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1.
This paper develops a spatial general equilibrium model that accommodates both congestion and agglomeration externalities, while firms’ and households’ land-use decisions are endogenous across continuous space. Focusing on the interaction between externalities and land use patterns, we examine the efficiencies of first-best policies and second-best pricing and place-based strategies using numerical simulations. A first-best policy must combine both Pigouvian congestion tolling (PCT) and Pigouvian labor subsidies (PLS) instruments, or design an optimal toll (or subsidy) internalizing agglomeration externalities (or congestion externalities). We also examine second-best pricing policies if only one instrument is adopted. Congestion pricing policies alone (e.g., a partial PCT or a flat-rate toll) can improve social welfare only in heavy-congestion cities, and their welfare gains may be insignificant (e.g., below 10% of the welfare improvement achieved by first-best policies). In contrast, second-best labor subsidy policies alone are a more effective alternative to first-best policies. As to place-based policies, the firm cluster zoning (FCZ) regulation is more efficient than the urban growth boundary (UGB) policy. UGBs only have small effects on the agglomeration economy but could worsen land market distortions via residential rent-escalation effects. These findings suggest that it is important to internalize business land use decisions and relax monocentricity assumptions, in order to appreciate the interplay of both urban externalities, since spatial adaptations to policy interventions can distort system efficiencies.  相似文献   

2.
Accident externalities that individual drivers impose on one another via their presence on the road are among the most important external costs of road transport. We study the regulation of these externalities when insurance companies have market power. Some of the results we derive have close resemblance to the earlier literature on externality regulation with market power in aviation and private roads, but there are important differences, too. Using analytical models, we compare the first-best public welfare-maximizing outcome with a private profit-maximizing monopoly, and oligopoly. We find that insurance companies will internalize some of the externalities, depending on their degree of market power. We derive optimal insurance premiums, and regular parametric taxes as well as “manipulable” ones that make the companies set socially optimal premiums. The latter take into account that the firm tries to exploit knowledge of the tax rule applied by the government. Finally, we also study the taxation of road users rather than that of firms.  相似文献   

3.
Downstream Competition, Bargaining, and Welfare   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
I analyze the effects of downstream competition when there is bargaining between downstream firms and upstream agents (firms or unions). When bargaining is over a uniform input price, a decrease in the intensity of competition (or a merger) between downstream firms may raise consumer surplus and overall welfare. When bargaining is over a two-part tariff, a decrease in the intensity of competition reduces downstream profits and upstream utility and raises consumer surplus and overall welfare. Standard welfare results of oligopoly theory can be reversed: less competition can be unprofitable for firms and/or beneficial for consumers and society as a whole.  相似文献   

4.
How are prices set in the American automobile oligopoly? This paper seeks empirical estimates of the extent of departure from marginal-cost pricing and of the effects of foreign competition. The model estimated has product differentiation, multiproduct firms, and heterogeneity in consumer tastes. The estimation presumes that product type (proxied by engineering specifications) is exogenous to the price/quantity market equilibrium. Cross-section results for the 1977 and 1978 model years yield price-cost margins around 10%. Import competition has the effect of lowering equilibrium margins for compact and subcompact models.  相似文献   

5.
We consider a general equilibrium economy with public goods and externalities. Following Boyd and Conley (1997), we treat externality markets directly instead of indirectly through Arrovian commodities. Because such direct externality markets are not subject to the nonconvexities that Starrett [Starrett, D., 1972. Fundamental nonconvexities in the theory of externalities. Journal of Economic Theory 4, 180–199] shows are fundamental to Arrow’s externality markets, this new approach admits the use of largely standard methods to prove welfare and existence theorems in an economy with externalities. We extend the Boyd and Conley model to allow firms to benefit from public goods and be damaged by externalities, and to allow consumers to produce externalities. We state a first welfare theorem and prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Taken together, this can be viewed as a type of general equilibrium Coase theorem. Considered as a special case, these theorems also represent a significant generalization of existing results for pure public goods economies.  相似文献   

6.
In this paper, we investigate the social impacts of strategic transfer pricing by oligopoly firms, aiming to derive regulatory implications for transfer prices. A notable finding from our model is that the negative effects on social welfare of transfer prices being set above marginal cost are pronounced when either (1) the number of competing firms is large and the product is relatively highly differentiated or (2) the number of firms is small and the product is not very differentiated. This result indicates that even when the number of firms in the industry is significant and the market is thus apparently competitive, the authorities should not overlook the possibility that setting transfer prices above marginal cost might seriously damage social welfare if the product is highly differentiated.  相似文献   

