An empirical analysis of the nexus between external balance and government budget balance: The case of the GIIPS countries

The present study investigates the causality relationship between the external (trade and current account) balance and government budget balance for five countries of the euro area's Mezzogiorno, namely Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. These countries, due to their weak economic and financial performances, have been labelled the GIIPS group. The analysis is implemented using two methodologies: the traditional Granger test and the approach developed by Toda–Yamamoto. The results reveal homogeneity in using both approaches and give support to the Ricardian theory, according to which there is no clear nexus between budget-current account balances and budget-trade balances. This implies that fiscal austerity could help the five peripheral countries to conform to the budget deficit criteria as established by the Stability and Growth Pact, but would not be effective in restraining external deficits.     

On the relationship between the current account and the fiscal balance: The case of Canada

This paper uses an Autoregressive Distributed Lag model to examine the long run and short run relationship between the current account and the fiscal balance, as well as other determinants, using Canadian quarterly data from 1981 to 2018. The results indicate that there is a long-run cointegrating relationship between the current account and the fiscal balance, investment, and private credit. Moreover, the relationship between the current account and the fiscal balance is positive in the long-run, thus providing support for the Keynesian Hypothesis of the fiscal balance driving the current account. Specifically, a one percentage point rise in the fiscal balance to GDP ratio yields a 0.43 percentage point rise in the current account as a percent of GDP. This positive relationship is present in the short-run as well. Finally, the findings from the error correction model yield a speed of adjustment of 0.225, hence 22.5% of the long-run adjustment in the current account occurs next period.     

The Feldstein–Horioka Puzzle and Twin Deficits in Selected Countries

Hysteresis (unit root) of the current account, fiscal balance, and investment shares is found for the majority of industrial countries as well as selected emerging and transition economies between 1970 and 2001. Twin deficits are defined as a positive long-run relationship between the current account and the fiscal balance. The paper provides evidence for twin deficits in several countries, although we can see differences between the 1980s and the 1990s. Investment in some EU countries is financed to a relatively high degree at the international financial markets implying that the Feldstein–Horioka puzzle is less important in the EU.     

Economic fundamentals and Eurozone sovereign spreads: will the good news continue?

Spreads between government bond yields in the Eurozone periphery and Germany have fallen to the lowest levels in 3 to 4 years. There are two major factors behind this. The first is the speech by ECB President Mario Draghi on 26 July 2012 promising ‘to do – within its mandate – whatever it takes’ and the ECB's Outright Monetary Transactions initiative of summer 2012. This has been successful in eliminating fears of an imminent Eurozone break‐up. The second factor is the improvement in economic fundamentals in the periphery countries, particularly in Ireland, Spain and Greece. Previous econometric work on the role of economic fundamentals at the country level has focused almost entirely on government debt and government deficit to GDP ratios. The true fundamentals have been obscured by market panics and by the fact that markets really only took full account of these fundamentals from the end of 2010. Before the middle of 2007, markets ignored the build‐up of stresses between Eurozone countries. Once amplification of perceived risks by market panics and the shift from inattention to full market attention are taken into account, a far more nuanced picture emerges of what country fundamentals really matter for sovereign spreads. In addition to excessive government debt, deteriorating competitiveness, excessive private debt, and housing market crises spilling into banking systems, have been especially prominent in the countries at the periphery. In Ireland and Spain, declining relative unit labour costs and the fading of the housing crisis have recently been important in narrowing spreads against Germany. The econometric model also suggests that good news on relative growth and inflation help narrow spreads. Prospects for further narrowing of spreads for Greece and especially for Spain look good. Once the current bout of falling spreads is over, the underlying picture suggested by the estimated model is less good for Ireland, Italy and Portugal and for the euro area core economy, France. In all four cases, the government debt to GDP ratio has been deteriorating, and for France and Italy, competitiveness has not improved significantly. For France, another factor is the rising level of the private debt to GDP ratio. For Ireland, scope is limited for the effect on the spread of further improvements in competitiveness and housing market recovery.     

