货币均衡对产业结构及国际收支平衡的影响

货币政策对经济发展起着重要影响,特别是完全脱离金本位的纸币体制下,货币不仅影响到通货膨胀,还会影响到汇率进而影响国际贸易。从货币均衡角度,分析经济危机发生后,利用货币政策刺激经济发展,对一国产业结构和国际贸易的影响,来说明货币均衡的重要性,分析货币政策的积极作用和负面影响,为宏观经济调节提供理论依据。     

国际金融危机背景下我国国际收支格局发展趋势研究

本次国际金融危机是全球经济失衡加速调整的结果,我国也受到一定程度的冲击和影响。国际收支"双顺差"是中国外向型经济增长模式下外部失衡的体现,也反映了全球经济失衡条件下中国在国际经济利益分配中的不利现状。本文通过论证全球经济失衡背景下金融危机的爆发必然性及其对全球经济失衡的反向冲击作用,审视本次国际金融危机对我国国际收支"双顺差"格局的影响,提出在当前保持我国经济增长的"双依靠"策略。     

Devaluation,Inflation, and the Balance of Payments: A Short-Run Monetary Approach*

In this paper a model is presented to analyze, in a monetary setting, the effects of a once-and-for-all adjustment in the exchange rate in a small economy committed to a fixed exchange-rate system. The effects of such an adjustment are shown to be transitory. After a devaluation the domestic rate of inflation accelerates in relation to the rate of inflation in the rest of the world. The increase in prices reduces the real value of the nominal stock of money and, in order to restore real liquidity to its previous level, foreign-exchange reserves start to flow into the country. However, as monetary equlibrium is reached, the flow of reserves tends to stop and the domestic rate of inflation converges to the world rate.     

Monetary Stabilisation Policy in a Monetary Union: Some Simple Analytics

We do two things in this paper. First, we look at some simple models of monetary decision making in a monetary union and ask how much more variable a country's output and inflation is likely to be if it joins the union. We answer this analytically and then go on to 'calibrate' the simple model. The model has few structural equations, but it is useful in allowing us to examine how the variability of output and inflation are likely to change as key parameters change. Our conclusions on this front are likely to be sensitive to model specification. However, we also identify a second best issue concerning the optimal make–up of the monetary union which is likely to be more robust: namely that only when all members of the union have the same structural parameter values (and shocks are perfectly correlated) will it be optimal for a new member to have these same structural parameter values.     

Policy Uncertainty and Economic Reforms in a Monetary Union

Abstract. The paper analyzes the relation between monetary uncertainty and government incentives to implement economic reforms in order to reduce structural distortions and make economies more flexible. It is shown that uncertainty about the central bank's behavior leads to more reforms. I relate this result to the debate about central bank structure in a larger European monetary union.     

Asymmetric Shocks and Monetary Policy in a Currency Union

We analyze the conduct of monetary policy in a currency union in the face of asymmetric shocks. In particular, we compare the stabilization properties of a currency union versus alternative exchange rate arrangements. The relative performance of a currency union is shown to depend on the extent of economic integration in patterns of consumption and production and on the relative weights placed on price stability versus employment stability in the monetary authority's objective function.
JEL classification : F 33; F 40     

Macroeconomic Performance and Wage Bargaining in a Monetary Union

Building on a micro-founded model of a two-region monetary union, this paperanalyses the macroeconomic impact of institutional reforms in labour marketsand central banking that may occur as a result of monetary unification. Thepaper shows that monopoly distortions in the labour market are a key factorin evaluating the effects of central bank's conservativeness and wagecentralisation on inflation and unemployment. Wage restraint is favoured ina highly decentralised wage bargaining setup as well as under a liberalcentral bank, provided competition is high in the labour market.     

Whither the Balance of Payments?

This article sets out the analytical framework of the 'new' approach to the balance of payments under the conditions of 'international financial laissez faire' characterised by financial deregulation, floating exchange rates, and high international capital mobility. It is argued that much of the reasoning underlying the new approach derives from the modus operandi of regional payments systems. The fundamental differences between the benchmark model of regional financing and the current international financial laissez faire are explored, and the extent to which the presence of exchange risk may interfere with the 'optimal' debt/borrowing processes posited by the new approach is discussed. The possibility of a transfer problem arising from Australia's rapid accumulation of short-term foreign debt is considered.
While developments in international banking, together with the liberalisation and globalisation of world securities markets, have considerably narrowed the differences between the new global financial environment and regional payments systems, the conclusion of the article is that there are substantial externalities in the international case which are intrinsic to the debt/borrowing process and which are likely to remain a source of continued policy concern.     

