军民融合企业技术创新生态系统协同机制研究

本文在共生视角下研究军民融合企业技术创新生态系统的协同演化机制,分析政府干预下"学研机构—军民融合企业"的主从博弈策略,探讨"政企学研"组成的技术创新生态系统在独立生存合作、协同创新合作和联盟共存合作三个阶段的运作机理.主要考虑两种政府干预情境:一种是针对一般技术创新,政府不进行补贴激励;另一种是针对高精尖技术创新,政府会对其进行补贴激励.针对两种政府干预情境和三个演化阶段,采用主从博弈分别确定学研机构的技术创新程度和技术转移费用以及军民融合企业的边际收益.研究表明:学研机构和军民融合企业采用成本分担机制共同进行技术研发,有助于提高技术创新程度;协同创新合作阶段的成本分担机制可使创新生态系统获得帕累托改进;在大部分情形下不存在使学研机构和军民融合企业都满意的创新成本分担契约;联盟共存合作阶段的利润共享机制可以消除创新生态系统的双重边际效应,获得帕累托最优.     

基于收益共享和成本共担的供应链双向激励协调

在供应商和销售商组成的二级供应链中,供应商隐藏关于生产成本的私人信息,销售商隐藏关于销售努力的行动,且双方地位相当,此时协调主体不明确。为了解决该问题,文章引入虚拟第三方为利他的委托人,站在供应链整体利润最大化的角度,设计基于收益共享和成本共担的协调契约,对供应商和销售商实施双向激励。研究结果表明:当收益共享比例和成本共担比例满足一定条件时,供应链实现了协调。此时,该契约调动了供应商降低生产成本、销售商提高努力水平的积极性,合作双方达到了"双赢"。笔者通过数值实验对结果进行了验证,表明了结果的有效性。     

考虑成本利润率的供应链优化与协调

文章研究了以成本利润率为目标优化函数,在收益共享契约下,构建单一供应商和单一零售商构成的供应链优化与协调模型.建立未提供收益共享契约和提供收益共享契约、零售商风险中性和风险规避的不同情形下的决策模型,给出不同情况下的最优订货量及实现供应链协调的收益共享系数的区间范围.研究认为:收益共享契约下的零售商最优订货量大于未提供收益共享契约下的最优订货量;不论是否提供收益共享契约,利润最大化为优化目标的零售商最优订货量均高于以成本利润率最大为优化目标的最优订货量;此外,研究给出了零售商的最优订货量与收益共享系数的关系.     

制造企业与服务中介合作创新的激励机制

运用多任务委托代理模型,构建了制造企业与服务中介合作服务创新的激励机制模型。该模型考虑了双方的知识共享水平、努力水平对服务创新质量的影响。研究表明:契约一旦被设定,双方的努力水平为均衡解下的努力水平;双方的努力水平、知识共享水平和服务创新质量都随着激励系数的增大而增大;但激励系数的增大并不总会使制造企业收益增大,制造企业收益在激励系数临界值处达到最大值,超过临界值后会随着激励系数的增大而下降;双方的知识共享程度的增大会使服务创新质量和系统收益增大。最后通过数值算例验证了相关结论。     

协调三级供应链风险分析——基于数量折扣契约与收益共享契约组合

本文研究了随机需求下基于数量折扣契约与收益共享契约组合的协调三级供应链中各参与方的风险分担问题.采用利润的方差来衡量各参与方的风险水平,给出了三级供应链各参与方的风险水平与契约参数之间的关系,并用数值例子进行了说明.可以为供应链参与方谈判、缔结契约、实现共赢提供参考.     

多零售商环境下中国石油企业供应链收益共享契约研究

本文以中国石油企业供应链为研究对象,基于博弈论思想,构建了普通契约模型和收益共享契约模型,并分别求出两种契约条件下零售商、供应商以及整条供应链的收益,同时求出了收益共享契约中的利润分配比例系数。通过算例分析,证明合适的收益共享契约可以起到协调石油供应链的作用。     

研发外包中价值不可验证的隐性知识共享激励

收益共享是激励代理人努力工作的有效手段之一,但在研发外包中服务商隐性知识价值难以验证,收益共享难以实现。对此,建立了显性知识和隐性知识共享努力的多任务委托代理模型,模型的求解分析表明,当服务商显性和隐性知识共享努力成本存在替代关系时,模型将回归于一般的单任务模型;当存在互补关系时,客户对显性知识的激励同样能激励隐性知识共享,且激励效果随互补性的增加而越发有效。此时,客户最优的显性知识共享激励系数与成本相关系数、隐性知识共享努力成本系数正相关,而与显性知识创造共享努力成本系数、服务商风险规避度、方差负相关。     