日本震后财政赤字的评判

日本大地震导致的核危机进一步引发国际市场对日本财政赤字隐忧的担心,普遍观点认为其财政赤字会进一步恶化,进而引起债务危机。通过对日本财政赤字的结构性分析可以看出,日本财政支出占比GDP的根本指标长期稳定,且导致已有财政赤字和债务的原因在于日本长期执行低税率,同时地震影响对其国内经济发展有一定局限性。     

SURPLUSES AND DEFICITS

The US economy has twin deficits: internal (the budget deficit) and external (the current account). In sharp contrast, the UK combines a PSBR surplus with a rising current account deficit. Japan and West Germany both enjoy large current surpluses, though in Japan the public sector deficit is narrowing whereas in Germany it is rising. Remarkably, as Figure 1 shows, the present position on the public sector and overseas balances in each of the three major OECD economies and the UK is quite different. Japan is the mirror image of the US: the budget and overseas balances have been moving in the direction of surplus - private sector savings have been more stable. For the UK and West Germany (though again as images of one another) it is movements in private sector savings which have driven the current account. How has this come about?     

THE 1992 BUDGET FOUR LEGS GOOD; TWO LEGS BETTER

In framing his Budget, the Chancellor, Mr. Lamont, sought to balance two mutually exclusive goals: the political imperative of establishing the Conservatives as the party of low taxation on the one hand; the deterioration in the financial position of the public sector on the other. Inevitably the Budget fell between these two stools. The net cut in taxes, though cleverly angled towards the low paid, was a modest £2.2bn, 0.4 per cent of GDP, which is unlikely to 'buy' many votes on 9 April. This may largely free the Government of the charge of trying to bribe the electorate, yet it still leaves the PSBR at £28bn in the coming financial year, £36bn excluding privatisation receipts, which is equivalent to 6 per cent of nominal GDP. Over the medium term Mr. Lamont reaffirmed the Government's commitment to a balanced budget, though on the Treasury projections this is not achieved by 19967, despite the assumption that growth averages 3.5 per cent a year from 1993 onwards. On our calculations, a return to budget balance is unobtainable even on the Treasury's optimistic growth projections without a move to tighter fiscal policy. The Conservatives' maxim that 'budget balance is good; budget deficits are bad' may not have been formally jettisoned, but it is in the process of being re-written as 'budget balance is good; budget deficits are better, as long as they are prudent'.     

Forecast Summary

In comparison with our February forecast, we are more optimistic on the prospects for output and unemployment both this year and into the medium term. But in consequence we have raised our forecast for the current account deficit. GDP growth, nearly 5 per cent last year, falls back to 3½ per cent this year and 2½ per cent in 1989; from 1990 onwards output is expected to increase at its underlying trend of 3 per cent. Inflation is currently rising but, as output decelerates, it peaks at 5 per cent and drifts gradually lower over the medium term. The current account deficit is projected at £5bn both this year and next; helped by a steadily depreciating exchange rate, which boosts exports, the deficit narrows from 1990 onwards.     

Do independent fiscal institutions cause better fiscal outcomes in the European Union?

This paper explores the budgetary implications of the independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) in the European Union (EU). We employ a dynamic panel model for the period 2000–2019 and find that these fiscal watchdogs have a positive and significant influence not only on government budget balance for the EU member states, resulting in smaller government budget deficits, but also on countries’ compliance with fiscal rules, results that hold across alternative fiscal balances. IFIs appear to have a beneficial impact on fiscal performance and compliance with numerical targets in countries with poorly designed fiscal responsibility norms but weaker influence when fiscal rules are less binding (well-designed fiscal rules). The findings remain significant regardless the year of accession to the EU (old vs. new members) or euro-area status (euro-area vs. non-euro-area members). However, we document that IFIs play a larger role in countries that established these monitoring bodies before 2013, indicating that experience matters in IFI performance. Also, our findings show that the influence of IFIs remains if we take into account institutional reforms in which their mandates were extended with different powers and tasks, which has a positive and significant effect on fiscal balances. Moreover, we find that, under the circumstance of systemic and banking crises, these institutions are associated with improved fiscal outcomes, reflecting their increased concern about the path of public finances and their role in reducing budgetary forecasting biases. Our results are robust to a variety of specifications and models, including alternative measures of the government budget balance and after controlling for a set of institutional characteristics and for potential endogeneity in the estimations.     

