A demographic-economic explanation of political stability: Mauritius as a microcosm

"This paper examines current models of economic and political development--social modernization theory, political and economic characteristics of stable regimes, and cross country analysis of political stability--and tests them on the Indian Ocean Island of Mauritius. The analysis continues with a causal explanation for political stability in Mauritius' recent history, derived from an examination of economic policies and demographic patterns. Political change in Mauritius over the past sixty years seems to be explained best by a model for political stability which integrates specific economic and demographic factors. The model, applicable to development in other third world nations, revises Malthus' conclusion that population and economic conditions move in an oscillatory relationship and replaces it with a more comprehensive theory, suggesting that political stability is a function of both economic development and a repeating cyclical relationship between economics and population."     

Casinos and political corruption in the United States: a Granger causality analysis

The commercial casino industry experienced an unprecedented expansion in the United States during the 1990s. As the industry has grown, so has the anecdotal evidence that links the casino industry with political corruption. However, there have been no empirical analyses of the issue. We use state-level panel data from 1985–2000 to posit a Granger causality analysis of the relationship between corruption convictions of state public officials and the predicted adoptions of casinos at the state level. We find evidence that predicted casino adoptions Granger cause corruption convictions. This finding is suggestive of a scenario of regulatory capture and may help explain why state-level gaming regulatory agencies have a history of softening gaming regulations after the initial introduction of casinos. Our study provides the first empirical evidence linking casinos to political corruption.     

Why the Arab Spring turned Islamic: the political economy of Islam

This paper argues that the fundamental reason for the ascendancy of political Islam in the wake of the Arab revolutions lies in the uncompetitive nature of the religion and its implications for political economy: the fact that Islam is one and long since unchanged, which makes the Islamists’ call very costly to resist and very attractive to follow. The argument is developed through an examination of sectarian and legal history in Islam and a comparison of the nexus between church, state and individual in Christian and Muslim religious traditions. Special attention is devoted to Islamic Law and the law schools that define it.     

State politics,tuition, and the dynamics of a political budget cycle

This paper attempts to improve the understanding of political budget cycles by first identifying a previously undocumented cycle in tuition and required fees at public four-year institutions of higher education in the United States. I find that tuition and fees are 1.5 % lower during gubernatorial election years than in non-election years. No similar cycle is found in private tuition and fees. Using a newly constructed dataset, I then explore the variation in electoral competition in gubernatorial and state legislative elections within states over time to uncover the underlying electoral incentives creating the cycle. The results suggest that the tuition cycle is not designed to increase the reelection prospects of governors as standard theories would predict. I find that tuition decreases during gubernatorial election years as the reelection prospects of the incumbent governor increases. Instead, the evidence suggests that popular governors use lower tuition as political pork to expand party power in the state by capturing swing districts in concurrent state legislative elections. I find that the magnitude of the cycle increases with the level of competition in state house elections and that the effect is concentrated among those districts held by the opposition party, particularly if those opposition districts are populated with voters likely to be responsive to tuition as a policy lever. These results reveal important dynamics about party competition within states in the United States and suggest that the electoral incentives driving political budget cycles can be complex.     

A dirty deed done dirt cheap: Reporting the blame of a national reform on local politicians

This paper tests the hypothesis that upper-level governments can transfer the accountability of the costs of a reform to a lower one. The reform of the school week in France provides the ground for a verification of the attribution of accountability hypothesis, as it was nationally decided and locally implemented, right before a municipal election. The results confirm that local incumbents have taken the blame of the reform, especially in larger cities. In this case, thus, the cost of the reform is borne twice by the lower level of government, financially and politically. So doing, the central government does a dirty deed to the local ones, for a very cheap cost. That mayors who have announced a boycott of the reform have received electoral gains confirms that some local politicians expected to be the fall guys, bearing the brunt of the costs of the reform.     

Social and political components of economic performance for the 1960s: A note on Adelman and Morris' ‘society,politics and economic development’

The influence of a given sociopolitical setting on the subsequent economic performance of the LDCs is examined. For this purpose, non-economic indicators developed by Adelman and Morris and two indices of economic activity, per capita gross national product and per capita energy consumption, are used. Component and regression analysis show that in the short run, a given sociopolitical setting significantly affects subsequent economic activity. The results enable a broadening of some of Adelman and Morris' findings.     