CVaR准则下随机需求依赖价格的供应链协调研究

研究由单个风险中性的供应商和单个风险厌恶的零售商组成的两级供应链。在CVaR度量准则下探讨了随机需求依赖于价格的供应链协调问题。通过对零售商和整个供应链的决策分析,得到批发价契约不能使供应链达到协调,而收益共享契约和回购契约能使供应链达到协调,并给出了契约参数取值(范围)的计算公式。进一步证明了,回购契约与收益共享契约在零售商为风险厌恶的情形下具有等价性。同时,当供应链达到协调时,风险厌恶的零售商的利润随其风险厌恶程度的增加而增加。     

电信产业协调发展的经济学分析

基于剧烈变革的电信产业,认为合作利益分配是产业协调发展的核心问题.通过基于收益共享合同的一个实例分析,证实存在由批发价和分享比率共同作用的契约安排,能够实现利润一定程度的任意分配,同时具有可操作性.任意分配利润是契约的理想状态,而执行该类契约往往会增加各种各样的管理成本,因此,实践中的方案往往是两者之间的折衷.     

高管特征、晋升激励对公司财务治理效率的影响研究

在委托代理理论、高阶理论和心理契约理论基础上,研究高管特征的不同方面对晋升激励的耦合作用,而高管晋升激励水平将对财务治理成本和财务治理收益分别产生不同的影响,从而导致公司财务治理效率的显著差异。     

考虑保鲜努力的生鲜农产品零售商与物流服务商的协调合同

物流服务商提高生鲜农产品的保鲜努力水平会对零售商的利润产生重要影响。一般的物流合同不能有效鼓励物流服务商提高生鲜农产品的保鲜努力水平。为此,本文建立了一种成本分担与收入共享合同。该合同在不损害物流服务商利益的前提下,使物流服务商提高保鲜努力水平;同时,零售商分担部分保鲜努力成本,并分享部分销售收入给物流服务商。研究结果表明,这一合同可形成一种有效的内在激励机制,提高物流服务商对生鲜农产品的保鲜努力水平,最终实现系统利润的最大化、双方的共赢。     

电信服务提供商的多因素激励机制研究

在电信运营商和SP合作中,电信运营商提供业务传输通道,SP主要提供业务服务,然后二者按一定比例对该业务收益进行分成。如何处理电信运营商与SP的关系,是电信产业未来几年所要研究的重点,由于电信运营商和电信服务提供商（SP）之间存在利益冲突和信息不对称,很容易导致SP的违规行为。电信运营商和SP之间的关系属于多因素的委托-代理关系。在设计委托-代理激励合同时,从多因素角度考虑了电信运营商对SP的激励,在设计委托-代理激励合同时,从两个任务的角度即：可观测到的SP发展的用户数、业务量和用户数及业务量增量和可观测到的SP的信用积分和等级。并通过风险成本和代理成本研究可知对SP进行多因素激励是非常必要的。在具体分析时采用了双因素激励模型。     

Service sharing,profit mode and coordination mechanism in the Online-to-Offline retail market

How does the sharing economy affect the retail industry? This study investigates the impact of service sharing on the decisions and profits of two profit modes in the Online-to-Offline (O2O) retail market. We find that service sharing always improves the profit of the brand supplier as a service demander in both two profit modes, and improves the profit of the offline franchisee as a service provider in the profit-sharing mode under certain circumstances, but always reduces its profit in the non-profit-sharing mode. This is associated with the double marginalisation effect of the non-profit-sharing mode which leads to channel conflicts. Thus, a service-cost sharing mechanism is introduced to coordinate conflicts and achieve a win-win strategy, thereby improving the performance of the entire O2O supply chain.     

Demand disruption and coordination of supply chain via effort and revenue sharing

This article explores the equilibrium behaviour of a basic supplier–retailer distribution channel under demand disruption via effort and revenue sharing contract. This differs from the traditional supply chain coordination model. Firstly, demand is simultaneously affected by retail price and nonprice marketing effort from manufacturers and retailers. Secondly, when the demand is disrupted, this article considers disruptions in the market scale and price sensitivity coefficient. Thirdly, the supply chain coordination model is proposed via effort and revenue sharing contract. In this way, the manufacturer reduces the wholesale price as an incentive for the retailer to share revenue. Finally, the total supply chain profit is greater with contract than no contract. This also constitutes another incentive for the players to follow the effort and revenue sharing contract.     