7.
This study examines the endogenous choice of strategic contracts in a duopoly composed of firms that produce goods with network externalities with some sort of compatibility. We adopt two types of expectations—active and passive—as consumers' expectations for each firm's equilibrium market share. In addition, we take into account the managerial case and entrepreneurial case with and without separation between ownership and management, as firms' internal structures. We derive the properties in the Cournot competition and the Bertrand competition as the equilibrium market structures under both passive and active expectations under imperfectly compatibility of networks.  相似文献   

8.
I examine strategic implications of competing for consumers with self‐control problems. For investment goods, like health clubs, I find that the equilibrium sign‐up (lump‐sum) fees decrease when competition intensifies, similarly to prices in standard oligopoly models. However, the equilibrium attendance (per‐unit) price increases due to firms' deteriorated ability to take advantage of consumers' self‐control problems. Moreover, firms earn less profit due to consumers' self‐control problems—the firms have a unilateral incentive to charge per‐unit fees lower than the marginal cost; however, they cannot make up the lost margins by increasing the lump‐sum fee, due to competition. I also show that for plausible parameter regions the market adjusts to consumers' self‐control problem in such a way that firms play the standard equilibrium strategies that they would have engaged in with fully rational consumers, with identical market outcomes. Most of the results are qualitatively the same for leisure goods (for example, credit cards); however, some results are reversed: the per‐unit fees are higher than marginal cost and decrease as competition intensifies.  相似文献   

9.
Abstract. This paper surveys the contribution that recent developments in game theory have made to the understanding of oligopoly theory. It is argued that conventional models suffer from the problem that there are a number of solution concepts offered with little guidance as to which should be selected, and this is related to the static nature of the models employed. One important development in game theory has been the analysis of repeated games, and when applied to oligopoly theory this suggests that outcomes may be more cooperative than conventional theory suggests. Related to this is the requirement that firms employ credible threats to punish cheating from cooperative outcomes, and the paper examines the extent to which imperfect information may restrict the scope of firms to employ such punishments. One way in which firms may seek to make threats credible is through strategic investments, for example in production capacity, and the paper explores how competition over price or output is integrated with competition over instruments for strategic investment.  相似文献   

10.
Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly   总被引:8,自引:0,他引:8  
We consider the general problem of price discrimination with nonlinear pricing in an oligopoly setting where firms are spatially differentiated. We characterize the nature of optimal pricing schedules, which in turn depends importantly upon the type of private information the customer possesses–either horizontal uncertainty regarding brand preference or vertical uncertainty regarding quality preference. We show that as competition increases, the resulting quality distortions decrease, as well as price and quality dispersions. Additionally, we indicate conditions under which price discrimination may raise social welfare by increasing consumer surplus through encouraging greater entry.  相似文献   

11.
Antony W. Dnes&#x; 《Socio》1984,18(4):247-253
Economic activity is explicitly modelled as a set of joint production processes encompassing the generation of environmental pollution. Particular results of Leontief, generalized by Lowe, which would finance environmental protection through a number of tax or pricing schemes, are shown to be inconsistent with strictly correct definitions of national income. Qualified use of linear joint production environmental models is accepted, where these use efficiency prices and recognize data limitations. Such models can aid understanding of the costs, in terms of other goods and services foregone, of attaining particular standards of environmental protection.  相似文献   

12.
We study a model of competitive foremarkets and partly monopolized aftermarkets. We show that high aftermarket power prompts firms to engage in inefficiently aggressive below‐cost pricing in the foremarket. This inefficiency is driven by the presence of consumers with valuations below marginal cost. While for intermediate aftermarket power their presence leads to a competition‐softening effect, for high aftermarket power firms attract increasing numbers of unprofitable consumers by aggressively pricing below cost. For high aftermarket power, firms' equilibrium profits can therefore be decreasing in aftermarket power but are always higher than for low aftermarket power. If firms engage in price discrimination by bundling the foremarket and aftermarket goods or by reducing their aftermarket power, they avoid selling to unprofitable consumers but also reduce the competition‐softening effect. This decreases firms' equilibrium profits but increases consumer and social welfare.  相似文献   

