The impact of foreign direct investment on the relative return to skill

Since the early 1980s, China has adopted favourable economic policies to attract FDI in order to facilitate technology development. Since inward FDI induces either sector‐ or factor‐biased technical progress, the impact of FDI on the distribution of income between skilled and unskilled labour is not trivial. This paper introduces vertical product differentiation to analyze the impact of FDI on the return to skill and concludes that, for a labour abundant country, this impact depends on whether the FDI‐induced technology transfer is skill‐ or labour‐biased, regardless of which sector receives FDI. The analysis shows that FDI with relatively labour‐biased technology will decrease the wage gap while FDI with relatively skill‐biased technology will increase the profit margin of the host country’s exports as well as its wage gap. The findings provide policy insights for FDI recipient countries in balancing wage growth between skilled and unskilled workers by managing inward FDI with relatively labour‐biased and skill‐biased technologies. This is particularly important for China given the expected further increase of inward FDI following its imminent membership of the WTO. JEL classification: F23, J31, P33.     

Shouldn't Physical Capital Also Matter for Multinational Enterprise Activity?

The foreign direct investment (FDI) literature has generally failed to find strong systematic evidence of “vertical” motivations in bilateral aggregate FDI and foreign affiliate sales (FAS) data, despite recent evidence of vertical FDI in firm‐level data. Moreover, a Bayesian analysis of the empirical determinants of FDI (and FAS) flows reveals that the parent country's physical capital per worker has a strong positive effect on FDI alongside typical gravity‐equation variables; however, this variable is ignored in the knowledge‐capital (KC) model and most empirical work. We address these two puzzles by introducing relative factor endowment differences into the three‐factor, three‐country knowledge and physical capital extension of the 2 × 2 × 2 KC model. Using a numerical version of our model, we show that horizontal and vertical multinational enterprises' (MNEs') headquarters surface in different parts of the Edgeworth box relating the parent country's skilled labor share relative to its physical capital share (of the parent's and host's endowments). The key economic insight is that horizontal MNE headquarters will be relatively more abundant than vertical MNE headquarters in countries that are abundant in physical capital relative to skilled labor, because of the multi‐plant (single‐plant) structure of horizontal (vertical) MNEs—assuming plants (headquarters) use physical capital (skilled labor) relatively intensively in their setups. The theoretical relationships suggest augmenting empirical FAS gravity equations with (polynomials of) the parent's skilled labor share alongside the parent's physical capital share to explain in aggregate bilateral data the coexistence of horizontal and vertical FAS. The theoretical and empirical results shed light on the positive effect of parent's physical capital share on FAS flows, but also suggest that MNE headquarters may be prominent in parent countries with relatively high and low skilled labor shares—once physical capital is accounted for—a result not suggested by the two‐factor KC model.     

AN OLIGOPOLISTIC HECKSCHER–OHLIN MODEL OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT*

We develop a 2 × 2 × 2 trade model in which one of the two sectors is perfectly competitive and the other is oligopolistic. The oligopoly sector consists of a given number of identical firms for each country, but they are free to locate in either country. The allocation of the firms between the two countries is endogenously determined, and changes in factor prices play a crucial role in establishing this equilibrium. Under this framework we examine the validity of factor price equalization, patterns of trade and gains from trade. Effects of technological progress and preference changes on firm locations are also analysed.     

Brain Drain,Fiscal Competition,and Public Education Expenditure

A two‐country model is developed in this paper to examine the implications of fiscal competition in public education expenditure under international mobility of high‐skilled labor. The authors allow for educational choice, asymmetry of countries with respect to total factor productivity, and tax base effects of migration in source and host country. As the latter may give rise to multiplicity of equilibrium, alternative belief structures of mobile high‐skilled workers are carefully taken into account. The paper also looks at the consequences of bilateral policy coordination. While in line with other studies on tax competition, bilateral coordination can reduce the under‐investment problem in public education spending, it also tends to hinder migration or may even reverse the direction of the migration flow that materializes under non‐cooperative policy setting. As a result of its potentially adverse effects on migration patterns, bilateral coordination may therefore reduce global welfare and bring the world economy further away from the social planner's solution.     

Trade costs,quality and the skill premium

We develop a monopolistic competition model with non‐homothetic factor input bundles where increasing quality requires increasing use of skilled workers. As a result more skill abundant countries export higher quality, higher priced goods. Using a multi‐country dataset, we test and confirm the findings in Schott ( 2004 ) of a positive effect of skill abundance on unit values identified with US data. We extend the core model with per unit trade costs leading to the Washington apples effect that goods shipped over larger distance are of higher quality. The combination of high‐quality goods being relatively skill intensive with the Washington apples effect implies that countries at a larger distance from their trading partners display a higher skill premium. Simulating our model, we find that a doubling of distance of a country relative to all its trading partners raises the skill premium in a country by about 1.6%.     

