Incorporating Policymaker Costs and Political Competition into Rent-Seeking Games

We incorporate policymaker costs of supplying rents and variable intensities of competition among rent seekers into the standard rent-seeking game. By incorporating these aspects, the game has greater verisimilitude to the lobbying process. The first aspect captures the fact that in rent-seeking contests there is a positive probability that neither firm will obtain the rent. The second aspect captures the fact that firms seeking different rents still must compete for policymakers' resources. We find that lobbying expenditures, rent-seeking profits, and rent dissipation depend on the intensity of competition and the value of the rent relative to policymaker costs. For example, if the value of the rent is sufficiently high relative to policymakers' costs, an increase in the intensity of political competition will increase lobbying expenditures; otherwise, expenditures fall as competitive intensity increases. In addition, the model establishes pure-strategy equilibria with underdissipation where only mixed-strategy equilibria exist in the standard model.     

Protection versus Free Trade: Lobbying Competition between Domestic and Foreign Firms

This article considers how political interaction between policymakers and domestic and foreign firms endogenously determines tariff rates. We show that because of lobbying competition between foreign and domestic firms, even a less competitive foreign firm can successfully elicit a tariff reduction under reasonable conditions. Moreover, lobbying competition may also increase the level of aggregate domestic welfare when the market powers of the competing firms are sufficiently alike.     

Resistance to Trade Liberalization in Unionized Sector

This paper studies the lobbying against trade liberalization by both a firm and a union in the same industry. We find that the relationship between their political activities depends on the effect of political activity by one on the marginal effectiveness of political activity by the other. We also show that, when they are strongly risk-averse and their political activities are strategic complements, trade liberalization is likely to be successful if business is brisk, the foreign firm's production cost is high or the number of union members is small. However, when they are not strongly risk-averse, these results hold reversely.     

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS OF THE TRANSITION: DETERMINANTS OF ENTERPRISE EFFICIENCY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY

Firm level data are employed to estimate frontier productionfunctions for Czechoslovak industry in 1990 and for Hungarianindustry in 1991. In both countries there is evidence of inefficientfirms, with the distribution of efficiency characterized bya small number of inefficient outliers. Enterprise efficiencyis positively related to firm size and negatively to managerialeffort expended in lobbying for easier targets, but export orientationhas no effect on efficiency. Most importantly, in Hungary'smore reformed economy, efficient firms are more profitable,while profit redistribution by the center in Czechoslovakialed to an inverse relationship between efficiency and profitability.     

Testing Conflicting Political Economy Theories: Full‐Fledged versus Partial‐Scope Regional Trade Agreements

We apply a duration analysis to test the conflicting predictions of the median voter model and the lobbying model using panel data on regional trade agreement (RTA) formation. Our results show that the pro‐labor prediction of the median voter model is supported by the full‐fledged free trade areas and customs unions (FTAs/CUs), while the pro‐capital prediction of the lobbying model is supported by the partial‐scope preferential trade arrangements among developing countries. This finding holds better for the country pairs with more different capital‐labor ratios as a result of the stronger distributional effects of RTAs. The support for the median voter model (lobbying model) is stronger when the two countries in a pair have left‐oriented (right‐oriented) governments. I also find stronger support for the median voter model for the subset of FTAs/CUs with service coverage and stronger support for the lobbying model for countries that place higher weight on political contribution.     

European integration and corporate restructuring: the strategy of Unilever,c.1957–c.19901

European integration and corporate restructuring: the strategy of Unilever, c.1957‐c.1990. While much has been written about the politics of European integration, discussion about the role of business in this process has been largely confined to lobbying activities. This article focuses on the business reaction to European integration. It highlights the constraints facing one of Europe's largest firms in building a regional detergents business. These included divergences in market demand and political obstacles to rationalization, but more serious was a corporate culture based around local decision making and consensus. The study demonstrates that a full understanding of the European integration process must incorporate a firm‐level analysis of how Europe‐wide businesses were built after 1957.     