13.
Congestion costs in urban areas are significant and clearly represent a negative externality. Nonetheless, economists also recognize the production advantages of urban density in the form of positive agglomeration externalities. The long-run equilibrium outcomes in economies with multiple correlated but offsetting externalities have yet to be fully explored in the literature. Therefore, I develop a spatial equilibrium model of urban structure that includes both congestion costs and agglomeration externalities. I then estimate the structural parameters of the model using a computational algorithm to match the spatial distribution of employment, population, land use, land rents, and commute times in the data. Policy simulations based on the estimates suggest that congestion pricing may have ambiguous consequences for economic welfare.  相似文献   

14.
Contrary to much of the existing literature, we obtain robust and clear-cut results for the incentives and welfare effects of information sharing when information is firm-specific. We show that firms’ incentives to share this type of information are aligned with social welfare. Whenever revealing information is the dominant strategy (such as for Cournot firms revealing costs or Cournot and Bertrand firms revealing demand), it is socially beneficial. Only cost information in Bertrand competition will not be revealed but this is socially desirable, too. These findings are independent of distributional assumptions on random shocks and signals and hold for general asymmetric oligopoly with any mixture of substitute, complementary and independent goods.  相似文献   

15.
The paper discusses long-term managerial cost pricing, thus taking into account both operating and capital costs of new plant. This approach is relevant to the public industries, oligopoly and can also be the basis for competitive pricing. The model integrates pricing and investment decisions, and incorporates, among other factors, expected future technical change and inflation. The treatment is illustrated in relation to a range of industries with very different rates of technical advance. It also discusses the reasons for the frequent failure for full potential gains from such advances to be realized and hence for sluggish economic growth.  相似文献   

16.
In the present paper a tractable two-sector growth model with technological externalities and many countries is considered. It is shown that the occurrence of indeterminacy, a typical side-product of externalities, may appear due to the enlargement of the markets for goods and factors. Various scenarios of progressive levels of integration are considered. In particular, it is found that the integration into a common market on which countries trade the produced good and the inputs may lead to indeterminacy even when the equilibrium under full autarchy is determinate. A similar result holds when integration only affects consumption and capital goods. However, such result does not occur if the inverse of relative risk aversion is a linear or concave function. We conclude that in many usual situations, as the one with CES preferences, indeterminacy and the associated fragility of expectations and financial instability, is not likely to be increased by market integration.  相似文献   

17.
A model of duopoly competition in nonlinear pricing when firms are imperfectly informed about consumer locations is analyzed. A continuum of consumers purchase a variable amount of a product from one of two firms located at the endpoints of the market. At the Nash equilibrium in quantity-outlay schedules, consumers buy the same quantities as they would from the same firm if it were a monopolist facing the same informational asymmetries, but they receive greater surplus. Hence, no efficiency gains result from competition. If consumers have the option to reveal their locations and have the firms deliver the goods, all consumers choose to reveal their locations in equilibrium. Thus, the inefficiencies from information asymmetries may not arise because firms can deliver the good to consumers. In contrast, with a monopoly seller, consumers have no incentives to reveal their locations.  相似文献   

18.
This paper shows that the congestible public goods can generate local indeterminacy in a two-sector, constant-return human capital enhanced growth model. While the productive public good exerts positive sector-specific externalities, the congestion effect generates negative aggregate externalities. The sector-specific externalities alone arising from productive public goods cannot establish local indeterminacy without the combination of negative externality in a model with social constant return technology. Congestible public good generates local indeterminacy if the degree of productive public good externality and the degree of congestion effect are large enough. The condition for indeterminacy is independent of the factor intensity rankings. The conditions are quantitatively assessed and the required parameter values for the degrees of public good externality and congestion are consistent with the estimated values in existing literature.  相似文献   

19.
Two models of the location of office activities within a city are developed. In the first model, the pattern of interoffice contacts is specified exogenously as has been traditional in the literature. In the second model the contact patterns as well as the distribution of firms are endogenous. For both models, the market equilibrium distribution of office activities is not socially optimal. Two sources for this market failure are identified in these models: (1) agglomeration economies and (2) transactional externalities arising from firm interdependence and mobility.  相似文献   

20.
Estimates of limit pricing values are useful to researchers studying princing strategies and oligopolistic behavior. Previous studies have demonstrated that limit prices (profits) can be estimated with the use of data on the entry of new firms. Unfortunately, entry data are scarce. The current study presents a methodology based on a property of dynamic-stochastic theories of limit pricing wherein limit prices can be estimated without entry data. This methodology requires the use of price elasticity of demand values which are more readily available than entry data. Following the methodology section, an application of this method is presented with a cross-section sample of consumer goods industries.  相似文献   

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