金融宏观调控护航经济发展

在科学发展观的指引下,我国金融业实现跨越式发展,中央银行和各监管部门的工作也同样取得辉煌成就。     

THE ROLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH KOREAN ECONOMIC REFORM

In South Korea, as in some other troubled Asian economies, banks and large public corporations have been run more in the interest of the government and the controlling share-holder group than to maximize efficiency and overall shareholder wealth. Any serious attempt to reform the South Korean economy must thus include significant changes in its system of corporate governance. After discussing in general terms how corporate ownership and control can affect economic performance, this article examines the corporate governance institutions that prevail in different countries, with particular attention to the U.S., Japan, and Germany. From such comparative analysis it then develops a set of criteria for appraising the effectiveness of corporate governance systems that are applied to the specific case of South Korea. The article concludes with number of suggestions for reforming the South Korean corporate governance system, including:

• 1 greater legal protection for minority shareholders from transactions involving potential conflicts of interest; and
• 2 strengthening of the incentives of management and large corporate holders, such as house or main banks, to maximize value (as the author notes, “charging management or the board with a legal mandate to ‘balance’ the interests of various constituencies or stakeholders is merely to diminish any legally enforceable responsibility to shareholders”).

As the article notes in closing, the main beneficiaries of such governance reforms will not be the new shareholders–including those foreign investors who might be persuaded to buy the stocks–but rather the existing owners, whose shares will command a higher price from “outside” investors. And the greatest beneficiary will be the South Korean nation as a whole, since the resulting improvements in corporate performance and reductions in cost of capital will increase productivity and international competitiveness.     

2001年经济金融走势与工商银行的经营策略

2001年,全球经济增长速度虽有所放缓,但仍将维持4%以上的增长速度;中国经济发展将呈现以巩固回升基础为特征的平稳增长趋势;宏观金融政策更加侧重于币值的稳定,并且把抑制通货紧缩和超前防范通货膨胀以及防范化解金融风险作为金融宏观调整的着力点和重点.面对这一难得的机遇,工商银行应研究制订实施战略的策略和细化的措施,并如实地贯彻到基层,扎实有效地解决已有问题;应以发展为主题,及早考虑市场定位、业务开拓等新问题;应加速引入信息技术,用信息化带动经营决策和管理方式的变革;应实施全员强制培训工程,实行"等级行员资格考核认证"制度.     

ADDING VALUE FOR SHAREHOLDERS IN SOUTH AFRICA: AN ANALYSIS OF THE REMBRANDT RESTRUCTURING

Thanks to a restructuring movement known as "unbundling," which involves the selling or otherwise splitting off of unrelated businesses, the South African corporate landscape has changed materially from the system dominated by family controlled groups of companies that the author described in this journal six years ago. Holding companies like Anglo-American, the largest and best known of all the groups, have become more both more focused and more international (in those lines of business they have chosen to retain). At the same time, they have relinquished a good deal of control to outside shareholders.
But if unbundling has succeeded in adding value in some cases, it is by no means a panacea for shareholders. Value is likely to be added for shareholders only when such restructurings are expected to (1) increase the efficiency of existing operations; (2) discontinue value-destroying investments; or (3) encourage new investment only in projects that are expected to return more than their cost of capital. For this reason, a restructuring like the one recently completed by the Rembrandt group—one that simply divided the company into two major parts while retaining the old managerial control structure—does not hold out much promise for shareholders.
Besides challenging the basic premise of the Rembrandt structuring, the author also questions a common practice among financial analysts: the tendency to view a company that trades at a "discount" to its net asset value as an obvious candidate for unbundling. As currently calculated, the relationship between a holding company's market value and the net asset values of its listed (and unlisted) subsidiaries provides an unreliable indication both of the extent to which management has succeeded in delivering value in the past, and whether an unbundling is likely to increase shareholder value in the future.