The Effect of Cost Heterogeneity in the Success and Failure of the New Deal''s Agricultural and Industrial Programs

The Agricultural Adjustment Act and the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) were cornerstones of the early New Deal, designed to cartelize agriculture and industry. When the Supreme Court annulled both acts, agricultural regulation was reinstalled within 6 weeks, following organized lobbying by farming interests, but broad industrial regulation was not reinstated. There was no corresponding lobby effort by industry to return the NIRA. To explain these differences we analyze the effect of farm/firm cost heterogeneities within commodity programs and industries on the ability of the parties to agree to and adhere to collusive regulations. We find that in the case of agriculture, because agricultural pricing and production policies were designed and implemented by low-cost producers, they were relatively self-enforcing and long-lasting. In contrast, high-cost firms in industry played a major role in setting prices and output within many of the NRA industrial codes. Consequently, these collusive policies were not self-enforcing and failed to create an effective lobby for their reinstatement.     

A Lobbying Approach to Evaluating the Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd‐Frank Reform Act of 2010

We evaluate the net costs and benefits of the whistleblower (WB) provisions adopted under the Dodd‐Frank Reform Act of 2010 by examining investor responses to events related to the proposed regulations. We focus our main analysis on a sample of firms that lobbied against implementation of the WB provisions by submitting a comment letter to the SEC. Lobbying firms are characterized by weaker existing WB programs and greater degrees of managerial entrenchment than a matched control sample of similar non‐lobbying firms. Short‐window excess stock returns around events related to implementation of the WB rules are significantly more positive for the portfolio of lobbying firms than for their matched controls; this effect is also more pronounced for lobbying firms with weaker existing WB programs. These results suggest that investors expect the new WB provisions to provide net benefits by improving shareholder protection.     

Were Lobbyists on Income Tax Accounting Influenced by Income Strategies?*

Abstract. This study provides further evidence about whether accounting choice decisions reflect a consistent strategy to manage income by investigating the relation between methods used in financial reports and lobbying positions on accounting for income taxes. A numerical income-strategy score is calculated for each lobbyist based on whether the firm chose an income-increasing or income-decreasing alternative for the following: depreciation, inventory, investment tax credit, and pension amortization. We find that firms lobbying for no tax allocation, the most income-increasing alternative, have higher average income strategies (more income increasing) than firms lobbying for comprehensive allocation, the most income-decreasing alternative. Combining the firms favoring either no allocation or partial allocation (due to the conceptual similarity of these alternatives), we find that their average income strategy score is also higher than firms favoring comprehensive allocation. Further, firms favoring discounting deferred taxes, which would ordinarily increase net income by reducing the deferred portion of income tax expense, employ more income-increasing strategies than firms opposed to discounting. In contrast, the hypothesized relationship was not found between income strategy and when the benefits anticipated from the use of a net operating loss carryforward should be recognized. Nevertheless, the combined lobbying positions differ significantly between both the upper and lower third and upper and middle third of the firms classified by their income strategy scores. We also provide analyses to examine whether income strategies can be used to predict lobbying positions. We find that the associations are not sufficiently strong to do so. Résumé. Les décisions relatives aux choix comptables sont-elles le reflet d'une stratégie uniforme visant la gestion des bénéfices? Les auteurs jettent un éclairage nouveau sur cette question, en analysant la relation entre les méthodes utilisées dans les rapports financiers, et ils approfondissent également celle des positions de lobbying relatives à la comptabilisation des impôts sur le bénéfice. Les auteurs attribuent une note numérique à la stratégie de bénéfice de chaque lobbyiste, selon que l'entreprise a opté pour une méthode qui accroît ou décroît le bénéfice, à l'égard des éléments suivants: l'amortissement, les stocks, le crédit d'impôt à l'investissement et la ventilation des coûts découlant des régimes de retraite. Selon les auteurs, les entreprises qui militent en faveur du non-report des impôts, l'option qui contribue le plus à accroître le bénéfice, poursuivent des stratégies de bénéfice moyen supérieur (contribuant davantage à hausser le bénéfice) que les entreprises qui militent en faveur du report intégral, l'option qui contribue le plus à décroître le bénéfice. Si l'on combine les entreprises qui favorisent le non-report et celles qui favorisent un report partiel (compte tenu de la parenté conceptuelle de ces options), il appert que la note correspondant à leur stratégie de bénéfice moyen est, encore une fois, supérieure à celle des entreprises qui favorisent un report intégral. Plus encore, les entreprises qui favorisent l'actualisation des impôts reportés, ce qui devrait ordinairement accroître le bénéfice net en réduisant la portion différée de la charge fiscale, emploient des stratégies qui accroissent davantage le bénéfice que les entreprises qui s'opposent à l'actualisation. En revanche, la relation dont les auteurs posent l'hypothèse entre la stratégie de bénéfice et le moment de la constatation des avantages que l'on prévoit tirer d'un report prospectif de perte d'exploitation n'a pas été confirmée. Les positions de lobbying combinées s'écartent néanmoins sensiblement si l'on compare le tiers supérieur et le tiers inférieur de même que le tiers supérieur et le tiers médian des entreprises classées en fonction des notes attribuées à leur stratégie de bénéfice. Les auteurs procèdent également à des analyses visant à déterminer si les stratégies de bénéfice peuvent être utilisées pour prévoir les positions de lobbying. Ils en concluent que les associations ne sont pas suffisamment probantes pour permettre ces prévisions.     

