Foreign Direct Investment, Local Content Requirement, and Profit Taxation

We develop a partial equilibrium model of foreign direct investment (FDI) in which identical foreign firms locate themselves in a host country to compete in an oligopolistic market for a non-tradeable commodity. The host country, assumed to be small in the market for FDI, makes use of two instruments, viz., a profit tax and a local content requirement, to compete for FDI in the international market. We assume the existence of unemployment in the host country. The structure of optimal instruments and their relationship to the number, and the relative efficiency levels, of the domestic firms, are established     

外商直接投资与地方政府激励政策

地方政府在利用外资竞争中,普遍存在使用激励政策进行代价高昂的价格战的经济现象。指标考核体系形成的锦标赛机制,导致各个地方政府不断提高对外商投资者的激励政策优惠程度,竞争所产生的“囚徒困境”下会出现负和博弈的结果。文章以博弈论为框架,建立密封价格拍卖模型对其中的博弈活动进行分析,希望能对这种经济现象的成因作出一定程度的合理解释。并在此基础上提出了政策建议。     

Local Institutions,Foreign Direct Investment and Productivity of Domestic Firms

This paper examines the linkage between foreign direct investment (FDI) and the productivity of domestic firms, paying particular attention to local institutions. Using Chinese manufactures from 1998 to 2007, we find strong evidence that FDI negatively affects the productivity of domestic firms. Firm in regions with better institutions suffers more from foreign presence owing to production contraction, labor cost increases and innovation deterrence.     

Market Size,Local Sourcing and Policy Competition for Foreign Direct Investment

This paper analyzes policy competition for a foreign‐owned monopolist firm between two asymmetric countries. In particular, one country has a larger economy than the other country. At the same time, the small country produces an intermediate good for the final good production, while the large country does not. We show that whether a country will win foreign direct investment (FDI) competition is determined by the interaction between relative transport costs of intermediate and final goods and the market size of the large country relative to that of the small country; and policy competition for FDI may Pareto weakly improve national welfare of the competing countries.     

Foreign Debt,Foreign Direct Investment and Volatility

We investigate how foreign debt and foreign direct investment (FDI) affect the growth and welfare of a stochastically growing small open economy. First, we find that foreign debt influences the growth of domestic wealth by lowering the cost of capital, while FDI affects the country's welfare by providing an additional source of permanent income. Second, a decline in domestic investment may improve domestic welfare as FDI replaces the gap. Even when the welfare deteriorates, its magnitude is mitigated, leaving more room for discretionary fiscal policy. Third, a fiscal policy aimed to stabilize domestic output fluctuations needs to be conducted not to crowd out the welfare benefit of FDI too much. Fourth, an economy with both types of foreign capital experiences wider welfare swings by external volatility shocks than the one with foreign debt alone, while the welfare effects from domestic volatility shocks are mitigated. The welfare effects of fiscal shocks are much smaller with both types of foreign capital. Lastly, the first-best labor income tax covers the government absorption by the labor's share of total output, and the capital income tax covers the rest. Investment is penalized or subsidized depending on the social marginal cost-gain differential.     

外商直接投资与国家自主创新

本文将FDI(外商直接投资)和LICENSIING(技术许可)作为其潜在的渠道,建立了技术引进的模型.此模型的一个重要特征是模型中的主要假设,模型的结论以及模型的政策意义都与实际经验的观察相一致.对于包括中国在内的发展中国家(LDC)而言,技术许可比外商直接投资所带来的技术外溢更有效,在考虑制定何种政策以达到社会福利的最优化时,人力资本的水平起到了决定性的作用.     

Regional Blocs and Foreign Direct Investment

The paper examines the impact of the emergence of regional blocs on the patterns of interbloc and intrabloc trade when firms have the option to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI). For exogenously given external tariffs, when firms have the option to engage in FDI, all interbloc trade may cease—complete trade diversion that is replaced by interbloc FDI investment creation. In such an event the volume of world trade declines but this is more than offset by the increase in world output due to direct investment. The paper also investigates the optimal tariff that a trading bloc levies on imports from nonmember countries. The tariffs are restricted by the option to engage in two‐way direct investment; hence, the regional blocs are hampered from mutually harming one another through an escalation in the tariff war. Finally, the formation of two regional blocs enhances the welfare of all countries.     

