What Drives Oil Prices? Emerging Versus Developed Economies

We explore the role of demand from emerging and developed economies as drivers of the real price of oil. Using a FAVAR model that identifies shocks from different regions of the world, we find that demand from emerging economies (most notably from Asian countries) is more than twice as important as demand from developed countries in accounting for the fluctuations in the real oil price and in oil production. Furthermore, geographical regions respond differently to adverse oil market shocks that drive up oil prices, with Europe and North America being more negatively affected than countries in Asia and South America. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Regional or global shock? A global VAR analysis of Asian economic and financial integration

This study employs a global vector autoregressive (GVAR) model to empirically investigate the viability of regional monetary arrangements in Asia. In marked contrast to the previous studies, we analyzed whether recent regional economic and financial integration in Asia were driven by global (U.S.) shock or regional (Japanese and Chinese) shock, using the GVAR model that allows global inter-linkages between domestic and foreign variables. By estimating generalized impulse responses of Asian economies’ real outputs and interest rates to global and regional shocks, we found that the Chinese shock exerted more real and financial influences on Asian economies than the U.S. shock. Another regional shock, i.e., the Japanese shock, had a far smaller influence on Asian economies. The relative importance of regional shocks originating from China needs to be considered when establishing regional monetary arrangements in Asia.     

Globalisation and monetary policy—A FAVAR analysis for the G7 and the eurozone

We assess the significance of global shocks for the world economy and national central banks and governments. More specifically, we investigate whether monetary policy has become less effective in the wake of financial globalization. We also analyze whether there is increasing uncertainty for central banks due to globalization-driven changes in the national economic structure. A FAVAR framework is applied to identify structural shocks on a world level and their effect on other global and national variables. To estimate our macroeconomic model, we employ quarterly data from Q1 1984 to Q4 2007 for the G7 countries and the euro area. According to our results, global liquidity shocks significantly influence the world economy and also various national economies. But common shocks driven by real estate prices and GDP also turn out to be significant at a global scale. These results prove to be robust across different specifications.     

Direct and indirect oil shocks and their impacts upon energy related stocks

We attempt to consolidate (at least in part) the vast literature on oil shocks and stock returns by decomposing the influence of oil shocks into two channels of effect: ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’. Using a simple empirical asset pricing model, it is shown that oil shocks can affect stocks not only directly, but also indirectly through general market risk (which is shown to be due in part to oil shocks), or put another way that additional oil price risk exposure is embedded in the traditional market beta. As far as is known this is the first paper explicitly quantifying both effects together. By doing so we offer a more complete picture of when and how oil shocks impact stock returns, thus allowing investors to make more informed responses to oil shocks. The results are illustrated using daily data from all (active) listed energy related stock portfolios in the Asia Pacific Region, and are robust to structural instability and the specification of oil shock used.     

The impact of oil price changes on selected macroeconomic indicators in Azerbaijan

We examine the relationship between oil price fluctuations and economic activity in Azerbaijan using vector autoregressive models for the period 2002Q1–2018Q4. Our key results are as follows. First, growth in the gross domestic product (GDP) decreases after oil price innovations in the oil and gas sector and in the remainder of the economy. Downturns (upswings) in the oil and gas sector also prompt downturns (upswings) in the non-oil sector as fluctuations in oil revenues affect the government's capacity to subsidize the rest of the economy. Second, oil price innovations also lead to higher inflation in Azerbaijan. In response to the required tightening of monetary policy, the manat appreciates against the US dollar. Finally, GDP effects are primarily seen after oil price increases, whereas the interest rate and the exchange rate mainly react to decreases. Inflation increases after both types of shocks, due to either the accommodative monetary policy stance in the case of oil price decreases or the shock itself in the case of increases.     

Investigating properties of commodity price responses to real and nominal shocks

This paper studies dynamic adjustments of 49 world commodity prices in response to innovations in the nominal exchange rate and the world real GDP. After we estimate the dynamic elasticity of the prices with respect to these shocks, we obtain the kernel density of our estimates to establish stylized facts on the adjustment process of the commodity price toward a new equilibrium path. Our empirical findings imply, on average, that the law of one price holds in the long-run, whereas the substantial degree of short-run price rigidity was observed in response to the nominal exchange rate shock. The real GDP shock tends to generate substantial price fluctuations in the short-run because adjustments of the supply can be limited, but have much weaker effects in the long-run as the supply eventually counterbalances the increase in the demand. Overall, we report persistent long-lasting effects of the nominal exchange rate shock on commodity prices relative to those of the real GDP shock.     

Price effects of steel commodities on worldwide stock market returns

We analyze the price effects of steel commodities on stock market returns in emerging and developed economies. These commodities have recently attained increased media exposure due to the rise in the U.S. steel import tariffs, which pose the threat of reducing global demand for steel products and, consequently, lowering prices abroad. However, little has been investigated on the impact of steel commodity prices on worldwide stock market returns. By performing structural VAR and GARCH techniques on a weekly-frequency time series from 2002 to 2015, we find positive and statistically significant effects of linear and non-linear steel commodity price shocks on real stock returns in the commodity markets. In the highly diversified financial markets such as U.S. and Germany, real stock returns do not significantly respond to steel commodity price shocks, although we find highly significant positive responses from developed economies such as Australia, Japan and South Korea. Results are robust to different model specifications. Our evidence suggests that higher tariffs on steel imports represent a larger disadvantage to commodity markets which are more largely impacted by steel commodity prices. We provide economic policy implications based on recent literature.     

