Simultaneity in the market for housing characteristics

The nature of simultaneity in the markets for housing characteristics is examined. Simultaneity is found to arise in the implicit markets for individual characteristics because of the presence of nonlinearity in the market (hedonic) price function for housing. However, this simultaneity is not the kind discussed by S. Rosen [J. Political Econ. 82, 34–55 (1974)] between firm supplies and household demands. As a result, the Rosen suggestion of identifying demand with firm supply shifters is inappropriate. Among the alternative approaches to identification, the most desirable involve use of data over two or more markets in which residence for a given household is exogenous to the choice of housing.     

A note on the determinants of residential succession

A recent paper by J. Brueckner [J. Urban Econ., 4, (1977)] presents empirical evidence that the Muth vintage model explains the neighborhood succession process better than the Bailey boundary externality model. This note shows that Brueckner's apparent empirical findings are spurious as a result of the construction of the dependent variable, and do not provide insight into the neighborhood succession process. Re-estimation of the corrected regressions using similar data yields results which are clearly supportive of neither theoretical model.     

Job Decentralization with Suburban Housing Discrimination: An Urban Equilibrium Model of Spatial Mismatch

The spatial mismatch hypothesis, with its roots in the work of Kain (1968,Quart. J. Econ.82(2), 175–197), has received much recent attention from empirical researchers. Its basic premise is that differences in job access between black and white workers have contributed to increasing racial inequality in urban labor markets. While the initial evidence was ambiguous, recent studies have established that differences in job accessibility have worsened the labor market outcomes of minority workers. This paper develops an urban equilibrium model which allows for the analysis of the impact of job decentralization and suburban housing discrimination on the welfare of workers in a city.     

The short-run comparative statics of a rental housing market

This paper examines the short-run effects of changes in exogenous variables (including several government policies) on the schedule relating market equilibrium rent to quality level. The basic model differs from Sweeney (Econometrica, 42, 147–167 (1974)) by use of a bid rent closed city approach rather than a supply and demand (partially) open city approach. The mathematics changes completely, the analytics simplify, and the results change somewhat. Housing is treated as a durable quality differentiated good, but frictional forces and the multidimensionality of the housing package are ignored. The exception is an extension to a monocentric city context, so that housing units vary in both quality and location.     

Capitalization and Community Size

Studies often show taxes and public services capitalized into house prices, but no one has tested whether the rate of capitalization depends on community size. The theoretical model of W. H. Hoyt (1999, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 29, 155–171), predicts that capitalization occurs, but that the rate of capitalization is weaker in large communities. Hoyt's model is tested empirically using a house price hedonic framework. The tax capitalization results are less clear, but the school quality and crime results firmly support the model's predictions. Using both school districts and municipalities to measure communities, larger communities weaken the rate of capitalization.     

An extension of Mohring's model for land rent distribution

In an early paper Herbert Mohring (J. Pol. Econ., 49 (1961)) presented a model for land rent distribution yielding the well-known result that the price of land must fall with the distance from the city center to offset transportation costs. Our paper is an extension of Mohring's model in which we relax some of his drastic simplifying assumptions. This extended model has been incorporated in a method for economic evaluation of city master plans which has been applied to a Swedish city. In this method the interdependence among housing, heating, and transportation, the durability of urban structures, and the uncertainty of future demand are explicitly considered within a cost-benefit approach. Some empirical results from this pilot study concerning land rent distributions are also presented here.     

