Preemption,leapfrogging and competition in patent races

This paper investigates when patent races will be characterized by vigorous competition and when they will degenerate into a monopoly. Undersome conditions, a firm with an arbitrarily small headstart can preempt its rivals. Such ‘?-preemption’ is shown to depend on whether a firm that is behind in the patent race, as measured by the expected time remaining until discovery, cant ‘leapfrog’ the competition and become the new leader. An example of an R&D game with random discovery illustrates how ?-preemption can occur when leapfrogging is impossible. A multi-stage R&D process allows leapfrogging and thus permits competition. A similar conclusion emerges in a model of a deterministic patent race with imperfect monitoring of rival firms' R&D investment activities.     

Information disclosure, banking development and knowledge-driven growth

In this study we develop a knowledge-driven growth model which explicitly models the banking sector as monopolistically competitive. The main mechanism through which financial intermediaries affect the real economy is through the evaluation and provision of liquidity to R&D projects. We distinguish two scenarios. In the regime with information disclosure, banks are able to use the stock of information obtained by the banking industry from evaluating R&D projects. This information externality brings about efficiency improvements, thereby leading to a positive entry of banks, more bank-funded research and in turn positive economic growth. By contrast, in the regime with no information disclosure, it is not profitable for new banks to enter the industry. This implies that no more potential R&D projects can be evaluated and hence financed, thus leading the economy to a zero-growth equilibrium.     

Optimal patent length and breadth in an economy with creative destruction and non-diversifiable risk

In this paper, I examine the optimal patent shape in an economy in which R&D firms innovate and imitate, households face non-diversifiable risk and there is externality in production and R&D. With non-diversifiable risk, a household’s consumption and investment decisions are interlinked. This economy contains industries of two kinds: monopoly industries with an innovator only, and duopoly industries with an innovator and an imitator. I define patent length as the expected time in which an innovation is imitated, and patent breadth as the innovator’s profit share in an industry after a successful imitation. The government can control patent length by the requirements for accepting a substitute for a patented good, and patent breadth by imposing compulsory licensing and royalties for the patentee after a successful imitation. I show that the stronger the externality in production relative to R&D is, the slower the optimal growth rate, the larger the optimal proportion of duopoly industries, and the longer and narrower the optimal patent.     

Dynamic analysis of outsourcing

This paper develops an R&D-based growth model and calibrates the model to aggregate data of the US economy to quantify a structural relationship between patent length, R&D and consumption. Under parameter values that match the empirical flow-profit depreciation rate of patents and other key features of the US economy, extending the patent length beyond 20 years leads to a negligible increase in R&D despite equilibrium R&D underinvestment. In contrast, shortening the patent length leads to a significant reduction in R&D and consumption. Finally, this paper also analytically derives and quantifies a dynamic distortionary effect of patent length on capital investment.     

Too Much of a Good Thing? The Economics of Investment in R&D

Research and development is a key determinant of long-run productivity and welfare. A central issue is whether a decentralized economy undertakes too little or too much R&D. We develop an endogenous growth model that incorporates parametrically four important distortions to R&D: the surplus appropriability problem, knowledge spillovers, creative destruction, and duplication externalities. Calibrating the model, we find that the decentralized economy typically underinvests in R&D relative to what is socially optimal. The only exceptions to this conclusion occur when the duplication externality is strong and the equilibrium real interest rate is simultaneously high.     

Patent portfolios and knowledge flow(s) of photovoltaic companies

The current trend towards green energy is encouraging manufacturers to invest in photovoltaic technologies. In order to guarantee R&D and optimal operational performance, operators should be able to identify the technological advantages of their competitors for the conduct R&D and to ensure adequate technological knowledge intake. Therefore, from the perspective of patent portfolios and knowledge flow(s) of photovoltaic companies, this study adopted two approaches namely, patent counts and patent citations, to discuss the technical capability of R&D portfolios and the technological knowledge flow. Three patent indices were utilised for the integration of R&D portfolios which include: technology attractiveness, relative patent position, and revealed patent advantage. Technological knowledge flow allows construction of a patent citation network through backward citation of patents. Sources and movement directions of technological knowledge are measured by calculating the relative citation propensity. R&D portfolios and knowledge flow are complementary perspectives of each photovoltaic company.     

