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黄赛 《金融经济(湖南)》2009,(7):68-70
经理股票期权激励机制是一项对企业核心人员的长期激励机制,它在解决委托—代理问题,吸引和稳定人才乃至促进经济发展等方面具有较大的优越性。但是经理股票期权也是一把"双刃剑",一旦被滥用很可能会异化成经理人损害股东利益的工具。因此本文从这个角度分析了现有经理股票期权存在的问题,并提出了如何去完善它的建议。 相似文献
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浅议股票期权激励机制的缺陷 总被引：4，自引：0，他引：4
近期在我国上市公司中，在经理人激励机制方面逐渐采用股票期权激励机制，使经理人和所有者利益更加一致，使企业经营目标趋于长期化，有利于企业的长远发展。股票期权激励机制是指企业根据股票期权计划的规定，授予高层管理人员（即经理人）在一定期限内（通常为5到10年)，按约定的价格（认股价或行权价）购买本企业一定数量股票的权利。高层管理人员可以在规定时间内选择行使或放弃该权利。如果股价上涨，即行权价低于行权日的股价，行权后被授权人可以从中谋利，被授权人就会行权；反之，如果行权价高于或等于行权日的股价，行权后无利可… 相似文献
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黄赛 《金融经济(湖南)》2009,(14)
经理股票期权激励机制是一项对企业核心人员的长期激励机制,它在解决委托—代理问题,吸引和稳定人才乃至促进经济发展等方面具有较大的优越性。但是经理股票期权也是一把"双刃剑",一旦被滥用很可能会异化成经理人损害股东利益的工具。因此本文从这个角度分析了现有经理股票期权存在的问题,并提出了如何去完善它的建议。 相似文献
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股票期权：构建商业银行激励机制的有效途径 总被引：3，自引：0，他引：3
作借鉴国外经验,提出了“股票期权：根除商业银行传统薪酬弊端的良方”。对推动股票期权的必要性、合理性、科学性进行了分析研究。进而提出了商业银行在推动股票期权时应坚持的原则,还就环境塑造、规范运作、法律保证等方面提出了独到的见解。 相似文献
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股票期权激励机制及其在我国上市公司的应用 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
股票期权作为一种薪酬激励的有效方式,能较好地实现对经理人长期激励的目的。本文探讨了股票期权激励机制形成的理论依据,阐述当前我国上市公司具备实施股票期权激励机制的前提,分析股票期权方案将在我国上市公司激励机制中普遍使用,最后指出实施股票期权激励机制中需注意的关键问题。 相似文献
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股票期权的实践与探讨 总被引：4，自引：0，他引：4
李国秀 《中央财经大学学报》2001,(2):37-40
作为分配制度变革的股票期权计划，在发达国家运用已有近30年的历史，成为企业一种有效的激励机制。随着我国企业改革的深化与市场经济的确立，急需探索一条科学有效的激励机制。在我国现行的法律体系下，股票期权计划这种长期激励机制吸引了越来越多的注意力。本对我国在推行股票期权计划的实践中所产生的一些问题作了初步的探讨。 相似文献
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资本市场是市场经济的一个重要机构。通过资本市场配置资源远比国家计划部门的投资计划来得有效。资本市场降低了产权交易的交易成本，有利于资本的优化重组。同时，资本市场是股权激励机制在实施中不可缺少的配套机制。如果没有完善的资本市场，那末股权激励就会成为无源之水，无本之木。 相似文献
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股票期权制度与国有企业激励机制创新 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
在高新科学技术发展基础上，发端并成熟于新经济形态中的股票期权制度是现代企业激励机制的创新，本结合股票期权制度的内容和特点，考察了我国国有企业实施该项制度的意义，存在的问题及相关对策。 相似文献
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近年来,国内部分上市公司通过引入经理股票期权,以解决企业经营者激励问题。然而,在当前国内相关法规政策不健全,资本市场不成熟,公司治理结构不完善的大环境下,股票期权实施过程中存在诸多困难和问题。该文重点分析了实施经理股票期权激励存在的问题并提出相应的对策。 相似文献
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We estimate the short‐run stock price response to unanticipated capital expenditures. We use association study methodology to avoid the self‐selection bias in event studies and to facilitate construction of a large sample of firm‐years likely to exhibit agency problems. We find that the average price response to routine capital expenditures is negative, and that commonly used agency cost measures explain fully the negative response. Subsample results support the conclusion that the market is skeptical of cash flow financed spending by low‐q firms and even capital spending by high‐q firms when the firm is large and q is only marginally high. 相似文献
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This article considers the strengths and weaknesses of value-based management approaches based upon the residual income (RI) concept as the basis for incentive-based reward systems. The objective of these systems is to encourage optimal corporate investment selection by divisional managers and to encourage them to act as if they were independent owners of their divisions sharing a proportion of all losses and all profits. Part 1 of the article considers these systems in the light of the earlier RI debate in the 1960s and 1970s which raised a number of problems applicable to today's value-based systems. It also considers recent attempts to solve, perhaps, the major problem generated in the earlier debate—how to ensure that a single period RI is congruent with project net present value. Part 2 of the article provides a brief survey of current research into incentive systems based on RI. It then presents a possible programme of further research emphasising relevant research in finance theory. 相似文献
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Chih&#;Ying Chen† 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2003,30(7-8):941-974
A sample of firms where employee stock options and other long‐term incentives are absent but an annual bonus is required is examined. A positive relation is found between firm equity value and stock bonus but not cash bonus. The positive relation is stronger when the firm has greater investment opportunities. Additionally, the relation is shown to be nonlinear in the sense that the marginal effect of stock bonus on equity value is positive but decreasing (negative) when the stock bonus is below (above) the breakpoint. Overall, the annual stock bonus is valued positively by investors even though it is linked to the firm's contemporaneous but not future performance. 相似文献
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Firm diversification is shown to be a function of excess discretionary cash flow and managerial risk considerations. We measure firm diversification using the concentric diversification index. The index is positively related to both the number of business units in the firm and the extent to which the business firm's segments differ. Consequently, the measure provides a proxy for how firm diversification decisions impact the risk of the firm, and the measure is found to be inversely related to both total risk and unsystematic risk. Consistent with the agency arguments of discretionary cash flow, we find the level of excess discretionary funds in the firm to be a significant positive determinant of the level of firm diversification. We also find support for both a wealth transfer hypothesis over low levels of managerial ownership, and a managerial risk aversion hypothesis over high levels of managerial ownership. 相似文献