Are regulations the answer for emerging stock markets? Evidence from the Czech Republic and Poland

Does the emergence of a stock market require a well-developed legal and/or regulatory system? Although historical work by Neal and Davis [Neal, L., & Davis, L. (2005). The evolution of the rules and regulations of the first emerging markets: The London, New York, and Paris stock exchanges, 1792–1914. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 45, 296–311] and Stringham [Stringham, E. (2003). The extralegal development of securities trading in seventeenth century Amsterdam. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 43, 321–344] suggests that securities markets have successfully developed with little government oversight, numerous authors [including Black, B. (2001). The legal and institutional preconditions for strong securities markets. University of California Law Angeles Law Review, 48, 781–855; Coffee, J. (1999). Privatization and corporate governance: The lessons from securities market failure. Journal of Corporation Law, 25, 1–39; Frye, T. (2000). Brokers and bureaucrats: Building market institutions in Russia. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; Glaeser, E., Johnson, S., & Shleifer, A. (2001). Coase versus the Coasians. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 853–899; Mlčoch, L. (2000). Restructuring of property rights: An institutional view. In L. Mlčoch et al. (Eds.), Economic and Social Changes in Czech Society After 1989. Prague: The Karolinum Press; Pistor, K. (2001). Law as a determinant for equity market development – the experience of transition economies. In Peter Murrell (Ed.), The Value of Law in Transition Economies (pp. 249–287). Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press; Stiglitz, J. (1999). Whither reform. Ten years of the transition. Keynote Address, Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, DC, April 28–30, 1999; Zhang, X. (2006). Financial market governance in developing countries: Getting the political underpinnings right. Journal of Developing Societies, 2, 169–196] argue that the Czech Republic and other Eastern European governments need more regulation for their newly created stock markets. They maintain that the Warsaw Stock Exchange, which is seen as more regulated, has outperformed the Prague Stock Exchange which is seen as largely unregulated. Thus increased regulations are a key to increased performance. This article, however, maintains that the evidence from the Czech experience has been misinterpreted. This article provides an in depth case study of the Czech stock market and finds that (a) Czech capital markets have been hindered by government intervention from their beginning, (b) that the evidence on Poland's superior performance is not as strong as suggested, and (c) that Czech regulators seem to be unqualified, lack the proper incentives, and are unlikely to benefit the market. Under these circumstances it appears that Neal and Davis (2005:311) are correct that increased government involvement is unlikely to improve the situation.     

The case for heterogeneity of cities

The general similarity of the results of comparative statics in a semiclosed and in a fully closed city have been demonstrated by Pines and Sadka (Journal of Urban Economics 20, 1–20, 1986). The objective of this paper is to determine if the consequences of different forms of public regulation of the urban land market are also invariant with respect to the type of city. The conclusion is that while there are well-defined consequences of such controls on metropolitan area and land values in a semiclosed city, the impacts in a fully closed city are generally ambiguous. Therefore, proposals for the introduction of zoning and density regulation have to be city-specific and take into consideration the pattern of land ownership and the extent of leakage of urban land rent income.     

Property values and pension underfunding in the local public sector

This paper reexamines the empirical implication of the C. Tiebout (J. Pol. Econ.64, 416–424 (1956)) hypothesis, taking account of the fact that many municipal pensions are grossly underfunded. OLS results show that underfunding has no impact on local property values. The motives for incomplete funding of pensions are also examined and are built into a simultaneous equation model. The OLS results are confirmed and some light is shed on factors leading to the underfunding of pensions.     

Book reviews

Book reviewed in this article: Gutkind, P. C. W. and Wallerstein, I. , editors, 1977: The political economy of contemporary Africa. Mellor, J. R. 1977: Urban sociology in an urbanized society. Ragon, M. 1977: L'architecte, le prince et la démocratie: vers une démocratisation de l'architecture. d'Arvois, A. 1977: L'architecture du Prince. Dialectiques 20 Burlen, K. 1978: L'idéologique des architectes. Lamy, B. et Robirosa, A. 1976: Evolution de la profession d’ architecte. Stretton, H. 1976: Capitalism, socialism and the environment. Walton, J. and Masotti, L. H. , editors, 1976: The city in comparative perspective. Harloe, M. , editor, 1977: Captive cities. Brown, A. A., Licari, J. A., Neuberger, E. , editors, 1974; Urban and social economics in market and planned economies Wieviorka, M. 1977: L'état, le patronat et les consommateurs.     

