Optimal credit risk transfer, monitored finance, and banks

We examine the implications of optimal credit risk transfer (CRT) for bank-loan monitoring, and the incentives for banks to engage in optimal CRT. In our model, properly designed CRT instruments allow banks to insure themselves against loan losses precisely in those states that signal monitoring. We find that optimal CRT enhances loan monitoring and expands financial intermediation, in contrast to the findings of the previous literature. Optimal CRT instruments are based on loan portfolios rather than individual loans and have credit-enhancement guarantees, pretty much as banks do in practice. But the extent of credit enhancement needs to be precisely delimited. Above that exact level, monitoring incentives are undermined (loan quality deteriorates) and wealth is transferred from the bank's financiers to the bank. Properly designed risk-based capital requirements are shown to prevent such a wealth transfer and to provide banks with the incentive to engage in optimal CRT.     

Credit risk transfer and bank competition

We present a banking model with imperfect competition in which borrowers’ access to credit is improved when banks are able to transfer credit risks. However, the market for credit risk transfer (CRT) works smoothly only if the quality of loans is public information. If the quality of loans is private information, banks have an incentive to grant unprofitable loans that are then transferred to other parties, leading to an increase in aggregate risk. Higher competition increases welfare in the presence of CRT with public information. In contrast, welfare eventually decreases for high levels of competition in the presence CRT with private information due to the expansion of unprofitable loans. This finding coincides with the decrease in credit quality observed during the late years of the credit boom preceding the subprime crisis.     

Credit information sharing in the nexus between charter value and systemic risk in Asian banking

In this paper, we assess whether the link between charter value and systemic risk in banking is affected by credit information sharing at the country level. Using a sample of Asian listed banks, we document that banks with higher charter value exhibit lower systemic risk because these banks hold more capital. Nevertheless, we find that the self-disciplining role of charter value in banking is more pronounced for countries with lower depth of credit information sharing. Specifically, our findings also reveal that higher charter value alleviates systemic risk and increases capitalization, particularly in countries with lower quality of private credit bureaus. These findings suggest that higher charter value can be detrimental for financial stability due to an increase in bank systemic risk, particularly when private credit bureaus are of better quality. In order to overcome bank systemic risk, this paper advocates the importance of strengthening bank competition to limit charter value, in addition to promoting the development of private credit bureaus.     

我国商业银行信贷风险的成因及化解方法探析

我国金融体系仍以银行业为主导,信贷业务作为银行主要收入来源的同时,与之相应的信贷风险也成为其面临的首要风险。本文分析了商业银行信贷风险的成因,并建设性提出加强商业银行风险管理是化解商业银行信贷风险的有效手段。     

金融科技、最优银行业市场结构与小微企业信贷供给

小微企业融资问题一直备受各界关注,金融科技的发展或许会带来新变化,但相关研究尚不充分。本文构建包含贷款技术和银行业市场结构的理论模型,提出金融科技、银行业市场结构与小微企业信贷供给的关系假说。在此基础上,手工收集百度搜索指数数据,建立与银行小微企业信贷业务相关的各省金融科技发展水平指数,并利用2011-2018年省级面板数据进行相应的实证检验。研究结果表明:针对整个银行业体系,金融科技有助于促进银行小微企业信贷供给;银行业市场结构与小微企业信贷供给之间呈现“倒U”型关系,即推动银行增加小微企业信贷供给时,存在最优银行业市场结构;与此同时,金融科技发展水平将影响银行业最优市场结构,金融科技发展水平越高,促进小微企业信贷供给的最优银行业竞争程度越高。本文的研究结论能够进一步丰富小微企业信贷理论,补充中国经验证据,为促进银行小微企业信贷供给提供重要启示。     

Efficient Recapitalization

We analyze government interventions to recapitalize a banking sector that restricts lending to firms because of debt overhang. We find that the efficient recapitalization program injects capital against preferred stock plus warrants and conditions implementation on sufficient bank participation. Preferred stock plus warrants reduces opportunistic participation by banks that do not require recapitalization, although conditional implementation limits free riding by banks that benefit from lower credit risk because of other banks’ participation. Efficient recapitalization is profitable if the benefits of lower aggregate credit risk exceed the cost of implicit transfers to bank debt holders.     

