DO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS MATTER TO TAIWAN'S EXPORTS? A DYNAMIC PANEL APPROACH

This article analyses whether and how Taiwan's exports are sensitive to national differences in intellectual property right (IPR) protection, as well as the degree of imitation threat. Applying a longitudinal IPR index developed by the World Economic Forum (WEF) and using the generalized method of moments dynamic panel data modelling technique to control for endogeneity and panel unit root problems, the empirical results show that the strength of importing countries' IPR protection has a positive impact on Taiwan's exports, supporting the standpoint of market expansion that stronger IPR protection will induce more trade. Under various classification systems to differentiate the degree of threat of imitation across countries, both positive and negative export effects of IPR are found in Taiwan's case. However, the pattern of threat of imitation–trade nexus seems to contradict theory predictions. Moreover, high‐tech exports are found be more IPR sensitive than non‐high‐tech exports.     

南方最优知识产权保护水平与南方企业自主创新

构建了一个扩展的南北贸易模型,讨论了南方知识产权保护的决定因素及其对南北双方福利的影响。在模型中,南方政府内生决定知识产权保护水平,北方厂商内生决定研发投资水平和市场竞争策略,南方厂商内生决定自主创新或模仿。研究发现:南方的最优知识产权保护水平与北方存在差异;当南方厂商模仿北方厂商的技术时,南方执行最严格的知识产权保护对北方福利和南方福利都造成损害;当南方厂商的创新效率较高时,严格的知识产权保护能激励南方厂商进行自主创新、改善南方福利。     

Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth

Interest in links between protection of intellectual property and growth has been revived by developments in new growth theory and by the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement. The relationship between the strength of a country’s intellectual property rights (IPRs) regime and rate of growth is ambiguous from a theoretical standpoint, reflecting the variety of channels through which technology can be acquired and their differing importance at different stages of development. We investigate the impact of IPR protection on economic growth in a panel of 79 countries using threshold regression analysis. We show that whilst the effect of IPR protection on growth depends upon the level of development, it is positively and significantly related to growth for low‐ and high‐income countries, but not for middle‐income countries. This suggests that, although IPR protection encourages innovation in high‐income countries, and technology flows to low‐income countries, middle‐income countries may have offsetting losses from reduced scope for imitation.     

Imitation and innovation driven development under imperfect intellectual property rights

Developing countries employ about two-fifth of the world's researchers, originate one quarter of world expenditures on R&D, and their inventions are subject to imitation. Nevertheless, the previous literature focuses on North–South setups in which the South is restricted to imitating northern inventions. To analyze the effects of IPR policies on developed and developing countries, we extend this literature to allow not only for southern innovation and imitation of northern goods, but also for imitation targeted at southern innovations. We find the effects of IPRs on R&D and welfare to be non-monotonic and dependent on innovation efficiency and an innovation threshold in the South. For sufficiently strong IPRs the South engages in original R&D and stronger IPRs promote southern innovation, welfare, and a reduction in the North–South wage gap. Below the threshold, a strengthening of IPR protection fails to promote innovation and decreases welfare. Stronger IPRs exclusively for southern firms can benefit both regions by shifting southern resources from the imitation of northern goods to original southern innovation.     

Intellectual property rights and quality improvement

This paper explores why theories about the effects of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection on foreign direct investment (FDI) and innovation have reached mixed conclusions. In our model, Northern firms innovate to improve the quality of existing products and may later shift production to the South through FDI. Southern firms may then imitate the products of multinationals. We find that imitation can increase FDI and innovation for quality improvements, whereas the opposite occurs when innovators develop new varieties. Hence, stronger IPR protection, by reducing imitation, may shift innovation away from improvements in existing products toward development of new products.     

Endogenous growth and intellectual property rights: A north–south modeling proposal

In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium endogenous growth model that emphasizes the IPR enforcement effects on growth, in a scenario of north–south technological knowledge diffusion. The economy consists of three sectors, and firms are engaged in step-by-step innovation. In line with the literature, we introduce an IPR parameter that makes imitation more difficult. We find that, in steady state, the increases in IPR protection result in decreases in the growth rate. This result is in line with the literature, which argues that the enforcement of IPR does not always have a positive effect on economic growth. To sum up, we present some suggestions for future research which can help to clarify the relationship between IPR and endogenous growth.     