Bias of distance functions estimates and Primont and Primont’s homotheticity test

The question of whether a technology exhibits particular properties such as radial input or output homotheticity is a crucial one for a producer since it should strongly impact on its reactions to market changes. Primont and Primont (Econ Lett 45:191–195, 1994) established that it can be tested using only weak assumptions. They further used their results to test for input homotheticity of an educational production technology (Primont and Primont, Can J Econ 29:587–591, 1996). In this paper, it is shown that if not implemented properly, the test can lead to biased results. Some ways to obtain unbiased results are also suggested.

A response to the critiques of DEA by Dmitruk and Koshevoy, and Bol

We here critique the articles by Dmitruk & Koshevoy (1991, J Econ Theory 55:121–144) and by Bol (1986, J Econ Theory 38:380–385) by showing how to solve the examples they erected to show the non-existence of functions for evaluating performance efficiencies in DEA. We also show that functions satisfying these criteria—and other important criteria as well—were already available prior to the publications of D&K and by Bol and have since been greatly extended to increase the power and scope of DEA.

Inconsequential arbitrage

We introduce the concept of inconsequential arbitrage and, in the context of a model allowing short-sales and half-lines in indifference surfaces, prove that inconsequential arbitrage is sufficient for existence of equilibrium. Moreover, with a slightly stronger condition of nonsatiation than that required for existence of equilibrium and with a mild uniformity condition on arbitrage opportunities, we show that inconsequential arbitrage, the existence of a Pareto optimal allocation, and compactness of the set of utility possibilities are equivalent. Thus, when all equilibria are Pareto optimal — for example, when local nonsatiation holds — inconsequential arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for existence of an equilibrium. By further strengthening our nonsatiation condition, we obtain a second welfare theorem for exchange economies allowing short sales.Finally, we compare inconsequential arbitrage to the conditions limiting arbitrage of Hart [Hart, O.D., 1974. J. Econ. Theory 9, 293–311], Werner [Werner, J., 1987. Econometrica 55, abs1403–1418], Dana et al. [Dana, R.A., Le Van, C., Magnien, F., 1999. J. Econ. Theory 87, 169–193] and Allouch [Allouch, N., 1999. Equilibrium and no market arbitrage. CERMSEM, Universite de Paris I]. For example, we show that the condition of Hart (translated to a general equilibrium setting) and the condition of werner are equivalent. We then show that the Hart/Werner conditions imply inconsequential arbitrage. To highlight the extent to which we extend Hart and Werner, we construct an example of an exchange economy in which inconsequential arbitrage holds (and is necessary and sufficient for existence), while the Hart/Werner conditions do not hold.     

E-Leadership and Virtual Teams

In this paper we have identified some key challenges for E-leaders of virtual teams. Among the most salient of these are the following:

• The difficulty of keeping tight and loose controls on intermediate progress toward goals

• Promoting close cooperation among teams and team members in order to integrate deliverables

• Encouraging and recognizing emergent leaders in virtual teams

• Establishing explicit processes for archiving important written documentation

• Establishing and maintaining norms and procedures early in a team’s formation and development

• Establishing proper boundaries between home and work

Virtual team environments magnify the differences between good and bad projects, organizations, teams, and leaders. The nature of such projects is that there is little tolerance for ineffective leadership. There are some specific issues and techniques for mitigating the negative effects of more dispersed employees, but these are merely extensions of good leadership—they cannot make up for the lack of it.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