Macroeconomic Effects of Precautionary Demand for Oil

We evaluate the macroeconomic effects of shocks specific to the oil market, which mainly reflect fluctuations in precautionary demand for oil driven by uncertainty about future supplies. A two‐stage identification procedure is used. First, daily changes in the futures–spot price spread proxy for precautionary demand shocks and the path of oil prices is estimated. This information is then exploited to restrict the oil price response in a vector autoregression. Impulse responses suggest that such shocks reduce output and raise prices. Historical decomposition shows that they contributed significantly to the US recessions in the 1990s and in the early 2000s, but not to the most recent slump. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Oil Prices and Personal Consumption Expenditures: Does the Source of the Shock Matter?

This paper studies the effect of structural oil shocks on personal consumption expenditures (PCE). First, we estimate a nonlinear simultaneous equation model, compute impulse responses by Monte Carlo integration, and conduct a test of the symmetry of the impulse response functions. We find that aggregate PCE responds asymmetrically to positive and negative oil‐specific demand shocks. Second, we find that aggregate PCE responds negatively to positive oil demand shocks, while adverse oil supply shocks are of limited effect. Third, we find important heterogeneity in the magnitude, sign and timing of the disaggregate PCE responses to structural shocks in the crude oil market. Our results clearly indicate that the response of PCE to an unexpected oil price increase depends on the source of the oil price shock. Our findings are robust to different nonlinear transformations for the real price of oil.     

The time varying effect of oil price shocks on euro-area exports

In this paper we provide novel evidence on changes in the relationship between the real price of oil and real exports in the euro area. By combining robust predictions on the sign of the impulse responses obtained from a theoretical model with restrictions on the slope of the oil demand and oil supply curves, we identify oil supply and foreign productivity shocks in a time varying VAR with stochastic volatility. We find that from the 1980s onwards the relationship between oil prices and euro area exports has become less negative conditional on oil supply shortfalls and more positive conditional on foreign productivity shocks. Using the theoretical model we show that our empirical findings can be accounted for by (i) stronger trade relationship between the euro area and emerging economies (ii) a decrease in the share of oil in production and (iii) increased competitive pressures in the product market.     

Trilemma policy convergence patterns and output volatility

We examine the development of open macroeconomic policy choices among developing economies from the perspective of the powerful “trilemma” hypothesis. We construct an index of divergence of the three trilemma policy choices, and evaluate its patterns in recent decades. We find that the three dimensions of the trilemma configurations are converging toward a “middle ground” among emerging market economies, equipped with managed exchange rate flexibility, underpinned by sizable holdings of international reserves, and intermediate levels of monetary independence and financial integration. We also find emerging market economies with more converged policy choices tend to experience smaller output volatility in the last two decades. Emerging markets with relatively low international reserves/GDP could experience higher levels of output volatility when they choose a policy combination with a greater degree of policy divergence while this heightened output volatility effect does not apply to economies with relatively high international reserves/GDP holding.     

Leaning into the Wind: A Structural VAR Investigation of UK Monetary Policy*

This paper adapts Uhlig's [Journal of Monetary Economics (2005) forthcoming] sign restriction identification methodology to investigate the effects of UK monetary policy using a structural vector autoregression (VAR). It shows that shocks which can reasonably be described as monetary policy shocks have played only a small role in the total variation of UK monetary and macroeconomic variables. Most of the variation in UK monetary variables has been due to their systematic reaction to other macroeconomic shocks, namely non‐monetary aggregate demand, aggregate supply, and oil price shocks. We also find, without imposing any long run identifying restrictions, that aggregate supply shocks have permanent effects on output.     

Monetary policy for rationally inattentive economies with staggered price setting

The paper examines the optimal monetary policy when firms are constrained by information processing capability and infrequent price adjustments. Firms' information processing limit gives rise to imperfect knowledge about macroeconomic aggregates and endogenous information learning contingent on the monetary policy. Staggered price setting introduces the observed price duration and additional policy tradeoffs resulting from the interactions between nominal rigidities and imperfect information processing. The integrated model implies an optimal policy that commits to complete price stabilization in response to natural rate shocks but not in response to markup shocks. In the presence of markup shocks, it is optimal for the central bank to focus on price stabilization in the initial periods following markup shocks and shifts the emphasis to output gap stabilization later. Moreover, larger information capacity, stronger complementarities and more persistent shocks require more aggressive price stabilization in the short-run.     