Economic Growth with Imperfect Protection of Intellectual Property Rights

This paper examines the growth effects of intellectual property right (IPR) protection in a quality-ladder model of endogenous growth. Stronger IPR protection, which reduces the imitation probability, increases the reward for innovation. However, stronger protection also gradually reduces the number of competitive sectors, in which innovation is easier than in monopolistic sectors. With free entry to R&D, the number of researchers in each remaining competitive sector increases, but the concentration of R&D activity raises the possibility of unnecessary duplication of innovation, thereby hindering growth. Consequently, imperfect rather than perfect protection maximizes growth. Welfare and scale effects are also examined.     

Innovation,imitation and multinationalisation in a North–South model: a theoretical note

We consider a dynamic general equilibrium product variety model of international product cycle with endogenous rate of imitation in the South; and find that a policy of strengthening intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in the South lowers the rate of product innovation, rate of multinationalisation and South–North relative wage if multinationalisation [or, foreign direct investment (FDI)] is the channel of production transfer. These results are significantly different from those obtained in the exogenous imitation model of Lai (J Dev Econ 55(1): 133–153, 1998). So a stronger IPR protection policy adopted by the South may not be interpreted as an incentive to encourage Northern FDI in the South and to raise the rate of innovation in the North.      

知识产权保护、FDI与国际收入转移

"加强知识产权保护能吸引更多外商直接投资(FDI),并能使后发国受益"这一命题能否构成支持加强后发国知识产权保护的论据?文章将知识产权保护对FDI、自主创新、国内模仿和国外模仿的影响纳入三方参与的两阶段动态博弈模型,讨论后发国通过加强知识产权保护来吸引FDI的政策效应。分析认为后发国通过加强知识产权保护能吸引更多FDI,但并不一定能从中获益。因为:FDI偏向进入能够对后发国产生最小收益的产业;加强知识产权保护产生了大量国际收入转移;通过加强知识产权保护,由FDI进入新行业而增加的利润将被已有FDI产业利润的减少所抵消。根据各行业特征选择相应的最优知识产权保护才能使总体福利最大化。     

Cross‐Border Intellectual Property Rights: Contract Enforcement and Absorptive Capacity

This article studies the cross‐border protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) as an outcome of a contract obtained through a Nash bargaining process between an innovative North and an imitative South. The level of disclosure required in such contract is higher, the more capable is the South in copying if bargaining breaks down. This raises questions about the suitability of universal IPR standards through a single contract. The threat of a penalty in case of non‐compliance can, however, reduce the outside option of more advanced countries and make a stricter IPR regime enforceable by harmonizing their interests with relatively less developed nations.     

Private patent protection in the theory of Schumpeterian growth

We develop a Schumpeterian growth model with privately optimal intellectual property rights (IPRs) enforcement and investigate the implications for intellectual property and R&D policies. In our setting, successful innovators undertake costly rent protection activities (RPAs) to enforce their patents. RPAs deter innovators who seek to discover higher quality products and thereby replace the patent holder. RPAs also deter imitators who seek to capture a portion of the monopoly market by imitating the patent holder's product. We investigate the role of private IPR protection by considering the impact of subsidies to RPAs on economic growth and welfare. We find that a larger RPA subsidy raises the innovation rate if and only if the ease of imitation is above a certain level. With regards to welfare, we find that depending on the parameters it may be optimal to tax or subsidize RPAs. Thus a prohibitively high taxation of RPAs is not necessarily optimal. We also show that the presence of imitation strengthens the case for subsidizing R&D.     

严格知识产权保护效用之争:基于文献综述

当前,严格知识产权保护成为国际法律、经济、政治的大势所趋。将技术进步作为直接和间接中间变量,梳理严格知识产权保护作用机理,回顾以往文献中关于严格知识产权保护对技术转移和创新、FDI、国际贸易、社会福利、收入分配及经济增长的效用争论,从研究框架、研究模型、研究视角3个方面解释该争论。分析影响知识产权制度效用的国际、国内因素,提出最大化知识产权制度效用的生态演化系统构想。从研究内容细化、研究视角拓展、研究模型深化、研究方法多样化4个方面对严格知识产权保护效用及作用机理的未来研究作出展望。     

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION AND IMITATION: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF JAPANESE F.D.I. IN CHINA

Abstract.  By using data obtained from a questionnaire survey to Japanese firms in China, we empirically examine the effects of the IPR protection against local illegal imitation. No evidence has been found that patent and trademark registration, which constitutes a part of the IPR protection system, has a protective effect. On the contrary, the results suggest that the patent and trademark registration system may play a role in facilitating local illegal imitation and may be easing technology transfer/diffusion in China.     