Measuring systemic importance of financial institutions: An extreme value theory approach

This paper proposes a set of market-based measures on the systemic importance of a financial institution or a group of financial institutions, each designed to capture different aspects of systemic importance of financial institutions. Multivariate extreme value theory approach is used to estimate these measures. Using six big Canadian banks as the proxy for Canadian banking sector, we apply these measures to identify systemically important banks in Canadian banking sector and major risk contributors from international financial institutions to Canadian banking sector. The empirical evidence reveals that (i) the top three banks, RBC Financial Group, TD Bank Financial Group, and Scotiabank, are more systemically important than other banks, while we also find that the size of a financial institution should not be considered as a proxy of systemic importance; (ii) compared to the European and Asian banks, the crashes of the U.S. banks, on average, are the most damaging to Canadian banking sector, while the risk contribution to the Canadian banking sector from Asian banks is quite lower than that from banks in the U.S. and euro area; (iii) the risk contribution to Canadian banking sector exhibits “home bias”, that is, cross-country risk contribution tends to be smaller than domestic risk contribution.     

非银行金融科技与上市公司借贷成本——竞争压力还是信息溢出？

金融科技作为技术驱动的金融创新,是深化金融供给侧结构性改革、增强金融服务实体经济能力的重要引擎。基于我国A股上市公司数据,本文实证分析了针对中小微企业和个人的非银行金融科技发展对上市公司借贷成本的溢出效应。结果表明,非银行金融科技发展每提高10%,上市公司借贷成本平均下降1.6个百分点。进一步分析表明,这一结果同时受到“竞争压力”与“信息溢出”两种机制的作用:前者表现为在银行业竞争程度更高的地区,非银行金融科技的发展更能显著降低企业的借贷成本;后者表现为,非银行金融科技的发展能够显著降低商业银行不良贷款率,同时也能降低商业银行业务及管理费用开支。本文探索金融科技如何影响上市公司融资成本,为金融科技进一步增强金融服务实体经济能力提供了新的启示。     

中国银行业竞争与非金融企业影子银行化

本文结合非金融企业影子银行化的形成机制以及中国金融市场发展的特征事实,从“供给侧”和“需求侧”双重视角探究银行竞争如何抑制非金融企业影子银行化。以2003—2019年中国非金融上市企业为研究样本,分析发现,银行竞争能够显著降低非金融企业影子银行化。进一步以放松中小商业银行分支机构市场准入为标志事件构造准自然实验,基于双重差分法的计量结果为识别银行竞争对非金融企业影子银行化的抑制效应提供了稳健的经验证据。机制分析发现,银行业竞争通过弱化“信贷扭曲”和“监管套利”两个维度的作用机制抑制非金融企业影子银行化。异质性分析表明,银行竞争对非金融企业影子银行化的抑制作用在融资约束较高和投资机会较少的样本中尤为明显。     

The impact of bank consolidation on small business credit availability

This paper examines how banking consolidation has affected small businesses credit. Using the Survey of Small Business Finances, the empirical model examines how credit supply to small firms responds to larger banks, and whether the non-bank supply of credit has offset decreases in credit from banks. Using an empirical model to correct for sample selection, large banks are found to lower the probability of obtaining credit for small businesses, and this lower probability is not offset by increased total loans. Non-bank institutions are found to make up much, but not all, of the decrease.     