Learning from successes and failures in pharmaceutical R&D

In this paper, we build a cumulative innovation model to understand the role of both success and failure in the learning dynamics that characterize pharmaceutical R&D. We test the prediction of our model by means of a unique dataset that combines patent information with R&D projects, thus distinguishing patents related to successfully marketed products from those covering candidate drugs that failed in clinical trials. Results confirm model predictions showing that patents associated with successfully completed projects receive more citations than those associated with failed projects. However, we also show that failed projects can be in turn cited more often than patents lacking clinical or preclinical information. We further explore the ‘black box’ of innovation, providing evidence that both successes and failures contribute to R&D investment decisions and knowledge dynamics in science-driven sectors.     

University patents,R&D competition,and social welfare

Although university patenting has increased dramatically over the past three decades, debates persist regarding the broad economic implications of the phenomenon. This article examines the social welfare implications of university patenting in a model of R&D competition in which firms develop innovations on the basis of the disclosure of a university invention. When such disclosure does not preempt the patenting of downstream innovations, university patenting enhances social welfare only if a regime of open access to university inventions is characterized by excessive aggregate R&D from the viewpoint of social welfare. When the university invention disclosure preempts patenting on firms’ innovations, the nature of the open access equilibrium in the R&D market depends on the threat of imitation ex post. Only when the threat of imitation is sufficiently strong firms will not invest in downstream R&D in the open access regime. In this case, university patenting promotes R&D investment and increases social welfare.     

R&D and foreign direct investment with asymmetric spillovers

This paper analyzes how firms’ R&D investment decisions are affected by asymmetries in knowledge transmission, considering different sources of asymmetry such as unequal know-how management capabilities and spillovers localization within an international oligopoly. We show that a better ability to manage knowledge flows incentivizes the firm to invest more in R&D. By introducing geographically bounded spillovers, we also find that one-way foreign direct investment (FDI) stimulates the multinational enterprise to raise its own R&D and that an FDI equilibrium is more likely to occur. Finally, spillovers localization leading to two-way FDI is welfare improving when compared with non-localized spillovers.     

The impact of public R&D investments on patenting activity: technology transfer at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

ABSTRACT

This paper presents estimates of the impact of public R&D on patenting activity at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Using a time series of public sector agency data, we estimate the per-capita R&D elasticity of new patent applications using a knowledge production function framework model that is an expanded version of what other scholars have used with private sector data. New patent applications are an important step in the technology transfer activities of a federal agency. We estimate this elasticity to be about 2.0. This elasticity value represents an initial estimate of the impact of EPA’s R&D investments on its technology transfer activity.     

The effectiveness of R&D subsidies

In this paper, the effectiveness of R&D subsidies is analyzed in an oligopolistic model that we apply to the cases of international R&D competition and cooperation. We find that the existence of asymmetric information among firms on whether a rival (or partner) is being subsidized or not may play a key role in explaining whether subsidies are effective or not in increasing R&D investments. In particular, it is shown that if the existence of the subsidy is made public (e.g. because strict information release regulation about R&D subsidies is enforced) and depending on the strategic relationship between the firms’ R&D efforts, an R&D subsidy could even hurt the subsidized firm.     

The struggle to survive in the R&D sector: Implications for innovation and growth

By allowing for investment activities by research and development (R&D) firms to prevent product obsolescence, we show that if legal patent protection is too strong, a higher R&D subsidy rate delivers insufficient investments for survival in the R&D sector, depressing innovation and growth in the long run.     

Innovation or imitation? The effect of spillovers and competitive pressure on firms’ R&D strategy choice

In this paper a firm’s R&D strategy is assumed to be endogenous and allowed to depend on both internal firm characteristics and external factors. Firms choose between two strategies, either they engage in R&D or abstain from own R&D and imitate the outcomes of innovators. This yields three types of equilibria, in which either all firms innovate, some firms innovate and others imitate, or no firm innovates. Firms’ equilibrium strategies crucially depend on external factors. We find that the efficiency of intellectual property rights protection positively affects firms’ incentives to engage in R&D, while excessive competitive pressure has a negative effect. In addition, smaller firms are found to be more likely to become imitators when the product is homogeneous and the level of spillovers is high. Regarding social welfare our results indicate that strengthening intellectual property protection can have an ambiguous effect. In markets characterized by a high rate of innovation a reduction of intellectual property rights protection can discourage innovative performance substantially. However, a reduction of patent protection can also increase social welfare because it may induce imitation. This indicates that policy issues such as the optimal length and breadth of patent protection cannot be resolved without taking into account specific market and firm characteristics.     

