Dynamic pollution regulation

This paper examines pollution regulation in a dynamic setting with complete information. We show that tradeable pollution permits may not achieve the social optimum even when the permit market is perfectly competitive. The reason is that the optimal tradeable permits regulation will typically be time inconsistent. We then show that pollution taxes can achieve the first best and are time consistent.We thank Claudio Mezzetti, Wally Oates, and Paul Rhode for helpful comments. The last two authors thank the National Science Foundation for financial support.     

Tradeable permits for pollution control when emission location matters: What have we learned?

Our knowledge about tradeable permit approaches to pollution control has grown rapidly in the two decades in which they have received serious analytical attention. Not only have the theoretical models become more focused and the empirical work more detailed, but we have now had over a decade of experience with them in the U.S. This article draws upon economic theory, empirical studies, and actual experience with implementation to summarize what we have learned about applying tradeable permits to air pollution control in the special circumstance where the spatial aspects of the problem are a prime consideration.     

A Model of Tradeable Capital Tax Permits

Standard models of horizontal capital tax competition predict that, in a Nash equilibrium, states set tax rates inefficiently due to externalities—capital inflow to one state corresponds to capital outflow for another state. Researchers often suggest that the federal government impose Pigouvian taxes to correct for these effects and achieve efficiency. We propose an alternative incentive‐based regulation: tradeable capital tax permits. Under this system, the federal government would require a state to hold a permit if it wanted to reduce its capital income tax rate from some predefined benchmark. These permits would be tradeable across states. We show that, if the federal government sets the correct number of total permits, then social efficiency is achieved. We discuss the advantages of this system relative to the canonical suggestion of Pigouvian taxes.     

Hybrid Carbon Incentive Mechanisms and Political Acceptability

This paper analyses how hybrid systems of carbon taxes and tradeable permits optimize some conflicting dimensions of political acceptability related to the design of these instruments. Pure systems like taxes without exemptions or auctioned tradeable permits cause problems for political acceptability in open economies due to high overall costs (abatement cost plus payments on the tax or auctions) for current polluters. Unfortunately, pure systems based on grandfathering of emission rights across the board do not provide a feasible alternative because of monitoring and enforcement problems. In contrast, consciously designed hybrid systems employ grandfathering of emission rights together with either carbon taxes or auctioned carbon permits in order to overcome acceptability problems of pure systems, while leaving incentives to reduce emissions at the margin untouched. Moreover, monitoring and enforcement costs of the hybrid systems are less due to the lower number of participating agents compared with the pure systems, while opportunities for cost- or burden-sharing exist as well.     

Fairness in a tradeable-permit treaty for carbon emissions reductions in Europe and the former Soviet Union

This paper evaluates the distributional implications of alternative permit allocations in a tradeable permit regime for carbon emissions reductions (20% below baseline) in 2010 for a region consisting of Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Participation in such a regime is expected to hinge on the fairness of the distributional consequences. We find that initial permit allocations by populationand/or GDP are unlikely to induce participation by most countries of Eastern Europe and FSU because of the net costs involved. We identify a set of initial allocations that would at least compensate these countries. A fair treatment of the countries in Western Europe (WE) is here one which equalizes net costs perGDP. For a wide set of cost functions for carbon emission reductions, the cost gains that WE would reap from a tradeable permit system relative to unilateral reductions by WE as a group are found to be on the order of 85 percent. This would imply, among other things, a significant increase in WE'scapacity to make further emissions reductions.     

Economic growth with environmental damage and technical progress

The papers on economic growth with environmental constraints usually ignore the effect of technical progress, this results in static steady state solutions. This paper examines the problem of optimal economic growth with environmental damage, technical progress taken into account, which produces a steady state solution that corresponds to an equilibrium growth, with non-constant emissions and pollutant stock. As a means of steering the economy along the optimal path, two types of tradeable pollution permits are analyzed. The method of stabilizing the optimal path, leading to a steady state, is suggested.     