财务指标评价银行信贷风险的实例运用

纵观古今,对于全球银行业来说,信贷风险管理的好坏决定了银行的生死存亡。近年来,随着我国银行业体制改革深入,各家银行信贷业务发展迅速,但是我国银行业信贷风险管理观念薄弱,管理水平仍较低,信贷业务快速发展和风险管理相对滞后的矛盾日益凸显,国内关于银行信贷风险管理手段和技术的研究也比较落后,本文将着重从财务报表分析角度探讨财务指标在信贷风险评价中的运用,探讨财务指标在信贷风险评价中的有效性。     

气候变化冲击下的涉农信用风险——基于2010-2019年256家农村金融机构的实证研究

气候变化可能导致的经济金融风险已经成为学术界关注的热点问题。本文首先分析了气候变化引发涉农金融风险的传导机制,以2010-2019年256家农村金融机构的经营数据为样本,将标准化后的年均气温作为刻画气候变化程度的核心指标,评估农村金融机构所在县域地理单元的气候变化程度对其信用风险的影响。研究发现,年均气温波动对农村金融机构的信用风险水平存在显著影响,且影响呈现阶段性特征;在4个季度中,冬季气温的波动对信用风险的影响最为突出;虽然城商行与农商行、村镇银行均是立足于服务地方经济发展的商业银行,但由于城商行的业务在地域上和行业上更为分散,气候变化未对其信用风险水平产生显著影响。为此,提出了开展压力测试、实施差异化监管和创新风险缓释工具三个方面的对策建议。本文为管理由气候变化导致的涉农信用风险提供了政策启示和决策参考。     

What influences banks’ choice of credit risk management practices? Theory and evidence

Banks use different risk management practices with varying levels of sophistication. This paper examines the factors that determine the choice of risk-management practices. In a theoretical model, we identify two main determinants for the choice of risk management tools: bank competition and sector concentration in the loan market. We empirically test the predictions of our model using hand-collected data on the credit risk management of 249 German savings banks. The results are in line with our theory: Competition pushes banks to implement advanced risk management practices. Sector concentration in the loan market promotes credit portfolio modeling, but it inhibits credit risk transfer.     

English commercial bank liquidity, 1860-1913

This article presents new half-yearly time series for the asset ratios of commercial banks in England and Wales, 1860-1913. The series reveal new evidence on the nature of the banks' business and are, therefore, relevant to the debate on the role of banks in British economic development. The new estimates are used to examine trends and short-term changes in bank liquidity. Analysis is concerned with the changing stability of bank asset structure and with substitutability across different asset ratios. The main finding is of a sharp, long-term increase in liquidity and a concomitant decline in bank credit to the non-bank, private sector. The article also highlights the significance of short-term shocks to the trend increase in bank liquidity. The new findings are supportive of the argument that, over time, English banks became less involved with the non-bank private sector. In general, the results confirm that the English and Welsh bank asset structure became more liquid over time. However, no detailed breakdown of bank loans to the non-bank, private sector (for example, between business loans and personal loans), is available for this period. Moreover, the current study offers no evidence as to the trend in financial provision to the business sector from institutions other than the commercial banks. Nevertheless, the results are clear in showing a strong upward trend in commercial bank liquidity and a relative decline in private sector credit provision by the commercial banks.     

Shadow Banking,Risk Transfer,and Financial Stability

Shadow banking is the process by which banks raise funds from and transfer risks to entities outside the traditional commercial banking system. Many observers blamed the sudden expansion in 2007 of U.S. sub‐prime mortgage market disruptions into a global financial crisis on a “liquidity run” that originated in the shadow banking system and spread to commercial banks. In response, national and international regulators have called for tighter and new regulations on shadow banking products and participants. Preferring the term “market‐based finance” to the term “shadow banking,” the authors explore the primary financial instruments and participants that comprise the shadow banking system. The authors review the 2007–2009 period and explain how runs on shadow banks resulted in a liquidity crisis that spilled over to commercial banks, but also emphasize that the economic purpose of shadow banking is to enable commercial banks to raise funds from and transfer risks to non‐bank institutions. In that sense, the shadow banking system is a shock absorber for risks that arise within the commercial banking system and are transferred to a more diverse pool of non‐bank capital instead of remaining concentrated among commercial banks. The article also reviews post‐crisis regulatory initiatives aimed at shadow banking and concludes that most such regulations could result in a less stable financial system to the extent that higher regulatory costs on shadow banks like insurance companies and asset managers could discourage them from participating in shadow banking. And the net effect of this regulation, by limiting the amount of market‐based capital available for non‐bank risk transfer, may well be to increase the concentrations of risk in the banking and overall financial system.     