Economic Development, Trade and Wages

We present models that allow the use of unskilled and skilled labor as well as capital and land. Thus agriculture, important in developing countries, can be included as well as two types of labor and a single (or two) type(s) of physical capital. The models are related to the simple 3×2 specific factors structure by means of what is called the linear neighborhood structure, wherein no activity uses more than two factors, and the two types of labor work in separated sectors, using in common a type of physical capital. We discuss how wage rate changes are related when endowments change, when agriculture becomes traded and prices rise, and when unskilled labor becomes educated and joins the ranks of skilled workers.     

Wage Inequality and Human Capital Formation under Migration Possibilities

I examine the problem in the relationship between wage inequality and human capital formation under migration possibilities. Unlike previous analyses, I incorporate the education market and the education price into the analysis, and assume that workers bear the pecuniary cost for receiving education. Given such an assumption, migration possibilities do not necessarily increase education demand since the larger demand for education raises the education price and lowers the net return on education. By modelling an economy where workers in the home country (the labour‐sending country) comprise skilled and unskilled workers and they can migrate to the foreign country (the labour‐receiving country), I show that brain gain and brain drain occur simultaneously in the home country. In particular, if wage inequality is larger in the foreign country than in the home country, skilled workers experience brain gain and unskilled workers experience brain drain in the home country. On the other hand, if wage inequality is sufficiently larger in the home country, brain drain occurs in skilled workers and brain gain in unskilled workers.     

Trade Liberalization,Skill‐linked Intermediate Production and the Two‐sided Wage Gap

Abstract

A rising wage‐gap, almost universally, in the last two decades has contradicted the age‐old conventional wisdom of asymmetric wage movements across nations when trade is liberalized. We offer an explanation that fits well with the emerging trade pattern between the developed and more advanced developing countries like India and Mexico. We argue that a tariff reduction in the South on imports of an intermediate good from the North may raise the wage‐gap in both the North and the South. The price of the intermediate good moving in different directions and different factor‐intensity‐ranking of this good relative to the two different final goods produced in the two countries underlie this result. Rising wage inequality may specially affect the South because educational expenses and infrastructure do not allow ready transformation of the vast masses of unskilled workers into skilled workers. Hence, the policy lesson of the paper seems to be more public effort in arranging for smoother acquisition of human capital by the unskilled.     

Skill Composition,Fertility, and Economic Growth

While high fertility persists in the poorest countries and fertility declines with per capita income in developing countries, fertility and per capita income are now positively associated across most developed countries. This paper presents a model where a U‐shaped relationship between overall fertility and per capita income reflects within country differences in workforce skill composition and household choice of occupation, fertility, and childrearing. The fraction of skilled workers rises with economic growth. By allowing for both differences in the fertility of skilled and unskilled workers and purchased childrearing inputs, we explain a poverty trap with high fertility, fertility decline with economic development, and the possible reversal of fertility decline in a developed economy where most workers are skilled.     

Changes in income distribution and welfare from greater immigration of unskilled workers

This paper considers the consequences of greater immigration of unskilled labor on income distribution and welfare in the receiving country. To address these issues, both the sending and receiving countries are represented in a static general equilibrium model which distinguishes between skilled and unskilled labor and which allows prices to be determined endogenously. In this framework an inflow of unskilled labor is likely to reduce wages of unskilled labor, but whether capital or skilled labor benefits depends upon demand elasticities, elasticities of substitution in production, and differences across countries in the productivity of unskilled labor. National welfare in the receiving country is likely to rise, to the extent that the relative price of importable goods falls, non-residents already in the country receive lower wages, immigrants receive lower wages than those paid to domestic workers, and immigrants cause little increased demand for public services and transfer programs.     

Globalization and the Inequality–Unemployment Tradeoff

Over the last 20 years, advanced economies have experienced an “unemployment versus inequality” tradeoff that is critically uneven across countries. To explain this, we propose an extended HOS model in which: the factors are skilled and unskilled labor; there is a continuum of goods; the world comprises two North countries (one egalitarian and one nonegalitarian) and the South; there is no factor price equalization; globalization consists in the South cornering a growing share of world production. In the North, globalization entails an inequality–unemployment tradeoff and the adjustment to globalization is more painful for the country that was initially inequality‐oriented.     

Can Rich Countries Become Pollution Havens?*

This paper bridges the gap between two‐country Ricardian trade models where differences in environmental policies create pollution havens in a poorer region with weaker pollution regulations, and 2 × 2 Heckscher–Ohlin models that predict under certain conditions that pollution havens may occur in a richer region with tighter regulations. By relaxing the Heckscher–Ohlin assumptions of factor price equalization and no specialization, we show how creation of pollution havens in either region is possible, due to the interplay of policy and factor‐endowment motives. We also analyze the conditions for creating pollution havens in the cases of exogenous and endogenous environmental policy.     

Country asymmetry,trade agreements,and transfers

Using a standard 2 × 2 trade agreement model, I show that the welfare effects of a free trade agreement (FTA) depend on the asymmetry on supply and demand functions. When countries are sufficiently asymmetric with respect to the size or the demand functions, the small country tends to be better off, while the large country is worse off. Thus, the small country must compensate the large country for the FTA to be incentive‐compatible. However, in the presence of sufficient asymmetry in the supply functions, the small country is worse off, while the bigger is better off. In this case, the transfer must flow from the large to the small country. This last finding helps explain why some FTAs between rich and poor countries provide for adjustment transfers to the latter.     

