area sooner rather than later may be lower than if membership in the single currency area is delayed beyond 2008.     

Do house price developments spillover across euro area countries? Evidence from a global VAR

This paper empirically assesses the prospects for house price spillovers in the euro area, where co-movement in house prices across countries may be particularly relevant given a general trend with monetary union toward increasing linkages in trade, financial markets, and general economic conditions. A global VAR is estimated for three housing demand variables (real house prices, real per capita income, and the cost of borrowing, captured by a real long-term interest rate) on the basis of quarterly data for 7 euro area countries (Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy and the Netherlands), which together comprise nearly 90% of euro area GDP, over the period 1971–2009. The results suggest limited house price spillovers in the euro area, albeit with evidence of some overshooting in the first year after the shock, followed by a long run aggregate euro area impact of country-specific changes in real house prices related in part to the country’s economic weight. This contrasts with the impacts of a shock to domestic long-term interest rates, causing a permanent shift in house prices after 2–3 years. Underlying this aggregate development are rather heterogeneous house price spillovers at the country level, with a strong importance for weights – either economic or geographic – in governing their general magnitude. More generally, the impact of financing costs on house prices appears to have grown though time.     

Are central banks really breaking the (policy) rules?

• ? Looking at the strength of the global economy, it's no surprise that simple policy rules suggest that interest rates in some advanced economies are much too low and/or that several rate hikes would be needed in 2018 to avoid falling further behind the curve. Nonetheless, we expect central banks to respond cautiously and we see a slower pace of tightening than the consensus view .
• ? Policy rules, such as the Taylor Rule, have long been considered a useful guide to the potential path for policy rates. But while it suggests that current US, Eurozone and Australian central bank rates are broadly appropriate, it signals that UK, Canadian, and Swedish rates should be substantially higher. Based on our economic forecasts, Taylor Rules suggest that the central banks in the US, Eurozone, Canada and Australia will all need to raise intertest rates by around 100bps by end‐2018.
• ? However, there are several reasons not to draw strong conclusions from such point estimates. First, the Taylor Rule requires estimates of two unobservable variables – the output gap and the natural rate of interest – which cannot be estimated precisely.
• ? Second, using models that were designed to predict US policy responses in the 1990s to forecast central banks' behaviour today is likely to be misleading. Meanwhile, inferring central banks' reaction functions from recent policy rate moves to assess the future policy path is fraught with difficulties. Not only have interest rates been broadly unchanged for the bulk of the post‐financial crisis period, but policymakers have provided other forms of policy support.
• ? Third, outside the US at least, Taylor Rules have historically pointed to persistently different policy rates from those observed, yet inflation has been well anchored.
• ? The upshot of all this is that we expect central banks in the advanced economies to err on the side of caution and anticipate interest rates rising less quickly than the consensus amongst economists.

     

Exogenous uncertainty and the identification of structural vector autoregressions with external instruments

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the identification (point‐identification) of structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) with external instruments considering the case in which r instruments are used to identify g structural shocks of interest, r ≥ g ≥ 1. Novel frequentist estimation methods are discussed by considering both a “partial shocks” identification strategy, where only g structural shocks are of interest and are instrumented, and a “full shocks” identification strategy, where despite g structural shocks being instrumented, all n=g+(n?g) structural shocks of the system can be identified under certain conditions. The suggested approach is applied to investigate empirically whether financial and macroeconomic uncertainty can be approximated as exogenous drivers of US real economic activity, or rather as endogenous responses to first moment shocks, or both. We analyze whether the dynamic causal effects of nonuncertainty shocks on macroeconomic and financial uncertainty are significant in the period after the global financial crisis.     

Technological change and the U.S. real interest rate

Economic theory predicts that the rate of technological growth exerts a positive influence on the real rate of interest. To test this hypothesis, I examine the relationship between the inflation-adjusted yield of the 90-day Treasury-Bill and two measures of innovation: the rate of growth of the stock of patents per worker and R&D spending relative to GDP. As theory predicts, from 1963 to 2008 the rate of interest responds positively to an increase in either measure. The point-estimates imply an elasticity of intertemporal substitution between one and two. The findings suggest that a change in the stance of monetary policy and a wave of innovation both contributed to the rise of real interest rates in the 1980s.     

