The Demise of the Mutual Organizational Form: An Investigation of the Life Insurance Industry

We investigate the role of organizational structure in financial services markets by examining the U.S. life insurance industry. Traditionally, stock and mutual life insurers were equally represented, but now the industry is mainly composed of stock firms. We find operational efficiency, access to capital, and tax savings are important determinants for this shift. The incentive to demutualize differs by the type of conversion: full demutualization is chosen for efficiency and access to capital reasons and partial conversion, using a mutual holding company, is chosen for tax savings. Firm operational efficiency improves after conversion. We also find the efficiency of the stock organizational form dominates that of the mutual structure during our sample period, 1995 to 2004.     

Assessing Systemic Risk Exposure from Banks and GSEs Under Alternative Approaches to Capital Regulation

A key function of capital regulation is to mitigate the potential for systemic financial risk by maintaining public confidence in the ability of regulated market participants to honor their financial obligations in times of market stress. While it is well known that the portfolios of banks and non-banks, especially those intermediaries specializing in mortgage securitization or in specialized mortgage lending, differ in important respects, debate over alternative capital regulations has yet to recognize the implications of these differences, despite the increasing importance of non-bank intermediaries in risk-sharing markets. This paper uses a simple two-date discrete state space exchange economy with opportunities for moral hazard on the part of financial intermediaries to investigate the design of capital regulations to control systemic risk. Holding constant asset risks, we show that intermediaries that issue contingent liabilities may exhibit low or no risk of insolvency while holding significantly less capital than deposit-taking institutions because banks primarily issue claims that promise fixed payments in all states of nature. We also show that, rather than raising capital requirements, the control of systemic risk may involve lowering capital requirements and extending guarantees to liability-holders, without a necessary increase in expected subsidy payments, if such requirements account for shareholder incentives. Specifically, we analyze an example of regulatory policy in which lower capital requirements and an ex post penalty schedule reduce systemic risk by increasing the volume of tradable securities exchanged and by offering a credible mechanism by which intermediaries can signal the true riskiness of their portfolios to liability-holders.     

Uncertainty and the neutrality of government financing policy

Some ideas from the theory of finance are applied to consider whether debt-financed tax cuts affect desired consumption. It is shown that government financing policy is a matter of indifference to infinitely-lived households, if a perfect substitute for public debt exists. The analysis allows for uncertainty about future taxes, and for missing markets in some kinds of assets. Income redistribution risk, and the public insurance aspects of an income tax scheme, qualify this neutrality result, but in general the net effect is ambiguous. The real resource costs of financial transacting, as well as government superiority in the intermediation process, may be one rationale for activist debt-management policy. A better understanding of functioning capital markets is essential to evaluate these arguments.     

Capital incentives and adequacy for securitizations

This paper analyzes the capital incentives and adequacy of financial institutions for asset portfolio securitizations. The empirical analysis is based on US securitization rating and impairment data. The paper finds that regulatory capital rules for securitizations may be insufficient to cover implied losses during economic downturns such as the Global Financial Crisis. In addition, the rating process of securitizations provides capital arbitrage incentives for financial institutions and may further reduce regulatory capital requirements. These policy-relevant findings assume that the ratings assigned by rating agencies are correct and can be used to build a test for the ability of Basel capital regulations to cover downturn losses.     

The Role of Gatekeepers in Capital Markets

Gatekeepers in financial markets have the power to provide the institutional stability, fortitude, and direction necessary for the development and the smooth functioning of capital markets. At the same time, they are often motivated by their own private incentives. This along with the tradeoffs they face, and the at‐times unintended consequences of the regulations they propose and enforce, can undermine their effectiveness. A thorough understanding of gatekeepers and their roles can thus illuminate academics, the financial community, and regulators on how such gatekeepers can be the most effective and generate the greatest benefits for capital markets. Since gatekeeping roles and the literature they have inspired encompass a wide array of institutions and agencies, our overview concentrates on those that the conference papers appearing in this volume focus on. We conclude that collectively, the papers contribute to significant progress, and point out some crucial areas that call for further investigation and offer opportunities for future research.     

An analysis of earnings management by European private firms

This paper addresses the questions of whether private firms in eight European countries engage in earnings management, and if so, whether tax incentives affect such practices. To measure earnings management, we analyze the earnings distributions of private firms and compare these distributions with those of public firms in the same countries. The empirical evidence suggests that in absence of capital market pressures, firms still have incentives to manage earnings, as we find that private firms avoid reporting small losses. We further find that private firms in some countries where tax regulation strongly influences financial accounting do not avoid reporting small losses. We attribute this finding to tax incentives reducing firms’ benefits of (upward) earnings management. Finally, our results suggest that some types of earnings management are due to capital market pressures and are specific to public firms since we do not find evidence that private firms avoid earnings decreases.     

Government policy and ownership of equity securities

Since World War II, direct stock ownership by households across the globe has largely been replaced by indirect stock ownership by financial institutions. We argue that tax and retirement policies are among the factors behind these changes. We develop empirical measures of two tax incentives of holding stocks inside tax-deferred plans, tax-free investment income and the smoothing benefit. Using long time-series from eight countries, we show that the fraction of household ownership decreases with these measures of the tax benefits. This finding contributes to policy debates on effective taxation and to financial economics research on the long-term effects of taxation on corporate finance and asset prices.     