Impact of China's currency valuation and labour cost on the US in a trade and exchange rate model

Ricardian dynamic general equilibrium analyses show that under free trade arrangements a low income country with lower wage cost and large endowment of labour has comparative advantage in trade. Efficiency gains from this enhance economic growth and welfare of households simultaneously in both low income and advanced economies. Theoretical predictions are empirically validated here with structural VAR analysis based on quarterly data over the time period 1995:1 to 2009:1 on China's relative wage cost, interest rate differential, real effective exchange rate (REER), relative GDP and the US current account balance. It is shown how the relative prices of labour, capital and the currency affect the economic activity in China and current account balance in the US. With free capital inflows and outflows and restrictions on labour mobility, comparative advantage of China and the trade deficit of the US will both be minimised if China allows real appreciation of the Yuan and complete adjustment in prices. Higher production cost and prices in China could reduce welfare of Chinese households and the trade imbalance of the US, while higher relative GDP of China lowers the current account balance for the US.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

In October we forecast 1 per cent output growth in 1993 accompanied by little change in retail price inflation, an increase in unemployment to 3.2 million by the end of the year and a £20bn deficit on the current account of the balance of payments. Since then we have revised our view of the international outlook and the Chancellor has made his Autumn Statement. There are also some hopeful signs in the latest data on retail sales, manufactured exports and the money supply that demand may be picking up both domestically and overseas. How do these developments affect our short-term forecast? The simple answer is very little: the outlook on output and inflation in 1993 is barely changed since October (Table I). We have lowered our forecasts for world inflation and for German interest rates which means that the pound can be held steady against the DM at lower UK interest rates and that the inflationary consequences of devaluation, though significant, are slightly less over the medium term than we made out in October. There is one revision of major significance, and that relates to the PSBR, which is now likely to reach f45bn in 1993-4, more than 7per cent of nominal GDP. The change is not on the spending side - the Autumn Statement confirmed existing expenditure plans - but on revenues, notably corporate taxes and tares 011 spending, which have fallen far more quickly than we envisaged. This, in combination with a projected near-2'per cent of GDP deficit on the balance of payments, poses a difficult medium-term policy dilemma. To escape from the twin deficits requires either deflation of demand, which conflicts with the Government's new-found commitment to growth, or a more buoyant economy to boost tax revenues and a competitive pound to underpin export-led growth. Of the two the latter is self-evidently more inflationary. This highlights the policy dilemma: at some stage the Government may have to choose between reducing the deficits and its 1–4 per cent inflation target or sacrifice its commitment to growth.     

The impact of fiscal positions on government bond yields in CEE countries

This paper investigates the influence of government debt and primary balance on long-term government bond yields in 10 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in the period 2000–2013. The results indicate that a one percentage point increase in the stock of government debt is associated with an increase in government bond yields of 2.7–4 basis points, while a one percentage point increase in the primary deficit to GDP ratio is associated with an increase in government bond yields of 12.9–24.3 basis points. We also find evidence of non-linearities in the debt-interest rate relationship, whereby the threshold after which the impact of debt turns from negative to positive is significantly lower than in advanced economies.     

A nonlinear investigation of the twin deficits hypothesis over the business cycle: Evidence from Turkey

In this paper, we analyze the twin deficits hypothesis covering the period from 1994 to 2012 in Turkey. In contrast to previous studies on Turkey, the existence of twin deficits is investigated by regime-dependent impulse response functions and forecast error variance decompositions based on a multivariate two-regime threshold VAR (TVAR) model. Our results suggest that the dynamics between the current account and budget account variables are affected by macroeconomic activity: twin deficits are only the case in the upper regime, when the economy operates above its potential level. When the economy is in the lower regime, budget and trade deficits show divergent movements. The results are consistent with Kim and Roubini (2008), indicating that the divergence of fiscal balance and current account might be explained by the cyclical fluctuations of output.     