Institutional individualism and institutional change: the search for a middle way mode of explanation

After noting the lack of enthusiasm of several well-known scholarsconcerning the adoption of both methodological holism and methodologicalindividualism in its several versions, this paper shows thatinstitutional individualism is a different mode of explanationfrom both of these and also that it is not the same thing asthe so-called Popperian programme of situational analysis. Institutionalindividualism is a mode of explanation that yields non-systemicand non-reductionist explanations at the same time as it allowsfor the incorporation into economic theories and models of themany formal and informal institutional aspects surrounding allhuman interactions, whether these interactions take place withinstable structures of legal rules and social norms or whetherthey attempt to change the said rules and norms. Finally, thepaper shows that it is possible for old institutionalists tomake institutional individualist analyses of institutional changeswhile retaining the remaining methodological assumptions ofthe school. The same is true for new institutionalists. Someexamples are offered from both camps.     

A signalling explanation for preferential attachment in the evolution of social networks

The network theory developed by physicists has several critical drawbacks in characterizing the structure of social networks. First, they largely neglect considering the link cost and the link benefit that agents usually take into account in forming their links. Second, they view a social network as a consequence of unilateral decisions of agents, not of bilateral decisions of linking parties, although a link of an agent can be formed only after he obtains the consent of the other side. Third, there is no logical justification for the assumption of preferential attachment upon which their analysis heavily relies. In this paper, we provide several models that overcome the three drawbacks. By analyzing the models, we can explain preferential attachment as rational equilibrium behavior. The main idea is that people are not certain of the value that they can obtain from forming a link with someone. Based on this assumption, we will argue that a person has an incentive to form a link with another who has many links because the number of his links can convey some information about his value.     

Tax competition and the political economy of public employment: a model for Austria

In this work, we simulate the effects of the tax autonomy of the Austrian states on the levels of public employment in each state. We show that depending on the strength of the public sector lobby, tax autonomy would require a reduction of employment in the public sector of between 25 and 35% of the current level. We also show that tax autonomy increases welfare levels by 1–1.5%; that is, the positive change in the disposable income of the workers more than offsets the welfare loss resulting from the lower provision of public goods. Finally, we show that the reduction of public employment is superior in terms of welfare to an alternative scenario in which employment levels are held constant but the wage levels in the public sector are adjusted.     

Destabilizing effects of a successful stabilization: a forward-looking explanation of the second Hungarian hyperinflation

Summary. The extreme severity of the second Hungarian hyperinflation is argued to be related to the unusual way in which the inflation was eventually stabilized. The historical features of this episode are represented in a general equilibrium model, which incorporates a transition from one monetary regime to another. During the inflation the government finances a fixed deficit with seigniorage revenue. After the stabilization the government budget is balanced and the central bank engages in a program of subsidized lending to the private sector. Stabilization is achieved by targeting a low inflation rate path through adjustments in the quantity of central bank lending. I show that under this stabilization policy (1) the dynamic equilibrium path of the economy is indeterminate and (2) arbitrarily high pre-stabilization inflation rates are possible. Received: November 5, 1998; revised version: November 30, 1998     

On the persistence of prices in Mexico: a fractional integration approach

A relevant yet often overlooked characteristic of the inflation rate is its mean-reverting property. If a series has this feature, shocks eventually dissipate, whereas if it does not, they have a permanent effect on the series. The usual I(1) versus I(0) dichotomy in time-series econometrics goes only so far towards disentangling this issue. By employing a methodology that estimates the persistence of inflation by allowing (i) fractional integration and (ii) persistence and level shifts in the series, we aim to define whether it is stationary and/or mean reverting and, if so, during which periods. The results of our analysis for the period 1987–2015 are threefold: firstly, inflation in the eighties and nineties should be seen as a highly persistent yet mean-reverting process (not a random walk); secondly, inflation remained mean reverting, though became a short-memory (less persistent) process around the date of the implementation of the inflation-targeting framework of 2001; thirdly, during the later phase, the level of inflation also decreased and is now within the inflation target range set by Banco de México, namely 3 per cent with an interval of ±1 percentage point.     

Firm innovation persistence: a fresh look at the frameworks of analysis

This paper introduces the special issue on innovation persistence. It delineates three complementary theoretical frameworks assessing drivers and implications of innovation persistence: ‘knowledge accumulation’ approach, the ‘success-breeds-success’ hypothesis and the concept of sunk costs in R&D activities. It emphasizes how path dependence could be related to innovation persistence. It provides an extensive overview of the main empirical findings of recent papers and suggests a new research agenda about firms’ dynamic capabilities and innovation persistence. Finally it highlights a set of issues that deserve further investigation in the future. The contributions to this issue are set out as well.     

