Tariff Liberalization and Trade Integration of Emerging Countries

This paper investigates how tariff liberalization has affected exporting at the product‐destination level in emerging countries. We use a highly disaggregated (six‐digit level of the harmonized system—HS—classification) bilateral measure of market access to compare tariffs applied in 1996 and 2006, which includes the timing of the Uruguay Round and episodes of bilateral liberalization. Our econometric estimations consider impacts of tariff cuts on three components of the trade margins: extensive margin of entry (new trade relationships at the product‐destination level), extensive margin of exit (disappearance of existing relationships) and intensive margin of trade (deepening existing relationships). Our main estimates indicate that a reduction of bilateral applied tariffs of 1 percentage point increases the extensive margin of entry by 0.1% and the intensive one by 2.09%, while it reduces the extensive margin of exit by 0.25%.     

The “Emulator Effect” of the Uruguay Round on US Regionalism

Using a detailed data set at the tariff line level, we find an emulator effect of multilateralism on subsequent regional trade agreements (RTAs) involving the USA. We exploit the variation in the frequency with which the US grants immediate duty free access (IDA) to its RTA partners across tariff lines. A key finding is that the US grants IDA status especially on goods for which it has cut the multilateral most favored nation (MFN) tariff during the Uruguay Round the most. Our results suggest that the Uruguay Round multilateral “concessions” have elicited subsequent preferential trade liberalization.     

Regional Trade Agreements and Cross‐border Lobbying: Empirical Evidence from the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement Negotiations

This paper documents participation of special interest groups in negotiations of the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement. Using data on the tariff reduction schedules mandated by the agreement, it shows that industries represented by strong lobby groups were faced with more favorable tariff reduction paths in both countries: phase‐out periods were longer at home and shorter in the partner country. This result provides evidence on the involvement of industry lobbying in negotiation of regional trade agreements and suggests that countries negotiating trade agreements are responsive to the interests of lobbying groups from across the border. Both results provide important implications for the political economy theory of trade agreements.     

Explaining Export Performance through Inputs: Evidence from Aggregated Cross‐country Firm‐level Data

Which trade barrier related to intermediate inputs forms a greater burden on the export performance of firms in developing countries? Using aggregated cross‐country firm‐level data covering 43 mostly developing economies, this paper estimates the marginal importance of the impact of various intermediate input trade cost barriers, namely tariffs, non‐tariff barriers (NTBs) and services barriers, on firms' export behavior. In a cross‐sectoral setting, this paper takes the firm's export performance in goods as a central focus to study the effects of these different trade barriers through the exporting firm's choice of use of intermediate inputs. The results show that the most significant trade barriers on inputs that impede export performance in developing countries are mainly NTBs and restrictions of services.     

Reconciling Observed Tariffs and the Median Voter Model

Median voter theory applied to trade policy predicts positive tariffs in capital‐abundant countries and negative tariffs in labor‐abundant countries. Negative tariffs are rare, and this paper reconciles the median voter theory with observed protectionism across countries. By considering large countries, I show the optimal tariff is a sum of the median voter component and a positive term of trade component. Positive terms of trade effects raise tariffs in all countries, and can overcome the negative median voter component in labor‐abundant countries. Testing the tariff prediction with cross‐section and panel data from the 1990s, I show the median voter component is negative in labor‐abundant countries and positive in capital‐abundant countries. As expected, terms of trade effects raise tariffs across all countries and are stronger among nonmembers of the WTO.     

Developing-Country Benefits from MFN Relative to Regional/Bilateral Trade Arrangements

Using a general‐equilibrium model of world trade, this paper evaluates the benefits of most‐favored‐nation (MFN) treatment to developing countries in multilateral relative to bilateral or regional trade agreements, from three sources. First, developing countries may be able to free‐ride on bilateral tariff concessions exchanged between larger countries in MFN‐based GATT/WTO rounds. Second, MFN benefits developing countries by restricting discriminatory retaliatory actions by other countries, evaluated here by a non‐ cooperative Nash tariff game. Finally, MFN changes threat points in bargaining and hence affects the bargaining solution of multilateral MFN‐based trade negotiation compared to a bilateral/regional arrangement. The authors find that the benefits to developing countries are small in the first case as the tariff rates are already low, and the benefits are small in the second case as the optimal tariffs under unconstrained retaliation are not very asymmetric. Benefits from the third case are large as large countries can extract large side‐payments if they bargain bilaterally.     

Race‐to‐the‐bottom Tariff Cutting

Unilateral tariff liberalization accounts for the lion's share of trade liberalization since the 1980s and has accompanied the most successful trade‐led development model of the past 50 years, “Factory Asia”. Understanding what drove this liberalization is therefore crucial to our grasp of the process of economic development. This paper provides empirical evidence for seven Asian emerging economies from 1988 to 2006 consistent with a tariff race to the bottom driven by a competition for foreign direct investment (FDI). The identification is two‐pronged. First, it is shown that tariffs on parts and components, intermediates and capital goods, crucial locational determinants for assembly firms, are correlated in competitive space, i.e. across countries at a similar level of development, but not across all countries. Second, it is shown that the tariff correlation in competitive space is significantly higher for inputs than consumer goods.     