Market Structure and Foreign Direct Investment

During the last decade the extent of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in the US has increased dramatically. An important aspect of industries where most FDI takes place is their high level of concentration. This paper investigates how strategic interactions among domestic and foreign producers influence the structure of the industry. Especially, it focuses on the foreign firms' choice between exporting versus servicing these markets by investing in a plant located in the host country when facing competition from a domestic oligopoly. The empirical investigation reveals that the relationship between FDI and tariffs is not as simple as previously thought. In highly concentrated industries, where strategic behavior may play an important role, high tariffs rather than low tariffs may lead to less FDI and more imports.     

外商直接投资与金融创新

改革开放20多年以为，中国与世界经济一体化迅速加快，而外商直接投资已经成为中国经济快速增长的关键因素之一。外商直接投资促进了所有制结构多元化的变迁，对中国经济制度的市场化变革提供了持续的推动力。虽然我国金融市场化改革取得了很大成就，但是金融结构和金融制度安排并没有发生实质性的变化。随着中国加入WTO，外商直接投资的深度与广度将得到很大发展，这将推动我国金融结构的金融制度安排和创新。     

Foreign Direct Investment and Environmental Taxes

Abstract. This paper studies the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on environmental policy stringency in a two-country model with trade costs, where FDI could be unilateral and bilateral and both governments address local pollution through environmental taxes. We show that FDI does not give rise to ecological dumping because the host country has an incentive to shift rents away from the source country toward the host country. Environmental policy strategies and welfare effects are studied under the assumption that parameter values support FDI to be profitable.     

Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment

Despite the growing interest in capital and technology issues, certain issues still remain to be explored regarding the determinants of foreign direct investment by a multinational corporation and the corporation's consequent choice of investment location. This paper addresses some of these concerns by analyzing the determinants of foreign direct investment by a multinational corporation, both theoretically and empirically. For this purpose, the paper integrates a number of traditional and nontraditional variables into the standard theory of investment based on the maximization of the expected value of the firm. The theoretical model implies that both traditional as well as nontraditional factors matter in determining the flows of foreign direct investment in a country. The generalized investment theory on US foreign direct investment then is tested empirically utilizing panel data for 44 countries from 1983 to 1990. The estimation results provide considerable support for the importance of both traditional and nontraditional factors in determining flows of foreign direct investment in a country. Furthermore, the country-specific dummies show high level of significance, reflecting the importance of the country-specific characteristics in explaining flows of foreign direct investment.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Contract Enforcement

A long-standing deterrent to foreign direct investment in developing countries is weak enforcement of binding contracts. A local firm may learn business skills from a cooperating multinational firm and subsequently do business on its own based on the acquired skills. In a two-period, double-moral-hazard model, non-binding contracts are shown to be preferred by all parties, implying that contract enforcement is unnecessary. Our results shed light on the puzzling phenomenon that substantial FDI has been carried out under contractual arrangements in developing countries in which contract enforcement is problematic. They can also explain some interesting stylized facts on contractual joint ventures between multinationals and local firms in the early stage of an economic transition.J. Comp. Econom.,December 1998, 26(4), pp. 761–782. School of Business, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong; and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong.     

Controlled Openness and Foreign Direct Investment

The paper investigates why a developing country may adopt a partial reform. A country is considered where the ruling elite (referred to as state capital) prevents the entry of foreign capital, and taxes the private sector before reform. A higher productivity of foreign capital always increases the attractiveness of a partial reform under which state capital can control the inflow of foreign capital, but can reduce the attractiveness of a full reform under which the entry of foreign capital is unregulated. Hence, state capital's control over foreign capital may be a necessary condition for the reform to take place at all.     