Using Tradeable Permits to Achieve Sustainability in the World's Large Cities: Policy Design Issues and Efficiency Conditions for Controlling Vehicle Emissions, Congestion and Urban Decentralization with an Application to Mexico City

Many large cities in the world have serious ground level ozone problems, largely the product of vehicular emissions and thus the argued unsustainability of current urban growth patterns is frequently blamed on unrestricted private vehicle use. This article reviews Mexico City's experience with vehicle use restrictions as an emissions control program and develops the conditions for optimal quantitative restrictions on vehicle use and for complementary abatement technologies. The stochastic nature of air pollution outcomes is modelled explicitly in both the static and dynamic formulations of the control problem, in which for the first time in the literature the use of tradeable vehicle use permits is proposed as a cost-effective complement to technological abatement for mobile emissions control. This control regime gives the authorities a broader and more flexible set of instruments with which to deal more effectively with vehicle emissions, and with seasonal and stochastic variation of air quality outcomes. The market in tradeable vehicle use permits would be very competitive with low transactions costs. This control policy would have very favorable impacts on air quality, vehicle congestion and on urban form and development. Given the general political resistance to environmental taxes, this program could constitute a workable and politically palatable set of policies for controlling greenhouse gas emissions from the transport sector.     

Timing and Commitment of Environmental Policy,Adoption of New Technology,and Repercussions on R&;D

We investigate the interplay between environmental policy, incentives to adoptnew technology, and repercussions on R&D. We study a model where a monopolistic upstream firm engages in R&D and sells advanced abatement technology to polluting downstream firms. We consider four different timing and commitment regimes of environmental tax and permit policies: ex post taxation (or issuing permits), interim commitment to a tax rate (a quota of permits) after observing R&D success but before adoption, and finally two types of ex antecommitment before R&D activity, one with a unique tax rate (quota of permits), the other one with a menu of tax rates (permit quotas). We study the second best tax and permit policies and rank these with respect to welfare. In particular, we find that commitment to a menu of tax rate dominates all other policy regimes.     

Pricing and regulating affect environmental ethics

Effluent charges and tradeable permits are economically efficient but rarely used. A new explanation for this discrepancy is offered. Pricing may crowd out environmental ethics in the pricing, and via spillovers, also in non-pricing sectors. Pricing may therefore increase pollution, providing a reason why decision-makers tend to reject environmental pricing. Five propositions showing the conditions for counterproductive effects are advanced. They are consistent with available empirical evidence. Regulation by setting standards and subsidies damage environmental ethics less than pricing, because pollution is condoned. Damaging environmental ethics may prevent political action in favor of the environment.     

A Pollution Offset System for Trading Non-Point Source Water Pollution Permits

Water pollution from non-point sources is a global environmental concern. Economists propose tradable permit systems as a solution, but they are difficult to implement due to the nature of non-point sources. We present a pollution offset system for trading non-point source water pollution permits. Conventional pollution offset systems suffer from thin markets and transaction costs. In this paper, we show how to overcome these problems with a centrally managed common-pool market. We define permits as allowable nitrate loading to a groundwater aquifer. This trading system utilizes estimates of potential nitrate leaching from land uses, a set of transport coefficients generated from a simulation of nitrate transport in groundwater, an online trading system, and a linear program to clear the market. We illustrate the concept using a hypothetical case study.     

Tradeable permits,missing markets,and technology

This paper examines the effects of missing markets, heterogeneous pollutants, and the pollution technology of firms on the efficacy of transferable pollution permits. Under the assumption of perfect competition in all markets, we show that if firms can substitute among pollutants, then setting the optimal number of permits for only one pollutant will not, in general, lead to an efficient outcome. The degree of the inefficiency will depend on the information set available to the regulator and the substitutability among pollutants by firms. When establishing transferable pollution rights regulators should, therefore, consider the technology of firms. If firms discharge pollutants in the same fixed proportions, then the regulator need only set a market for one of the pollutants to ensure an efficient outcome. Where firms can substitute among pollutants, however, establishing a market for only one pollutant provides an incentive for firms to substitute to unregulated ones. This is an important policy issue as substitutability among pollutants within and across production processes may dampen the dynamic advantages of a tradeable permit policy.     

