融资激励和融资约束对PPP模式下公共产品提供效率的影响——基于不完全契约理论的一般均衡分析

通过构建不完全契约理论下的一般均衡模型,对比分析了PPP模式中的融资约束和融资激励对公共产品提供效率和社会福利的影响,并探讨了融资约束条件下的效率损失。结果显示:私人融资的专业性可以提高公共产品合意程度,但是私人部门的融资约束会抵消其专业性带来的好处,导致社会福利损失。最后针对民营企业参与PPP项目对政府提出建议:必须打破融资约束和制度歧视,完善和规范金融市场,在公平、竞争的市场环境下引入专业机构参与公共产品提供的各个领域。     

专利技术垄断、仿冒进入与政府管制政策

文章通过构建政府、正版厂商与仿冒厂商三者之间的Stackelberg博弈模型,并考虑仿冒品厂商的市场结构特征和性质,探讨了仿冒厂商进入条件下正版厂商的竞争行为、策略以及社会福利水平的变化.经研究发现:(1)市场中有仿冒厂商进入且政府稽查力度较弱的情况下,正版厂商总会选择大于独占均衡时的产出数量作为竞争的最优策略,并且,正版品的市场均衡价格要低于正版品独占时的市场均衡价格;(2)仿冒品和正版品之间具有相互替代性,但替代程度不同,仿冒品对正版品仅能部分替代,正版品对仿冒品产生完全替代作用;(3)仿冒品的存在有可能对正版厂商的利益产生正面的影响和作用;(4)在没有考虑政府管制成本的情况下,政府采取对仿冒品不予追究,或者采取严格的查处力度都会提高社会的福利水平.     

Comparing Horizontal Mergers Under Cournot with Bertrand Competitions

Taking the product substitutability into account, this paper considers the horizontal mergers under Cournot with Bertrand competition. Firstly, the big market size indicates non‐intention to merge. Secondly, independent goods indicate indifferences between the quantity competition and price competition. Finally, firms under quantity competition are more willing to merge than under price competition. The antitrust authority is more inclined to approve the merger under quantity competition than that under price competition.     

THE DECISION TO HIRE MANAGERS IN MIXED MARKETS UNDER BERTRAND COMPETITION*

This paper analyses the decisions of firms as to whether or not to hire managers when there is a public firm competing with a private firm in the product market. It is shown that under Bertrand competition with heterogeneous goods both firms hire managers. This is in contrast with the result obtained under Cournot competition, where only the private firm hires a manager. Moreover, welfare is lower if both firms hire managers than if neither firm does. In contrast, under Cournot competition welfare is greater if both firms hire managers.     

考虑港口收费管制的进出口贸易竞争研究

考虑港口的收费管制因素,建立了进出口贸易竞争模型。该模型由一个出口国和两个进口国组成,且各国都拥有一个港口,位于出口国的两家公司均向两个进口国销售商品,并在各个进口国展开市场竞争（古诺竞争或伯川德竞争）,各贸易国的港口根据其是否存在价格管制确定港口收费。针对进出口公司的每种竞争模式,得到了不同的港口收费管制组合下各贸易国的港口收费、港口利润和社会福利,并将竞争均衡结果进行了比较。研究发现： （1）在进出口公司古诺竞争模式下,若三个贸易国的港口都无收费管制（有收费管制）且进出口产品的差异较大 （小）时,各贸易国的社会福利和港口利润均更高; （2）在进出口公司伯川德竞争模式下,若进出口产品的差异较大 （小）,则出口国的港口利润主要取决于港口收费 （贸易量）,而进口国恰好相反; （3）当进出口产品的差异较大 （小）时,进出口公司在古诺 （伯川德）竞争模式下各贸易国的社会福利、港口利润以及港口使用费都更高。     

Market Structure,Competition, and Welfare Change Due to Technological Innovations

This paper analyzes the change in social welfare brought about by a cost-reducing technological innovation. Each firm adopts a new technology at the expense of the other firms. Hence, competitive adoption of new technology can reduce social welfare. Because a technological innovation can change market structure in different ways under different kinds of competition it can cause quantity competition to generate greater social welfare than price competition does. [020]     

标准专利许可中可变价格的社会福利效应:基于产品差异化的视角

技术标准在产品生产过程中的使用越来越广泛,标准专利许可定价形式问题关系到技术标准所有者和产品生产者的收益,有待拓展研究。通过构建古诺竞争模型,从产品差异化角度对标准专利许可中可变价格形式的社会福利效应进行分析,得到的主要结论为:当产品市场达到均衡,且标准专利许可采用的价格形式是可变价格时,社会总福利随着产品差异化程度的提高而增加,随着差异化产品市场中标准专利使用者数量的增加而增加,随着可变价格中可变费用比率的提高而降低;均衡产量随着产品差异化程度的提高而增大,随着可变价格中可变费用比率的提高而降低;均衡价格与产品差异化程度呈现出倒“U”型关系,临界点为特定的市场规模;标准专利使用者的均衡利润随着产品差异化程度的提高而增大。由此可见,标准专利许可的可变费用比率下降有利于激励技术标准使用者生产更多的差异化产品,提升社会总福利。     

