“泛珠三角”经济差异与政府关系的策略选择

经济发展水平、发展格局和资源禀赋存在的差异性为区域内政府间的合作提供了基本前提和基础。通过对泛珠三角的地缘经济关系的测度,分析区域经济关系与资源禀赋的差异对政府间关系选择的影响,推测区域内地方政府间竞合的基本态势,进而提出建立在基于利益和信任基础之上的区域内政府竞合关系的对策建议。     

Intergovernmental grants in Russia

Two hypotheses about the determinants of Russian intergovernmental grants are tested. According to the first hypothesis, federal transfers to regions correlate with recent voting behaviour of regional electorates. The second hypothesis states that transfers are higher in regions with politically powerful governors. I find a strong confirmation for the first hypothesis and no evidence for the second hypothesis for the years 1995–99. This result is robust across specifications. However, in the years 2000–2004 electoral variables show no effect on transfers. The only significant political variable is Putin’s visits to regions.     

论城市政府竞争、制度创新与知识溢出

随着经济的发展,城市政府更多地依靠制度创新促进地方经济的增长。在制度创新过程中,城市政府行为的核心是与其他地区竞争制度创新的进入权,因此,研究制度创新需要依托城市政府竞争的基础,创新成功的一个前提条件是城市政府之间较高的知识溢出。     

Asymmetric Decentralization,Intergovernmental Transfers,and Expenditure Policies of Local Governments

Although China’s asymmetric fiscal decentralization system has been criticized for many years, there have been few studies giving direct evidence of its negative incentives on local government spending policies. By introducing the mechanism of asymmetric decentralization and fiscal transfers to the objective function of local government, this paper studies the incentive effects of asymmetric decentralization and fiscal transfers on spending policies of local governments, and uses the provincial panel data to carry out an empirical test. The conclusion shows that the asymmetric decentralization significantly weakens the incentives of local government to increase social expenditure, and as a solution to asymmetric decentralization, fiscal transfers fail to play a good role. Due to the relatively large income effect, the financing mechanism of fiscal transfers not only significantly reduces the incentives of local government to provide social public goods, but also weakens the constraint effect of fiscal competition on expenditure policies of local governments because of the increase in the relative cost. Although the distribution mechanism of fiscal transfers has a significant positive incentive to local government in regions where the net inflow of fiscal resources is more than zero, because of common pooling effects, the comprehensive effects of fiscal transfers in the distribution of incentives of local governments to provide social public goods are negative in all regions.     

我国政府间转移支付制度有效性分析

本文拟通过建立制度有效性的研究框架,对我国政府间转移支付体系从目标系统、制度装置、制度环境、制度目标实现程度等几个方面进行分析和检验,指出影响我国政府间转移支付制度得到有效发挥的主要因素:制度装置与目标体系不相适应、相关制度安排不具备、制度变迁主体的不合作博弈等,进而提出有助于提高这一制度有效性的制度安排。     

Inter-Governmental Fiscal Relations: The Facilitator of Fiscal Decentralization

The decentralization of fiscal authority to lower level jurisdictions contributes to the efficient delivery of public services, but conflicts with national objectives. This paper argues that the system of fiscal relations, including both the grant structure and institutions for policy coordination, are necessary for achieving the full benefits of fiscal decentralization while preserving national efficiency and equity objectives. The case for decentralization is recounted, along with the ways it can impinge upon efficiency and equity in the national economy. These adverse effects can be mitigated by appropriate fiscal transfers, both equalizing and conditional, and suitable measures of policy harmonization.     

单一制国家财政联邦制的“中央-地方”财政关系

财政联邦主义是联邦主义政治理念在财政领域的应用。在单一制政治体制下实行财政联邦主义,中央和地方之间的财政关系有其特殊之处。文章通过构建两种异质群的演化博弈模型,采用系统动力学方法研究了中国"中央—地方"财政关系的演化特征。研究发现,当前的固定分权格局使中国的中央财政与地方财政之间处于一种失衡状态,存在"一放即乱,一收即死"的"治乱循环"。     

我国区域协调机制的四种类型--基于府际关系视角的分析

文章从中央政府与地方政府、地方政府之间的关系以及在区域协调中政府与市场之间的关系这两个维度,把区域协调机制分为四种典型类型,即中央政府主导型的区域协调机制—以京津冀为例、省内政府引导—市场主导型的区域协调机制-以广东省为例、省际市场主导-地方参与型的区域协调机制—以长三角为例、省际地级市间政府主导型的区域协调机制—以黄河金三角为例。四种区域不同的经济、地理位置、文化等情况,决定了其内部不同行政区间以及与中央政府间具有不同的府际关系,从而形成各具特色的区域协调机制。同时文章试图通过从府际关系的视角对区域协调机制的四种典型类型进行全面细致的分析,为我国其他区域的协调发展在理论上与实践上提供一定的借鉴意义。     

水资源在行政辖区间配置的政府间财政关系研究

水资源空间分配的不均衡决定了有必要对其在行政辖区间进行重新分配,由此难免引起相关辖区政府之间的矛盾和利益冲突,并可能影响区域经济的均衡、协调发展。要实现中国区域经济与生态环境的协调发展,需要通过适当的财政制度安排建立和完善水资源在行政辖区间配置的政府间横向财政补偿机制,以激励水资源调出地的积极性,同时促进行政辖区内水资源的有效供给。     

企业公共关系与互联网络

互联网络推动了企业公关向全球化、现代化、多元化发展；增强了企业公关的管理功能；促使企业形象塑造更加透明、新颖；能够帮助企业建立科学的公关信息系统，并高效解决公关危机。     

一种劳资关系理论的新探索：劳资关系周期理论

劳资关系的矛盾与冲突日益加剧,实现劳资关系的和谐与稳定,对我国构建和谐社会有着极其重要的意义.企业中劳方与资方之间存在"劳资关系周期",各周期中具有不同的特点和应对策略.企业应通过构建和谐劳资关系享受收益,增加自身的无形资产,从而提高企业核心竞争力.     

