A symposium on Theodore Burczak’s, Socialism after Hayek

What does socialism after Hayek look like? Ted Burczak provides one highly intriguing answer.     

On fallibility and perfection: Boettke’s Hayek vs. mainline economics

The Review of Austrian Economics - Peter Boettke’s F.A. Hayek Economics, Political Economy, and Social Philosophy (Palgrave 2019) is a nuanced treatment that examines the historical context...     

Choosing one’s own informal institutions: on Hayek’s critique of Keynes’s immoralism

In the main, Hayek favored rules that apply equally to all and located such rules in tradition, beyond conscious construction. This led Hayek to attack Keynes’s immoralism, i.e., the position that one should be free to choose how to lead one’s life irrespective of the informal institutions in place. However, it is argued here that immoralism may be compatible with Hayek’s enterprise since Hayek misinterpreted Keynes, who did not advocate the dissolving of all informal rules for everybody. By avoiding this misinterpretation, immoralism can be seen as institutional experimentation at the margin, which Hayek himself favored.

Hayek’s monetary theory and policy: A note on alleged inconsistency

Challenging the dominant view, we claim that Hayek’s monetary views did not significantly change over his lifetime. The prevalent perception of early Hayek as a money stream stabilizer and late Hayek as a price level stabilizer is attributable to an unjustified normative interpretation of Hayek’s positive analysis. We argue that in his contributions to monetary theory, Hayek took the goals of monetary policy as exogenously given and analysed the efficiency of different means of achieving them. Hayek’s allegedly inconsistent transformation from a critic to an advocate of price level stabilization is explained by a change of issues under his focus, rather than by a change in his positive views. We also claim that Hayek was always aware that every practical monetary policy involves difficult trade-offs and that he was therefore reluctant to impose his own value judgments on what people should strive for.     

The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek’s legacy

This paper is organized as follows: first, we show that the reference to the notion of group selection is coherent with the other parts of Hayek’s thought. Second, we develop the idea that recent works in terms of the emergence and evolution of social norms corroborate in part Hayek’s theses in this domain. Finally, we put to the fore some drawbacks in Hayek’s approach and propose means to solve them.

F. A. Hayek’s influence on Nobel Prize winners

F.A. Hayek’s broad research program has led some to conclude that his impact on economics has been minimal. This citation study examines the frequency of Nobel laureates cited by other laureates in the official Prize Lectures to understand how elite economists influence other elite economists. It finds that Hayek is the second most frequently mentioned laureate in the Prize Lectures, and he has the second most publication citations of the laureates. Hayek’s influence on the top tier of economists is substantial.

A brief note concerning Hayek’s non-standard conception of knowledge

Whatever F.A. Hayek meant by “knowledge” could not have been the justified true belief conception common in the Western intellectual tradition from at least the time of Plato onward. In this brief note, I aim to uncover and succinctly state Hayek’s unique definition of knowledge.     

Hayek’s 1945 Finlay Memorial Lecture: Tracing the origins and evolution of his ‘true’ individualism

Hayek’s original 1945 University College Dublin lecture outlined the origins and evolution of two different interpretations of ‘individualism’, comparing and contrasting what Hayek terms ‘true’ and ‘false’ individualism notwithstanding the misleading contemporary interpretations and distorted perceptions of the assumptions underlining ‘true’ individualism. Hayek developed and extended the Scottish Enlightenment theory of spontaneous order originally formulated by Adam Ferguson’s maxim that social order was the result of unintended human action rather than the result of deliberate human design in order to explain the origin of complex social structures, which originated in a Cromwellian maxim. The origination and inspiration for the title of Hayek’s lecture is also considered, as is the influence of other thinkers; Mandeville, Tocqueville, Mill, Acton and Schatz that Hayek cites in his Dublin lecture.     

30 years after the nobel: James Buchanan’s political philosophy

There are three main foundations of Public Choice theory: methodological individualism, behavioral symmetry, and “politics as exchange.” The first two are represented in nearly all work that identifies as “Public Choice,” but politics as exchange is often forgotten or de-emphasized. This paper—adapted from a lecture given on the occasion of the 30th year after Buchanan’s Nobel Prize—fleshes out Buchanan’s theory of politics as exchange, using four notions that are uniquely central to his thought: philosophical anarchism, ethical neutrality, subjectivism, and the “relatively absolute absolutes.” A central tension in Buchanan’s work is identified, in which he seems simultaneously to argue both that nearly anything agreed to by a group could be enforced within the group as a contract, and that there are certain types of rules and arrangements, generated by decentralized processes, that serve human needs better than state action. It is argued that it is a mistake to try to reconcile this tension, and that both parts of the argument are important.     

On the ‘Origins’ of Sraffa’s Production Equations: A Reply to de Vivo

In this rejoinder to de Vivo’s comment on Gehrke and Kurz (2018, ‘Sraffa’s constructive and interpretive work, and Marx.’ Review of Political Economy) we first ask what could possibly be meant by seeking to identify the ‘origins’ of Sraffa’s production equations. We then show that in his comment de Vivo has abandoned his original view, according to which the magnitudes in Sraffa’s ‘first equations’ are to be interpreted in Marxian (labour) value terms, without advising the reader. In addition, we show that his ‘new’ view is not supported by evidence from Sraffa’s papers. De Vivo misconstrues several propositions of Sraffa and misunderstands his ‘reduction method’ by means of which the values of commodities are reduced to some basic product or to labour. The criticisms de Vivo levels at the interpretation advocated by us are without any foundation.     

On the redistributive effects of Germany’s feed-in tariff

This article assesses the redistributive effects of a key element of German climate policy, the promotion of renewables in the electricity generation mix through the provision of a feed-in tariff. The tariff shapes the distribution of households’ disposable incomes by charging a levy that is proportional to household electricity consumption and by transferring financial resources to households who are feeding green electricity into the public grid. Our study builds on representative household survey data, providing information on various socio-demographics, household electricity consumption, and ownership of photovoltaic facilities. The redistributive effects of the feed-in tariff are evaluated by means of inequality indices. All the indices indicate that Germany’s feed-in tariff is regressive.     

On Hegel’s Interpretation of the Conflict in Antigone

This essay will argue that Hegel’s balanced interpretation of the Antigone is the correct one on the grounds that any interpretation that favors either Creon or Antigone or reduces the conflict to one of personalities and not values would render Antigone a weaker tragedy.     

On the origin of money,or Menger’s one-sided reading of Genovesi’s Lezioni

Abstract

By examining Menger’s interpretation of Genovesi’s arguments on the origin of money, this note shows that Genovesi is a subtle theorist managing to blend the Cartalist with the Mengerian approaches to the origins of money. Far from resting exclusively on the Mengerian unattended consequences of the uncoordinated behaviours of rational agents trying to minimise their transaction costs, Genovesi shows how governments can and do create fiat money with a positive value in connexion with their ability to raise taxes. For Genvesi both trust (à la Menger) and authority (à la Cartalist) are necessary to explain the positive value of money.