International R&D Rivalry with Spillovers and Policy Cooperation in R&D Subsidies and Taxes

Abstract

We have investigated non-cooperative and jointly optimal R&D policies in the framework of Spencer & Brander (1983) in the presence of R&D spillovers. When R&D activities are strategic substitutes and the R&D game exhibits a positive externality, the result of Spencer & Brander (1983) reverses: the non-cooperative policy is a tax while the jointly optimal policy is a subsidy. Moreover, when R&D activities are strategic complements, the usual result of the prisoners' dilemma in the strategic subsidy game does not hold, implying that a welfare intervention is preferable over laissez-faire. When spillovers are sufficiently large, the joint welfare increases with subsidies being higher than those under non-cooperation.     

Trade-related R&D Spillovers in Vietnamese Manufacturing

ABSTRACT

This study aims to examine how Vietnamese manufacturing could benefit from R&D investment locally and from OECD countries through trade during a period marked with major trade liberalisations. Using the industry-level data during 2000–2009, it finds that the foreign R&D has accounted for the most part of the R&D spillovers in the sector, with a larger proportion earning from the other foreign industries’ R&D. The domestic industries’ own R&D has improved the sector’s total factor productivity, but in a relatively smaller magnitude compared to the foreign sources. In examining the localised effects of R&D spillovers in Vietnamese manufacturing, the results reiterate the important roles of trade-embedded foreign R&D spillovers from Japan, the US, South Korea, and Germany in the sector’s total factor productivity growth. These findings altogether give support to foreign technology diffusion as a major conduit for growth prospects in Vietnamese manufactures.     

R&D Spillovers and Growth: Specialization Matters

We explore the relationship between openness and growth by taking a closer look at trade‐related knowledge spillovers at the industry level. First, we estimate the relation between sectoral R&D expenditures, trade‐related spillovers, and growth. Next, we incorporate these R&D linkages in a computable general‐equilibrium model for the world economy. We simulate trade liberalization in the model with R&D spillovers and compare the effects on GDP in different regions with a non‐R&D‐based model simulation. We find that the GDP effects of trade liberalization are magnified considerably by R&D spillovers for some regions—notably Japan and Southeast Asia. In other regions, such as China, the additional GDP effects are modest. These findings can be traced back to changing specialization and import patterns.     

R&D Spillovers and Location Choice under Cournot Rivalry

A model of location choice by Cournot oligopolists is presented, under the assumption that R&D spillovers depend on the distance between firms. It is shown that a variety of patterns emerge. Agglomeration is optimal under certain assumptions. Geographical dispersion in a two-dimensional plane is another possible outcome.     

Competition and Persistence of R&D

This paper investigates the R&D persistence of R&D active firms in different markets with different intensities of competition, based on firm-level panel data for the period 1996–2008. In a dynamic setting of the empirical model, it turns out that persistence is strongly related to market competition (measured by the number of principal competitors). Persistence of R&D expenditures is more likely to be observed in markets with few principal competitors (between six and 10) and is very unlikely to be observed in polypolistic market types (more than 50 competitors).     

Subsidizing Technological Innovations in the Presence of R&D Spillovers

Abstract. We analyze a situation where a principal wants to induce two firms to produce an output, for example electricity from renewable energy sources. Firms can undertake non-contractible investments to reduce production cost of the output. Part of these investments spills over and also reduces production cost of the other firm. Comparing a general price subsidy and an innovation tournament, we find that the principal's expected cost of implementing a given expected output is always higher under the tournament, even though this scheme may lead to more innovation.     

Intersectoral and International R&D Knowledge Spillovers and Total Factor Productivity

Disaggregate panel data estimates are presented of equations that relate a set of OECD countries' sectoral total factor productivity to domestic and to foreign R&D capital. The estimates indicate that there are both important international and national R&D knowledge spillovers and that these spillovers are intersectoral and intrasectoral in nature. They show that the influence of domestic R&D is stronger in the large economies and that this is caused by more important domestic intersectoral R&D spillovers. There is also evidence of a greater influence of domestic and of foreign R&D in research intensive industries and of an interaction between the domestic economy scale and the research intensity effects.     

Cooperative R&D and Strategic Trade Policy with Bertrand Competition

This paper uses a strategic trade policy model to analyze the welfare effects from allowing cooperation in R&D when firms compete in a price‐setting game in the product market. A policy game between two governments is analyzed, where each government chooses a particular cooperative R&D policy in order to maximize national welfare. At the Nash equilibrium to this game only one government allows cooperation in R&D. This equilibrium is both individually and jointly optimal. International cooperation in R&D is superior to no cooperation in R&D but is inferior to the Nash equilibrium of the government policy game.     

Competition Between Exclusive Religions: The Counter‐Reformation As Entry Deterrence

This article sets forth a theory of competition between exclusive religions as an entry deterrence game, in which the incumbent may find it profitable not to accommodate but to deter the competitor's entry by precommitting to sufficient capacity expansion in the event of entry. If entry costs are high enough, deterrence is optimal and the incumbent remains a monopolist, although the entry threat distorts its effort upward. The model is then applied to the Catholic Church's reaction to the Protestant Reformation. It is argued that the model provides a better fit to the historical data of the Counter‐Reformation than the price‐cutting model proposed by economists Ekelund, Hébert and Tollison ( 2004 , 2006 ).     