Banking systemic vulnerabilities: A tail-risk dynamic CIMDO approach

This study proposes a novel framework which combines marginal probabilities of default estimated from a structural credit risk model with the consistent information multivariate density optimization (CIMDO) methodology and the generalized dynamic factor model (GDFM) supplemented by a dynamic t-copula. The framework models banks’ default dependence explicitly and captures the time-varying non-linearities and feedback effects typical of financial markets. It measures banking systemic credit risk in the three forms categorized by the European Central Bank: (1) credit risk common to all banks; (2) credit risk in the banking system conditional on distress on a specific bank or combinations of banks; and (3) the buildup of banking system vulnerabilities over time which may unravel disorderly. In addition, the estimates of the common components of the banking sector short-term and conditional forward default measures contain early warning features, and the identification of their drivers is useful for macroprudential policy. Finally, the framework produces robust out-of-sample forecasts of the banking systemic credit risk measures. This paper advances the agenda of making macroprudential policy operational.     

A credit scoring model for Vietnam's retail banking market

As banking markets in developing countries are maturing, banks face competition not only from other domestic banks but also from sophisticated foreign banks. Given the substantial growth of consumer credit and increased regulatory attention to risk management, the development of a well-functioning credit assessment framework is essential. As part of such a framework, we propose a credit scoring model for Vietnamese retail loans. First, we show how to identify those borrower characteristics that should be part of a credit scoring model. Second, we illustrate how such a model can be calibrated to achieve the strategic objectives of the bank. Finally, we assess the use of credit scoring models in the context of transactional versus relationship lending.     

对银行信用卡业务转型及市场营销新突破的思考

信用卡最早诞生于20世纪50年代的美国，经过近六十年的发展，已经在全球范围内实现了广泛的普及和受理，是目前最为流行的银行卡支付和消费信贷金融工具。同时，作为商业银行向零售客户提供服务的重要载体和渠道，信用卡为银行源源不断地提供着丰厚且稳定拓展、维护和绑定客户关系方面发挥着重要的战略作用，被誉为最具价值的零售银行产品线。     

金融科技布局、银行信贷风险与经营绩效——来自商业银行与科技企业战略合作的证据

商业银行通过布局金融科技进行的金融服务创新,已成为深化金融供给侧结构性改革的重要举措。本文通过手工搜集2005—2019年323家商业银行与科技企业战略合作的数据,研究银行布局金融科技如何影响其信贷风险与经营绩效。结果表明：(1)银行布局金融科技战略能降低银行信贷风险,提高银行经营绩效;(2)银行布局金融科技通过提高其自身创新能力与竞争力从而降低银行的信贷风险水平;(3)银行布局金融科技,通过降低信贷风险、提升普惠金融服务、提高运营管理能力与拓展中间业务这四个渠道提高了银行经营绩效;(4)全国性银行发展金融科技使其信贷风险水平得到降低,资本充足率低的银行通过布局金融科技降低信贷风险的效果更强。同时,信用贷款比重越高的银行通过发展金融科技降低信贷风险、提高经营绩效的效果更加明显。本文研究有助于理解商业银行顺势而为所进行的金融科技布局的微观经济后果,也为进一步完善金融服务实体经济相关政策提供参考。     

Financial stability and Basel II

The Basel II Advanced Internal Ratings (AIRB) approach is compared to capital requirements set using an equilibrium structural credit risk model. Analysis shows the AIRB approach undercapitalizes credit risk relative to regulatory targets and allows wide variation in capital requirements for a given exposure owing to ambiguity in the definitions of loss given default and exposure at default. In contrast, the Foundation Internal Ratings Based (FIRB) approach may over-capitalize credit risk relative to supervisory objectives. It is unclear how Basel II will buttress financial sector stability as it specifies the weakest regulatory capital standard for large complex AIRB banks.