R&D tax incentives: a reappraisal

This paper examines R&D tax incentives in oligopolistic markets. We characterize the conditions under which tax incentives reach the socially desirable level of firm-financed R&D spending. The outcome of the market depends not only on the level of technological spillover in the industry but also on the degree of strategic interaction between the firms. One major result emerges from the model: The socially desirable level of R&D investment is not necessarily reached by subsidizing R&D. When the technological spillover is sufficiently low, the government might want to tax R&D investments, and this result does not necessarily arise because firms are overinvesting in R&D. There are also cases in which an R&D tax is desirable even though firms are underinvesting in R&D compared with the first-best optimum. In practice, this theoretical finding calls for a lower sales tax combined with an R&D subsidy in oligopolistic industries with high technological spillovers, and a lower sales tax combined with an R&D tax in oligopolistic industries with low technological spillovers.     

私人信息、公开信息与中国的金融市场参与

金融市场的发展能够为长期的经济增长提供动力,家庭对金融市场的有限参与是制约金融发展的重要因素之一。2015年中国绝大多数家庭未能参与金融市场。本文采用倾向得分匹配方法考察了私人信息和公开信息对家庭金融市场参与的影响以及两者的影响差异。基于2015年CGSS数据集的分析结果显示,家庭拥有金融市场私人信息或者能够充分获取公开信息都会显著提升其参与金融市场的概率。家庭获取公开信息的渠道越广泛,经由各种渠道获取的公开信息越多,参与金融市场的概率就越高。总体而言,充分获取公开信息比拥有私人信息对家庭金融市场参与的影响更大,这是源于个体对两种信息质量预期的不同。公开信息具有比私人信息更广泛的信息来源和更强的可验证性,这提升了家庭对公开信息质量的预期,为其提供了参与金融市场的更大激励。对中国而言,改善政策制定和执行的效率以及政策承诺的可信性有助于提升家庭对公开信息质量的预期,从而鼓励家庭参与金融市场。     

The multinational bank: A financial MNC?

The theory of non-financial multinational corporations is applied to the multinational commercial bank. The incentives toward multinationality that characterize the expansion of non-financial firms have their counterparts in multinational banks. The theory of the MNC provides a useful basis for the development of a theory of the multinational bank when the subsidiary offices operate in foreign financial markets. When banks' foreign subsidiaries operate in supranational markets (such as the Eurocurrency markets), there is little or no equivalence because the multinational banks compete only among themselves: there is no competition with indigenous firms. The supranational markets give rise to a distinct type of subsidiary. These banking offices and the markets in which they operate serve to integrate national capital and money markets with some possible endangerment to the stability of the international financial system.     

Power and ideas: The development of retirement savings taxation in Australasia

New Zealand and Australia have adopted vastly different approaches to retirement savings and its associated taxation. Two fundamental differences exist: New Zealand offers little in the way of tax incentives for retirement savings and there is no compulsion for retirement savings; Australia provides highly concessionary tax incentives and has a mandatory occupational retirement savings scheme. This paper uses a historical institutionalism theoretical framework to investigate the events that led to these diverse approaches in retirement savings taxation between two countries that frequently adopt similar policy ‘solutions’.The research highlights the importance of power and ideas in the policy development process. Power imbalances among institutions and individuals facilitated the pursuit of tax and retirement savings policy arrangements that were aligned with the world view of privileged elites. Ideas justified the policy direction adopted in each country and assisted in legitimising the power granted to actors and institutions that supported the prevailing ideology. The strongest ideas were found in New Zealand, where reform was the most radical.     

Measuring the Effective Tax Burden in the Real World*

This paper argues that forward‐looking indices of the effective tax burden on income from capital – namely, effective marginal and average tax rates – are negatively biased because traditional models overlook dividend constraints associated with financial tax incentives, such as accelerated depreciation. The paper presents measures of the two indices adjusted to remove the bias and compares the new indices with the traditional ones. Numerical simulations carried out to quantify the magnitude of the bias for France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and the UK give evidence of sizeable distortions in the unadjusted indices and, in turn, suggest significant mismeasurement in the current assessment of the effective tax burden.     

Tax treatment of dividends and capital gains and the dividend decision under dual income tax

The paper analyses efficiency aspects of a dual income tax system with a higher tax on capital gains than dividends. It argues that apart from the distortions to investments claimed in earlier literature, the system puts even more emphasis in creating incentives for entrepreneurs to participate in tax planning. The paper suggests that the owner of a closely held company can avoid all personal taxes on entrepreneurial income by two tax-planning strategies. The first is the avoidance of distributions, which would be taxed at the tax rate on labour income. These funds would instead be invested in the financial markets. The second strategy is a distribute and call-back policy, converting retained profits into new equity capital. Interestingly, the outcome is that investment in real capital is not distorted in the long-run equilibrium. Empirical evidence using microdata is also provided.      