A Tradable Permit System in an Intertemporal Economy

It is known that in an intertemporal competitive economy, a tradable permit system may not achieve efficiency without setting appropriate permit interest rates (i.e., rewards for holding permits). To find the rates, however, we need to know in advance the path of efficient permit prices, which is difficult to obtain. This study intends to solve this problem in two ways. First, we analyze a special case in which the permit interest rates are given by a simple rule. For example, if the marginal abatement cost of pollution emission is constant, then the appropriate rate is to equal the monetary interest rate. As is the case for global warming, if the damage is caused in the future far beyond the planning period of the environmental program, the appropriate rate coincides with the marginal self-recovery of environmental stock under certain conditions. As a second approach, we propose a tradable permit system with a permit bank, as a mechanism by which the permit interest rates are generated endogenously without governmental intervention other than the issuance of permits. However, we also show that this approach raises the problem of indeterminacy of the equilibrium.     

Optimal Policy with Tradable and Bankable Pollution Permits: Taking the Market Microstructure into Account

This paper analyzes how the way emission permits are traded—their market microstructure—affects the optimal policy to be adopted by the environmental agency. The microstructure used is one of a quote driven market type, which characterizes many financial markets. Market makers act as intermediaries for trading the permits by setting an ask price and a bid price. The possibility of bank permits is also introduced in our dynamic two‐period model. We consider two models whether the market makers are perfectly informed about the technology of the producers or not. When the market makers have complete information, the equilibrium price of permits is the same as if the market is walrasian. When they are imperfectly informed, they may set a positive spread between bid and ask permit prices, which creates some inefficiency as the marginal abatement costs of polluters do not equalize. By allowing more flexibility in the use of the permits, banking may reduce the spread. Moreover, it may introduce price rigidities due to intertemporal arbitrage. In this framework, the circumstances under which banking should be allowed or not depend crucially on the evolution of the marginal willingness to pay for the environment.     

Environmental regulation and international trade

In this paper, we investigate how a country's choice of environmental policy instrument affects the international competitiveness of its firms. We show that in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the total market share of firms regulated through tradeable emission permits increases relative to that of the firms operating under command and control due to better allocation of total abatement among the firms in the country. Our work suggests that free trade situations should not only result in similar environmental standards but also in similar regulatory regimes. It may come as no surprise that the environmental authorities in Canada are seriously considering following the United States in instituting a tradeable emission permits mechanism.Most of the work was completed during the time that E.S. Sartzetakis was a post-doctoral fellow at the Department of Economics, Université Laval. He gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of the department during this period. Earlier, versions of the paper were presented at the fifth conference of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists and at the 1993 Rancontre Franco-Québécoise du GREEN. We would like to thank Joseph Doucet, Thomas Ross, and Aart de Zeeuw for extremely helpful suggestions. We would also like to thank two anonymous referees of this journal for their comments. Financial support from the LRSA of the Faculté des sciences de l'administration, Université Laval, the Groupe de rechearche en économie de l'énergie et des ressources naturelles (GREEN), Université Laval, and the Centre for International Business Studies (CIBS), University of British Columbia, is gratefully acknowledged. The responsibility for errors and omissions remains ours.     

Pollution control in a Cournot duopoly via taxes or permits

We consider an asymmetric Cournot duopoly with firms facing linear Leontief technologies. A pollutant is generated proportional to the quantity of output. The government may regulate the firms by imposing Pigouvian taxes or by issuing a number of tradeable permits. We characterize the optimal tax as well as the optimal permit policy as a function of a critical damage parameter. It turns out that in general neither the social optimum is enforceable, nor is one of the two policies always superior to the other. For a wide range of parameters, however, the permit policy leads to a higher welfare.This paper has been written for the most part during a visit to the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California. The author would like to express his gratitude to the Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences for its hospitality, to P. Chander, W. Trockel, the participants of seminars at California Institute of Technology, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Purdue University, the universities of Bielefeld, Dortmund, and Mannheim, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments, and especially to Jeanne Netzley for her T_EX-nical support at Caltech. Financial support by the state government of Nordrhein-Westfalen (von Bennigsen-Foerder Preis) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Allowing for Household Preferences in Emission Trading – A Contribution to the Climate Policy Debate

