Strategic Product R&D Investment Policy under International Rivalry in the Presence of Demand Spillover Effects

Abstract

We develop a model of product (i.e., quality-improving) research and development (R&D) investment competition in a horizontally differentiated duopoly. In particular, based on a third-country market model, we consider the optimal product R&D investment policy under international rivalry in the presence of demand spillover effects associated with improving the quality level of a product. We show how the optimality of a non-cooperative and a cooperative R&D investment policy depends on the strength of demand spillover effects. Furthermore, we consider the same issues in the case of heterogeneous consumers and alternative utility functions.     

Growth and optimal policies in an R&D-growth model with imperfect international capital mobility

In this paper, we examine the effects of international capital mobility on innovation, growth, and optimal growth policies in a small open economy with R&D-driven growth. Households can borrow funds from an imperfect international capital market to finance their investment in R&D firms. We show that the economy can reach a higher growth rate if international capital is more mobile. This result is consistent with recent empirical findings. Moreover, we show that the common growth-enhancing policies, such as patent protection and the R&D subsidies, have an additional negative welfare effect when households can access the international capital market. Accordingly, the optimal patent protection and R&D subsidy should be smaller when the degree of international capital mobility is higher.     

International Trade Policy towards Monopoly and Oligopoly*

This paper highlights the importance of product differentiation and endogenous R&D in determining the optimal R&D policy, in a model where investment in cost‐reducing R&D is committed before firms compete in a differentiated‐goods third‐country export market. R&D is always taxed in oligopolies for high degrees of product differentiation. For lower degrees of product differentiation the duopoly is subsidized or the government remains inactive. In contrast, the monopoly is always subsidized. The government with a duopoly may be active or inactive depending on the degree of product differentiation. Thus, we may observe a reversal in the sign of the optimal R&D policy if the degree of product differentiation changes or, alternatively, if there is a change in the number of firms. Similar qualitative results hold if trade policy uses output subsidies, instead of R&D promotion.     

A Note on Optimal Industrial Policy Towards Bertrand Homogeneous Duopoly

Recent studies in strategic trade and industrial policy analysis suggest that an investment subsidy, in the form of an R&D subsidy, a capacity subsidy or an advertising subsidy, would be a robust industrial policy recommendation towards an international differentiated oligopoly. However, in this paper, we show that this result does not carry over to the case of a Bertrand homogeneous duopoly. This result together with the fact that the optimal industrial policy is to set an investment subsidy when in product market competition firms play a Cournot output game, imply immediately that there hardly exists a robust industrial policy recommendation towards homogeneous goods industries.     

R&D Subsidies Under Asymmetric Duopoly: A Note

This paper analyses the question of optimum R&D subsidies in the context of a two-stage asymmetric Cournot duopoly model with endogenous R&D. For the special case of symmetric duopoly, whether the firms should be subsidized or taxed in their R&D activities crucially depends on the concavity/convexity property of the demand function. It is also shown that a firm with some initial cost advantage should be subsidized in its R&D activities and a firm without should be taxed. In this way, we obtain policy implications that cast doubts on the universal applicability of competition policies.
JEL Classification Numbers: L13, L52, H25.     

International spillovers of R&D and marginal social returns

This study analyzes marginal social and private returns of R&D investment through the impact of international spillovers of R&D stocks. We compare the marginal social with marginal private returns using data of 27 OECD and EU countries from 1995 to 2008. We consider two channels of R&D spillovers: embodied in trade flows and disembodied by bilateral technological proximity. We find that marginal social returns on R&D are much larger than the marginal private returns for R&D‐intensive countries, in the embodied spillover channel. We also find that the embodied spillover channel through import flows is more important than the disembodied channel.     

Strategic timing in R&D agreements

We study the endogenous formation of R&D agreements in a R&D/Cournot duopoly model with spillovers where also the timing of R&D investments is endogenous. This allows us to consider the incentives for firms to sign R&D agreements over time. It is shown that, when both R&D spillovers and investment costs are sufficiently low, firms may find difficult to maintain a stable agreement due to the strong incentive to invest noncooperatively as leaders. In this case, the stability of an agreement requires that the joint investment occurs at the initial stage, thus avoiding any delay. When spillovers are sufficiently high, the coordination of R&D efforts becomes a profitable option, although firms may also have an incentive to sequence noncooperatively their investment over time. Finally, when spillovers are asymmetric and knowledge mainly leaks from the leader to the follower, investing as follower may become extremely profitable, making R&D agreements hard to sustain unless firms strategically delay their joint investment in R&D.     