Differentiated Products,Vertical Related Markets,and Optimal Export Policy

This paper studies the optimal export policy in the context of a vertically related industry with differentiated products, and analyzes the effects of the degree of product substitutability and market structure on the determination of such a policy. It is shown that the results obtained in a similar model with homogeneous goods rivalry no longer hold when the goods are differentiated. Indeed, the degree of product substitutability plays an important role in the determination of export policies, and also determines whether a country can be better off under a trade policy war compared to free trade. The use of a differentiated product setting also allows one to compare export policies and countries' welfare levels under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. It is found that the results of the comparison are also sensitive to the degree of product substitutability.     

收入分布、破坏性创新与社会福利

通过构建破坏性创新企业与在位企业进行市场竞争的双寡头博弈模型,分析在具有不同收入分布特征市场中破坏性创新企业的市场绩效及社会福利。研究发现,在收入差距较大的市场中,破坏性创新企业获得更大的市场份额和利润,社会福利相对较小;相反,在收入水平较高且分布趋向同质的市场中,在位企业获得更大的市场份额和利润,并且,破坏性创新厂商的利润随着收入水平的提高而降低。同时,随着收入水平的提高,两企业的产品质量不断提高,但质量差距不断扩大,社会总福利也随之增加。最后,进一步阐释了破坏性创新更多地发生于贫富差距较大的新兴市场的微观机制,为企业根据不同市场的收入分布特征选择竞争战略提供理论依据,为相关国家基于收入分布特点制定限制或支持破坏性创新创业政策提供理论参考。     

政府产品创新补贴下的企业R＆D策略选择

为了研究在政府产品创新补贴政策下企业的R＆D策略选择问题,建立了双寡头市场中面向工艺R＆D的三阶段博弈模型：第一阶段政府以社会福利最大为目标选择产品创新补贴率;第二阶段企业进行R＆D投资以降低生产成本;第三阶段企业在产品市场中进行古诺竞争。根据双寡头在第二和第三阶段是否合作,给出了研发竞争、研发卡特尔、技术共享联盟和研究共同体等四种R＆D策略,得到了相应的政府最优R＆D补贴率。研究表明：从企业的R＆D投入和产品产量的角度看,当溢出效应较高时,研发竞争策略优于研发卡特尔策略;当溢出效应较低时,研发卡特尔策略优于研发竞争策略。研发卡特尔策略与研发竞争策略相比,研发卡特尔更能推动企业利润的提高并且可以改善社会总福利。从产品产量、企业利润和社会总福利最大化角度考虑,研究共同体为四种策略中的最优策略。     

Bundling strategy and product differentiation

The existing literature shows that a decrease in the degree of substitutability increases a monopoly’s incentive to bundle. This paper in addition takes into account competition in the second product market and then re-examines how intra-brand and inter-brand product differentiations affect the incentive to bundle. In order to formally examine the above conjectures, this research builds up a two-firm, two-product model in which product 1 (monopoly product) is produced only by the bundling firm and product 2 (competing product) is produced by both firms. The analysis shows that under both Bertrand and Cournot competitions the incentive to bundle does not necessarily increase with the degree of intra-brand differentiation, while it strictly decreases with the degree of inter-brand differentiation. Moreover, under Bertrand competition bundling always decreases consumer surplus, but may increase the competitor’s profit and social surplus. Under Cournot competition bundling always reduces the opponent’s profit and social welfare, but may increase consumer surplus.     

Trade liberalization gains under different trade theories: a case study for Ukraine

We analyze the deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA) between Ukraine and the EU using a multi-regional general-equilibrium simulation model. Three alternative trade structures are implemented: (a) a standard specification of perfect competition based on the Armington assumption of regionally differentiated goods; (b) monopolistic competition among symmetric manufacturing firms; and (c) a competitive selection model of heterogeneous manufacturing firms. Across these structures the DCFTA indicates relatively large gains for Ukraine of more than 3 percent. We show, however, that the gains for Ukraine are lower when we consider monopolistic competition in manufacturing. This is attributed to a movement of resources into Ukraine’s traditional export sectors to the EU, which produce under constant returns. While there is little danger of deindustrialization dominating the overall welfare gains, we do observe substantially lower gains when we consider monopolistic competition. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical confirmation of the theoretic predication that the relative gains from trade in monopolistic competition models might be lower than under perfect competition in the context of a numeric simulation of economic integration. Under the popular heterogeneous-firms monopolistic competition theory we find significant firm selection effects indicating welfare impacts for Ukraine that are less than under the Armington structure but above those found under symmetric firms and monopolistic competition. These results are important considerations for Ukraine’s overall development strategy.     