Macroeconomic Uncertainty and Oil Price Volatility

This paper shows that higher macroeconomic uncertainty causes higher oil price volatility. Regimes of low and high uncertainty are identified in a threshold VAR model in which the effects of structural oil demand and supply shocks are estimated. The results show that higher macroeconomic uncertainty, as measured by global industrial production volatility, significantly increases the sensitivity of oil prices to shocks in oil demand and supply. This occurs as uncertainty lowers the price elasticity of oil demand and supply. The difference in the estimated oil price elasticities is economically meaningful as the price impact of a similar change in oil production might double when it hits the economy in uncertain times. As such, varying uncertainty can explain why oil price volatility is typically higher during periods such as financial crises and recessions, and why oil price volatility changes over time more generally.     

Markov Switching Oil Price Uncertainty

We investigate whether the United States economy responds negatively to oil price uncertainty and whether oil price shocks exert asymmetric effects on economic activity. In doing so, we relax the assumption in the existing literature that the data are governed by a single process, modifying the Elder and Serletis (2010) bivariate structural GARCH‐in‐Mean VAR to accommodate Markov regime switching in order to account for changing oil price dynamics over the sample period. We find evidence of asymmetries, against those macroeconomic theories that predict symmetries in the relationship between real aggregate economic activity and the real price of oil.     

Income diversification and bank risk in Asia Pacific

This paper investigates the effect of income diversification on bank risk for a large sample of commercial banks in 14 Asia Pacific economies over the period 2011–2016. Using a dynamic panel data model with a system generalized methodof moments estimator, we find that banks with a higher level of income diversification are less risky in general. We further consider both developed and emerging economies according to the International Monetary Fund's classification of the level of economic development. Specifically, for emerging economies, the results indicate that banks with a higher level of income diversification face less risk. However, the diversification of commercial bank income has no significant impact on bank risk in developed Asia Pacific economies.     

全球向量自回归模型的理论、方法及其应用

全球向量自回归模型(GVAR)是将经典VAR模型加以扩展,使其能够用于分析世界各国或各地区之间经济联系的一种新的模型方法。本文阐述GVAR模型的理论、方法及其在中国经济分析中的应用。基于包含33个国家的GVAR模型,本文实证分析了中国与世界经济的相互影响。通过一般冲击反应函数方法分析中国需求冲击、美国需求冲击、美国债券市场价格和国际油价变动等冲击对中国和其他国家经济增长以及通货膨胀的传导机制、影响强度、持续时间等。结果显示,中国需求冲击对美国、欧元区、日本等主要工业化国家有显著影响,同时中国经济也受到美国债券价格变动较强烈的冲击。     

The transmission of foreign shocks to South Eastern European economies: A Bayesian VAR approach

The paper analyses the macroeconomic effects of foreign shocks in three South-East European (SEE) economies: Croatia, Macedonia and Bulgaria. In this regard, we investigate the transmission of several eurozone shocks (output gap, money market rates and inflation) on various macroeconomic variables in the aforementioned countries (output, inflation, money market rates and budget deficits). We trace the effects of foreign shocks on the basis of impulse response functions obtained from the Bayesian Vector Auto Regressions (VARs) separately for each country. The main findings from our study are: first, economic expansion in the eurozone has strong output and inflation effects on SEE economies, implying some degree of synchronization of business cycles; second, eurozone inflation is instantly and to a great extent transmitted to domestic inflation, suggesting that inflation in the SEE economies is mostly driven by foreign inflation; third, domestic money market rates are not closely linked with eurozone money markets; fourth, monetary policy in the SEE countries does not seem to be responsive to eurozone inflation shocks; and fifth, the fiscal authorities attempt to offset the spillover effects from both economic expansion and monetary tightening in the eurozone.     

How should monetary policy respond to changes in the relative price of oil? Considering supply and demand shocks

This paper examines optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model where supply and demand shocks affect the price of oil. Optimal policy fully stabilizes core inflation when wages are flexible. The nominal rate rises (falls) in response to the demand (supply) shock. With sticky wages core inflation falls (rises) in response to the demand (supply) shock. Impulse response functions from a VAR estimated with post-1986 U.S. data show minimal movement in core inflation in response to both shocks. The federal funds rate rises (falls) in response to the demand (supply) shock, consistent with the predictions from the theoretical model for policy that stabilizes core inflation.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

Events in the Gulf have finally brought an end to the world economic boom of the last eight years. The oil price shock itself is only partly responsible for the downturn. The previous tightening of monetary policy in the face of inflationary pressures and the end of a rapid period of credit and asset price expansion had severely weakened the ability of some economies to respond to the shock. This is reflected in the diversity of response, most obviously in the United States where Fed fine tuning and the credit crunch have already weakened the economy. The rise in oil prices has led to a sudden collapse in consumer confidence and a swift cutback in output. Although we do not expect the recession to be deep, the financial problems will delay recovery. The Japanese economy was already in financial difficulties before the shock, although the real economy was stronger and here we expect a sharp deceleration from almost 6 per cent growth last year to around 3.5 per cent. In contrast the German economy, partly shielded by the substantial appreciation of the DM over the last year, has been affected less by the oil price shock and we expect the consumer and investment boom to continue this year as the economies merge. This provides a welcome boost to other European economies.