Trade Creation Effects of Regional Trade Agreements: Tariff Reduction versus Non‐tariff Barrier Removal

This study uses the most disaggregated tariff line‐level trade data in a large number of countries in the world to empirically decompose the trade creation effects of regional trade agreements (RTAs) into those owing to tariff reduction and those owing to non‐tariff barrier (NTB) removal. Specifically, utilizing our detailed dataset, we employ the standard gravity equation and identify those effects by estimating the trade creation effects of RTAs for ineligible and eligible products for RTA preferential schemes separately. Our major findings are as follows. First, for the whole sample, there are significantly positive trade creation effects owing to tariff reduction while the effects for NTB removal are weak. Second, the trade creation effects of tariff reduction and NTB removal are substantially large in the case of trade among low‐income countries but weak among high‐income countries.     

Protection for maturing industries: Evidence from Canadian trade patterns and trade policy, 1870–1913

As industries mature, experience is accumulated, productivity increases, trade performance improves on domestic and international markets and learning potential dissipates. Using theory‐consistent empirical specifications, I find a strong, robust negative relationship linking tariff rates to trade performance for manufactured products that matured during the first decade after Canada prioritized protectionist policy objectives in 1879. This relationship also holds at a more aggregate industry level, where I can use other measures of maturity, control for import penetration, use historically contemporaneous trade elasticity estimates, link trade performance to trade restrictiveness and effective rates of protection and where I can instrument for import penetration and trade performance using a two‐stage IV–GMM estimation approach. The results suggest that after 1890 the Canadian government carefully cut tariffs on products produced by maturing Canadian producers and this retreat from protectionism significantly lowered the static deadweight losses resulting from Canadian trade policy during the post‐1890 period.     

Tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade in Hungary: The impact of the Uruguay Round and EU accession

International trade has featured prominently in Hungary's rapid transition to a market economy. This paper reports some relatively simple summary and complementary indicators for tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade, which are designed to reflect the level and structure of tariffs and the scope of NTBs in Hungary. The existence of tariff 'spikes' and highly pervasive NTBs in certain sectors constitutes prima facie evidence that the domestic dead-weight efficiency and net welfare losses caused by tariff and non-tariff protection as well as the costs to consumers could be high. The indicators are used to highlight several key developments associated with Hungary's transition to a market economy, implementation of the Uruguay Round (UR) agreements and possible accession to the EU.     

A Two‐Country Game of Competition Policies

Recently a number of studies have recognized that trade policy can be substituted for by competition policy. This study demonstrates, however, that there is a fundamental difference in the working of terms‐of‐trade effects between competition policy and tariff policy and that if countries optimally set their respective competition policies, it is unlikely to result in a tariff‐war‐like state in which all countries adopt distortionary policies. Instead, in a Nash equilibrium, one country maintains perfect competition in its domestic service sector while the other country tolerates imperfect competition.     

India’s Green Revolution: Economic Gains and Political Costs

Research and development (R&;D) promotion policies are critical for economic development in the sense that they contribute to technical progress. Although it is true that policy space is restricted under the World Trade Organization (WTO) system, there are still some R&;D promotion policy measures made available to developing countries. It is thus necessary for developing countries to utilize such available measures. In addition to explaining the R&;D promotion measures available under the current WTO regulations, I provide suggestions for modifying the Uruguay Round Subsidies Code with respect to the R&;D promotion policies of developing countries from the viewpoint of “distributional fairness” in international trade relations.     

Multilateral trade and export-led growth in the world economy: some post-war evidence

In this paper, we address an empirical question: is there evidence to substantiate the assumption that the post-war liberalization of world trade has actually led to a significant increase in the world GDP? In our attempt to answer that question, time series data in the Penn World Table 6.1 are aggregated across countries to obtain a measure of world trade and output, and the total number of GATT/WTO member countries is employed as an explanatory variable to account for the impact of multilateral trade agreements, such as the Kennedy Round, Tokyo Round, and the Uruguay Round, on the trade-growth nexus. We then examine the relationship between world trade and the post-war GDP per worker across the world through the multivariate cointegration and error correction modeling and the Granger causality test. The results suggest that, at the global level, the post-war liberalization of multilateral trade has promoted both GDP and trade activities. There is also evidence that supports the export-led growth hypothesis in the world economy.     