An excellent reference for research on teams is M. E. Shaw, R. M. McIntyre, and E. Salas, “Measuring and Managing for Team Performance: Emerging Principles from Complex Environments,” in R. A. Guzzo and E. Salas, eds., Team Effectiveness and Decision Making in Organizations (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1995). For a fuller discussion of teleworking and performance-management issues in virtual teams, see W. F. Cascio, “Managing a Virtual Workplace,” Academy of Management Executive, 2000, 14(3), 81–90, and also C. Joinson, “Managing Virtual Teams,” HRMagazine, June 2002, 69–73. Several sources discuss the issue of trust in virtual teams: D. Coutu, “Trust in Virtual Teams,” Harvard Business Review, May–June 1998, 20–21; S. L. Jarvenpaa, K. Knoll, and D. E. Leidner, “Is Anybody Out There? Antecedents of Trust in Global Virtual Teams,” Journal of Management Information Systems, 1998, 14(4), 29–64. See also Knoll and Jarvenpaa, “Working Together in Global Virtual Teams,” in M. Igbaria and M. Tan, eds., The Virtual Workplace (Hershey, PA: Idea Group Publishing, 1998).Estimates of the number of teleworkers vary. For examples, see Gartner Group, Report R-06-6639, November 18, 1998, and also Telework America survey, news release, October 23, 2001. We learned about CPP’s approach to managing virtual work arrangements through David Krantz, personal communication, August 20, 2002, Palo Alto, CA.There are several excellent references on emergent leaders. For example, see G. Lumsden and D. Lumsden, Communicating in Groups and Teams: Sharing Leadership (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1993); Lumsden and Lumsden, Groups: Theory and Experience, 4th ed. (Boston: Houghton, 1993); R. W. Napier and M. K. Gershenfeld, Groups: Theory and Experience, 4th ed. (Boston: Houghton, 1989); and M. E. Shaw, Group Dynamics: The Psychology of Small Group Behavior, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981).An excellent source for e-mail style is D. Angell and B. Heslop, The Elements of E-mail Style: Communicate Effectively via Electronic Mail (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1994). To read more on the growing demand for flexible work arrangements, see “The New World of Work: Flexibility is the Watchword,” Business Week, 10 January 2000, 36.For more on individualism and collectivism, see H. C. Triandis, “Cross-cultural Industrial and Organizational Psychology,” in H. C. Triandis, M. D. Dunnette, and L. M. Hough, eds., Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 2nd ed., vol. 4 (Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press, 1994, 103–172).Executive SummaryAs the wired world brings us all closer together, at the same time as we are separated by time and distance, leadership in virtual teams becomes ever more important. Information technology makes it possible to build far-flung networks of organizational contributors, although unique leadership challenges accompany their formation and operation. This paper describes the growth of virtual teams, the various forms they assume, the kinds of information and support they need to function effectively, and the leadership challenges inherent in each form. We then provide workable, practical solutions to each of the leadership challenges identified.     

Assessing bankruptcy prediction models via information content of technical inefficiency

We use a stochastic frontier model with firm-specific technical inefficiency effects in a panel framework (Battese and Coelli in Empir Econ 20:325–332, 1995) to assess two popular probability of bankruptcy (PB) measures based on Merton model (Merton in J Financ 29:449–470, 1974) and discrete-time hazard model (DHM; Shumway in J Bus 74:101–124, 2001). Three important results based on our empirical studies are obtained. First, a firm with a higher PB generally has less technical efficiency. Second, for an ex-post bankrupt firm, its PB tends to increase and its technical efficiency of production tends to decrease, as the time to its bankruptcy draws near. Finally, the information content about firm’s technical inefficiency provided by PB based on DHM is significantly more than that based on Merton model. By the last result and the fact that economic-based efficiency measures are reasonable indicators of the long-term health and prospects of firms (Baek and Pagán in Q J Bus Econ 41:27–41, 2002), we conclude that PB based on DHM is a better credit risk proxy of firms.     

A dynamic CAPM with supply effect: Theory and empirical results

Breeden [Breeden, D. T. (1979). An intertemporal asset pricing model with stochastic consumption and investment opportunities. Journal of Financial Economics 7, 265–196] and Grinols [Grinols, E. L. (1984). Production and risk leveling in the intertemporal capital asset pricing model. The Journal of Finance 39, 5, 1571–1595] and Cox et al. [Cox, J. C., Ingersoll, J. E., Jr., & Ross, S. A. (1985). An intertemporal general equilibrium model of asset prices. Econometrica 53, 363–384] have described the importance of supply side for the capital asset pricing. Black [Black, S. W. (1976). Rational response to shocks in a dynamic model of capital asset pricing. American Economic Review 66, 767–779] derives a dynamic, multiperiod CAPM, integrating endogenous demand and supply. However, Black's theoretically elegant model has never been empirically tested for its implications in dynamic asset pricing. We first theoretically extend Black's CAPM. Then we use price, dividend per share and earnings per share to test the existence of supply effect with U.S. equity data. We find the supply effect is important in U.S. domestic stock markets. This finding holds as we break the companies listed in the S&P 500 into ten portfolios by different level of payout ratio. It also holds consistently if we use individual stock data.     