Intra‐industry Trade Liberalization: Why Skilled Workers are More Likely to Support Free Trade

This paper presents a theoretical model and empirical analysis that connects the prevalence of intra‐industry trade with increased wage inequality from trade liberalization in both skilled and unskilled labor abundant countries. The Stolper–Samuelson effect is incorporated into an intra‐industry trade liberalization (intra‐ITL) hypothesis where skilled labor opposes protectionism in all countries engaged in intra‐industry trade because skilled workers gain at the expense of unskilled workers from multilateral trade liberalization within the skill‐intensive sector. We examine empirical evidence on whether skilled individuals are more supportive of trade liberalization than unskilled individuals across 31 countries with different levels of intra‐industry trade and skill endowments. We find that the extent to which countries engage in intra‐industry trade in high‐tech commodities is strongly linked with the intensity of opposition to protection by skilled labor. Regression results strongly support our hypothesis that skilled workers, almost everywhere, are more likely to support free trade.     

Population growth and the transfer paradox in an overlapping generations model

This study investigates whether the transfer paradox (donor enrichment and/or recipient impoverishment) occurs when a donor and a recipient have different population growth rates by using a one‐sector, two‐country overlapping generations model. We show that if the population growth rates differ, neither donor enrichment nor recipient impoverishment occurs in the steady state under dynamic efficiency. This result is in stark contrast to the existing results that the transfer paradox might occur when a donor and a recipient country have different marginal propensities to save, assuming that both have the same population growth rate. Furthermore, we present the condition for the transfer problem to occur on the transition path and show that the transfer paradox is less likely to occur as the economy converges to the steady state. Our result shows that the prevailing finding that the transfer paradox can occur in an overlapping generations model is limited to the special case of countries having the same population growth rate.     

Persistent income gaps in an occupational choice model with multi‐goods

In this study, we propose a theory to explain why income gaps persist. We model a simple overlapping‐generations economy with three consumption goods and two types of workers. We find that high‐skilled workers have comparative advantage in skill‐intensive jobs and low‐skilled workers in less skill‐intensive jobs. This pattern of comparative advantage determines occupational choices by workers. Combined with human capital accumulation, the occupational choices widen income gaps between families. At the same time, the relative price of skill‐intensive goods declines owing to productivity improvement. The decline holds back income gaps from exploding. The implications of skill‐biased technological change are also examined.     

Trans-boundary Pollution and Brain Drain Migration

The economic effects of international brain drain migration in the presence of trans‐boundary pollution are analyzed. In autarky, both skilled and unskilled workers are expected to migrate from the less developed foreign country to the developed home country, if permitted. Surprisingly, under certain conditions, all workers, apart from skilled foreign ones, will gain (lose) from the migration of unskilled (skilled) foreign workers. Moreover, if skilled foreign workers are employed as unskilled domestic workers, then skilled foreign workers will gain but unskilled workers in both countries will lose. Whether or not skilled domestic workers will gain depends on the magnitude of the pollution spillover parameter. Brain drain migration persists under free trade if the demand for manufactured goods is strong.     

Wage inequality, technology, and trade

The recent widening of wage inequality has been attributed by some to skill-biased-technical-change and by others to trade liberalization. This paper examines the two explanations within a unified model and also presents a new modeling of skill-biased-technical-change, where skilled workers replace unskilled ones. As a result technology adoption is endogenous and does not occur in all countries. Hence, wages for both types of workers, trade patterns and also factor productivities in all countries are endogenously determined. The model sheds light on the relationship between technology and trade, on the reasons for global productivity differences and on the causes for the recent rise in wage inequality.     

Greenfield FDI and skill upgrading: A polarized issue

Outbound FDI is often accused of increasing income inequality in developed countries by shifting labour demand from low‐skilled towards high‐skilled workers (wage polarization). In response, we employ data on greenfield FDI that, in contrast to M&As, may be more clearly linked to skill upgrading. Our data also delineate greenfield FDI by sector, function and destination, allowing us to control for different motives and skill intensities for 17 developed countries for 2003–2005. We find that greenfield FDI in support services, e.g., back and front office services, induces polarized skill upgrading, benefitting high‐skilled workers at the expense of medium‐skilled workers, thereby polarizing wages.     

WELFARE EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

Abstract.  This paper examines the welfare effects of aid tied to technology transfer in a two-country general equilibrium model. In the recipient country, some factors of production employed in a particular industry are difficult to use in other industries because their properties are specific to that industry. Technology transfer facilitates 'factor movement' and improves the efficiency of factor markets in the recipient. We identify and interpret the conditions under which technology transfer benefits the recipient and harms the donor. We also show that technology transfer can enrich (or harm) both the donor and the recipient under certain conditions.