Natural Resource Management and Economywide Policies in Costa Rica: A Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Modeling Approach

A computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is used to tracethe effects of government policies on Costa Rican forests inthe presence of incomplete markets. The results indicate thatcorrecting the market failure would, as expected, reduce deforestation.More interestingly, in the presence of the market failure, loweringthe tax on unskilled labor reduces deforestation because peoplegain employment in other parts of the economy. Taxation of otherproduced goods changes the incentives for deforestation. Forexample, a tax on agricultural products elevates the relativeprice of capital and shifts resources away from the capital-intensiveindustrial sector toward the agricultural and forest sectors;as a result, such a tax increases deforestation.     

Human capital and optimal positive taxation of capital income

This paper analyzes optimal linear and non-linear taxes on capital and labor incomes in a life-cycle model of human capital investment, financial savings, and labor supply with heterogenous individuals. A dual income tax with a positive marginal tax rate on not only labor income but also capital income is optimal. The positive tax on capital income serves to alleviate the distortions of the labor tax on human capital accumulation. The optimal marginal tax rate on capital income is lower than that on labor income if savings are elastic compared to investment in human capital, substitution between verifiable and non-verifiable inputs in human capital formation is difficult, and most investments in human capital are verifiable so that education subsidies can directly reduce the tax wedge on learning. Numerical calculations suggest that the optimal marginal tax rate on capital income is substantial.     

The Effect of Tax-Based Savings Incentives on Government Revenue

There is an unresolved debate on the effect of tax-based savings incentives on government revenue. The conventional wisdom on tax-assisted saving plans (TASPs) holds that they reduce public savings, but may raise national savings by stimulating private savings. Feldstein (1995) has challenged the view that TASPs reduce government revenue. According to Feldstein, ‘some of the increase in personal saving raises the corporate capital stock, and the return on this additional capital raises corporate tax payments’. When the additional corporate income tax revenue is taken into account, ‘the revenue loss associated with IRAs [Individual Retirement Accounts] either is much smaller than has generally been estimated or is actually a revenue gain’. This paper extends Feldstein's analysis to incorporate international considerations, differences in tax structures and alternative values for key parameters. We show that the result presented by Feldstein represents a special case that does not lead to broad generalisations. We also show that, under most conditions, the tenets of conventional wisdom that TASPs reduce government revenue are likely to hold, but that the magnitude of the effect may not be large. Finally, we suggest that the focus of research on the savings effects of TASPs is justifiable in a closed economy, where domestic savings affect domestic investment, but is not useful for policy development in small open economies. JEL classification: H2, H3, H6.     

The effect of leverage on the tax-cut versus investment-subsidy argument

Two common methods of attracting corporate investment are investment incentives and tax incentives. It is important to use the two incentives in the correct proportions, otherwise the government will give up too much value in the process of attracting investment. This paper examines the effect of tax cut and investment subsidy on the government's net benefit from a project. Earlier studies concluded that it was optimal to use only investment subsidy and no tax cuts. We show that this is not true when debt financing is possible, and it is generally optimal (from the government's perspective) to use a combination of tax reduction and investment subsidy. The optimal tax rate and optimal investment subsidy are identified and analyzed in the paper. It is shown that using a sub-optimal combination of incentives can result in substantial reduction of benefits for the government.     

A growth oriented dual income tax

This paper proposes a growth oriented dual income tax by combining an allowance for corporate equity with a broadly defined flat tax on personal capital income. Revenue losses are compensated by an increase in the value added tax. The paper demonstrates the neutrality properties of the reform with respect to investment, firm financial decisions and organizational choice. Tax rates are chosen to prevent income shifting from labor to capital income. The reform decisively strengthens investment of domestically owned firms as well as home and foreign based multinationals and boosts savings. Simulations with a calibrated growth model for Switzerland indicate that the reform could add between 4 to 5 percent of GNP in the long-run, depending on the specific scenario. Given the slow nature of capital accumulation, it imposes considerable costs in the short-run. We consider a tax smoothing scenario to offset the intergenerationally redistributive effects. JEL Classification: D58, D92, E62, G32, H25     

Residence-Based Capital Taxation in a Small Open Economy: Why Information is Voluntarily Exchanged and Why it is Not

The issue of capital tax competition is viewed to be unproblematic if residence-based capital-taxation exists. However, the sustainability of residence-based capital taxation depends on the exchange of information about foreign financial investments between tax authorities. This paper analyzes the incentives of tax authorities to voluntarily provide information. We show that voluntary information exchange is an equilibrium in a standard small-country model of tax competition, whereas it may not be an equilibrium when the size of the financial sector has a positive impact on the wage structure of an economy.     

Capital over the Business Cycle: Renting versus Ownership

We find that capital renting makes up one‐fifth of U.S. capital expenditures, and it increases during downturns. Further, we present cross‐country evidence that output losses after financial crises are smaller where renting is more prevalent. To understand these findings, we build a general equilibrium model with borrowing constraints and with the option to rent or buy capital. The countercyclicality of rentals occurs because their supply increases, as renting serves as an additional means of savings when credit markets malfunction. Moreover, demand also shifts toward rentals as they become relatively cheaper. By absorbing excess savings, renting mitigates financial crises.