Labor taxation, public finance, and wage determination: evidence from OECD countries

This paper analyzes the relationship between unemployment, average effective labour tax rates and public spending in 17 OECD countries. The focus is on the degree of centralization and cooperation in wage setting. Estimation results from a dynamic time-series-cross-section model suggest that the countries where wage setting takes place at the firm level have used labour taxes less extensively in financing welfare spending, compared to countries with centralized or decentralized bargaining. This is consistent with another finding, according to which labour taxes distort the labour demand the least in the countries with firm level bargaining.     

Bargaining structure and nominal wage flexibility

In a model with wage setting by monopoly unions and monetary policy conducted by a central bank, the duration of nominal wage contracts is shown to be u-shaped in the degree of centralization, with intermediate bargaining systems yielding contracts of shorter duration and thus, more flexible nominal wages than both decentralized and centralized systems. The theoretical predictions of the model are tested on OECD data, and there is empirical support for the main results on contract length.     

Lower coverage but stronger unions? Institutional changes and union wage premia in Central Europe

In this paper we use the national samples from the European Structure of Earnings Survey (ESES) to analyze the evolution of the wage premium of firm- and industry-level agreements in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (the CE3) around the time of their accession to the EU. We find that despite a generalized reduction in union coverage in these countries, the union wage premium after accession to the EU became bigger and statistically more significant for Poland and Hungary, particularly for industry-level agreements. We interpret these findings in terms of the institutional reforms that occurred in the CE3 between 2002 and 2006. These reforms, which were prompted by the EU Commission's requirements for EU accession, increased the social partners' ability to bargain and enforce wage agreements, and made industry-level unions more effective in guaranteeing the protections provided by labor standards. Results are less conclusive for the Czech Republic, probably due to factors that attenuate the effect of bargaining coverage upon wages, e.g. a smaller effect of institutional reforms, a greater use of mandatory extension mechanisms, the more radical firm restructuring during transition in that country.     

LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY IN A PANEL OF OECD COUNTRIES

In this paper we analyze empirically how labor market institutions influence business cycle volatility in a sample of 20 OECD countries. Our results suggest that countries characterized by high union density tend to experience more volatile movements in output, whereas the degree of coordination of the wage bargaining system and the strictness of employment protection legislation appear to be only of limited importance. We also find some evidence suggesting that highly coordinated wage bargaining systems have a dampening impact on inflation volatility.     

INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF INTER-INDUSTRY WAGE DIFFERENTIALS

We use OECD data to examine inter-industry wage differentials (relative wages among industries) for 14 OECD countries over the period 1970–85. We find, first, that the industrial wage structures have shown remarkable stability over time in terms of rank order for all the countries in the sample. Second, despite their rank order stability, wage structures show a tendency to expand or contract. While the U.S. has shown increasing industry wage dispersion between 1970 and 1985, the pattern is very mixed for other countries. Unionization is a significant factor in explaining cross-country differences. Third, industry wage rankings show some evidence of becoming increasingly similar across nations over time, and this movement is associated with a convergence of per capita incomes. Fourth, industry wage differentials are positively related to an industry's productivity growth, output growth, capital intensity, and export orientation.     

Optimal tax progressivity in unionised labour markets: What are the driving forces?

In labour markets with collective wage bargaining higher progressivity of the labour income tax creates a trade-off. On the one hand, wages are lowered and unemployment decreases, on the other hand, the individual labour supply decision is distorted at the hours-of-work margin. The optimal level of tax progressivity within this trade-off is determined using a numerical general equilibrium model with imperfect competition on the goods market, collective wage bargaining and a labour-supply module calibrated to empirically plausible elasticity values. The model is calibrated to macroeconomic and institutional parameters of both the OECD average and a number of individual OECD countries. In most cases the optimal degree of tax progressivity is below the actual level. A decomposition approach shows that the optimal level is increased by high unemployment and by the general tax level.     

Labour market institutions and wage setting: evidence for OECD countries

The main channel through which labour market institutions are supposed to work in affecting unemployment is through their effects on the key parameters of the wage curve. In particular, labour market institutions may have both a direct wage push (or level) effect, i.e. change the level of the real wage for any given level of the unemployment rate and productivity, and an indirect slope effect, i.e. change the responsiveness of the real wage to the unemployment rate. The question this article addresses is whether there is any evidence that these transmission mechanisms were at work in a group of 20 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries over the period 1960 to 1999. The analysis is accomplished in two steps. Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimates of a wage equation including unemployment, productivity and a set of wage push institutions are first obtained, allowing only a subset of institutional coefficient to be homogeneous, while leaving the unemployment and other coefficients free to differ across countries. The country specific estimates of the unemployment coefficients are then used to investigate whether and to what extent cross-country heterogeneity in the estimated wage response to unemployment is related to institutional differences. The results support the existence of significant wage push effects of union density and benefit replacement rates, and of significant slope effects of benefit replacement rates, benefit duration and employment protection. A more generous unemployment benefit structure is found to lower the wage responsiveness to unemployment, while higher employment protection, contrary to what one expects, is found to enhance it. No significant level and slope effects are found for the tax wedge and bargaining coordination.     

