金融契约执行效率、企业进入与产品市场竞争

"供给侧"改革的核心之一是引导企业有序进入新行业,金融契约执行效率的高低会影响企业外部融资成本和进入决策,进而决定市场竞争程度。本文将不完全契约机制和古诺竞争引入动态一般均衡框架,从理论上阐释了金融契约执行效率对企业进入和市场竞争的影响机制。此外,本文使用1998—2007年中国制造业企业的微观数据对理论结果进行了实证检验,回归结果表明:金融契约执行效率越高的地区,企业进入激励越强、市场竞争越充分;从地区角度看,中部地区对金融契约执行效率的变动相对敏感;从行业角度看,技术密集型行业对金融契约执行效率的变动相对不敏感。     

契约执行效率与地区出口绩效差异-基于行业特征的经验分析

生产率差异是比较优势的重要来源,而契约执行效率又是决定行业生产率的制度因素之一.本文利用中国省区28个行业数据检验了契约执行效率对出口贸易的影响.实证结果显示,契约执行效率高的地区更倾向于专业化生产和出口契约密集度较高、物质资产专用性较强和人力资产专用性较弱的产品.在控制比较优势的其他影响因素及变量内生性之后,上述结论依然稳健.本文进一步指出,企业的一体化程度差异是解释上述结论的关键因素.     

企业组织理论新发展

早期的组织研究集中在企业内部，考察以官僚行政机构为特征的科层制组织的适用性及变革的方向。但自从新制度经济学家将“交易”作为考察单元，提出了将不完全契约和关系契约作为企业间交易活动协调的三边或双边治理机制的交易费用理论(TCT)后，组织研究跨越了单体企业的边界范围，研究视角也开始走向了管理学、     

基于超市场契约理论的大型物流企业组织形式选择

从契约理论的角度看,大型物流企业的本质是企业间超市场契约.其基本含义是,在价值链或产业链中拥有关键性资源的企业以行使控制权和指挥权的方式与其他企业的交易.这种交易具有以往企业间交易所不曾有的若干特征:具有框架的特征,其内容是在实施过程中逐步充实和展开的;整个交易过程伴随着生产过程,渗透在生产过程中;被交易的产品是双方多重复合交易的成果.这种契约特征决定了柔性化网络是其组织形式的必然选择.     

解构经济制度对我国企业生产率的影响

本文利用世界银行中国企业调查数据研究了经济制度的两个方面(产权保护制度和契约执行制度)对于企业生产率的影响。研究表明,产权保护制度对企业生产率有显著的正向影响,而契约执行制度对企业生产率的影响并不显著。此外,产权保护制度和契约执行制度对企业生产率的影响还与经济发展程度和企业发展速度有关:产权保护制度对生产率的促进作用在经济落后城市和发展速度较慢的企业中体现得更加明显,而契约执行制度则显著提升了经济发达城市和发展速度较快企业的生产率。     

契约执行效率与地区出口绩效差异——基于行业特征的经验分析

生产率差异是比较优势的重要来源,而契约执行效率又是决定行业生产率的制度因素之一。本文利用中国省区28个行业数据检验了契约执行效率对出口贸易的影响。实证结果显示,契约执行效率高的地区更倾向于专业化生产和出口契约密集度较高、物质资产专用性较强和人力资产专用性较弱的产品。在控制比较优势的其他影响因素及变量内生性之后,上述结论依然稳健。本文进一步指出,企业的一体化程度差异是解释上述结论的关键因素。     

契约执行效率与最优投资的主体差异

本文在Acemoglu和Pascli分析框架的基础上构建了一个两部门垄断竞争模型,考察契约执行效率与企业投资的关系.理论分析表明,对于契约密集度较大的行业,契约执行效率越高,企业的最优投资额越大.在此基础上,对中国分地区分行业数据进行检验,结果显示:契约执行效率对民间投资、外商投资有明显的正向效应,对政府投资的影响并不显著,在控制其他变量以及内生性问题后,这一结果依然稳健.     