Increasing human and social capital by applying job embeddedness theory

Most modern lives are complicated. When employees feel that their organization values the complexity of their entire lives and tries to do something about making it a little easier for them to balance all the conflicting demands, the employees tend to be more productive and stay with those organizations longer. Job embeddedness captures some of this complexity by measuring both the on-the-job and off-the-job components that most contribute to a person's staying. Research evidence as well as ample anecdotal evidence (discussed here and other places) supports the value of using the job embeddedness framework for developing a world-class retention strategy based on corporate strengths and employee preferences.To execute effectively their corporate strategy, different organizations require different knowledge, skills and abilities from their people. And because of occupational, geographic, demographic or other differences, these people will have needs that are different from other organizations. For that reason, the retention program of the week from international consultants won’t always work. Instead, organizations need to carefully assess the needs/desires of their unique employee base. Then, these organizations need to determine which of these needs/desires they can address in a cost effective fashion (confer more benefits than the cost of the program). Many times this requires an investment that will pay off over a longer term – not just a quarter or even year. Put differently, executives will need to carefully understand the fully loaded costs of turnover (loss of tacit knowledge, reduced customer service, slowed production, lost contracts, lack of internal candidates to lead the organization in the future, etc., in addition to the obvious costs like recruiting, selecting and training new people). Then, these executives need to recognize the expected benefits of various retention practices. Only then can leaders make informed decisions about strategic investments in human and social capital.

Selected bibliography

A number of articles have influenced our thinking about the importance of connecting employee retention strategies to business strategies:

• R. W. Beatty, M. A. Huselid, and C. E. Schneier. “New HR Metrics: Scoring on the Business Scorecard,” Organizational Dynamics, 2003, 32 (2), 107–121.

• Bradach. “Organizational Alignment: The 7-S Model,” Harvard Business Review, 1998.

• J. Pfeffer. “Producing Sustainable Competitive Advantage Through the Effective Management of People,” Academy of Management Executive, 1995 (9), 1–13.

• C. J. Collins, and K. D. Clark. “Strategic Human Resources Practices and Top Management Team Social Networks: An Examination of the Role of HR Practices in Creating Organizational Competitive Advantage,” Academy of Management Journal, 2003, 46, 740–752.

The theoretical development and empirical support for the Unfolding Model of turnover are captured in the following articles:

• T. Lee, and T. Mitchell. “An Alternative Approach: The Unfolding Model of Voluntary Employee Turnover,” Academy of Management Review, 1994, 19, 57–89.

• B. Holtom, T. Mitchell, T. Lee, and E.Inderrieden. “Shocks as Causes of Turnover: What They Are and How Organizations Can Manage Them,” Human Resource Management, 2005, 44(3), 337–352.

The development of job embeddedness theory is captured in the following articles:

• T. Mitchell, B. Holtom, T. Lee, C. Sablynski, and M. Erez. “Why People Stay: Using Job Embeddedness to Predict Voluntary Turnover,” Academy of Management Journal, 2001, 44, 1102–1121.

• T. Mitchell, B. Holtom, and T. Lee. “How To Keep Your Best employees: The Development Of An Effective Retention Policy,” Academy of Management Executive, 2001, 15(4), 96–108.

• B. Holtom, and E. Inderrieden. “Integrating the Unfolding Model and Job Embeddedness To Better Understand Voluntary Turnover,” Journal of Managerial Issues, in press.