战略性研发补贴政策稳健吗?-基于中间品贸易的视角

在Stackelberg竞争框架下,本文沿用Spencer and Brander(1983)第三国市场模型,考虑存在中间品贸易情形时,一国的战略性研发政策。研究结果表明,在只有单个国家可以实施研发政策的情况下,若最终产品间的差异程度较大(小),那么该国的最优研发政策为征税(补贴);而当两国政府均可以干预各自国内企业研发时,一国最优的研发政策将随最终产品间的差异程度不同而选择征税、补贴或不干预,并且当最终产品间的差异程度位于一定范围之内时,一国的研发补贴政策并不会招致另一国的报复,因此,战略性研发补贴政策并不如LeahyandNeary(2001)分析的稳健。     

An evolutionary model of recycling and product lifetime extension

This paper presents a model-based analysis of the development and diffusion of so-called ‘green’ products, i.e. those which are easily recyclable and which have a long lifetime. We address this problem by developing an evolutionary simulation model to identify the impact of the environmental R&D strategies of business firms on the economy and the environment. The simulation results show that R&D investment both in product recyclability and in product lifetime extension can be positive for the firm. Adopting such a strategy means that the firm can then market green products, which provides it with a competitive advantage on firms investing mainly in product recyclability whatever consumers' preferences. From an environmental point of view, the diffusion of green products will reduce both waste flows in the economy and pressure on virgin resources. However, diversifying R&D investment to develop both product recyclability and lifetime can mean slowing down the flow of recycled materials and may lead to even greater quantities of unrecycled waste. Our results suggest introducing regulation policies aiming at encouraging firms to invest both in product recyclability and lifetime in order to benefit from their complementarities. Furthermore, simulations show that it should be better to direct environmental policies on firms' environmental innovation strategies than on demand attributes because significant changes in these strategies would provide much more radical environmental changes.     

Optimal patent length and breadth in an economy with creative destruction and non-diversifiable risk

In this paper, I examine the optimal patent shape in an economy in which R&D firms innovate and imitate, households face non-diversifiable risk and there is externality in production and R&D. With non-diversifiable risk, a household’s consumption and investment decisions are interlinked. This economy contains industries of two kinds: monopoly industries with an innovator only, and duopoly industries with an innovator and an imitator. I define patent length as the expected time in which an innovation is imitated, and patent breadth as the innovator’s profit share in an industry after a successful imitation. The government can control patent length by the requirements for accepting a substitute for a patented good, and patent breadth by imposing compulsory licensing and royalties for the patentee after a successful imitation. I show that the stronger the externality in production relative to R&D is, the slower the optimal growth rate, the larger the optimal proportion of duopoly industries, and the longer and narrower the optimal patent.     

Demand Shift Effect of R&;D and the R&;D Organization

We assume that R&D investment by a firm improves the quality of the product. This is reflected in an upward shift of the demand function. Firms can do R&D either independently or cooperatively. We show that cooperative research strictly dominates non-cooperative research, both in terms of profitability and welfare. Also, R&D investment by each firm under cooperative research is larger for a relatively high R&D output elasticity. The higher the degree of product differentiation and/or larger the R&D output elasticity is, the larger the increase in quality level under cooperative research, compared to non-cooperative research, will be.     

Redistributive innovation policy,inequality, and efficiency

We examine the efficiency and distributional effects of regressive and progressive public R&D policies that target high‐tech and low‐tech sectors using a heterogenous‐agent growth model with in‐house R&D and incomplete capital markets. We find that such policies have important implications for efficiency and inequality. A regressive public R&D investment financed by income tax could boost growth and welfare via a positive effect on individual savings and effort. It could, however, also lower growth and welfare via its effect on the efficiency–inequality trade‐off. Thus, the relationship between public R&D spending and welfare is hump‐shaped, admitting an optimal degree of regressivity in public R&D spending. Using our baseline model, and the US state‐level GDP data, we derive the degree of regressiveness of public R&D investment in US states. We find that US states are more regressive in their R&D investment than the optimal regressiveness implied by our growth model.     

Strategic R&D policy under multiproduct duopoly and quality-price competition

This paper analyses strategic R&D policy in a third-country trade model where multiproduct firms with different production technologies compete in a vertically differentiated market. I show that the optimal R&D policies for both countries are subsidies when the product market is under price competition.     