排他性与非排他性策略下创新授权契约机制研究

分析了不完全信息下,拥有提高产品质量技术的创新企业,在（非）排他性授权策略下,向进行Cournot竞争生产低质量产品的生产企业技术授权的契约优化问题。研究表明,在排他性授权策略下,双重收费契约下信息不完全能使接受授权生产企业赢取更多的创新企业特许权补贴;在非排他性授权策略下,不完全信息能够削弱创新企业通过双重收费契约设计对产品间接市场的垄断程度。在排他性授权交易下,信息不完全使特许权收费契约优于固定收费契约成为可能,这不同于Li and Wang的研究结论。基于提高社会创新能力视角,政府应鼓励创新企业更多采用特许权收费授权契约,削弱信息不对称的影响,赢取更多研发投资利润回报。     

不完全契约、专用性投资与纵向一体化

笔者探讨了不完全契约情形下市场交易、长期契约和纵向一体化的专用性投资水平.基于博弈结构,我们将市场交易和长期契约分别视为鲁宾斯坦和纳什谈判方式.结论表明,纵向一体化能达到最优的专用性投资水平,并且,在长期契约中下游企业的专用性投资水平要高于市场交易.进一步表明,为了消除市场交易情况下专用性投资的不足,可取的办法不仅仅是纵向一体化,长期契约也是可行的办法,但它的投资激励不如一体化.     

"公司+农户"契约选择的影响因素研究:一个交易成本分析框架

笔者以"公司+农户"这一组织形式中的契约关系为研究对象,运用交易成本理论来探讨影响企业与农户对契约选择的因素,并构建模型对这些因素进行量化分析.通过分析我们认为,交易的不确定性、治理成本和双方的权力安排等对企业与农户间契约选择起决定性作用.由此获得的启示是,应建立契约的保障机制来降低交易中的不确定性,并通过建立长期的信誉与合作,使农户和企业保持利益上的协调一致.     

Incomplete Enforcement of Pollution Regulation: Bargaining Power of Chinese Factories

Only a limited number of papers haveempirically examined the determinants of themonitoring and enforcement activities performedby the environmental regulator. Moreover, mostof these studies have taken place in thecontext of developed countries. In this paper,we empirically examine the determinants of theenforcement of pollution charges in China.More precisely, we seek to identify thecharacteristics which may give firms more orless bargaining power with local environmentalauthorities pertaining to the enforcement(collection) of pollution charges. Firms fromthe private sector appear to have lessbargaining power than state-owned enterprises.Firms facing an adverse financial situationalso appear to have more bargaining power.Finally, we also show that the higher thesocial impact of a firm's emissions (asmeasured by the presence of complaints), thesmaller the bargaining power of the firms withlocal environmental authorities.     

Regulatory objectives and enforcement behavior

Economic models of enforcing environmental law have incorporated varying assumptions about regulatory objectives. This paper examines the consequences of different attitudes toward the benefits and costs of pollution control on the part of regulators who have limited powers and resources. We find that greater weight given to compliance costs relative to the social damages of the polluting activity will bring outcomes closer to the optimum when the regulator is strong, but may move outcome further from the social optimum when regulatory powers are weak. When negotiated noncompliance is an option, greater consideration of compliance costs will tend to produce better results.     

An Integrated Strategy to Reduce Monitoring and Enforcement Costs

A policy of effective environmental protection, inthe present political atmosphere, will requirelow-cost monitoring and enforcement (M&E) strategiesthat do not rely on draconian penalties. Infinite oreven very high penalties for environmental violationsare socially and politically unacceptable.Environmental violations are often classed as civiloffenses, and the occurrence of a violation may bethought insufficient to establish intent. If penaltiesare upper-bounded and each firm is inspected randomly,compliance cannot be maintained with arbitrarily smallinspection probabilities and, hence, small agencycosts. In this paper we examine possibilities forreducing agency M&E costs, including the requirementfor self-reports of effluents and the adjustment ofthe inspection probability to reflect a firm'scompliance or reporting reputation.     

