Hayek and the General Theory ∗

Abstract

Hayek did not review the General Theory, but he criticized it in Profits, Interest and Investment (1939 Hayek, F. A. 1939. “Profits, interest and investment”. In Profits, Interest and Investment, London: Routledge & Sons.  [Google Scholar]) and in part IV of The Pure Theory of Capital (1941 Hayek, F. A. 1941. The Pure Theory of Capital, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.  [Google Scholar]). First, he showed that only exceptionally does greater consumption favour investment and employment. Second, he rejected Keynes's liquidity preference and maintained that only in an ‘extreme case’ might it be said that Keynes's theory of the rate of interest is valid. Although he correctly identified the gist of Keynes's theoretical innovation, his criticisms were already implicitly answered in the General Theory.     

A symposium on Theodore Burczak’s, Socialism after Hayek

What does socialism after Hayek look like? Ted Burczak provides one highly intriguing answer.     

A brief note concerning Hayek’s non-standard conception of knowledge

Whatever F.A. Hayek meant by “knowledge” could not have been the justified true belief conception common in the Western intellectual tradition from at least the time of Plato onward. In this brief note, I aim to uncover and succinctly state Hayek’s unique definition of knowledge.     

F. A. Hayek’s influence on Nobel Prize winners

F.A. Hayek’s broad research program has led some to conclude that his impact on economics has been minimal. This citation study examines the frequency of Nobel laureates cited by other laureates in the official Prize Lectures to understand how elite economists influence other elite economists. It finds that Hayek is the second most frequently mentioned laureate in the Prize Lectures, and he has the second most publication citations of the laureates. Hayek’s influence on the top tier of economists is substantial.

Hayek’s monetary theory and policy: A note on alleged inconsistency

Challenging the dominant view, we claim that Hayek’s monetary views did not significantly change over his lifetime. The prevalent perception of early Hayek as a money stream stabilizer and late Hayek as a price level stabilizer is attributable to an unjustified normative interpretation of Hayek’s positive analysis. We argue that in his contributions to monetary theory, Hayek took the goals of monetary policy as exogenously given and analysed the efficiency of different means of achieving them. Hayek’s allegedly inconsistent transformation from a critic to an advocate of price level stabilization is explained by a change of issues under his focus, rather than by a change in his positive views. We also claim that Hayek was always aware that every practical monetary policy involves difficult trade-offs and that he was therefore reluctant to impose his own value judgments on what people should strive for.     

A Methodological Reflection on the “Thick Socialism” of Socialism after Hayek

This article discusses the valuable contribution that Ted Burczak's Socialism After Hayek makes to the Marxist theory of socialism by drawing on the Hayekian appreciation of markets as processes of discovery. But the article also critiques the book's acceptance of Hayek's exclusive reliance on markets as a mode of economic organisation. The article reflects on the methodological conditions that might have led the book down a path of market essentialism.     

Is market liberalism adaptive? Rethinking F. A. Hayek on moral evolution

Hayek’s social theory of evolution suggests that market liberal morality is adaptive for social groups. He justified the evolutionary superiority of market liberalism by asserting that groups operating under a market liberal morality would have a higher capacity to expand and reproduce than groups with alternative tribal moralities. Thus, market liberal groups would be favoured through cultural and genetic group selection. But in fact, market liberal morality reveals maladaptive tendencies and remains insufficiently powerful to create adaptive social groups. Hayek’s dismissal of moral tribalism in favour of market liberal morality is found to underestimate the importance of tribal goals in the evolutionary system.     

The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek’s legacy

This paper is organized as follows: first, we show that the reference to the notion of group selection is coherent with the other parts of Hayek’s thought. Second, we develop the idea that recent works in terms of the emergence and evolution of social norms corroborate in part Hayek’s theses in this domain. Finally, we put to the fore some drawbacks in Hayek’s approach and propose means to solve them.

Hayek and the Great Depression of 1929: Did he really change his mind?

The aim of this research is to establish whether, and if so in what way, Hayek changed his mind about the Great Depression of 1929.The work is divided into two parts. In the first part, I present the ‘early’ Hayek of the 1930s. Hayek was the great rival of Keynes. Both explained the Great Depression, applying opposing business cycle theories. For Keynes, the crisis was caused by an excess of saving over investment; for Hayek, on the contrary, by an excess of investment over saving. In the early 1930s, Röpke attempted a synthesis, positing that a recession due to overinvestment can degenerate, as in 1929, into a depression caused by oversaving. Hayek examined and rejected Röpke's theory. In the second part, I present the ‘later’ Hayek of the 1970s. After years of silence and solitude, Hayek was unexpectedly awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, precisely for the contribution he made in the 1930s to the theory of the business cycle. Hayek returned to his pursuit of the ghost of Keynes, debated with his friend and rival Friedman, re-examined Röpke's special case and, according to Haberler, changed his mind. In my conclusion, I attempt to resolve the dilemma.     