Unfair incentives: A behavioural note on sharecropping

We conducted a laboratory‐in‐the‐field experiment with real‐life tenants in Ethiopia to test the incentive effects of fixed wage, sharecropping, fixed rent, and ownership contracts. The experimental task resembles a common process in agricultural production. The sharecropping contract is a piece rate scheme framed as a profit‐sharing agreement. Sharecropping output was about 12 percent smaller than the fixed rent output. Surprisingly, it is statistically indistinguishable from the fixed wage output, despite substantial piece rates. This effect is driven by real‐life sharecroppers. Their sharecropping output was smaller than that of non‐sharecroppers, especially in a region where a controversial land reform took place. We argue that our subjects dislike sharecropping contracts because of the unfair profit sharing and the disputed allocation of land. Fairness concerns, therefore, may be another impediment to efficiency under the sharecropping contract.     

Moral hazard,land fertility and sharecropping in a rural area of the Philippines

Introducing concerns about land fertility for landlords in a Principal–Agent model of sharecropping with moral hazard, we show that the optimal contract under limited commitment reflects a trade-off between production and land quality maintenance. Using data from the Philippines, a model where the leasing out and contract choices are simultaneous is estimated and avoids the selectivity bias of observed contracts. Landlords prefer to use more incentive contracts for more fertile plots and less incentive ones when crop choices induce land overuse. Empirical tests reject the model of pure risk sharing in production and show the interest of taking land quality maintenance into account.     

Market share determination in marketing service industries - A demand side approach∗

A marketing service industry provides its business clients with its services such as advertising media or inbound telecommunication ( i.e. toll free 800 calls) to increase their sales. By extending Dorfman and Steiner (1954) to the world where firms obtain costly marketing services from outside specialized providers, this paper studies the market shares of providers of a marketing service from the perspective of their clients. It derives that at the optimal point for a representative client, a provider's market share equals the ratio of the profits contributed by its service to the total profits contributed by the services of all providers in the market. Under certain conditions, a provider's market share is just a function of quality-price ratios. This result should facilitate choosing a marketing service from alternative providers and analyzing market shares in marketing-service industries.     

弹性分成：分税制的契约与影响

本文从契约角度分析分税制的性质,并用统一的框架解释了分税制的正反两方面作用。研究认为：中国的分税制本质上是一个弹性的分成合同系统。它是中央政府与地方政府关于剩余分配的各种子契约的组合。这些子契约可归为四种基本形式--工资合同、定额合同、分税合同和分成合同,并且它们之间具有很强的互补性,由此构成了一个富有弹性的分成合同系统。在信息不对称的条件下,这个激励系统能够激励地方政府发展经济,但是易扭曲地方政府行为,促使经济重复建设和粗放型增长模式的形成。     

石油合同对国际油气合作博弈影响分析

本文建立了国际油气合作中的资源国与消费国之间的合作博弈模型,分析了不同的油气合同模式对资源消费国效用水平的影响.研究表明,合同模式在油气合作博弈中扮演着重要角色.从投资者的角度看,为获得效用最大化,投资者不但应注意投资区块的选择,还要对资源国的合同模式进行深入分析和利弊权衡.通过对几种石油合同模式的比较,发现在总收益相同的条件下,从风险大小的角度考虑,纯服务合同带来的效用大于产品分成合同和矿税制合同；从收益的角度考虑,产品分成合同和矿税制合同使资源消费国保留了油价上涨时获取高额利润的权利,带来的效用大于技术服务合同.     

Product quality and competition: evidence from the broadband industry

Access to high-quality broadband internet is important in many different respects such as in communication, education, commerce and information acquisition. We investigate the relationship between the number of broadband providers in an area and the quality of broadband service provided where download speed is used as a proxy for quality. We find that increased competition in an area positively affects the access to fast download speeds. This finding is robust to three different top download speeds tested. Additionally, a theoretical model is provided which shows that competition can decrease the profits associated with offering slow speeds; this gives an incentive for providers to offer higher speeds as a way to increase profits.