International R&D Collaboration and Strategic Trade Policy

We study an international trade model with symmetric countries and symmetric firms, with countries making strategic trade policies, anticipating the decisions of firms on R&D collaboration at the subsequent stage. In general we should observe a conflict between the equilibrium outcome and the efficient one. We find that an asymmetric outcome where one country unilaterally liberalizes trade while the other does not is likely to occur. We also find that while banning international R&D collaboration may help to reach free trade equilibrium in certain situations, it provides little assistance in reaching the outcome that maximizes global welfare.     

海外研发、贸易摩擦与创新绩效：来自中国高科技上市公司的经验证据

海外研发被视为后发国家实现技术赶超的有效路径,现有文献基于经贸自由化的前置条件证实了海外研发提升创新绩效的反哺作用。然而在全球贸易保护主义抬头的背景下,资源要素的自由流动愈发困难,海外研发能否发挥应有的作用尚不得而知。为此,基于中国高科技上市公司的数据,本文探索了中美贸易摩擦如何影响中国企业的海外研发绩效。研究发现,中美贸易摩擦非但没有侵蚀中国企业的海外研发绩效,反而产生倒逼效应,推动中国企业提升投资效率并积累国际投资经验,继而增强了海外研发的反哺作用。通过区分海外研发目的地,本文进一步发现倒逼效应在赴非美国家的样本中更显著。赴美研发受到贸易摩擦的冲击更为直接,稀释了提升投资效率和积累国际化经验所带来的收益。研究结论深化了国际商务理论关于贸易保护和壁垒如何影响跨国企业投资绩效的相关研究,为中国企业在高度不确定的投资环境下如何充分释放海外研发的潜能提供启示。     

Export Competition between Landlocked and Coastal Countries: An Analysis of Strategic Export Policies

This paper analyzes economic rivalry between two firms using an international Cournot duopoly model, where a firm from a landlocked country (LC) and a firm from a coastal country (CC) compete in a third‐country market. It is assumed that the landlocked country firm adopts a transport‐cost reducing R&D subsidized by its government, while the CC government imposes a toll fee on the LC firm. The findings show since a change in the LC's transport‐cost reducing R&D subsidy has a positive effect on its export and a negative effect on the CC's export, both measures have effective strategic export policies.     

R&D Strategy in International Mixed Duopoly with Research Spillovers

This paper examines the international mixed duopoly behaviour with research spillovers. Using a two‐stage game with Research and Development (R&D) and output, we investigate the effects of imperfectly appropriable R&D on optimal R&D strategies of a domestic public firm and a foreign private firm across different market interactions: (i) international R&D competition, (ii) only the foreign firm conducts R&D, (iii) only the domestic public firm conducts R&D, (iv) no firm conducts R&D, and (v) research joint venture. The results show that firms' research performances are determined by the degree of spillovers and the optimal R&D strategies involve R&D competition. Spillovers are shown to be socially beneficial and their absence can prove to be a strategic deterrent, with the public firm monopolising the market. Some of these findings contrast with the traditional models of oligopoly (with or without R&D) and mixed oligopoly (without R&D).     

Endogenous technology and tradable emission quotas

We study an international climate agreement that assigns emission quotas to each participating country. Unlike the simplest models in the literature, we assume that abatement costs are affected by R&D activities undertaken in all firms in all countries, i.e. abatement technologies are endogenous. In line with the Kyoto agreement we assume that the international climate agreement does not include R&D policies. We show that for a second-best agreement with heterogeneous countries, marginal costs of abatement differ across countries. In other words, the second-best outcome cannot be achieved if emission quotas are tradable.     

Market structure and R&D investment spillovers

This paper examines research and development (R&D) investment spillovers across different market structures. In particular, we extend the recent work in Matsumura et al. (2013) to incorporate R&D investment spillovers. When the market is a duopoly, noncooperative (cooperative) R&D investment is preferred for small (large) spillovers of less (more) than half. We show that as a market structure becomes more competitive, noncooperative R&D investment is more likely to be preferred. Moreover, noncooperative R&D is not always decreasing with the intensity of competition, even though it is ultimately zero with perfect competition. Our theoretical results fit well with existing empirical findings.     

ON THE CONSISTENT CONJECTURES EQUILIBRIUM OF EXPORT SUBSIDY GAME

This paper explores an export subsidy game in an international duopoly in which governments of countries as well as firms hold conjectures about the response of other governments. In the framework with linear demand/quadratic cost functions, a homogeneous good and no home consumption, I shall obtain the relations among the conjectural variation of firms, that of governments, and the optimal subsidies for countries. And I shall show that if and only if firms hold the consistent conjectures, Nash type behavior (zero conjectural variation) of governments is consistent.