Border Enforcement and Selection of Mexican Immigrants in the United States

Abstract

Since 1986, the United States has made considerable efforts to curb undocumented immigration across the US–Mexico border, resulting in an increase in migration costs for undocumented immigrants from Mexico and placing a particularly heavy burden on undocumented immigrant women. Using data from the 1990, 2000 Decennial Census and the 2006–8 American Community Survey, this study finds three effects of rising migration costs for immigrants from Mexico: (1) A decrease in the relative flow of older and highly educated undocumented immigrant women relative to men; (2) An increase in the skill composition of immigrant women relative to men; and (3) An increase, due to stronger positive selection, in the average earnings of those groups most affected by increased migration costs, particularly women. This research has important implications in light of the barriers and increasing dangers that women across the globe may face when migrating.     

The Oil Spill Process: The Effect of Coast Guard Monitoring on Oil Spills

In this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of Coast Guard enforcement efforts in reducing oil spills. We consider how vessel owners behavior changes with increases in the probability of being monitored. We also study the effectiveness of the performance standards adopted by the Coast Guard in 1984. We conclude that: (i) Coast Guard enforcement effort works to decrease both the frequency of oil spills and the spill size, even though in this latter case the effect is smaller; (ii) the expected fine has no effect on either the frequency or size of oil spills; (iii) few spills from non-monitored transfers are detected; and (iv) the implementation of the new performance standards increases the effectiveness of the Coast Guard monitoring efforts.     

Regulatory Compliance with Costly and Uncertain Litigation

Harrington (1988) and more recent papers by Heyes and Rickman (1999), Livernois and McKenna (1999), and Heyes (1996) have attempted to explain how a relatively large fraction of firms are thought to be in compliance with environmental regulations despite the fact that expected penalties for these violations are deemed rather low. This paper offers an alternative explanation for the interesting paradox by incorporating costly and uncertain litigation.     

中国流域环境管理体制研究

水是人类生存之本,也是保障社会可持续发展的基础性资源。但是由于我国目前的流域管理体制存在各方面的不足,从而导致流域环境恶化、水资源短缺等危及社会发展的重大问题。因此,建立一套科学合理的流域综合管理体制是保护流域环境质量的关键所在。文章通过对比我国与发达国家在流域管理体制方面存在的差距,从机构设置、执法、监督等方面分析了我国流域管理体制存在的问题,并结合对黄河、长江流域管理典型案例的剖析,提出了改善流域管理体制的政策建议。     

Compulsory Schooling Laws and the Cure for Child Labour

This paper provides an explanation for the existence of child labour which relies on the imperfect enforcement of compulsory schooling laws. In the presence of complementarities in the production of human capital that justify legislative intervention, mandatory measures ensure that coordination failures are solved so that all parents send their children to school and the socially optimal equilibrium is reached. However, if enforcement of legislation is too low, multiple equilibria emerge. In this case, compulsory schooling laws may have adverse welfare effects on all households.     

试论培训工作的素质教育

培训工作的素质教育十分重要,作为培训工作的教师首先要提高素质,这样在施教的过程中,才能提高短期培训学员的素质。通过在培训工作中注重学员的素质教育来达到培训的目的。     

Environmental Enforcement with Endogenous Ambient Monitoring

We consider an inspection game between n polluting firms and an environmental enforcement agency. If the cost of monitoring ambient pollution is low enough, the optimal inspection policy consists in imposing the maximal possible fine, and mixing between observing ambient pollution and not conducting any inspection at all. However, with stringent upper limits on the fine, the agency mixes between observing ambient pollution and inspecting all firms. The observation of ambient pollution is always followed by sequentially rational firm inspections. Comparisons with Franckx (2002a, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 43, 71–92, 2002b, Topics in Economic Analysis Policy 2(1), Article 1) show that commitment power has a very strong impact on the value of prior information.