In the context of emission trading it seems to be taken as given that people's preferences can be ignored with respect to the whole process of fixing emission targets and allocating emission permits to polluters. With this paper we want to reopen the debate on how citizens can be involved in this process. We try to show how citizen preferences can be included in the process of pollution control through emission trading. We propose an emission trading system where all emission permits are initially allocated to households who are then allowed to sell them in the permit market or to withhold (at least some of) them in order to reduce total pollution. This proposal tries to overcome the fundamental disadvantage of traditional permit systems which neglect consumer preferences by solely distributing emission permits to producers / polluters. In our system the property right to nature is re-allocated to the households who obtain the opportunity of reducing actual emissions according to their personal preferences by withholding a part or all of the emission permits allotted to them. Such a change in environmental policy would mark a return to the traditional principles of consumer sovereignty by involving households (at least partially) in the social abatement decision process instead of excluding them. Another advantage of admitting households to the TEP market as sellers or buyers of permits is that this increases the number of agents in the permit market and thus significantly reduces the possibilities of strategic market manipulations.     

Conserving biodiversity with tradable permits under changing conservation costs and habitat restoration time lags

Tradable permits are a common environmental policy instrument that has recently been applied also to the conservation of biodiversity. Biodiversity conservation differs in many respects to the classical applications of tradable permits like emissions control. One particularity is that, even if the permit system maintains a constant total amount of species habitat, habitat turnover (the destruction of a habitat and restoration elsewhere) affects the ecosystem. Another particularity is that the restoration of habitats often takes much time, leading to time lags between the initiation of restoration activities and the time when restored habitat is available for trading. We use an agent-based model of a tradable permit market to study the influence of heterogeneous and dynamic conservation costs and habitat restoration time lags on key variables of the market, such as the costs incurred to the market participants and the amount of habitat turnover. Our results show that there may be trade-offs between these key variables. We also find that restoration time lags can lead to fluctuations in permit prices that reduce the efficiency of the permit market. We conclude that temporal lags deserve a careful analysis when implementing tradable permit systems for the preservation of natural habitats and biodiversity.     

On the Efficiency of Competitive Markets for Emission Permits

It is typical for economists andpolicy makers alike to presume that competitivemarkets allocate emission permits efficiently.This paper demonstrates that competition in theemission permits market cannot assureefficiency when the product market isoligopolistic. We provide the conditions underwhich a bureaucratic mechanism is welfaresuperior to a tradeable emission permitssystem. Price-taking behaviour in the permitsmarket ensures transfer of licenses to the lessefficient in abatement firms, which then becomemore aggressive in the product market,acquiring additional permits. As a result, theless efficient firms end up with a higher thanthe welfare maximizing share of emissionpermits. If the less efficient in abatementfirms are also less efficient in production,competitive trading of permits may result inlower output and welfare.     

Diffusion and adoption of advanced emission abatement technology induced by permit trading

This paper analyzes firm incentives to diffuse and adopt advanced abatement technology for three different regimes of tradeable emission permits (auctioning, benchmarking, and grandfathering). We particularly consider technical change that decreases marginal abatement costs (MACs) only at high emission levels, whereas it increases them at low firm emissions. We establish that the desirability of the different regimes of allocating permits to firms is critically influenced by how MACs are changed by technological improvements.     

Using Non Market Valuation to Inform the Choice Between Permits and Fees in Environmental Regulation

The purpose of this short note is to open an exploration regarding the use of non market valuation to help guide the selection of economically efficient pollution control instruments. As long as non market valuation techniques can correctly estimate the slope of the marginal benefit of abatement curve, this information along with engineering cost estimates of the unit costs or slope of the marginal abatement cost will provide useful information to policy makers in choosing between fees and permits. An illustrative review of the literature suggests that both stated and revealed preference methods have estimated slopes of marginal benefit functions for reducing several pollutants. To investigate the efficiency of permits versus fees, an illustrative review of corresponding marginal abatement costs is also made. For air pollutants affecting visibility, the slope of the marginal benefit curve is far greater than the slope of the marginal abatement costs, suggesting permits as the efficient instrument. For nitrates in groundwater used for drinking, the marginal benefit curve is flatter than the rather steep marginal abatement cost, suggesting fees/taxes would be a more efficient economic instrument. We hope this note stimulates more emphasis in non market valuation on estimating the slope of the marginal benefit function to enhance environmental economists ability to make policy recommendations regarding the choice of pollution instruments for specific pollutants.