THE UK'S PERSISTENT TRADE DEFICIT

The UK current account deficit reached a peak in excess of £20bn in 1989, equivalent to 4 per cent of GDP. In the next two years, as recession took its toll of domestic spending, it shrank quickly - on the latest data the deficit was only £4.4bn last year, 3/4 per cent of nominal GDP. Over the same period the trade gap narrowed front £25bn to £10bn, in each case taking the deficit back to the levels of 1987, before the late 1980s' boom really got under way. Since 1989, therefore, both 011 trade and the current account, there has been a significant reduction in the external deficit. Yet it remains the case that, despite the length of the recession - non-oil GDP has fallen for six successive quarters - the current account is still in deficit. Moreover, despite there being no concrete data to point to the beginnings of recovery, the shortfall is widening. The low point was the second quarter of last year, with a rare current surplus recorded in June, since when the trade deficit has steadily widened again as the consequence primarily of a 5.5per cent increase in the volume of imports over the last 12 months. Why is it that, in contrast with the experience in the 1980-81 downturn, this recession has not produced a trade or even a current account surplus? Does this mean that the recovery, when it does come, will inevitably widen the deficit with the possible consequence that ‘balance of payments problems’ will undermine the pound inside the ERM? We conclude that, while it is disappointing that UK producers have not managed to claw back more of the domestic market - in contrast with the experience of exporters in world markets - our forecast of a current account deficit of 0–2 per cent of GDP should be relatively easily financed and will riot therefore cause serious problem for economic policy. This conclusion would riot necessarily hold if the recovery occurs more rapidly than we expect arid sucks in a greater volume of imports. It may be the case that the UK will continue to run a current deficit with Japan in particular as the counterpart to ongoing Japanese direct investment in this country.     

The determinants of austerity in the European Union 2010–16

This paper aims at decteting what drove the adoption of austerity policies over the period 2010–16 in a panel of 28 European countries. Austerity is identified by year increases in the ratio between the structural primary balance and potential GDP. By means of principal component factor analysis we select the aggregate factors that might affect austerity, namely (i) fiscal consolidation (correction of high deficits and debts), (ii) market discipline (high sovereign spreads, low ratings), (iii) rule-based fiscal discipline (compliance with the Eurozone rules), and macroeconomic stabilisation (consideration for the cyclical position of the economy). Then we estimate a dynamic panel model with the system-GMM method. Results show that the most important contributions to austerity are provided by the market discipline and fiscal consolidation factors together with Excessive Deficit Procedures, with no significant role played by concomitant macroeconomic conditions. Overall, governments complied with orthodox fiscal principles and rules.     

An exploratory empirical inquiry into the impact of federal budget deficits on the ex post real interest rate yield on ten year Treasury notes over the last half century

Using over a half century of data, this exploratory empirical study adopts a simple loanable funds to investigate the impact of the federal budget deficits on the ex post real interest rate yield on 10 year Treasury notes. For the period 1960–2012, an autoregressive 2SLS estimate finds that the ex post real interest rate yield on 10 year U.S. Treasury notes is an increasing function of the ex post real interest rate yield on Moody’s Baa-rated corporate bonds, the ex post real interest rate yield on 3 year Treasury notes, and the ex post real interest rate yield on high grade municipal bonds. This exploratory analysis also finds that federal budget deficit (relative to the GDP level) exercised a positive and statistically significant impact on the ex post real interest rate yield on 10 year Treasury notes, a finding consistent with a number of earlier studies of shorter time periods     