Self-insurance vs. self-financing: A welfare analysis of the persistence of shocks

We study the welfare cost of market incompleteness in a generalized Bewley model where idiosyncratic risk takes the form of entrepreneurial productivity shocks. Market incompleteness in our framework has two dimensions. First, in the Bewley tradition, only a limited set of instruments for consumption smoothing is available. Second, entrepreneurs? capital rental is subject to collateral constraints. As is well known, it is harder to self-insure against more persistent shocks, and the welfare cost of missing consumption insurance increases with shock persistence. On the other hand, with collateral constraints, an increase in shock persistence leads to better allocation of production factors through entrepreneurs? self-financing, and the welfare cost of imperfect capital rental markets decreases with shock persistence. The overall welfare cost of market incompleteness can be increasing, decreasing, or even non-monotone in shock persistence, depending on the relative strengths of its two components—the cost of missing insurance and the cost of imperfect capital markets.     

On the interpretation of bribery in a laboratory corruption game: moral frames and social norms

Past studies on laboratory corruption games have not been able to find consistent evidence that subjects make “immoral” decisions. A possible reason, and also a critique of laboratory corruption games, is that the experiment may fail to trigger the intended immorality frame in the minds of the participants, leading many to question the very raison d’être of laboratory corruption games. To test this idea, we compare behavior in a harassment bribery game with a strategically identical but neutrally framed ultimatum game. The results show that fewer people, both as briber and bribee, engage in corruption in the bribery frame than in the alternative and the average bribe amount is lesser in the former than in the latter. These suggest that moral costs are indeed at work. A third treatment, which relabels the bribery game in neutral language, indicates that the observed treatment effect arises not from the neutral language of the ultimatum game but from a change in the sense of entitlement between the bribery and ultimatum game frames. To provide further support that the bribery game does measure moral costs, we elicit the shared perceptions of appropriateness of the actions or social norm, under the two frames. We show that the social norm governing the bribery game frame and ultimatum game frame are indeed different and that the perceived sense of social appropriateness plays a crucial role in determining the actual behavior in the two frames. Furthermore, merely relabelling the bribery game in neutral language makes no difference to the social appropriateness norm governing it. This indicates that, just as in the case of actual behavior, the observed difference in social appropriateness norm between bribery game and ultimatum game comes from the difference in entitlement too. Finally, we comment on the external validity of behavior in lab corruption games.     

Democracy as a middle ground: A unified theory of development and political regimes

Although many of the worst performing countries over the post-World War II period were autocracies, many of the best were likewise autocratic. At the same time, no long-lived autocracy currently is rich whereas every long-lived democracy is. This paper proposes a theory to account for these observations that rests on the ideas that autocrats are heterogeneous and that elites experience lower land rents with industrialization. In a model calibrated to Britain's development, we show that elites democratize society only after the economy has accumulated enough wealth, and that the democratization date depends importantly on the history of rulers and distribution of land.     

The age of the universal consumer: a reconsideration of Ricardo's politics *

This paper reconsiders Ricardo's political thought, its relationship with his political economy and, more generally, Ricardo's connection with the ‘philosophical radicalism’ of Bentham and James Mill. It is arguedinter alia, that Ricardo's politics were utilitarian and individualistic; that he developed a notion of a shared, homogeneous interest; that he believed that individuals should know their ‘real’ interests as a condition for their suffrage; and that he subscribed to a doctrine of virtual representation. It is also argued that Ricardo was considerably less ‘radical’ in his political views than some previous commentators have recognized.     

An index of political support for decentralization: the Spanish case

This paper presents a method to make measurable what was not: the discourses of politicians regarding decentralization. For this purpose, we develop a “matrix of arguments” and a set of indexes, and apply them to provide a snapshot of the politicians’ views on the “General Law of Budgetary Stability”, a landmark for the process of decentralization in Spain.     

The case of the United States: Energy as a political good

This paper presents an analysis of energy as a “political” good in the U. S. market economy. Political status is said to be acquired if a good is systematically and persistently allocated by criteria other than efficiency. The mechanics of allocating energy are examined in terms of interaction between market and command institutions. Then the energy-policy process is analyzed to determine why and how energy became a political good. An observed reversal of equity roles in the 1970s is traced to an economic source—the sharp change in world oil prices—rather than to changes in political power.