An ‘art’, not a ‘science’? Central bank management in Portugal under the gold standard, 1863–871

As long as Portugal was on the gold standard, the Bank of Portugal sought to help stabilize the currency at the exchange rate to which the country was committed. Because it was subject to political and other non-economic constraints, the bank carried out discount rate interventions sparingly, although in accordance with what could be termed the contemporary ‘science’ of central banking. Consequently, it had to intervene frequently in the currency markets, usually in covert fashion, in order to conciliate the needs of convertibility with this less than orthodox stance towards the gold standard. This article also shows how the bank was able to keep on repeatedly infringing the ‘rules of the game’ with success for almost 30 years, and raises the question of the sustainability of such a state of affairs.     

Flight‐to‐safety and the credit crunch: a new history of the banking crises in France during the Great Depression†

Despite France's importance in the interwar world economy, the scale of the French banking crises of 1930–1 and their consequences have never been fully assessed quantitatively. The lack of banking regulation severely limited the availability of balance sheet data. Using a new dataset of individual balance sheets from more than 300 banks, this article shows that the crises were much more severe than previously thought, although they did not affect the main commercial banks. By reconstructing financial flows, this study shows that the fall in bank credit was mostly driven by a flight‐to‐safety by deposits, from banks to savings institutions and the central bank. The decrease in bank deposits due to bank runs was offset by an increase in deposits with savings institutions, with the central bank, and in cash hoarding, whereas the decrease in bank credit was not offset by an increase in loans from non‐bank financial institutions. In line with the gold standard mentality, cash deposited with savings institutions and the central bank was used to decrease marketable public debt and increase gold reserves, rather than pursuing countercyclical policies. Despite massive capital inflows and rising aggregate money supply, France suffered from a severe, persistent credit crunch.     

Central bank cooperation under the interwar gold standard

The limits of cooperation and the failures of leadership are recurrent themes in historical accounts which seek to explain the instability of the interwar gold standard. Yet these themes are wholly incompatible with received models of the gold standard. In an attempt at reconciliation, this paper has presented a simple model of central bank interaction under the interwar gold standard, and used it to interpret Anglo-French financial relations following Britain's return to gold. The model is inspired by Keynes' and Norman's comment that the interwar system can be understood as a competitive struggle for gold. It shows that if two central banks play a noncooperative game in which they both seek to augment their gold reserves, they will tend to raise their discount rates above the level consistent with price stability, depressing incomes at home and abroad. While central bank policy was but one factor at work in the world economy in the 1920s, the model is suggestive when applied to a period marked by historically high discount rates, conflicts over the distribution of gold, and steady deflation culminating in a Great Depression.     

Central banks and gold puzzles

We study the curious patterns of gold holding and trading by central banks during 1979–2010. With the exception of several discrete step adjustments, central banks keep maintaining passive stocks of gold, independently of the patterns of the real price of gold. We also observe the synchronization of gold sales by central banks, as most reduced their positions in tandem, and their tendency to report international reserves valuation excluding gold positions. Our analysis suggests that the intensity of holding gold is correlated with ‘global power’ – by the history of being a past empire, or by the sheer size of a country, especially by countries that are or were the suppliers of key currencies. These results are consistent with the view that central bank’s gold position signals economic might, and that gold retains the stature of a ‘safe haven’ asset at times of global turbulence. The under-reporting of gold positions in the international reserve/GDP statistics is consistent with loss aversion, wishing to maintain a sizeable gold position, while minimizing the criticism that may occur at a time when the price of gold declines.     

Gold-Point Arbitrage and Uncovered Interest Arbitrage under the 1925-1931 Dollar-Sterling Gold Standard

Efficient gold-point arbitrage confines the exchange rate to the gold-point spread, but efficient uncovered interest arbitrage stabilizes the exchange rate even more, locating it within a narrower "speculation band." Under the 1925-1931 dollar-sterling gold standard, gold-point arbitrage was uniformly efficient, but uncovered interest arbitrage exhibited periodic episodes of apparent inefficiency, susceptible to various explanations. Gold-point arbitrage and uncovered interest arbitrage reinforce each other′s efficiency, thereby enhancing exchange-rate stability. In fact, the dollar-sterling exchange rate during the interwar gold standard was considerably more stable than that in the classical period.     

The European Periphery in the Era of the Gold Standard: The Case of the Spanish Peseta and the Pound Sterling from 1883 to 1931

This paper analyses the relationship between the Spanish peseta, the currency of a peripheral country, and the pound sterling, the central currency of the gold standard. From 1883, when Spain suspended metallic convertibility, until 1931, when Great Britain definitively abandoned gold, the peseta was a fiat currency with a flexible exchange rate regime. Our results confirm, first, long-run PPP hypothesis compliance for the peseta/pound sterling rate during the period. Secondly, we illustrate how the inclusion of peripheral variables (erratic trade and financial risk), significantly improves the short-run adjustment to the PPP hypothesis. It appears that the floating regime thus helped Spain to smooth out the required external adjustment process resulting from balance of payments shocks.     