Sunk capital,unions and the hold-up problem: Theory and evidence from cross-country sectoral data

In this paper we study the hold-up problem by considering the effect of union bargaining power on the level of investment per worker across sectors characterised by different levels of sunk capital investment. We develop a search and matching model with heterogeneous sectors and ex-post collective wage bargaining and test the predictions of the model using a difference-in-difference approach on manufacturing sector data in a set of OECD countries during the period 1980–2000. We find that union power reduces investment per worker particularly in sunk capital intensive industries. We refine our empirical analysis showing that the underlying hold-up problem is exacerbated when strikes are not regulated after a collective contract is signed and there is no arbitration, while the presence of social pacts may sustain cooperative equilibria that alleviate the hold-up problem. Our results are robust to a series of controls and possible endogeneity of union power.     

Profit sharing as entry deterrence mechanism

In a right-to-manage framework, this paper analyzes the optimal choice of the pay scheme (profit sharing vs. fixed wage) in a unionized duopoly with potential market entry and decentralized bargaining. The paper shows that, depending on the institutional features, both pay systems can arise as equilibria in Nash strategies. Under duopoly with committed bargaining, the fixed wage is the Nash equilibrium; with flexible bargaining, an agreement between the incumbent firm and its union about profit sharing arises as Nash equilibrium, if the union is not too strong. A monopoly with threat of entry reinforces the selection of profit sharing as a deterrent mechanism.     

How large are wage differentials in Austria?

The OECD has repeatedly recommended that wage bargaining in Austria be decentralised to allow wage diferentials to widen. But the status quo itself is in question. While studies of aggregate industry data indicate a high degree of wage dispersion, research based on data from household surveys seems suggest that income inequality in Austria is as small as in the Scandinavian countries. This paper seeks to reconcile these opposing views. It shows that data from the household surveys underestimate the size of inter-industry wage differentials. An analysis of the structure of contractual wage rates supports the view that wage inequality is very pronounced in Austria and that a narrowing of the wage gap would lead both to an increase in productive efficiency and an increase in income equality.     

Openness, centralized wage bargaining, and inflation

This paper develops a model of an open economy containing both sectors in which wages are market-determined and sectors with wage-setting arrangements. A portion of the latter group of sectors coordinate their wages, taking into account that their collective actions influence the equilibrium inflation outcome in an environment in which the central bank engages in discretionary monetary policymaking. Key predictions forthcoming from this model are (1) increased centralization of wage setting initially causes inflation to increase at low degrees of wage centralization but then, as wage centralization increases, results in an inflation drop-off; (2) a greater degree of centralized wage setting reduces the inflation-restraining effect of greater central bank independence; and (3) increased openness is more likely to reduce inflation in nations with less centralized wage bargaining. Analysis of data for seventeen nations for the period 1970–1999 provides generally robust empirical support for all three of these predictions.     

Market Rigidities and Labour Market Flexibility: An International Comparison

The effects of product and labour market rigidities on labour market dynamics are analysed using a panel of two-digit ISIC level data for seven OECD countries. As expected, employment protection was found to slacken labour market flows. Centralized wage bargaining also reduced the degree of job turnover, although a priori the effect of centralized wage bargaining on labour market flexibility is not clear. Industry subsidies have a positive impact on job reallocation by increasing job creation. The labour market dynamics are also compared in detail for two economies regarded as extremes in terms of regulations, the U.S. and Norway.     

Wage‐Setting Institutions and R&D Collaboration Networks

We analyse how union structures that differ in the degree of wage‐setting centralisation affect the pattern of R&D network formation. Within the context of a three‐firm industry, a central union that sets a uniform wage is shown to induce a partial R&D network that includes two firms but excludes the third. In contrast, we find that, under less centralised union structures, firms have incentives to form R&D networks with a larger number of alliances. This result is consistent with the stylised facts for industrialised countries: recent decades have seen an upsurge in R&D alliances along with labour market deregulation towards more flexible wage‐setting institutions.     

Country characteristics and the incidence of capital income taxation on wages: An empirical assessment

This paper examines the incidence of corporate income taxes on wages using data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics for 13 OECD countries. Within a wage‐bargaining framework, our econometric analysis shows that a substantial share of the corporate tax burden is shifted from capital to labour. However, the magnitude of this shift is influenced importantly by country characteristics affecting the process of wage determination, such as the degree of capital mobility, a country's relative influence over the world price of output and trade unions’ strength.     