Revenue‐enhancing Trade Liberalization in a Differentiated Duopoly

Existing studies suggest that in developing countries, tax reforms that increase consumption taxes can compensate for shortfalls in revenue from a tariff reduction. However, these revenue‐enhancing tariff–tax reforms have a critical shortcoming—they generally reduce welfare under imperfect competition. This paper shows that tax reforms such as consumption tax reforms do not necessarily have to be implemented to make up for revenue shortfalls from tariff reductions under imperfect competition, because trade liberalization through tariff cuts leads to an increase in government revenue when domestic and imported goods have a high substitutability. This revenue‐enhancing effect of a tariff reduction occurs for a wider degree of product substitutability when initial tariff and consumption tax rates are high. More importantly, we show that even if initial tariff and consumption tax rates are sufficiently low, a tariff reduction still increases government revenue for a low degree of product differentiation under Bertrand competition.     

Trade Sanctions and the Incidence of Child Labor

The purpose of this paper is to develop an imperfect competition model of a small open developing country to analyze the effects of trade sanctions on the incidence of child labor. We show that a uniform tariff levied by the developed countries on imports produced with the help of child labor is a failure in terms of reducing child labor. A more effective course of action would be a firm‐specific tariff where the tariff rate varies with the amount of child labor incorporated in a single good. While such an instrument reduces child labor, however, it worsens the children’s well‐being due to lower income and consumption. Contrary to expectations, the entrepreneurs in the developing countries, supposedly the main beneficiaries of child labor, are better off under trade sanctions as they realize higher profits.     

The Cairns Group and the Uruguay Round of International Trade Negotiations

The Cairns Group was formed out of frustration among comparatively efficient agricultural exporting countries about a series of changes in the conduct of world agricultural trade over which they, as individual countries, could have no influence. They are collectively significant as producers of agricultural products, with more value added in agriculture than either the EC or the United States, and as agricultural exporters, with more such exports than the EC and the United States combined. Their cohesion, stemming from the reduction in their net agricultural export earnings by more than half as a consequence of protection in industrial countries, and their unique combination of industrial and developing countries has given them an extraordinary influence over the conduct of the Uruguay Round. This article quantifies their collective interest in agricultural trade reform, reviews their contributions to the Round and examines their interest in the reforms which are most likely to emerge from it.     

WAGE SUBSIDY AND WELFARE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

This paper seeks to answer if wage subsidy to workers displaced due to trade reform raises welfare in a developing country. We use a general equilibrium model with non‐specific factor inputs and trade liberalization as a policy variable. A combination of wage subsidy and tariff rate obtains the second‐best welfare level. The theoretical result is new, policy‐relevant and important in view of political‐economy aspects of free trade in developing and transition countries.     

TRADE,STRUCTURAL REFORM,AND INSTITUTIONS IN SUB‐SAHARAN AFRICA

Sub‐Saharan African countries have traditionally lagged the rest of the developing world in terms of overall trade relative to gross domestic product. But, there is growing interest among these countries to initiate trade policies and improve quality of institutions as a way to promote trade and boost foreign direct investment. This article extends the gravity model of trade to include proxies for trade reform policy and institutional quality among the 15 countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for data spanning 1984–2006. Alternative methods of estimation based on ordinary least squares, Heckman two‐step procedure, and Poisson pseudo‐maximum likelihood produce predictions that are consistent with the standard gravity model. They further highlight the evidence of restrictive trade policies and weak institutions that contribute to the failure of ECOWAS countries to boost bilateral trade. (JEL F13, F15, O19, O55)     

A Political‐Economic Account of Global Tariffs

The objective of this paper is to evaluate the relative importance of three distinct factors that motivate redistributive government policy: tariff revenues, consumer welfare, and producer profits. We generalize Grossman and Helpman's (1994, American Economic Review 84: 833–850). protection‐for‐sale model by positing that government places different weights on these components of the welfare of its polity when it decides which industries to protect and to what extent. Employing tariff data from 40 countries, the predictions from this model are used to estimate these weights. The results are surprising in their range and variety. Developing countries with weak tax systems often weigh tariff revenue heavily, while more developed countries weigh producer interests the most. Very few hold consumer welfare dear.     

Tariff rate quotas and the economic impact of agricultural trade liberalization in the world trade organization

Since their implementation at the Uruguay Round, tariff rate quotas (TRQs) have become a widely used instrument of trade policy in agricultural trade. With almost 1,300 TRQs scheduled at the World Trade Organization, this paper will examine their economic effects more closely. First, the theoretical background of TRQs is examined. Then, a short overview of the Uruguay Round and their institutional background is given. We demonstrate that official statistics, which do not count TRQs as nontariff barriers, are at least highly misleading. Very often, their effects are the same as those of regular quotas, including redistributive effects. The prominent example of the European banana regime is used to illustrate all of these points.A first draft of this paper was presented at the International Atlantic Economic Conference, March 14–21, 2000, Munich, Germany. The results are part of the research project "The Influence of the Institutional Design on the Actual Impacts of Agricultural Trade Liberalization after GATT." Financial support by Volkswagen Stiftung is gratefully acknowledged.