Labor Training and Foreign Direct Investment

Evidence shows that most foreign direct investment (FDI) flows from developed to developed countries (North–North) in skilled labor‐intensive industries. This paper builds a model that incorporates labor training into the proximity–concentration tradeoffs to analyze the entry mode of multinationals to a foreign country. Production requires both skilled labor and unskilled labor.. A multinational pursuing FDI needs to provide training to some workers in the host country to equip them with skills that are specific to the production of the firm. Labor training and skill specificity lead to contract friction. It is shown that in skilled labor‐intensive industries, FDI increases along with the economic development level of the host country, whereas in unskilled labor‐intensive industries, the reverse is true. This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the empirical findings on the prevalence of North–North FDI in skilled labor‐industries and North–South FDI in unskilled labor‐intensive industries.     

Strategic Foreign Direct Investment and Exchange‐Rate Uncertainty

We investigate how exchange‐rate uncertainty affects the foreign direct investment decision of a risk‐neutral multinational firm (MNF). We assume the firm can open plants, each with decreasing average costs, in two different countries. Under certainty, the MNF would open only one plant. We demonstrate that with sufficient exchange‐rate volatility, the firm can increase expected profits by opening several plants. We also show that if the MNF faces a competitor in the foreign market, the exchange risk, by inducing the MNF to open plants in both markets, may prevent entry by the local competitor.     

Direct Foreign Investment Versus Licensing

This paper examines the choice among alternative modes of direct foreign investment, namely, the wholly owned subsidiary (the S option) and joint venture (the J option), vis-à-vis licensing (the L option). The focus is on the role of moral hazard, difference in risk attitude and the prospect of the host country's policy toward the venture. An apparently surprising result is that riskiness of the project is a factor against the J option. Moreover, in the absence of policy intervention, L is dominated by either S or J, whereas if there is an anticipation of policy intervention (i.e., there is a policy moral hazard) L may emerge as the best option.     

Competing for Foreign Direct Investment

The paper analyzes 'subsidy games' between countries in order to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) from a third country. The winner of this game results from the interaction of two factors, relative country size and employment gains from FDI: a large (or 'central') country is more likely to attract FDI, and so is a country with high unemployment. The subsidy equilibrium is compared with two alternative solutions: zero subsidies and first-best subsidies. It is shown that total welfare may be greater under subsidy competition than under zero subsidies: the gains from efficient location implied by subsidy competition may more than outweigh the losses from higher subsidies. Moreover, departing from subsidy competition to zero subsidies or to first-best subsidies (without side payments) implies a gain to one country and a loss to the other. This suggests that it may be difficult to reach a consensus to move away from the status quo of subsidy competition.     

Cross‐border Mergers and Greenfield Foreign Direct Investment

This paper presents a model of international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), where FDI is comprised of greenfield FDI and mergers and acquisitions (M&A). In a monopolistically competitive environment merging firms do not reduce competition. Mergers are motivated by efficiency gains and transfer of technology. Following empirical evidence, greenfield investors are modeled as more productive than M&A firms, which are in turn more productive than exporters. The model has two symmetric countries and generates two‐way flows of both M&A and greenfield FDI. Trade liberalization makes more firms choose greenfield FDI over M&A and leads to lower productivity and welfare.     

Technology Sourcing and Strategic Foreign Direct Investment

Empirical evidence suggests that technological spillovers are limited by distance. The present paper investigates the implications of this observation for the investment decisions of a technologically leading and lagging firm, located in different countries. Technological spillovers may induce “technology sourcing” foreign direct investment by the less advanced firm, as it seeks to upgrade its technology. Our main result, however, is that there may be strong incentives for the leading firm to undertake strategic investment abroad in order to prevent technology sourcing by the lagging firm. We analyze how trade costs, the technology gap between firms, technological spillovers, and the ability of a firm to transfer technology between plants affect the two firms’ entry decisions.     

Labor Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment*

In this paper, we analyze the implications of the effective taxation of labor for profits and, hence, the decisions made by multinational enterprises concerning the location of their headquarters. If a higher employee‐borne tax burden reduces manager effort, it should also negatively affect firm profits and the location of the headquarters. We compile data on personal income tax profiles for 52 economies and the year 2002 at different moments of the distribution of gross wages. Our findings suggest that higher employee‐borne labor taxes are less conducive to the location of headquarters and foreign direct investment stocks in a given host economy.