Industry-Level Wage Bargaining: A Partial Rehabilitation—The German Experience

In order to reduce unemployment, it is often recommended that industry-level wage bargaining in Germany should be replaced by a more decentralized system. This paper provides a critical assessment of the current wage bargaining institutions and re-examines the case for a more decentralized system. Based on a theoretical model integrating Insider–Outsider aspects into the comparison, the uniformly superior employment performance of a decentralized wage bargaining system is questioned. We conclude that, rather than solely trying to decentralize wage bargaining, a promising policy option may be to improve the skills of the unemployed by efficient labour market policies and to foster institutional reforms such that wage bargaining takes account of the long-run employment consequences of wage setting.     

Labour market outliers: Lessons from Portugal and Spain

Spain has the highest unemployment rate (22.2%) of any European Union country, Portugal one of the lowest (7.3%). Superficially, these countries share many labour market features: the toughest job security rules in the OECD, an apparently similar architecture of wage bargaining, and comparable generosity of their unemployment insurance systems, at least since 1989. We address the puzzle by examining Portuguese and Spanish labour market institutions, in particular job security, unemployment benefits and the system of wage bargaining. We then conduct empirical analysis of Spanish and Portuguese unemployment outflows and wage distributions, using micro data. We find differences in unemployment benefits (non-existent in Portugal until 1985, and less generous nowadays), differences in wage flexibility (wage floors by category established by collective agreements are set at a lower relative level in Portugal), and, in practice, higher firing costs in Spain. A key explanation of the difference in Portuguese and Spanish unemployment rates is the wage adjustment process. Generous benefit levels may have been necessary for the path Spanish unions took, but this was not the sole explanation of different wage setting in Spain and Portugal.     

Wage Rigidity,Inflation, and Institutions

We study the possible existence of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) at wage growth rates different from zero in aggregate data. Even if DNWR prevails at zero for individual workers, compositional effects might lead to falling aggregate wages, while changes in relative wages combined with DNWR might lead to positive aggregate wage growth. We explore industry data for 19 OECD countries, over the 1971–2006 period. We find evidence for a floor on nominal wage growth at 6 percent in the 1970s and 1980s, at 1 percent in the 1990s, and at 0.5 percent in the 2000s. Furthermore, we find that DNWR is stronger in country‐years with strict employment protection legislation, high union density, centralized wage setting, and high inflation.     

Endogenous wage bargaining institutions in oligopolistic sectors

Summary. This paper explores the endogenous emergence of wage bargaining institutions in a union-oligopoly framework. Technological asymmetries among firms are shown to be the driving force for the emergence of alternative wage bargaining centralization structures that are observable in real life. As wage deals at the sector-level obtain the consensus of all unions and the efficient firms, a regulator has an incentive to authorize those deals by activating/establishing a Minimum Sectoral Wage Institution(MSWI). If productivity differences are high enough, wage setting above the established wage floor may subsequently occur in efficient firms. Otherwise, a completely centralized wage bargaining structure emerges and the sector-level wage deal is simply confirmed as the firms wage rate. If, however, productivity asymmetries are rather insignificant, firms and unions have conflicting interests and a completely decentralized wage bargaining regime prevails in equilibrium.Received: 17 December 2001, Revised: 9 June 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: J50, J31, L13.Correspondence to: Emmanuel PetrakisParticular appreciation is expressed to an anonymous referee who has greatly helped us to improve our work upon an earlier draft of this paper. We also wish to thank T. Kollinzas, J. Padilla, H. Bester, J. Sakovics, K. Uwe-Kühn, J. J. Dolado, J. L. Ferreira, A. Matsui and C. Martinelli for their helpful comments and suggestions.     

Must we choose? European unemployment, American inequality, and the impact of education and labor market institutions

In the last 15 years, two equilibria have arisen in the advanced world. On the one hand, wage dispersion has widened in those countries where unemployment has remained low (with cyclical variations). On the other hand, wherever income inequality has remained unchanged, unemployment has shot upwards. To account for these distinct patterns, we develop a political–economic model showing that, controlling for the skills of the population, the effects of technological and trade shocks (that have affected OECD nations) that are contingent on the institutional rules in place. Economies with generous unemployment allowances adjust through subsidized unemployment. By contrast, low levels of social protection lead to less unemployment but wider wage dispersion. The level of qualifications of the labor force determines the extent of the adjustment for a given institutional arrangement. We derive, in turn, the institutional structure of each country from the political conditions in place at the time of the shock. The empirical part successfully tests the model for the sample of European regions and US states.     

Unionized oligopoly,labor-management cooperation,and international competitiveness

In a model of a duopolistic product market with a unionized labor force, this paper explores the interaction between firms' duopolistic behavior and union-firm bargaining. In a two-union/two-firm setting, we show that adopting efficient bargaining can improve a firm's competitiveness as well as efficiency, and it arises in equilibrium; while in a one-union/two-firm set-up, we find that an industry union prefers wage bargaining. However, when foreign competition in the product market intensifies, even the industry union prefers efficient bargaining. As an application, the analysis may explain differences in international competitiveness and the recent trend toward labor-management cooperation in the labor market.