Does Liquidity Matter? Properties of a Divisia Monetary Aggregate in the Euro Area*

This paper builds a quarterly Divisia monetary aggregate for the euro area using area‐wide data over the sample period from 1980 to 2000, finding two main results. First, it is found that the demand for this monetary aggregate has been well behaved and relatively stable over the last two decades. Secondly, the Divisia‐weighed monetary aggregate is found to have interesting information content from a forward‐looking perspective. This lends support to the view that money and – in a broader sense – liquidity services should be assigned an important role in shaping monetary policy in the euro area, although the policy maker is not interested in monetary aggregates per se.     

Monetary Targets and the World Economy: A Progress Report

The recent changes in the value of the dollar and the talk of an interest rate ‘war’ demonstrate again that the world finds it difficult to cope with rapid exchange rate movements. In some ways the experience - and the reactions to it - are similar to the events of 1978. As now, the world was in a recession (though on a milder scale) and there were fears that exchange rate problems would obstruct economic recovery. The main difference is that in 1978 it was the strength of the Deutschmark which caused concern whereas this time the problems are associated with the rise in the value of the dollar. In a Briefing Paper in Economic Outlook, February 1978, ‘Monetary Targets and the World Economy’ we suggested that the problem arose from inconsistencies between national monetary policies and exchange rate objectives. In general, countries dislike exchange rate changes - in either direction - and there were problems because countries would not accept the exchange rate consequences of their own or other countries' monetary policies. We estimated the required monetary policies for stable exchange rates and suggested specific national monetary targets for 1978 which would at least move the world economy towards consistent monetary policies. In this Economic Viewpoint we return to those ideas. We consider what happened in 1978 and we also revise the underlying monetary rules. More recent experience suggests that although there has been some progress towards the convergence of monetary policies there will continue to be trend changes in exchange rates. It is also clear that there will be short-term fluctuations around these trends. We believe that greater convergence of monetary policies would be desirable but failing that it is important that countries should avoid abrupt changes in monetary policy. It is also important that countries should become accustomed to exchange rate changes. They should direct monetary policy towards their objectives for inflation and should not be diverted from it by temporary or permanent changes in their exchange rates.     

Monetary policy rules for convergence to the Euro

This paper investigates the applicability of open-economy convergence-consistent instrument rules for monetary policies in the economies undergoing monetary convergence to a common currency area. The proposed policy rule is forward-looking, consistent with a monetary framework based on inflation-targeting containing input variables that are relative to the corresponding variables in the common currency area. Robust forms of the policy rule are tested empirically for three inflation-targeting countries converging to the euro, i.e. the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. Empirical tests imply systemic differences in monetary policies among these euro-candidates. The Czech monetary policy seemingly follows the rule prescribed by our model. Both the Czech and the Polish central bank interest rate policies respond predominantly to changes in the inflation gap, while the Hungarian responds mainly to the exchange rate gap. In all three cases, changes in the eurozone short-term interest rates strongly drive adjustments in the central banks’ reference interest rates.     

GDP trend deviations and the yield spread: the case of eight E.U. countries

Several studies have established the predictive power of the yield curve in terms of real economic activity. In this paper we use data for a variety of E.U. countries: both EMU (Germany, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and non-EMU members (Norway, Sweden and the U.K.). The data used range from 1991:Q1 to 2009:Q3. For each country, we extract the long run trend and the cyclical component of real economic activity, while the corresponding ECB euro area government benchmark bond interest rates of long and short term maturities are used for the calculation of the yield spreads. We also augment the models tested with non monetary policy variables: the respective unemployment rates and stock indices. The methodology employed in the effort to forecast real output, is a probit model of the inverse cumulative distribution function of the standard distribution, using several formal forecasting and goodness of fit evaluation criteria. The results show that the yield curve augmented with the non-monetary variables has significant forecasting power in terms of real economic activity but the results differ qualitatively between the individual economies examined raising non-trivial policy implications.     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: Reflation enthusiasm is tempered

