Board of directors’ quality and firms’ debt financing: the moderating effect of insider ownership – evidence from Omani firms

This study aims to examine the direct effects of board of directors’ quality and insider ownership on firms’ capital structure and the moderating effect of insider ownership on the relationship between board of directors’ quality and firms’ capital structure. The sample of this study consists of the time period 2005–2011. The final sample consists of 535 firm-year observations of public nonfinancial firms listed on the Muscat Securities Market (MSM). The hypotheses are tested using a random effects model. The results reveal that the coefficient sign on the board of directors’ quality is as predicted, but the coefficient sign is insignificant. Further, the results show that insider ownership is positively associated with leverage at the significant level of 10%, suggesting that the inside substantial shareholders employ higher leverage. With regard to the moderating effect of insider ownership, the findings show that the effect of the board of directors’ quality-leverage relationship becomes negative and stronger with increasing insider ownership.     

独立董事社会关系增进还是削弱了董事会的功能*——基于灰色董事行为的博弈分析

董事会在公司治理中的作用得到了代理理论和友好董事会理论的广泛且富有成效的论证,而最近的灰色董事理论则致力于分析独立董事与CEO之间的社会关系及其对董事会功用的影响。本文构建了一个统一的理论模型,分析了股东、董事会和CEO之间的三阶段博弈,考察了灰色董事的监督和建议功能。结果发现,CEO和董事之间的关系可以削弱对企业的监督行为,但会增强建议行为,且该建议功能随着CEO持股比例的增加而增加;大股东和董事之间的关系不仅不能解决委托代理问题,反而有可能加剧大股东对小股东的掏空行为。     

信息不对称条件下董事会特征之于盈余信息披露质量的研究

董事会特征对于盈余信息披露质量具有重要影响。但已有的研究大多局限于单纯研究董事会特征,对于信息不对称条件下董事会特征对盈余信息披露质量的影响研究较少。研究结果发现:一方面,管理层盈余信息披露质量随着董事会规模增大及董事会会议频率提高而降低;随着独立董事比例提高,管理层盈余信息披露质量越高。另一方面,在考虑信息不对称程度交互作用后,董事会会议频率与管理层盈余信息披露质量之间负相关程度,以及独立董事比例与管理层盈余信息披露质量的正相关程度,均随着信息不对称程度提高降低。     

中国董事会特征与公司绩效关系研究述评

董事会是公司治理的核心。董事会特征是董事会内部特点的外部显现,是董事会治理机制发挥作用的基础和前提。中国学者关于董事会特征与公司绩效关系从董事会规模、领导权结构等六个方面进行研究。     

董事会互动过程(IOP)有效性研究

随着国内企业的迅速发展,董事会制度得到普遍发展。增强董事会的有效性研究成为公司治理研究的重要问题。董事会团队内部成员的互动过程对董事会有效性具有一定的影响,加强董事会有效性研究对于提升董事间的满足感、增强互动合作精神、提高其在公司的影响力等方面具有重要作用。     

上市公司董事会与经营绩效的相关实证研究

不同的研究者得到董事会与经营业绩关系的结论是不同的。本文认为其原因主要是不同的研究者所采取的样本不同,或者是他们所研究的董事会因为不同国家不同时期的法律、制度、文化等方面不同,所以董事会对经营业绩所产生的影响也就不一样。本文通过采用平行数据方法对上市公司董事会与经营绩效之间的关系进行了理论与实证分析,并提出了改善董事会与经营业绩的相关建议。     

高管薪酬、公司治理与公司业绩——基于沪深两市上市公司的研究

以2005—2011年沪深两市1236至2107家上市公司为样本,通过研究高管薪酬、公司治理以及公司业绩之间的关系发现：独立董事在董事会的占比越大、CEO对董事会的影响力越大对高管薪酬具有显著的正向影响;而股权集中度、公司为国有控股、董事会持股董事会越多、监事会持股监事越多对高管薪酬具有显著的负向影响。并且因公司治理引起高管获得的超额薪酬与公司业绩具有显著的负相关关系。     

Modelling money,price and output in India: a vector autoregressive and moving average (VARMA) approach

This article studies director additions and removals for S&;P 500 firms during the period 2000 to 2003. It finds that firms with smaller board size than estimated efficient levels add more and remove fewer directors than firms with larger board size. It also finds that firms with lower board independence than estimated efficient levels add more and remove fewer independent directors, and add fewer and remove more nonindependent directors than firms with higher board independence. These findings suggest that firms add and remove directors to adjust board structure in a manner consistent with economic efficiency.     