Multinational Production, Absorptive Capacity, and Endogenous R&D Spillovers

Do R&D spillovers have an impact on whether firms choose to go multinational or not? We present a three‐stage Cournot duopoly model, which identifies under what conditions firms choose to service a foreign market through exports or localized production. The establishment of a foreign subsidiary improves the ability to learn from foreign R&D since spillovers are strongly moderated by geographical distance. We explicitly model the concept of absorptive capacity, where gains from spillovers are determined by own R&D investments. With exogenous R&D investments, the absorptive capacity effect contributes to increase the gains from going multinational when the firm is R&D‐intensive. However, if R&D investments are endogenous, only medium‐sized absorptive capacity effects will result in firms going multinational. Furthermore, higher spillover rates do not necessarily drive down R&D and profits for the multinational firm. This stands in contrast to models that ignore absorptive capacity effects.     

Spillover, Competition and Better R&D Organization

This paper examines several types of R&D organization, including one noncooperative (independent R&D) form and three cooperative ones (R&D coordination, an R&D consortium and a research joint venture (RJV)). We consider the sharing of both research inputs and outputs in an R&D consortium and an RJV. We show that the superiority of a form of R&D organization cannot be determined uniquely, but should be judged by four parameters. In addition, it is shown that there exist possible mixes of these parameters in which an R&D consortium is superior to either R&D coordination or an RJV in terms of technological improvement and social welfare.
JEL Classification Numbers: L13, L41.     

R&D Returns,Spillovers and Firm Incentives: Evidence from China

Using a new data set of 12,000 firms in China, this paper estimates the returns to R&D investment and its spillover effects, and investigates how the returns to R&D depend on firm incentives. For the firms in the sample, the results show that on average firm output increases around 0.4 yuan for each additional 1 yuan spent on R&D in the previous year, and there is high R&D return regardless of whether the endogeneity of R&D intensity is dealt with or not. Interestingly, the marginal return to R&D is significantly higher in firms whose CEOs were not appointed by the government, and lower when CEO pay is directly related to annual performance. The return to R&D is higher in relatively poor regions and for firms with worse access to finance. There are also non-trivial R&D spillover effects.     

Spillovers,product innovation and R&D cooperation: a theoretical model

ABSTRACT

We analyze the impact of post-innovation knowledge spillovers on firms’ decisions to invest and cooperate in R&D, forming a research joint venture (RJV). We study the case of two potential investors involved in a non-tournament stochastic competition for developing a new but imitable product. We propose a theoretical model where cooperation may emerge as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a three-stage game. In the first stage, firms decide whether to cooperate; in the second, they decide whether to invest; and in the third, they compete. We show that firms cooperate in R&D when the spillovers are high enough and the fixed costs associated with R&D activities are low enough; however, our analysis suggests that forming an RJV may not always be socially optimal, and subsidizing R&D cooperation may not be efficient. We propose an optimal scheme of subsidies, which should be designed according to the intensity of the spillovers, the level of the R&D costs, and the probability of innovation success. Finally, we show that in the case of mergers the private incentive to invest is maximized, and firms may not need public subsidies to cooperate. When subsidies are costly, not hindering mergers may be the second-best solution.     

Vertical R&D Spillovers,Cooperation, Market Structure,and Innovation

This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied: no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three "competitive externalities" (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors decreases R&D when horizontal spillovers are low; the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when vertical spillovers are sufficiently high, and/or when horizontal cooperation is combined with vertical cooperation.     

R&D, Imperfect Competition and Growth with Human Capital Accumulation

This paper studies the long‐run consequences of imperfect competition on growth and the sectoral distribution of skills within an R&D‐based growth model with human capital accumulation. We find that steady‐state growth is driven only by incentives to accumulate skills. In the model imperfect competition has a positive growth effect, while influencing the allocation of human capital to the different economic activities employing this factor input. Contrary to general wisdom, the share of resources invested in R&D turns out not to be monotonically increasing in the product market power and its correlation with the equilibrium output growth rate is not unambiguous.     

R&D, Human Capital and International Technology Spillovers: A Cross-country Analysis

This paper is based on recent developments in the theory of innovation-driven growth that emphasize both the importance of R&D efforts — domestic as well as foreign — for explaining national productivity, and the complementarity between R&D and human capital investments. Estimates of specifications, in growth terms and in level terms, on a cross-section of OECD countries from the early 1960s to the early 1990s lend strong support to this thesis. The data show a significant influence of both domestic and foreign R&D. Moreover, there is clearly a net positive impact of human capital. The level and growth rate of human capital are shown to affect productivity growth and there is evidence of interaction with the catch-up process.
JEL classification: O 33; O 47     

Import Quotas and Entry Deterrence

Using a simple version of the Milgrom and Roberts entry deterrence model, it is shown that adjusting a quota so that a greater volume of imports is allowed, can facilitate entry into the domestic industry. That is, the easing of a quota, can cause the domestic incumbent to shift from deterring entry to accommodating entry.     

Strategic Delay in a Real Options Model of R&D Competition

This paper considers irreversible investment in competing research projects with uncertain returns under a winner-takes-all patent system. Uncertainty takes two distinct forms: the technological success of the project is probabilistic, while the economic value of the patent to be won evolves stochastically over time. According to the theory of real options uncertainty generates an option value of delay, but with two competing firms the fear of preemption would appear to undermine this approach. In non-cooperative equilibrium two patterns of investment emerge depending on parameter values. In a pre-emptive leader–follower equilibrium firms invest sequentially and option values are reduced by competition. A symmetric outcome may also occur, however, in which investment is more delayed than the single-firm counterpart. Comparing this with the optimal cooperative investment pattern, investment is found to be more delayed when firms act non-cooperatively as each holds back from investing in the fear of starting a patent race. Implications of the analysis for empirical and policy issues in R&D are considered.