Intellectual property rights and skills accumulation: A product-cycle model of FDI and outsourcing

This study investigates the effects of stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in the South on innovation, skills accumulation, wage inequality, and patterns of production based on a North–South general-equilibrium model with foreign direct investment (FDI) and international outsourcing. We find that stronger Southern IPR protection raises the extent of outsourcing and reduces the extent of FDI. This increases the proportion of unskilled Southerners and mitigates Southern wage inequality. In the North, stronger Southern IPR protection raises the proportion of skilled Northerners and wage inequality. The effects of international specialization, R&D cost, and Northern population are also examined.     

Intellectual property rights and diaspora knowledge networks: Can patent protection generate brain gain from skilled migration?

This paper studies the mechanism through which intellectual property rights (IPR) protection can influence the impact of skilled migration on innovation activities in developing countries. We argue that knowledge acquired by emigrants abroad can flow back to their country of origin through diaspora networks. IPR protection in the sending country facilitates this channel by increasing returns to skills and encouraging workers to move into the innovation sector. An expansion of the innovation sector allows diaspora knowledge to be absorbed by a larger range of workers. Strong IPR enforcement therefore makes it more likely for brain drain to be transformed into brain gain.     

The Growth Effects of National Patent Policies*

We construct a two‐country (innovative North and imitating South) model of product‐cycle trade, fully endogenous Schumpeterian growth, and national patent policies. A move towards harmonization based on stronger Southern intellectual property rights (IPR) protection accelerates the long‐run global rates of innovation and growth, reduces the North–South wage gap, and has an ambiguous effect on the rate of international technology transfer. Patent harmonization constitutes a suboptimal global‐growth policy. However, if the global economy is governed by a common patent policy regime, then stronger global IPR protection: (a) increases the rates of global innovation and growth; (b) accelerates the rate of international technology transfer; and (c) has no impact on the North–South wage gap.     

知识产权保护、技术创新与南北贸易摩擦成因

相关文献大量的分析知识产权保护与技术创新之间的关系,或者单就分析知识产权保护的国际争端,而对于贸易壁垒和贸易摩擦与技术创新之间的联系以及贸易壁垒对于知识产权的替代补充作用却较少被关注.论文通过扩展一个南北贸易模型的分析,得到在南北国家知识产权保护不足的情形下,降低南方国家的贸易壁垒可以起到激励技术创新和补充知识产权保护的效果,这就为南北贸易摩擦的发生找到了一个新的动因.同时,我们的模型结果得出了一个与先前文献不同的结论,即北方国家的贸易壁垒对于技术创新没有激励作用.     

Intellectual property rights and the upgrading of the global value chain status

The present paper explores how intellectual property rights (IPR) protection affects an economy’s status in global value chains (GVC) by introducing IPR protection into the sequential production model. We find that a suitable IPR protection system that matches the phase of economic and technological development a country has reached is the key for developing countries to upgrade their status in GVC, which are dominated by multinational firms from developed countries. Empirical analysis with multinational panel data for 55 countries from 2005 to 2015 provides evidence in support of the predictions of this model, although the GVC‐enhancing effects of IPR protection are heterogeneous for developing and developed countries. The empirical conclusions are robust after using the instrumental variable method and controlling for endogeneity.     

转型环境下创业战略与新创企业竞争优势关系研究

创新战略有利于企业构建新的价值链，模仿战略是对市场已有价值链的补充，现有研究主要关注创新战略，对模仿战略关注不足，实践中很多新创企业通过模仿战略实现创业成功。特别地，中国转型环境下制度不完善造成的不良竞争环境会制约创新战略，促进模仿战略。然而，实践中这两种战略对新创企业均存在积极影响，选择创新战略还是模仿战略事关新创企业创业成败。考察技术、市场环境和制度环境特征，剖析不同技术和市场环境下不良竞争对创新战略和模仿战略的调节作用。利用153份新创企业样本研究发现：创新战略和模仿战略均有利于竞争优势，但不同环境特征下作用效果存在差异。不良竞争对模仿战略的影响与技术、市场环境特征不相关；对创新战略的影响与技术、市场环境特征相关。创新战略和模仿战略并不存在孰优孰劣，是一定约束条件下新创企业战略决策的结果。     

Innovation,Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights with International Capital Movement

This paper extends the established Helpman (1993 ) model by introducing international capital movement, and obtains new results concerning the welfare implications of tightening intellectual property rights (IPR) in the South. First, if separated capital markets in the North and the South are integrated, enforcement of IPR would have more desirable welfare effects in both regions. Second, when international capital movement is allowed, the North always gains from the tightening of IPR if the imitation rate is sufficiently high. This implies that the North's demand on the South to tighten IPR becomes stronger as the integration of international capital markets progresses.