独立董事制度与中国创业板上市公司治理结构

为了规范上市公司的法人治理结构,使董事会更公正地代表股东利益尤其是中小股东的利益,针对创业板市场中民营企业比例较大的特点,借鉴国际市场经验,笔者认为,在创业板上市公司中引入独立董事制度是完善中国创业上市公司治理结构的重要步骤。     

公司治理、董事会行为与经营绩效

本对1996年12月31日以前上市的366家A股公司（包括同时发行B股）进行了实证研究,结果表明,在企业绩效下降之后董事会的活动通常会增加。我们还发现在具有董事会非正常活动频率较高的年度及其以后年度,企业的经营绩效会得到微弱的改进,这在一定程度上表明了董事会会议对于公司治理的涵义。但是,这一实证结果却未能有力地证明Nikos(1999)的结论,即董事会的活动（通常董事会的会议频率加以计量）是董事会参与公司治理的一个重要方面,从而间接地说明了我国上市公司董事会行为的低效率。     

董事会群体断裂带、股权集中度与公司创新战略

创新战略是企业为应对市场竞争,满足顾客需求,实施创新活动的一种整体规划或者方案,公司创新战略制定受董事会决策的影响。基于团队断裂带理论,将董事会群体断裂带区分为生理特征断裂带和任务相关断裂带,选取创业板上市公司为研究样本,基于2013—2017年样本公司相关数据,研究董事会群体断裂带与创新战略之间的关系,并通过引入股权集中度这一调节变量,探究股权集中度在董事会群体断裂带对创新战略影响过程中的作用,得到以下结论：①董事会生理特征断裂带与公司创新战略之间具有负相关关系;②董事会任务相关断裂带与公司创新战略之间具有正相关关系;③股权集中度在生理特征断裂带与创新战略关系中起正向调节作用;④股权集中度在任务相关断裂带与创新战略关系中起负向调节作用。研究结论对企业选聘董事会成员、提高创新战略决策质量以及完善公司治理机制具有借鉴意义。     

Co-opted directors and powerful CEOs: evidence from the CEO pay slice (CPS)

We explore the effect of co-opted directors on chief executive officer (CEO) power. Co-opted directors are those appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office and are found by prior research to represent a weakened governance mechanism. Our evidence reveals that co-opted directors lead to less powerful CEOs, consistent with the substitution effect. Because co-opted directors impose less stringent oversight, the CEO is able to exercise a great deal of latitude in running the firm. Therefore, it is less necessary for the CEO to command so much power where more directors are co-opted, hence leading to less powerful CEOs. In other words, co-opted directors substitute for strong CEO power. Crucially, we find that board co-option exhibits much more explanatory power than does board independence, which has been the primary measure of board effectiveness in the literature.     

DOES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS AFFECT FIRM PERFORMANCE OF CONSUMER CO‐OPERATIVES? THE CASE OF ICOOP KOREA

Consumer co‐operatives in Korea have been growing rapidly since they launched their own shops. If co‐operatives would be too much oriented to enlargement or economic growth, they might easily pay no attention to members’ participation which is one of the priorities in co‐operatives. It could lead to losing the value of co‐operatives. So it is important to adjust the balance between members’ participation and economic growth. This paper focuses on the role of board of directors in doing that. It aims to examine how effectiveness of the board influences members’ participation and the participation has effect on performance of co‐operatives in the case of iCOOP Korea. The variables such as communication with members and usage of management skills and knowledge are employed as measures of the effectiveness of the board in decision‐making process. The data are collected by survey the respondents of which are 222 directors of 30 primary co‐operatives. It is analyzed by Structural Equation Model. The findings of the research are as follows. Firstly, communication of the board with members increases the members’ democratic participation, and the increased participation contributes to improving the financial performance. Secondly, management skills and knowledge of the board does not have significant relations with the level of members’ participation, even though members’ economic participation has significantly positive relation with the financial performance. The findings imply that members’ voluntary participation will be increased when boards of co‐operatives try to reflect members’ needs in the decision making processes, and it can help the co‐operatives improve their financial performance. It suggests a clue for the trade‐off between the value of co‐operatives and growth of business which many co‐operatives are trying to resolve.     