Rethinking Globalization in the Trump Era: US-China Relations

The global economic and political order that was created in the aftermath of World War II is under attack by President Donald Trump. In this article, Nobel Prize Laureate Joseph Stiglitz discusses the scope for protectionist actions by President Trump and suggests how countries such as China could and should respond. In particular, he proposes a set of ten principles that should guide China’s response, principles designed to enhance a more stable and efficient multi-polar system of global governance that can contribute to a stronger global economy.     

论企业集群发展中的几个关系问题

培育和发展企业集群,必须要正确认识和处理市场主导与政府引导的关系、集群的主导企业与辅助企业及相关机构的关系、集群外延扩张与内涵提升的关系、经济全球化与地方企业群的关系等。     

Symmetric tax competition and lobbying within federations

The present paper deals with the question of whether tax harmonization and federal taxation increase welfare in a symmetric tax competition framework with heterogeneous individuals and lobbying. A model closely related to the approach of Lai (2010) is linked to externalities that are familiar from conventional public finance. The observed deviations from efficient taxation are derived from the interplay of four externalities, which can be divided into two groups: externalities occurring due to tax competition and externalities which are caused by lobbying. Whether or not the centralization of tax competences is useful depends mainly on the relative sizes of the competition-induced and lobbying-induced externalities.     

Targeting public goods to the poor in a segregated economy: An empirical analysis of central mandates in rural India

While local governments are increasingly being vested with control over funds for public goods, concern over the capture of decentralized funds by local elites has led decentralization to be combined with central mandates which require a certain proportion of funds to directly benefit the poor. If local capture is pervasive, however, central mandates may not be effective. Despite the popularity of this combination of decentralization and centralized control, there is little empirical evidence which separately identifies their effect on investment in public goods, and hence assesses the effectiveness of central mandates. This paper provides such evidence, using data collected by the authors for the North Indian state of Punjab, an economy where economic conditions facilitate such an analysis. We find that central mandates are effective, enhancing intra-village equality in expenditure on public goods. This finding informs the debate on the equity effects of centralized versus decentralized programs.     

从劳动激励与监督机制看劳资关系

劳动激励与监督机制显示,在"资本雇佣劳动"体制下,由于资本追求利润最大化的决策模式,市场机制总是使得资本在对劳动的关系上趋于强势.改变这种格局的必然逻辑是资本的权力应当得到抑制,资本追求利润最大化的决策模式应当得到修正.     

网络节点的动态性与组织数据关系重组

组织结构扁平化实质上就是组织数据关系的重组过程,信息网络技术在实现组织结构扁平化时,组织数据关系主要表现为网络节点间的数据传输处理关系。在弥漫连接面上,节点数目和位置的动态性能在保持数据传输性的条件下改变数据传输处理关系,因而能够支持组织数据关系重组,实现组织结构扁平化。基于Petri网理论论述了网络节点的动态性是如何支持组织数据关系重组的。     

雇佣关系研究:演进与启示

雇佣关系是市场经济体制的必然产物,是市场经济国家最主要的社会关系类型.本文梳理了雇佣关系研究的兴起、发展与学科界定上的不同观点,勾勒了PM与IEL两学派的主要学术主张,最后罗列了雇佣关系研究的两个理论模型的主要内容.雇佣关系已取得的研究成果,对我国学界开展中国当代雇佣关系研究,解决我国已显性化的劳资冲突具有借鉴意义.     

中国经济学家应关注人际关系问题

本文在分析人际关系尚未纳入西方主流经济分析之中及没有得到西方经济学家的普遍重视和认可之后，指出重视人际关系是最具特色的中国文化传统，提出人际关系作为人际资本，人际资本就是资本化的的交易成本的独到见解，并进行深入细致的分析、研究。     

Intergovernmental transfers and political competition measured by pivotal probability - Evidence from Hungary

I estimate the effects of political competition on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers to Hungarian municipalities between 1998 and 2006. The intergovernmental transfers were intended to finance schooling, elder care, and administrative needs in municipalities. Rather than use closeness of the dominant blocks' vote share, which is the standard measure of political competition, I instead employ (Myerson, 2000)'s pivotal probabilities, calculated at the municipality level. As a result, the number of voters, in addition to the vote difference, is taken into account when describing political competition at the municipal level. I argue that under mixed-member proportional systems, as well as under proportional systems in general, pivotal probability reflects the political reality better than closeness can. I find evidence that swing municipalities in villages are targeted and, ceteris paribus, that poorer regions receive larger transfer amounts than other areas.