FDI Deregulation Versus Labor Market Reform: a Political Economy Approach

This paper studies the political economy of foreign direct investment (FDI) in interaction with labor market policies. It analyzes the setting of reform focused on deregulating labor markets as a political compromise pressured by the lobbying of an industry lobby and a trade union. Using a common agency model of lobbying, we show that the interest group’s influence is socially distortive towards less deregulation. Also, our political economy framework shows that, for large countries, exogenous FDI liberalization policies lead to deregulation in the labor market. For small countries, such policies enhance more labor market rigidities.     

Sectoral Interests and Global Money: Renminbi, Dollars and the Domestic Foundations of International Currency Policy

In deciding whether to support an international role of their country’s currency, national policymakers are often influenced by lobbying from domestic sectoral groups. While these groups will be consistently more interested in some implications of international currency issuance than others, their specific preferences are likely to be highly context specific. Looking at the cases of the United States and China, we anticipate that domestic sectoral lobbying is unlikely to pressure either the US government to defend the dollar’s international role vigorously or the Chinese government to internationalize the renminbi fully. From this domestic sectoral perspective, the future looks to be characterized by reluctant monetary leaders rather than increasingly aggressive currency competition between the United States and China.     

Polluters and Collective Action: Theory and Evidence

We suggest a new perspective on firms' ability to organize collective action. We argue that industries that face a greater number of regulations have an easier time forming a lobby group and sustaining joint lobbying efforts. In particular, firms in industries that are pollution intensive, and therefore incur abatement costs, face an extra policy issue compared with other industries. The prediction that emerges from the theory is that more polluting industries should have greater levels of lobbying contributions. Using U.S. manufacturing sector data, we find empirical support for this hypothesis.     

The Effects of Norms on Investor Reactions to Derivative Use

Prior research indicates that a firm's use of derivatives to manage business risks is viewed favorably by investors. However, these studies do not consider a potentially key factor in this setting—namely, the typical behavior (or norms) regarding derivatives by other firms in the industry or the firm itself. In this paper, we report the results of multiple experiments that test whether norms are influential in affecting investors’ evaluations of firms’ derivatives choices. Our results show that the generally favorable reactions to derivative use actually reverse and become unfavorable when firms’ derivative decisions are inconsistent with industry or firm norms. Somewhat surprisingly, though, we find that industry and firm norms are not viewed similarly by investors. These results expand our understanding of how investors respond to firm's derivative use decisions and demonstrate the role of norms as factors that influence investors’ judgments in financial reporting settings. Our results have implications for firm managers making decisions about derivative use.     

The political economy of exchange rates: The case of the Japanese yen

This paper sets out a political economy model of strategic exchange rates, focusing on the importance of external pressures. In our approach, an exchange rate depreciation is shown to be analytically equivalent to an export subsidy and an import tax. Thus lobbying for exchange rate policy is akin to lobbying for trade policies. Applying our model to the recent history of the Japanese yen, we show that pressures from the US government can theoretically contribute to an appreciation of the Japanese yen. In addition, the yen will still appreciate even if we assume that the Japanese international firms are Aoki-type J-firms.     

IPO relative difficulty,M&A option and size effect

Size effect in the Chinese stock market is huge from 2012 to 2017. We empirically identify a driving force behind the effect: M&A option caused by IPO and M&A policies changes. We show that the M&A frequency increases and the acquirers' market value deceases as the IPO relative difficulty rises, small firm premium is positively related to both IPO relative difficulty and M&A frequency, and among the listed firms that have stronger tendency to merge or acquire a private firm, size effect is significantly larger. These results hold when controlling reverse merger probability. In sum, we reveal a new mechanism: Compared with a large public firm, a small one is more likely to acquire a private firm with discount since both the acquired and the acquirer benefit more, so the stock price of a small firm contains a larger part of M&A option. This option value increases as IPO relative difficulty rises.     