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Ettredge Michael Reed Margaret Stone Mary 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2000,15(1):57-79
Much of the agency literature assumes that various monitoring devices are partial substitutes in reducing total agency costs. In particular, internal and external auditing often are characterized as monitoring devices that should be partial substitutes. We argue that reliable evidence of this relation is lacking because prior studies using cross-sectional archival data have not carefully considered the implications of microeconomic theory of substitution for the models estimated. Our analysis leads to a reexamination of the relation using time-series data. We find no evidence that systematic substitution of internal for external auditing (or vice versa) occurred during the period 1989–1993. Further analysis indicates that the relative prices of internal and external auditing inputs did not change during the period. Therefore a necessary condition for substitution to occur did not exist. Although we do not detect substitution with our sample, the analysis and methodology we develop contribute to the literature by enhancing researchers understanding of substitution among monitoring methods. 相似文献
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Luciana Mancinelli 《European Journal of Finance》2013,19(3):265-282
Abstract This paper reports on empirical investigations into the relationship between dividend policy and ownership structure of firms, using a sample of 139 listed Italian companies. Ownership structure in Italy is highly concentrated and hence the relevant agency problem to analyse seems to be the one that arises from the conflicting interests of large shareholders and minority shareholders. This paper therefore attempts to test the rent extraction hypothesis by relating the firm’s dividend payout ratio to various ownership variables, which measure the degree of concentration in terms of the voting rights of large shareholders. The hypothesis that other non-controlling large shareholders may have incentives to monitor the largest shareholder is also tested. The results of the empirical analysis reveal that firms make lower dividend payouts as the voting rights of the largest shareholder increase. Results also suggest that the presence of agreements among large shareholders might explain the limited monitoring power of other ‘strong’ non-controlling shareholders. 相似文献
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Yimei Man 《Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance》2021,32(1):13-30
In this article, we investigate the link between agency costs (AC) and earnings management (EM) in China. We find a significant and positive relationship between AC and EM based on the static model that suggests opportunistic EM in China. However, we find an insignificant relationship between AC and EM when we use the dynamic model that takes into account the endogeneity issue. Therefore, our results provide further support to the growing literature on the concerns of endogeneity issues in corporate governance studies, since failing to take these into account can lead to spurious results. 相似文献
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本文以716家上市公司为样本,在动态内生性的框架下,运用动态面板的系统GMM估计方法,同时考虑了三种内生性,以动态性的视角,不仅研究了当期股权结构对当期代理成本的影响,还研究了股权结构与代理成本间的跨时期相互作用。通过研究,我们发现：（1）不仅当期股权结构对当期代理成本有影响,而且前期股权结构也对当期代理成本有影响,股权结构对代理成本的影响有持续期;（2）前期代理成本对当期股权结构有反馈效应;（3）股权结构与代理成本间存在动态内生性。 相似文献
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This study examines empirically the effect of managerial ownership on firms' disclosures. Agency theory predicts that investors' information requirements increase with the agency costs of the firm. Managerial ownership mitigates agency costs and therefore should reduce investors' information needs. This study tests the hypothesis that firms with lower levels of managerial ownership provide more extensive disclosures by examining analysts' ratings of firms' disclosures. In contrast to the proxies used in prior studies that test this relationship, such as the earnings-return correlation and management earnings forecasts, these ratings provide a more direct measure of firms' overall disclosure practices.I find that the relationship between managerial holdings and disclosures depends on the type of disclosure. Consistent with the hypothesis of this study, firms with lower levels of managerial ownership are more likely to receive higher ratings for the disclosures provided in their annual and quarterly reports, even after controlling for size, performance, volatility of returns, the frequency of securities offerings and proprietary costs. The more informal and flexible aspects of disclosures, however, as measured by the investor relations rating, are not influenced by the level of managerial ownership. These results are consistent with prior research that predicts that firms lower their costs of capital by signaling a commitment to maintain a more open disclosure policy. Because annual and quarterly reports are less flexible, and therefore less likely to change, they may represent a more credible commitment to provide more informative disclosures. 相似文献