共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Gautam Bose 《Economic Theory》2003,22(2):457-467
Summary. An explanation is provided for the evolution of segmented marketplaces in a pairwise exchange economy. Large traders operating
in a pairwise exchange market prefer to meet other similar traders, because this enables them to trade their endowments in
a smaller number of encounters. Large and small traders, however, cannot be distinguished a priori, and the existence of the small traders imposes a negative externality on the large traders. We show that, under conditions
which are not very restrictive, establishing a separate market (perhaps with an entry fee) designated for the large traders
induces the two types of traders to segment themselves. However, this segmentation is not necessarily welfare improving.
Received: January 12, 2001; revised version: July 17, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I wish to thank the participants in the Friday Theory Workshop at the University of Sydney, and the participants at
the 17th Australian Theory Workshop at the University of Melbourne for comments and discussion. John Hillas and Stephen King
pointed out an omission in an earlier version, and Catherine de Fontenay and Hodaka Morita made extensive comments on earlier
drafts. This work was initiated while I was a short-term visitor at the University of Southern California. 相似文献
2.
Summary. We study pricing and product diffusion in a dynamic general equilibrium framework with product market frictions. Ongoing
R&D activity leads, with an endogenously determined probability, to continual improvements in product quality. We characterize
the steady-state equilibrium with endogenous product diffusion in which a number of different goods co-exist on the quality
ladder. We show that the severity of the economy's market frictions is a crucial determinant of the pricing structure, the
product diffusion pattern, the level of R&D investment, the rate of endogenous growth, the length of Schumpeterian product
cycles and the possibility of multiple growth paths. Eliminating market frictions leads to a degenerate product ladder of
precisely one step, containing only the most recent product, as in the monopolistic competition literature.
Received: August 16, 1999; revised version: March 6, 2001 相似文献
3.
Jingang Zhao 《Economic Theory》2000,16(1):181-198
Summary. This paper studies the core in an oligopoly market with indivisibility. It provides necessary and sufficient conditions for
core existence in a general m-buyer n-seller market with indivisibility. When costs are dominated by opportunity costs (i.e., a firm's variable costs are sufficiently
small), the core condition can be characterized by the primitive market parameters. In a 3-2 market with opportunity cost,
the core is non-empty if and only if the larger seller's opportunity cost is either sufficiently large or sufficiently small.
Received: June 9, 1999; revised version: October 22, 1999 相似文献
4.
Summary. We offer a new proof of the maximum principle, by using the envelope theorem that is frequently used in the standard microeconomic
theory.
Received: April 11, 2002; revised version: June 26, 2002
Correspondence to: K. Shimomura 相似文献
5.
Gustavo E. Rodriguez 《Economic Theory》2002,19(2):283-309
Summary. This paper studies sequential auctions of licences to participate in a symmetric market game. Assuming that the rate at which
industry profits decrease with repeated entry is not too large, at the unique solution either a single firm preempts entry altogether or entry occurs in every stage, depending on the net benefit of complete preemption to an incumbent. If we relax the assumption, a third outcome can occur: two firms may coordinate their choices to avoid further entry. The
analysis employs a new refinement of Nash equilibrium, the concept of recursively undominated equilibrium.
Received: February 25, 2000; revised version: September 12, 2000 相似文献
6.
A note on decomposing the Malmquist productivity index by means of subvector homotheticity 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Rolf Färe Finn R. Førsund Shawna Grosskopf Kathy Hayes Almas Heshmati 《Economic Theory》2001,17(1):239-245
Summary. This paper introduces a decomposition of the Malmquist productivity index into component indexes. The motivation is to derive
an analogue of the decomposition of the T?rnqvist index into productivity and quality change provided by Fixler and Zieschang
(1992) to the Malmquist index. Since we employ no second order approximations, this decomposition requires additional structure,
namely a generalized version of Shephard's (1970) inverse homotheticity, which we dub subvector homotheticity. We show that
subvector homotheticity is necessary and sufficient for our decomposition.
Received: July 10, 1998; revised version: August 11, 1999 相似文献
7.