• ? We have kept our world GDP growth forecasts unchanged this month, at 2.6% for 2017 and 2.9% in 2018. But our outlook for inflation has been lowered to 3.0% this year (from 3.3% last month) as inflation is close to a peak in several economies and oil prices have fallen recently.
• ? Global indicators continue to point to buoyant activity, driven by manufacturing. The global manufacturing PMI rose to its highest level in almost six years in February, which in turn is boosting world trade. Despite the exuberance shown by the surveys, we remain cautious. We continue to expect a slowdown in consumer spending as households are squeezed by higher prices.
• ? Although we still see GDP growth in the US accelerating this year, we have lowered our forecast to 2.1% as economic data have been weaker than expected at the start of the year. Large uncertainties around our central forecast persist given the unpredictability of President Trump's policies, and markets have tempered their initial enthusiasm regarding the success of ‘Trumponomics’.
• ? With the Federal Reserve now close to meeting its dual mandate, the pace of policy normalisation will accelerate. We now expect the Fed to raise interest rates this month and three times overall this year. This means that US bond yields are likely to continue to rise and the euro will remain under pressure due to the widening interest rate differential between the US and the Eurozone.
• ? The Eurozone economy remains resilient ahead of key elections in France, the Netherlands and Germany. Our view remains that populist fears are overstated and that Emmanuel Macron is still favourite to become the next French president.
• ? Many emerging markets have started 2017 with positive momentum, but caution remains the name of the game as the Fed prepares to raise rates faster than previously expected and the future of US trade policy remains uncertain.

     

Britain,EMU and the European economy

In January 1999, 11 member countries of the European Union ‘irrevocably’ locked the foreign exchange values of their currencies to the euro, and they committed themselves to abandon their currencies in favour of the euro in 2002. As a result, these countries ceased to operate independent monetary policies. Monetary policy for the whole euro‐zone became the responsibility of the European Central Bank (ECB), whose primary objective is to maintain a low and stable rate of price inflation for the euro currency. The rules governing Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) were laid down in the treaty of Maastricht in 1992. As conditions for entry to EMU, the treaty specified ‘convergence criteria’ which consisted of upper limits for several macroeconomic aggregates including, notably, a 3 per cent maximum for the ratio of the public sector deficit to GDP and 60 per cent for the ratio of public debt to GDP.1 In February 1998 the 11 applicant countries submitted statistical analyses relating to their satisfaction of these conditions. Despite doubts as to whether some of them had strictly met the conditions, the European Commission deemed them all eligible, and the euro was launched.2 The British government, though more clearly eligible than most other EU countries on the basis of the convergence criteria, decided to defer its decision on entry. In this paper we consider the arguments for and against Economic and Monetary Union, and in particular whether it would be in Britain’s interest to join. We begin with a brief review of the state of the European economy and an analysis of the first year performance of the new Euro currency. 1 Upper limits were also set on the rate of inflation, at 1.5 percentage points above the average inflation rate of the three countries whose inflation was the lowest, and on long term interest rates, at 2 percentage points above the average of the rates prevailing in the three low inflation countries. An additional condition applied to exchange rate stability relative to the EU average for the two years prior to entry.
1 Notable cases were Belgium and Italy with debt to GDP ratios of 122.2 per cent and 121.6 per cent, respectively. Presumably, these countries were allowed membership under Article 104c(2) of the treaty which allows the debt to GDP ratio to be exceeded if ‘. . . the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching 60 per cent at a satisfactory pace’. The reader is left to judge whether Belgium and Italy fell within the ‘spirit’ of this article.
     

MODELLING LARGE OPEN ECONOMIES WITH INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES: THE USA AND EURO AREA

Empirical modelling of the linkages between the euro area and the USA requires an open economy framework. The methodology proposed in this paper achieves identification of a structural vector error correction model by supplementing restrictions from economic theory with assumptions for the direction of causality in cross‐country contemporaneous relationships. Our baseline model assumes contemporaneous causality runs from the USA to the euro area for both output and inflation, with monetary policy domestically focused. The role of the USA as leading the euro area business cycle is reinforced by our results, but strong bidirectional cross‐country interactions are uncovered for inflation and interest rates. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What drives returns to euro area housing? Evidence from a dynamic dividend–discount model

We apply a dynamic dividend–discount model to analyse housing returns for eight euro area countries comprising over 90% of euro area GDP, both individually and as a panel. A vector autoregressive model (VAR) is estimated for four variables – excess return to housing, rents, the real interest rate and real disposable per capita income – using quarterly data over the period 1978–2009. This empirical investigation – which allows for a decomposition of house price movements into movements in rent (cash-flow) and expected return news components – indicates that the bulk of the variability of euro area house price movements can be attributed to movements in fundamentals. There remains nonetheless an important but less sizeable influence of market-wide (or expected-return) variations in house prices. Country-specific estimation indicates considerable heterogeneity around the euro area result, both for what concerns long-term impacts and dynamics. Notably, changes in expected returns play a relatively strong role in the house prices of Ireland and Spain.     