Stock market reactions to announcements of the board of directors: evidence from Italy

The board of directors plays an important role in corporate governance. It is an internal mechanism that controls and monitors the actions of managers and aligns the utility functions between corporate owners and managers. The board of directors performs multiple functions that concern, for example, the replacement of the managers, financial policy, the preparation of strategic plans and other actions that affect the performance of the company. The board plays an important role since on the one hand it controls the actions of management and on the other it advises the management regarding the strategies to be adopted. In this study, 100 announcements regarding the appointment of the board of directors of 100 Italian listed companies during the period 2012–2014 are investigated. The results show a positive reaction within 20 days around the announcement date. In four of the six time windows, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are positive and statistically significant. The positive reaction of the market would appear, however, to be linked more to the composition of the board of directors than to the size of the board of directors.     

Directors network centrality and earnings quality

This study examines whether firms with network central boards of directors behave differently from other firms in terms of financial reporting quality. We find that earnings quality among firms is low when board networks are channels of incorrect information transmission (including earnings management information) and for firms whose directors are awarded equity-based compensation have connections through boardroom networks, but earnings quality is better for firms with good performance in spite of their networks. These results are robust to controlling for firm information environment, growth, size, age, leverage, performance, volatility in firm operations, and corporate governance.     

董事会的性质与国企董事会的出路

公司是企业演变的一个更高级形态。现代意义上的董事会具有一定程度的内生性,董事会一方面是股东力量互相抗衡的场所,另一方面是联结各利益相关者的中枢机构,具体而言应具有战略性、调和性、独立性、问责性。国企董事会尚存在政企不分、职责定位不清、独立董事功能有限等问题,政府应首先让董事会独立行事,然后对其问责,同时寻求高素质的董事,促使独立董事主动为小股东利益代言。     

董事会治理与企业技术创新:理论与实证

本文在代理理论的框架内考察了公司治理之董事会治理与企业技术创新投入的关系,并基于2004-2008年501家中国上市公司的数据对此进行了实证研究。结果表明:1)董事会规模与企业技术创新投入存在不显著的负相关关系;2)独立董事占比与企业技术创新投入存在显著的正相关关系,独立董事占比较高的企业其技术创新投入要显著高于独立董事占比较低的企业;3)董事长与总经理两职分离的制度安排对企业技术创新投入有显著的积极影响,两职分离的企业其技术创新投入要显著高于两职合一的企业;4)董事会股权激励对企业技术创新存在积极影响,董事会股权激励水平越高,企业技术创新投入越多,但这种发现仅具有较低的统计显著性。     

债转股企业的共同治理模式研究

通过分析案例企业的债转股协议,发现由于资产管理公司对债转股企业治理的积极参与,导致构成企业控制权的股东投票权、董事会权、职工参与权、优先转让权、剩余现金流权等都体现出强烈的权力制衡关系和保护弱势股东的特征。各投资主体平等地参与董事会决策权是构成共同治理模式的根本基础。改善债转股企业的治理质量,应在继续发挥政策效应的同时逐步强化市场原则。     

董事会非正式层级与企业创新——关系契约理论视角

创新既是企业获取长期竞争优势的关键行动,也是我国经济高质量发展的内生动力。董事会作为战略决策机构与治理核心,其内部运作机制必然会影响企业创新水平。基于关系契约理论,以2008—2019年沪深A股上市公司为数据样本,实证研究董事会非正式层级对企业创新的影响。结果发现,董事会非正式层级越清晰,企业创新水平越高,而当股权集中度较高、CEO处于非正式层级最高位时,董事会非正式层级与企业创新间的正相关关系会被削弱。进一步研究发现,董事会非正式层级可以通过降低企业环境不确定性和抑制管理层短视行为提升企业创新水平;区分创新类型后,相比于策略性创新,董事会非正式层级更能够显著提升企业实质性创新水平;董事会非正式层级能够提升企业价值。结论基于新的研究视角从微观动态交互层面理解董事会结构特征对企业创新的影响,对企业加强董事会建设、提升创新水平具有重要借鉴意义。     

Board structure,ownership, and financial distress in banking firms

This investigation pursues a new direction in the analysis of financial distress in banking firms. The research was inspired by recent research on corporate governance and the need to understand the internal processes behind the financial decisions that result in bank failures. The analysis examined the relationship between the ownership and structure of the board of directors and the internal control mechanism that influences the survival of the firm. The following aspects of ownership and governance are investigated: ownership by directors and officers, ownership by the CEO, number of directors, percentage of inside directors, and CEO duality. The influence of board structure and ownership on the probability of financial distress was explored with a sample of approximately 300 banking firms. The empirical tests indicated a lower probability of financial distress when one person is both the CEO and chairman of the board, but the other factors did not have a significant effect.