Summary. We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed in recent evolutionary literature to a class of coordination games played
simultaneously by the entire population. In these games payoffs, and hence best replies, are determined by a summary statistic
of the population strategy profile. We demonstrate that with simultaneous play, the equilibrium selection depends crucially
on how best responses to the summary statistic remain piece-wise constant. In fact, all the strict Nash equilibria in the
underlying stage game can be made stochastically stable depending on how the best response mapping generates piece-wise constant
best responses.
Received: February 12, 2001; revised version: October 29, 2001 相似文献
8.
Summary. The paper investigates the nature of market failure in a dynamic version of Akerlof (1970) where identical cohorts of a durable
good enter the market over time. In the dynamic model, equilibria with qualitatively different properties emerge. Typically,
in equilibria of the dynamic model, sellers with higher quality wait in order to sell and wait more than sellers of lower
quality. The main result is that for any distribution of quality there exist an infinite number of cyclical equilibria where all goods are traded within a certain number of periods after entering the market.
Received: December 21, 2000; revised version: September 5, 2001 相似文献
9.
Sonia Weyers 《Economic Theory》1999,14(1):181-201
Summary. For perfectly competitive economies under uncertainty, there is a well-known equivalence between a formulation with contingent
goods and one with state-specific securities followed by spot markets for goods. In this paper, I examine whether this equivalence
carries over to a particular form of imperfect competition. Specifically, I look at three Shapley-Shubik strategic market
games: one with contingent commodities, one with Arrow securities traded under imperfect competition and one with Arrow securities
traded under perfect competition. First I compare the feasibility constraints of these three games. Then I compare their equilibrium
sets. As in Peck and Shell (1989), the only common equilibria between the first and the second game are those which involve
no transfer of income across states. However, if the securities markets are competitive, then the set of equilibria of the
contingent commodities game and the securities game coincide.
Received: June 16, 1997; revised version: April 30, 1998 相似文献
10.
Summary. A model that includes the cost of producing money is presented and the nature of the inefficient equilibria in the model
are examined. It is suggested that if one acknowledges that transactions are a form of production, which requires the consumption
of resources, then the concept of Pareto optimality is inappropriate for assessing efficiency. Instead it becomes necessary
to provide an appropriate comparative analysis of alternative transactions mechanisms in the appropriate context.
Received: September 5, 2000; revised version: May 3, 2001 相似文献
11.
Summary. In this paper, we develop an endogenous growth model with market regulations on explicitly modeled financial intermediaries
to examine the effects of alternative government financing schemes on growth, inflation, and welfare. In the presence of binding
regulation, there is always a unique equilibrium. We perform four alternative policy experiments; a change in the seigniorage
tax rate, a change in the seigniorage tax base, a change in the income tax and a change in the fiscal-monetary policy mix.
We find that in the presence of binding legal reserve requirements, a marginal increase in government spending need not result
in a reduction in the rate of economic growth if it is financed with an increase in the seigniorage tax rate. Raising the
seigniorage tax base by means of an increase in the reserve requirement retards growth and it has an ambiguous effect on inflation.
An increase in income tax financed government spending also suppresses growth and raises inflation although not to the extent
that the required seigniorage tax rate alternative would. Switching from seigniorage to income taxation as a source of government
finance is growth reducing but deflationary. From a welfare perspective, the least distortionary way of financing an increase
in the government spending requirements is by means of a marginal increase in the seigniorage tax rate. Under the specification
of logarithmic preferences, the optimal tax structure is indeterminate.
Received: March 20, 2000; revised version: June 26, 2001 相似文献
12.
Karl Schmedders 《Economic Theory》2001,18(1):37-72
Summary. The purpose of this paper is to analyze endogenous asset innovation by an entrepreneurial exchange owner in a general equilibrium
model of incomplete security markets with financial transaction fees. A monopolistic market maker has the technology to introduce
a new option into the economy and charge investors proportional transaction fees if they trade on the exchange. The market
maker's objective is to choose the security and transaction fee that maximize revenues when opening the exchange. A computational
analysis of this problem is necessary since there are no interesting models with closed-form solutions. We compute the price
and welfare effects of the option introduction.
Received: March 14, 2000; revised version: December 12, 2000 相似文献
13.