COOPERATIVE MANAGERIAL DELEGATION,R&D AND COLLUSION

Existing literature on managerial delegation indicates that collusive outcomes can be obtained in an oligopoly game through cooperative managerial delegation. In contrast, this paper shows that, if managers are delegated to choose R&D, in addition to choosing production levels, full‐collusive outcomes cannot be achieved through cooperative delegation. Moreover, (i) under cooperative delegation, semi‐collusion always yields lower profit, higher R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than that in the case of competition and (ii) cooperative delegation leads to a higher profit lower R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than the no delegation case, irrespective of product market conduct.     

STRATEGIC EXPORT POLICY IN VERTICALLY RELATED MARKETS

This paper analyses how strategic export policies are affected by introducing an imperfectly competitive intermediate good into a Bertrand duopoly model with product differentiation, where a home and a foreign final‐good firm export to a third‐country market. It is shown that when the home and foreign markets for the intermediate good are segmented, the optimal export policy towards the final good is a tax. In contrast, under integrated markets, the optimal export intervention is a subsidy. Whether bilateral export intervention is welfare improving compared with free trade, depends on the degree of product differentiation between the home and foreign final goods.     

Labor Market Institutions and the Second-Best Tariff

Labor market distortions provide a second-best case for protection. However, the implications are less obvious when the product market is imperfectly competitive too, as suggested by several partial equilibrium studies. This paper adopts a general equilibrium approach, combining unionization in labor markets with monopolistic competition in product markets. Two labor market settings are considered: fully centralized wage bargaining ("Scandinavia", for short) and negotiation at the firm level ("Latin America"). The competitive labor market case is used as a benchmark. It is shown that in Latin America the second-best tariff is higher, and the welfare level lower, than in the benchmark case. Scandinavia reaches the first best under free trade.     

Choosing Price or Quantity? The Role of Delegation and Network Externalities in a Mixed Duopoly

This paper considers a differentiated goods managerial mixed duopoly composed of one social welfare‐maximising public firm and one profit‐maximising private firm. We model the firm choice of the strategic contract. We find that when the strength of network effects is sufficiently strong, the price competition can become the unique equilibrium market structure. Furthermore, we show that there exists an area of the degree of product differentiation and the strength of network effects such that the situation wherein the public firm chooses its price contract whereas the private firm chooses its quantity contract can become the unique equilibrium structure.     

Tariff Reductions in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment

This paper argues that the welfare effects of trade liberalization in the presence of foreign direct investment obtained under perfect competition cannot be extended to imperfectly competitive markets. In the Heckscher-Ohlin model, trade liberalization may be paradoxically immiserizing when the traditional welfare-increasing result is corrected for the change in foreign capital revenue. Under imperfect competition this cannot occur, except under rather implausible assumptions. Indeed, a tariff reduction is expected to increase welfare when the welfare indicator is corrected for the presence of foreign capital, regardless of the type of market structure and the form of competitive rivalry.     

Franchise fee, competition and economic growth

This paper introduces the different kinds of franchise contract bargaining into a macroeconomic model and accordingly researches the relationship between competition and economic growth. In Nash bargaining model/vertical integration we find an inverted-U shaped or a monotonically increasing relationship between the competitive degree of the intermediate goods market and economic growth. In bargaining of the right to manage model/vertical non-integration our result shows an inverted-U shaped or a monotonically decreasing relationship between the competitive degree of the intermediate goods market and economic growth. In addition, there is an overall negative relationship between the competitive degree of the final goods market and economic growth. Especially, our interesting findings that the pricing rule for intermediate goods firm depends not only on market power but also bargaining power are more general. Therefore, we can further explain the firms' vertical control strategy.     

Labor Mobility, Trade, and Social Capital

Labor market integration raises welfare in the absence of distortions. This paper examines labor and goods market integration in a general‐equilibrium model with social capital. The findings are: (i) labor market integration has an ambiguous impact on welfare, and raises it if the goods and labor skills are sufficiently different; (ii) compared to Pareto optimum, labor mobility (social capital) is excessively large (depleted); (iii) trade is superior to labor market integration if trading costs are no higher than private migration costs, otherwise the outcome is ambiguous; and (iv) the creation of new institutions in response to labor market integration has an ambiguous impact on welfare.