The Riskiness of Large Audit Firm Client Portfolios and Changes in Audit Liability Regimes: Evidence from the U.S. Audit Market*

We investigate whether the financial riskiness of large U.S. audit firm clienteles varied with the changing audit litigation liability environment during the period 1975‐99. Partitioning the period of study into four distinct periods (a benchmark period (1975‐84), a period of increasing concerns about litigation liability (1985‐89), a period of lobbying for reform (1990‐94), and a post‐relief period (1995‐99)), we find some evidence of risk decreases during 1985‐89, strong evidence of risk decreases during 1990‐94, and strong evidence of risk increases during 1995‐99. However, we also find that over the period of our study, a time during which Big 6 market shares grew appreciably, the proportion of litigious‐industry clients in Big 6 client portfolios grew at about the same rate as the proportion of such clients in the population. Moreover, the Big 6 share of the financially riskiest clients in the economy did not grow as fast as the overall Big 6 market share. In sum, although our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the riskiness of Big 6 client portfolios responded to changes in the audit litigation liability environment, we find no systematic evidence of a "race to the bottom" or "bottom fishing" by these firms in a bid to increase their market shares.     

The role of foreign direct investment in the host-country firm selection process: firm-level evidence from Slovenian manufacturing

This paper examines the role of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in firm selection processes in the Slovenian manufacturing sector in the 1994–2003 period. It adopts the firm dynamics framework that allows testing of selection effects directly by assessing the impact of foreign firms’ activity on the probability of exiting of local firms (crowding out). The results show that intra-industry productivity spillover effects offset only a minor part of the competition pressure which results from foreign firm entry, hence incumbent firms experience a drop in their survival probability upon a foreign firm’s entry within a particular industry. This result is driven by foreign firm entry of the greenfield type, as entry through the acquisition of existing firms has no significant effect. The strength of the crowding-out effect decreases with the incumbent firm’s export propensity. There is no significant evidence that inward FDI would stimulate the selection process through backward linkages in the upstream supplying industries, whereas foreign firms’ activity reduces the exit probability of downstream local customers (through forward linkages).     

Location: A Neglected Determinant of Firm Growth

This paper links the performance of new technology firms, measured in terms of employment growth, to geographic location. We introduce a model of firm growth that is specific to characteristics of the location as well as the firm and industry. The model is estimated using a unique data set identifying the growth performance of small technology-based firms in Germany. We find that firm performance, as measured by employment growth, does appear to be influenced by locational characteristics as well as characteristics specific to the firm and the industry. In particular, the empirical evidence suggests that being located in an agglomeration rich in knowledge resources is more conducive to firm growth than being located in a region that is less endowed with knowledge resources. These results suggest the economic value of location as a conduit for accessing external knowledge resources, which in turn, manifests itself in higher rates of growth. JEL no. L10, R11, O12, O30     

Roads to innovation: Firm-level evidence from People's Republic of China (PRC)

Although infrastructure and innovation play important roles in fostering a country's economic growth, discussion in the literature about how the two are connected is limited. This paper examines the impact of road density on firm innovation in the People's Republic of China. The analysis uses a matched patent database at the firm level and road information at the city level. Regional variation in the difficulty of constructing roads is used as an instrumental variable to address the potential endogeneity problem of the road variable. The empirical results show that a 10% improvement in road density increases the average number of approved patents per firm by 0.71%. Road development spurs innovation by enlarging market size and facilitating knowledge spillover.     

Globalization drives strategic product switching

Using firm-level panel data for Estonia, we analyse the impact of international competition on firm dynamics, considering both firm closedown and product switches. We contribute to the literature in two important ways: first, this is the first paper to study the determinants of exit and product switching in an emerging market; and second, we consider explicitly the role of export opportunities. Our results indicate that globalization does not affect firm exit significantly but it is an important factor explaining why firms choose a different core product. Previous studies on industrial countries have shown that product switching has been a defensive strategy against low-cost imports. In contrast, our results suggest that Estonian firms change their core products as an offensive strategy to take advantage of the export opportunities created by a globalized economy.