Equilibrium in a decentralized market with adverse selection 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Max R. Blouin 《Economic Theory》2003,22(2):245-262
Summary. This paper deals with trade volume and distribution of surplus in markets subject to adverse selection. In a model where
two qualities of a good exist, I show that if trade is decentralized (i.e. conducted via random pairwise meetings of agents),
then all units of the good are traded, and all agents have positive ex-ante expected payoffs. This feature is present regardless
of the quality distribution, and persists in the limit as discounting is made negligible. This offers a sharp contrast to
models of centralized trade with adverse selection (Akerlof, Wilson).
Received: April 2, 2001; revised version: March 29, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This research was funded by a grant from UQAM. I wish to thank Roberto Serrano and seminar participants at UQAM, Queen's
University at Kingston, the 2001 CEME General Equilibrium Conference (Brown University), and the 2001 North American Summer
Meeting of the Econometric Society (University of Maryland) for comments. 相似文献
14.
Wilfredo Leiva Maldonado 《Economic Theory》1999,14(2):473-478
Summary. In this paper I give a method for finding long-run-average policies in the undiscounted economic growth problem using approximations
by finite horizons. Required hypothesis is the strong interiority of T-horizon solutions.
Received: March 25, 1996; revised version: July 29, 1997 相似文献
15.
Summary. We examine price formation in a simple static model with asymmetric information, an infinite number of risk neutral traders
and no noise traders. Here we re-examine four results associated with rational expectations models relating to the existence
of fully revealing equilibrium prices, the advantage of becoming informed, the costly acquisition of information, and the
impossibility of having equilibrium prices with higher volatility than the underlying fundamentals.
Received: August 27, 1997; revised version: February 11, 1998 相似文献
16.
Summary. Sustained endogenous growth is known to be impossible in OLG one-sector models without non-convexities and externalities,
unless income is redistributed to the young generation. No redistribution proper is however necessary, as shown in two simple
examples, if positive profits accruing to young monopolistic entrepreneurs can be sustained in equilibrium, and/or if young
unionised workers can guarantee a non-vanishing share of aggregate income. In this context, market power appears, in two different
forms, as a significant source of sustained endogenous growth.
Received: October 3, 2000; revised version: March 9, 2001 相似文献
17.
Summary. This note provides an alternative proof for the equivalence of decreasing absolute prudence (DAP) in the expected utility
framework and in a two-parametric approach where utility is a function of the mean and the standard deviation. In addition,
we elucidate that the equivalence of DAP and the concavity of utility as a function of mean and variance, which was shown
to hold for normally distributed stochastics in Lajeri and Nielsen [4], cannot be generalized.
Received: November 27, 2000; revised version: November 26, 2001
Correspondence to: T. Eichner 相似文献
18.
Koji Shimomura 《Economic Theory》1999,14(2):501-503
Summary. Based on some elementary results on duality, the paper proposes a much simpler way of deriving the class of non-homothetic
CES production functions which was derived as a solution to a partial differential equation that defines the elasticity of
substitution.
Received: February 11, 1998; revised version: April 28, 1998 相似文献
19.
A note on asymmetric and mixed strategy equilibria in the search-theoretic model of fiat money 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Randall Wright 《Economic Theory》1999,14(2):463-471
Summary. The simple search-theoretic model of fiat money has three symmetric Nash equilibria: all agents accept money with probability
1; all agents accept money with probability 0; and all agents accept money with probability y in (0,1). Here I construct an asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium, payoff-equivalent to the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium,
where a fraction N in (0,1) of agents always accept money and 1-N never accept money. Counter to what has been conjectured previously, I find N > y. I also introduce evolutionary dynamics, and show that the economy converges to monetary exchange iff the initial proportion
of agents accepting money exceeds N.
Received: September 10, 1997; revised version: April 24, 1998 相似文献
20.
Summary. General equilibrium analysis is difficult when asset markets are incomplete. We make the simplifying assumption that uncertainty
is small and use bifurcation methods to compute Taylor series approximations for asset demand and asset market equilibrium.
A computer must be used to derive these approximations since they involve large amounts of algebraic manipulation. We use
this method to analyze the allocative and welfare effects of introducing a new security. We find that adding any nontrivial
derivative security will raise the price of the risky security relative to the bond when risks are small.
Received: April 1, 2000; revised version: January 10, 2001 相似文献