Sharing Money Creation in a Monetary Union*

How to share money creation among the members of the European Monetary Union? To address this issue, we construct a two‐country New Open‐economy Macroeconomics model of an asymmetric monetary union with an incomplete financial market and home bias in consumption. We consider two sharing rules consistent with the current regulations of the European System of Central Banks. First, each participating National Central Bank supplies half of the European Central Bank determined money creation in the monetary union. Secondly, each National Central Bank adapts the national increase in money demand, under the constraint that the total money creation in the union does not exceed the level determined by the ECB for the whole union. We show that the current sharing rule, which ignores countries’ heterogeneity, is superior in terms of welfare. The key role of the current account is emphasized. It proves an efficient decentralized mechanism for allocation of money.     

Monetary policy implementation and transmission in the European Monetary Union

I discuss possible problems engendered by loss of national monetary policies, and study them from three empirical perspectives. First, are business cycles sufficiently synchronized across EMU member countries? The evidence suggests that economic activity in those countries has become increasingly correlated in the 1990s, and that policy co–ordination has played a role in generating that outcome. Second, are there asymmetries in the mechanisms through which policy affects economic activity? The paper documents that policy transmission was indeed heterogeneous in the member countries, and that structural and financial factors were sensibly related to cross–country differences in the response of output to a monetary policy shock. Third, how is policy implemented in an environment of diverse business cycle fundamentals and transmission mechanisms? Estimation of monetary policy reaction functions finds that the European Central Bank is closer to an aggregate of the central banks in Germany, France, and Italy than to the Bundesbank alone.     

Relative Prices in Monetary Union and Floating

The setting is a small open economy with an open sector and a sheltered sector. If the unions that operate in each sector coordinate their wage claims within the sector, the choice of monetary regime—monetary union or floating with an inflation target—affects the relative prices of tradables and non–tradables as well as real wages and employment. EMU membership results in lower prices of tradable goods and lower relative wages in the open sector, while opposite results hold for sheltered sector prices and wages.
JEL classification : E 5; E 24; E 42; J 5; J 31     

Overturning Mundell: Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union

Central to ongoing debates over the desirability of monetary unions is a supposed trade-off, outlined by Mundell (1961) : a monetary union reduces transactions costs but renders stabilization policy less effective. If shocks across countries are sufficiently correlated, then, according to this argument, delegating monetary policy to a single central bank is not very costly and a monetary union is desirable.
This paper explores this argument in a setting with both monetary and fiscal policies. In an economy with monetary policy alone, we confirm the presence of the trade-off and find that indeed a monetary union will not be welfare improving if the correlation of national shocks is too low. However, fiscal interventions by national governments, combined with a central bank that has the ability to commit to monetary policy, overturn these results. In equilibrium, such a monetary union will be welfare improving for any correlation of shocks.     

Fiscal Transfers in a Monetary Union with Exit Option

It is widely debated whether a monetary union has to be accompanied by a fiscal transfer scheme to accommodate asymmetric shocks. We build a model of a monetary union with a central bank and two heterogeneous countries that are linked by a fiscal transfer scheme with repercussions on monetary policy. A central bank aiming at securing the existence of a monetary union in the presence of asymmetric shocks has to compensate single countries for the tax distortions arising from fiscal transfers. Monetary policy may become more expansionary or restrictive depending on asymmetries between member countries' inflation aversion and exit costs.     

The Economic Case for Monetary Union in the European Union

Differential requirements for seigniorage provide a weak case for retaining monetary independence. As regards adjustment to asymmetric shocks, nominal exchange rate flexibility is at best a limited blessing and at worst a limited curse. Absence of significant fiscal redistribution mechanisms among EU members is not an obstacle to monetary union. Neither is limited international labour mobility. Convergence of real economic performance is irrelevant for monetary union. A common currency is the logical implication of unrestricted capital mobility. The Maastricht criteria need not hinder monetary union provided the political will exists to adopt a flexible interpretation of the fiscal criteria.     

我国国际收支对货币政策独立性的冲击

随着我国经济对外开放程度的日益提高,货币政策的传导机制已经不完全取决于国内的经济变量,因此,研究来自外部经济因素的影响就越发显得重要.本文通过Granger影响关系、VAR模型的冲击反应和误差方差分解方法证实了,在开放经济条件下我国国际收支状况的变化引致通货膨胀和国内生产总值的变动,继而揭示了外部冲击对我国货币政策独立性具有影响.