The Louvre Accord and central bank intervention: was there a target zone?

This paper presents an empirical analysis of central bank intervention during the 10-month period following the Louvre Accord. We first examine whether the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve adopted a target zone in order to stabilize the yen–dollar exchange rate, by using daily foreign exchange intervention data. We then estimate the expected future exchange rate and the expected rate of devaluation in order to verify if there was a credible target zone. On the basis of these two tests, we conclude that the central banks did adopt a target zone during the period following the Louvre Accord, but that the target zone for the yen–dollar exchange rate was not credible.     

Central bank losses: causes and consequences

This paper seeks to understand the causes and consequences of central banks' losses. Ignorance of this vital issue over a sustained period has led to negative impacts on economies and on central banking and monetary policy effectiveness. Data from developing countries and economies in transition show that central bank losses have reached significant magnitudes. Engaging in quasi‐fiscal activities is responsible for most such losses because it increases central banks' expenditures. The main features of these fiscal activities are their large size and riskiness, and they are difficult to control. Central bank revenues can also be negatively affected because of declines in inflation rates and in the demand for money.     

Comparison of Bank Profitability in China and the USA

This paper examines and compares the profitability of banks in the USA and China. The USA has the largest market‐based banking system and the financial system of China is still bank‐based. Our analysis indicates that in terms of profitability, banks in China outperformed those in the USA during our study period (2008–2014). Real estate loans had an adverse effect on US bank profitability during the financial crisis and no effect after the crisis but consistently improved the profitability of Chinese banks. Interest margins have no effect on US bank profitability but a consistently positive effect on Chinese banks, confirming that China is a traditional bank‐based economy. Interbank loans have a positive and significant effect on Chinese bank profitability, while interbank domestic loans have a negative effect on US bank profitability. Finally, size had a positive effect on US banks after the financial crisis period, confirming the scale economies of large US banks, but a negative effect on Chinese banks, indicating diseconomies of scale.     

On the conduct of monetary policy in Vietnam

Vietnam has the highest inflation rate in Southeast Asia (over 20 per cent year‐on‐year in 2011). This paper examines the extent to which inflation in Vietnam is due to its conduct of monetary policy. It is argued that, had the central bank implemented policy on a more timely basis, inflation would not have been as high as it was, but the more fundamental problem is that the central bank does not have the tools it needs to conduct monetary policy effectively. Monetary policy is further complicated by Vietnam's exchange rate policy. By choosing to peg the currency and maintain fairly free capital mobility, the country has all but given up the ability to pursue an independent monetary policy. As a consequence, the central bank is forced to attempt to sterilise its foreign exchange interventions, which it is ill‐equipped to do. The paper argues that financial sector liberalisation is needed not only to promote growth but also to maintain macroeconomic stability.     

Exchange Rate Regimes and Reserve Policy: The Italian Lira, 1883–1911

The three exchange rate regimes adopted by Italy from 1883 up to the eve of World War I — the gold standard (1883–1893), floating rates (1894–1902), and “gold shadowing” (1903–1911)—produced a puzzling result: formal adherence to the gold standard ended in failure while shadowing the gold standard proved very successful. This paper discusses the main policies underlying Italy’s performance particularly focusing on the strategy of reserve accumulation. It presents a cointegration analysis identifying a distinct co-movement between exchange rate, reserves, and banknotes that holds over the three sub-periods of the sample. Given this long-run relationship, the different performance in each regime is explained by the diversity of policy measures, reflected in the different variables adjusting the system in the various regimes. Italy’s variegated experience during the gold standard provides a valuable lesson about current developments in the international scenario, showing the central role of fundamentals and consistent policies.     

J. Soedradjad Djiwandono,Bank Indonesia and the crisis

Soedradjad Djiwandono, Governor of Bank Indonesia during the critical early months of the Asian crisis, had already written extensively on the period (including in this journal), but this book brings a more comprehensive version of his story to a wider audience. His focus is on central bank issues—the exchange rate, interest rates, capital flows and the insolvency of the banking system—but as these are the defining issues of the crisis, the book provides a rare and valuable contribution to the still-incomplete history of this painful period. This review puts his account in context and offers some commentary on the issues.     

Bagehot for beginners: the making of lender‐of‐last‐resort operations in the mid‐nineteenth century1

In this article we develop new tools to survey the development of lending‐of‐last‐resort operations in the mid‐nineteenth century. One finding is that free lending and extensive liquidity support against good collateral developed gradually after 1847, and was already a fact of life before Bagehot published Lombard Street. Another is that the extension of the Bank of England's lender‐of‐last‐resort function went along with a reduction of its exposure to default risks, in contrast with accounts that have associated lending of last resort with moral hazard. Finally, we provide a new interpretation of the ‘high rates’ advocated by Bagehot. We suggest they were meant to prevent banks from free‐riding on the safety offered by the central bank, and were aimed at forcing them to keep lending during crises so as to maintain a critical degree of liquidity in the money market.     