Hayek’s 1945 Finlay Memorial Lecture: Tracing the origins and evolution of his ‘true’ individualism

Hayek’s original 1945 University College Dublin lecture outlined the origins and evolution of two different interpretations of ‘individualism’, comparing and contrasting what Hayek terms ‘true’ and ‘false’ individualism notwithstanding the misleading contemporary interpretations and distorted perceptions of the assumptions underlining ‘true’ individualism. Hayek developed and extended the Scottish Enlightenment theory of spontaneous order originally formulated by Adam Ferguson’s maxim that social order was the result of unintended human action rather than the result of deliberate human design in order to explain the origin of complex social structures, which originated in a Cromwellian maxim. The origination and inspiration for the title of Hayek’s lecture is also considered, as is the influence of other thinkers; Mandeville, Tocqueville, Mill, Acton and Schatz that Hayek cites in his Dublin lecture.     

Choosing one’s own informal institutions: on Hayek’s critique of Keynes’s immoralism

In the main, Hayek favored rules that apply equally to all and located such rules in tradition, beyond conscious construction. This led Hayek to attack Keynes’s immoralism, i.e., the position that one should be free to choose how to lead one’s life irrespective of the informal institutions in place. However, it is argued here that immoralism may be compatible with Hayek’s enterprise since Hayek misinterpreted Keynes, who did not advocate the dissolving of all informal rules for everybody. By avoiding this misinterpretation, immoralism can be seen as institutional experimentation at the margin, which Hayek himself favored.

Darwinian paradigm,cultural evolution and human purposes: on F.A. Hayek’s evolutionary view of the market

The claim that the Darwinian paradigm of blind-variation-and-selective-retention can be generalized from the biological to the socio-cultural realm has often been questioned because of the critical role played by human purposeful design in the process of cultural evolution. In light of the issue of how human purposes and evolutionary forces interact in socio-economic processes the paper examines F.A. Hayek’s arguments on the “extended order” of the market (capitalism), in particular with regard to their policy implications. Its focus is on the tension that exists in Hayek’s work between a rational liberal and an agnostic evolutionary perspective. A re-construction of his arguments is suggested that allows for a reconciliation of these seemingly contradictory views.     

Can a Dictator Turn a Constitution into a Can-opener? F.A. Hayek and the Alchemy of Transitional Dictatorship in Chile

Commenting on the Pinochet regime, Friedrich Hayek famously claimed in 1981 that he would prefer a ‘liberal’ dictator to ‘democratic government lacking liberalism.’ Hayek's defense of a transitional dictatorship in Chile was not an impromptu response. In late 1960, in a little known BBC radio broadcast, Hayek suggested that a dictatorial regime may be able to facilitate a transition to stable limited democracy. While Hayek's comments about Pinochet have generated much controversy, this paper neither provides a blanket condemnation of his views (he did not advocate dictatorship as a first-best ‘state of the world’) nor tries to excuse his failure to condemn the Pinochet junta's human rights abuses, but instead provides a critical assessment of Hayek's implicit model of transitional dictatorship.     

Social orders,and a <Emphasis Type="Italic">weak</Emphasis> form of the Hayek–Friedman Hypothesis

This paper contributes to a theoretical underpinning of the economic freedom–political freedom relationship. We use the theory of social orders (North et al. in Violence and social orders: a conceptual framework for understanding recorded human history, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009) to look at the Hayek–Friedman Hypothesis (HFH), which leads us to propose a novel interpretation. The core insight of our weak interpretation of the hypothesis is that economic freedom is a necessary condition for maintaining political freedom in open access order countries (countries with high levels of both freedoms), i.e., once achieved, political freedom needs economic freedom to be stable; but the HFH is not relevant for limited access orders (rent-seeking-dominated orders). We find empirical support for the weak interpretation with canonical correlations and conditional logit regressions, using a panel database for 122 countries for the period 1980–2011.     

From economic stability to social order: The debate about business cycle theory in the 1920s and its relevance for the development of theories of social order by Lowe,Hayek and Eucken∗

Abstract

The concepts of Adolph Lowe, Friedrich A. Hayek and Walter Eucken play an important role in the discussion of an adequate theory of economic and social order. It is noteworthy that at the beginning of their academic careers, these three economists dealt primarily with questions of business cycle theory. As we will show, this is not coincidental, but can be explained by economic history and the history of theory. Furthermore, all three economists agree that establishing a comprehensive social order would provide the basis for economic stability, although each postulates a different relationship between liberty and order.