Internal and external transmissions of monetary and fiscal policies in the EMU

With the introduction of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the sovereignty of national monetary institutions has been replaced by a common monetary institution, the European Central Bank (ECB) and national currencies have been replaced by a common currency, the euro. EMU therefore implies the loss of national monetary policy autonomy and internal exchange rate flexibility inside the EMU area. However, external exchange rate adjustment, i.e. adjustment of the euro exchange rate, remains a feasible adjustment mechanism. This paper analyses how internal and external exchange rate flexibility affect macroeconomic adjustment in EMU and non-EMU countries. To do so, a model is constructed in which three countries interact: two countries that decide to form a monetary union and a third country that does not participate in the monetary union. Numerical simulations of a representative example are used to characterise the adjustment dynamics induced by monetary and fiscal policies before and after the start of the EMU.     

Globalisation and monetary policy—A FAVAR analysis for the G7 and the eurozone

We assess the significance of global shocks for the world economy and national central banks and governments. More specifically, we investigate whether monetary policy has become less effective in the wake of financial globalization. We also analyze whether there is increasing uncertainty for central banks due to globalization-driven changes in the national economic structure. A FAVAR framework is applied to identify structural shocks on a world level and their effect on other global and national variables. To estimate our macroeconomic model, we employ quarterly data from Q1 1984 to Q4 2007 for the G7 countries and the euro area. According to our results, global liquidity shocks significantly influence the world economy and also various national economies. But common shocks driven by real estate prices and GDP also turn out to be significant at a global scale. These results prove to be robust across different specifications.     

Can Interest Rate Policy be Independent?

The conventional view is that interest rates are closely linked internationally and that larger countries determine monetary policy in smaller countries. In this article, Guglielmo Maria Caporale and Geoffrey Williams argue that this stylisation may not be accurate. The fundamental factors determining long-term interest rates are likely to be national rather than international. It may therefore be possible for domestic monetary authorities to pursue an independent interest rate policy indefinitely.     

Nominal interest rate policy rules and the feasibility of real interest rate control

In this paper the author builds a financial market model to demonstrate that policy aimed at reducing the variance in nominal interest rates reduces the information content of these variables. This has the undesirable effect of destabilizing real interest rates. The researcher demonstrates that nominal interest rate policy rules stabilize the component of the variance in the ex ante real interest rate attributable to the variance in the nominal rate. The variability of the expected inflation rate can, however, be increased by such policy rules, making the net effect of a nominal interest rate policy on the variance in the real interest rate ambiguous.     

When Does Government Debt Crowd Out Investment?

We examine when government debt crowds out investment for the US economy using an estimated New Keynesian model with detailed fiscal specifications and accounting for monetary and fiscal policy interactions. Whether investment is crowded in or out in the short term depends on policy shocks triggering debt expansions: higher debt can crowd in investment for cutting capital tax rates or increasing government investment. Contrary to the conventional view, no systematic relationships between real interest rates and investment exist, explaining why reduced‐form regressions are inconclusive about crowding out. At longer horizons, distortionary financing is important for the negative investment response to debt. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Low interest rate policy and the use of reserve requirements in emerging markets

This paper sheds light on the link between the interest rate policy in large advanced economies with international funding and reserve currencies (the United States and the euro area) and the use of reserve requirements in emerging markets. Using reserve requirement data for 28 emerging markets from 1998 to 2012, we provide evidence that emerging market central banks tend to raise reserve requirements when interest rates in international funding markets decline or financial inflows accelerate, most likely to preserve financial stability. In contrast, when global liquidity risk rises and funding from the large advanced economies dries up, emerging markets lower reserve requirements.     

International spillovers of (un)conventional monetary policy: The effect of the ECB and the US Fed on non-euro EU countries

We estimate a global vector autoregression model to examine the effects of euro area and US monetary policy stances, together with the effect of euro area consumer prices, on economic activity and prices in non-euro EU countries using monthly data from 2001-2016. Along with some standard macroeconomic variables, our model contains measures of the shadow monetary policy rate to address the zero lower bound and the implementation of unconventional monetary policy by the European Central Bank and the US Federal Reserve. We find that these monetary shocks have the expected qualitative effects but their magnitude differs across countries, with southeastern EU economies being less affected than their peers in Central Europe. Euro area monetary shocks have a greater effect than those that emanate from the US. We also find certain evidence that the effects of unconventional monetary policy measures are weaker than those of conventional measures. The spillovers of euro area price shocks to non-euro EU countries are limited, suggesting that the law of one price materializes slowly.