• D.G. Allen. “Do Organizational Socialization Tactics Influence Newcomer Embeddedness and Turnover?” Journal of Management, 2006, 32, 237–257.

Executive SummaryEmployee turnover is costly to organizations. Some of the costs are obvious (e.g., recruiting, selecting, and training expenses) and others are not so obvious (e.g., diminished customer service ability, lack of continuity on key projects, and loss of future leadership talent). Understanding the value inherent in attracting and keeping excellent employees is the first step toward investing systematically to build the human and social capital in an organization. The second step is to identify retention practices that align with the organization's strategy and culture. Through extensive research, we have developed a framework for creating this alignment. We call this theory job embeddedness. Across multiple industries, we have found that job embeddedness is a stronger predictor of important organizational outcomes, such as employee attendance, retention and performance than the best, well-known and accepted psychological explanations (e.g., job satisfaction and organizational commitment). The third step is to implement the ideas. Throughout this article we discuss examples from the Fortune 100 Best Companies to Work For and many others to demonstrate how job embeddedness theory can be used to build human and social capital by increasing employee retention.     

Testing for Strategic Interaction Among Local Governments: The Case of Growth Controls

This paper helps to fill a gap in the public economics literature by providing empirical evidence on strategic interaction among local governments. Using the methodology of Case et al. (Journal of Public Economics,52, 285–307 (1993)), the paper focuses on the adoption of growth-control measures by cities in California and looks for evidence of policy interdependence in these choices. The data are drawn from an elaborate survey of growth control practices in California cities, conducted by Glickfeld and Levine (“Regional Growth . . .Local Reaction,” Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, MA, 1992). The survey results are used to compute an index of the stringency of growth controls in each city, which serves as the dependent variable for the study.     

Restricted houseswapping games

Restricted houseswapping games (RHGs) are a generalization of ‘one-sided matching games’, in which we specify a class II* of ‘allowable’ simple trading cycles. The cores of such games may be empty. Given II*, all possible closed RHGs have non-empty cores of II* is ‘strongly balanced’. Examples include the one-sided matching markets (^{Shapley and Scarf. Journal of Mathematical Economics 1974. 1. 23–37}. ^{Tijs et al., OR Spektrum 1984, 6, 119–123}; ^{Quinzii, International Journal of Game Theory 1984, 13, 41–60}) and the two-sided matching markets (^{Gale and Shapley. American Mathematical Monthly 1962. 69, 9–16}; ^{Shapley and Shubik, International Journal of Game Theory 1972, 1, 111–130}: and ^{Demange and Gale Econometrica 1985, 53, 873–888}).We then consider the subclass of RHGs in which there is no transferable resource. In this case, a weaker condition on II*, called ‘weak balancedness’, is sufficient to guarantee core non-emptiness. In addition, if II* is not weakly balanced, then there exists a preference profile such that the strict core of the resultant game is empty.Several other examples are given of II* that are (a) strongly balanced: (b) weakly balanced but not strongly balanced: and (c) not even weakly balanced.Finally, we discuss the issues of equilibrium definition, existence, and core-equilibrium allocation equivalence in RHGs.     

Matching in local labor markets: a stochastic frontier approach

This paper investigates the technical efficiency of labor market matching from a stochastic frontier approach. The true fixed-effects model (Greene J Prod Anal 23:7–32, 2005a; J Econom 126:269–303, 2005b) is utilised in order to separate cross-sectional heterogeneity from inefficiency, and inefficiency terms are modelled following Battese and Coelli (Empir Econ 20:325–332, 1995). The data set consists of almost 17,000 observations from Local Labor Offices (LLOs) in Finland. According to the results, there are notable differences in matching efficiency between regions, and these differences contribute significantly to the number of filled vacancies. If all regions were as efficient as the most efficient one, the number of total matches per month would increase by over 23%. The heterogeneity of the job-seeker stock is an important determinant of matching efficiency: the weight of the composition of the job-seeker stock in the inefficiency terms is on average 85%.