Open Innovation in a dynamic Cournot duopoly

In recent years Open Innovation (OI) processes have been receiving growing attention from the empirical and theoretical economic literature, where a debate is taking place on the aspects of complementarity or substitutability between internal R&D and OI spillover. By means of a differential game approach, we analyze the case of substitutability in an OI setup in a Cournot duopoly where knowledge spillovers are endogenously determined via the R&D process. The game produces multiple steady states, allowing for an asymmetric solution where a firm may trade off the R&D investment against information absorption from the rival. The technical analysis and the numerical simulations point out that the firm which commits to a higher level of OI absorption produces a smaller output and enjoys higher profits than its rival.     

The 1988 EC directive on biotechnological inventions and the UK biotechnology industry

The article, based on a recent survey of UK biotechnology companies, highlights the complex interaction between the organization of R&D and the patenting policy in the biotech industry. Some of the more interesting findings include: the limited extent of private investment in biotechnological R&D; the existence of two markedly different R&D strategies (product- vs. process-based); the distinction between first- and second-generation patents and their effects on market structure. The core of the article deals with the likely effects on patenting behaviour of changes in patent law - both as envisaged in the October 1988 Directive and as suggested by recent theoretical research on the economics of patents. The Directive in its current form is reported to have no discernible effect on the extent and organization of R&D, whereas the industry's response to a series of hypothetical changes suggests that any definition or patentability standards has far-reaching repercussions on: (1) the allocation of resources between research and development; (2) the conditions of entry into the industry; (3) the balance of bargaining power between firms of unequal size (or pursuing different R&D strategies); and ultimately (4) the allocation of technological surplus between consumers and producers.     

Accounting for the recent surge in U.S. patenting: changes in R&D expenditures,patent yields,and the high tech sector

We decompose the recent patent increase into components representing (1) an increase in resources made available to research and development, (2) an across-the-board rise in the patent yield of an R&D dollar, and (3) changes in the patent yield in individual industries. Two high tech fields, computer hardware and pharmaceuticals, account for 22 percent of the patent increase. While these two industries had the fastest R&D growth among the industries we study, the pharmaceutical industry experienced a decline in its patent yield, limiting its patent growth. We show that increased R&D spending accounts for 70 percent of the patent increase. We discuss our results in the context of alternative hypotheses of the patent surge. We also compare our results to the anecdotal evidence of firm R&D performance at the industry level.     

Unsuccessful patent application and cooperative R&;D

We show that uncertainty in patent approvals may induce the firms to do cooperative R&D. With an exogenous probability of success in patent application, we show that, if all firms apply for patents under non-cooperative R&D, the firms prefer cooperative R&D than non-cooperative R&D for moderate (high) probabilities of success in patent applications, if the cost of patenting is small (large). We also show the implications of entry of non-innovating firms and endogenous probability of success in patent applications.      

Technological knowledge,spillover and productivity: evidence from Taiwanese firm level panel data

Using a panel data on Taiwanese manufacturing firms from 1990–1997, this study investigates the relationship among technological knowledge, spillover and productivity. In addition to R&D stock, we also employ patent counts to construct the output-side indicators of knowledge and spillover to explore the relationship between knowledge and productivity. We find a very significant contribution of R&D, patents and spillover stock to productivity. In addition, the magnitude of the patent stock coefficient is substantially larger than that estimated by R&D stock. Our results imply that innovative activity investment has been very productive in increasing output for Taiwanese manufacturing firms in the 1990s.     

Strategic technology editing of the patent stage: lesson from a case of inkjet printer development

Patents are conventionally regarded as representing post-procurement of rights based on results of research and development (R&D). Patents can also be regarded as factors promoting R&D itself. In this study, the author examines the strategic meaning of patents in R&D through analyses of the R&D processes at Canon Inc., which is widely considered to submit patents strategically. The author identified characteristic behaviour related to patent acquisition in the R&D of inkjet printers. Canon constructed a strong patent group precisely by editing patents submitted earlier. Characteristic patent submissions were also identified: they elevated the obtained R&D results to higher concepts as milestones of R&D. These findings are discussed from the viewpoint of the meaning of patents for R&D and the possibility of effective R&D at the patent stage.     

Strategic Rivalry With Spillovers Within Segmented Versus Integrated Markets

We consider a two-stage game with firms investing in R&D in the first stage while competing [a] la Cournot in the second stage. The firms are located in two countries, which are either segmented or integrated. R&D spillovers occur between firms located in the same country as well as between firms located in different countries.

We first examine the consequences of market integration on the impact of national and international R&D spillovers on innovative efforts, effective R&D, profits and total welfare. Comparing the resulting equilibrium levels, we subsequently conclude that market integration always leads to higher R&D investments and output if international R&D spillovers are limited, while the welfare consequences are ambiguous. Finally, we also analyze the welfare maximization problem of a ‘constrained social planner who can only decide on the level of R&D spillovers.