The Signalling Channel of Central Bank Interventions: Modelling the Yen/US Dollar Exchange Rate

This paper presents a theoretical framework analysing the signalling channel of exchange rate interventions as an informational trigger. We develop an implicit target zone framework with learning in order to model the signalling channel. The theoretical premise of the model is that interventions convey signals that communicate information about the exchange rate objectives of the central bank. The model is used to analyse the impact of Japanese FX interventions during the period 1999–2011 on the yen/US dollar dynamics.     

The evolution of Hayek's thought on gold and monetary standards

Early in his career, Hayek viewed attempts to stabilize exchange rates by facilitating cooperation between central banks, with respect to their demand for gold, to be at odds with the fundamental mechanisms of the gold standard. He opposed proposals by Irving Fisher, Gustav Cassel, and Ralph Hawtrey that promoted stabilization of demand for gold and price levels as a next best option. Hayek viewed the nations that refused to devalue their currency after monetary expansion during wartime as complicit in degrading the international gold standard. In 1935 Hayek's emphasis began to change, his position sounding much like the arguments of Cassel and Hawtrey. Though he eventually gave up hope that the international gold standard would be reestablished, his later work on money provides theoretical underpinnings for systems that would promote the same sort of stability and predictability that the classical gold standard had provided.     

International shocks and the balance sheet of the Bank of France under the classical gold standard

Under the classical gold standard (1880–1914), the Bank of France maintained a stable discount rate while the Bank of England changed its rate very frequently. Why did the policies of these central banks, the two pillars of the gold standard, differ so much? How did the Bank of France manage to keep a stable rate despite international constraints? This paper tackles these questions and shows that the domestic asset portfolio of the Bank of France played a crucial role in smoothing international shocks and in maintaining the stability of the discount rate. As a result, the French discount rate was only changed in exceptional circumstances, for which a change in the English rate was not a sufficient condition.     

Central Bank Independence,Speed of Disinflation and the Sacrifice Ratio

Using a theoretical model in which the degree of central bank independence affects the degree of inflation persistence and therefore the speed of disinflation, this paper suggests that sacrifice ratios are lower when central bank independence is higher. Empirical tests, using estimates of sacrifice ratios based on disinflation episodes for 18 OECD countries during the 1960–90 period, show that this result also holds empirically. This finding seems to be consistent with the credibility hypothesis by pointing out that an independent central bank may produce a credibility bonus.     

Contribution of interest rate control to China’s economic development

China’s economy has grown at an unprecedented pace since 1978, which has resulted in a sustained improvement in the average living standard in China. A theoretical model is developed in the present study to analyze the role of interest rate control in China’s economic growth, where investment is primarily determined by interest rates available to firms and entrepreneurs. When the central bank regulates the interest rates and makes them below the equilibrium rate, high-level investment activities boost economic growth and introduce new technologies into the economy, which in turn promotes growth in labour productivity. As the current marginal product of capital is much higher than the interest rate, the output growth is much faster than consumption growth and exports become an important part of the economy. To maintain competitiveness of exports over a longer period, it is necessary to keep exchange rates low, which results in large foreign exchange reserves. When the export sector is losing its competitiveness edge due to increased labour costs and exports cannot digest the difference between output growth and consumption plus investment growth, interest rate control may lose its positive impact on economic growth.     

升值背景下人民币汇率、FDI与经济增长动态时变效应研究

本文运用Pesaran边限协整检验方法系统地研究了升值背景下人民币汇率、FDI与经济增长之间的动态时变效应。研究发现,人民币汇率、FDI与经济增长在样本期内存在显著的长期均衡关系,人民币升值和经济增长均对FDI的流入具有明显的促进作用。而经济增长与FDI的流入对人民币汇率的反馈机制并不存在,FDI流入对于经济增长的促进作用也不明显,表现出强烈的以"投机套利"为主要目的的"本土特征"模式。且同期的向量误差修正分析同样表明,人民币汇率和经济增长能够有效促进FDI流入,而经济增长和FDI流入对于人民币汇率变动的反馈机制依然不存在。这意味着政府当局在保持经济适度规模增长的同时,尤其需要保持审慎的态度制定适当的政策保持汇率稳定,以避免人民币升值过快而导致外资迅速流入进行投机套利活动。     

后危机时期泰国的汇率安排及其改革模式

泰国是一个小型开放经济体,货币当局拥有较少的国际储备,在"不可能三角"中优先考虑了资本自由流动与货币政策独立性目标,泰国后危机时期实行了较具弹性的管理浮动汇率制。泰铢汇率的持续升值削弱了出口产品的国际竞争力,资本管制的非对称性增加了金融市场的不确定性,凸现出管理浮动汇率制的局限性。泰国未来的汇率制度改革,可以采取建立保持泰铢动态稳定的汇率安排和重视区域货币合作、汇率政策协调的两种模式。