Forecasting Australia’s economic performance during the Asian crisis

During the Asian economic crisis of 1997–98, published forecasts from a Bayesian vector autoregressive (BVAR) model consistently indicated that the crisis would have little or no effect on Australia’s economic performance, despite the deterioration in the trade balance. The worsening trade deficit led many other forecasters to predict a sharp fall in Australia’s GDP growth rate, as the countries most severely affected by the crisis represent over 60 percent of Australia’s export markets. This paper argues that the more pessimistic forecasts attached too much weight to the links between Australia’s external accounts and GDP growth. In particular, I show that forecasts for the period September 1997 to December 1998, conditional on the actual path of the merchandise trade balance, predict higher inflation and interest rates than unconditional forecasts from a model without the trade balance. There does, however, appear to be useful information in the individual components of the trade deficit. Conditioning on the actual paths of both exports and imports generally produces more accurate forecasts than conditioning on net exports. In particular, conditioning on the trade balance results in the least accurate forecasts for inflation and interest rates of any of the models considered here. On the other hand, conditioning on the individual trade flows produces the most accurate forecasts for inflation, and the second-most accurate for interest rates. Taken together, the results presented here lend support to the argument that Australia’s trade flows represent the outcomes of optimizing decisions, rather than defining constraints on economic growth.     

Short‐term monitoring of fiscal policy discipline

Under the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), European Union (EU) Member States commit themselves to avoid excessive deficits over 3% of GDP and to pursue the medium‐term objective of budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus. The SGP also provides regulation for the surveillance of budgetary positions. An analysis of tools for the surveillance of budgetary positions is the focus of this paper. In particular, it addresses two open issues in the empirical public finance literature which are crucial for monitoring fiscal policy discipline in the EU. First, the estimation of the structural component of the fiscal balance ratio. Second, the computation, when only annual fiscal data are available, of quarterly budget balance ratios, using relevant information from quarterly measured macroeconomic series. An econometric model that addresses both issues is presented and estimated. Additionally, this modelling framework allows us to answer questions such as: what is the safety margin that will prevent a particular country from reaching, with certain probability, a budget deficit that breaches the 3% upper bound? Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why big fiscal deficits and low inflation can coexist

• ▀ The surge in government debt caused by ballooning fiscal deficits is a necessary response to the coronavirus crisis. But we doubt this will lead to a burst of inflation in the advanced economies (AEs), let alone a debt crisis.
• ▀ Our fiscal forecasts assume AEs’ budget deficits averaged 20% of GDP or so in Q2. However, our deficit forecasts point to a sharp narrowing thereafter and for public debt as a share of GDP to peak in 2021.
• ▀ The risks around this forecast skew firmly towards deficits remaining wide, reflecting the balance of risks around our GDP forecasts and the possibility that governments allow some fiscal slippage.
• ▀ A slower narrowing of fiscal deficits than we forecast wouldn't automatically lead to a period of above-target inflation. Indeed, we wouldn't be surprised if larger-than-expected deficits were associated with weak inflation.
• ▀ High levels of corporate debt and weak labour markets raise the risk of private sector retrenchment ahead. In that case, large and sustained fiscal deficits may be needed to fill the vacuum and prevent GDP and inflation from falling. As has been the case in Japan over the past 25 years, large deficits over coming years could be associated with weak GDP growth and below-target inflation.
• ▀ If economies begin to overheat but governments keep fiscal policy loose, inflation could, of course, pick up. But central bank tightening would offset it. We believe the risk of sustained inflation overshoots is limited unless monetary policy were made subservient to governments’ own objectives. And we think the risk of central banks losing independence remains slim.

     

Deficits,expected deficits,financial markets,and the economy

This paper assesses the implications of U.S. budget and current account deficits for financial and economic stability. The primary focus is on the behavior of interest rates in response to deficits, then effects on the economy through the financial system. The paper argues, and shows with empirical evidence, including from a large-scale econometric model, that expected, but not realized, budget deficits affect interest rates. Under certain circumstances, particularly near full employment, sustained budget and current account deficits can lead to financial disarray and a severely constrained economy.