Labor theory of value and the uncertainty in capitalist economy

This article aims to offer a reply to Steedman’s critique of Marx’s labor theory of value. Although this critique having been there for about three decades, the anti-critiques from Marxists are up to date flawed with fatal limitation, losing sight of an important dimension of labor theory of value, i.e., without taking it as a theoretical tool of understanding the uncertainty rooted in capitalist mode of production. The first part of this article reviews the controversy initiated by Steedman. Part 2 discusses Marx’s dual theory of market value and Rubin’s interpretation. Our view is that, if Rubin’s interpretation is accepted, a refutation of Steedman’s critique towards Marx will be impossible. Part 3 of this article explores the possible reconstruction of market value in the perspective of the dynamics in the pivoting of market value. We concludes that, the relationship between the standard condition of production and value is not, as argued by Steedman, of deterministic and one-directional character. For Marx, labor theory of value is applied to analyze the uncertain relation between the means and the end, the condition and the result of capitalist production. Meanwhile, another reply is attempted towards the negative comment on labor theory of value made by contemporary evolutionary economist such as Hodgson. In our view, Marx’s labor theory of value is not irrelevant as claimed by Hodgson to the main topics of evolutionary economics such as variety and “natural selection.” It is through labor theory of value that Marx explains the co-evolution of technology and economy.     

Marx's socialism in the context of his typology of economic systems

This paper restates the major structural properties of Marx's conception of socialism in the broader context of his typology of economic systems, commencing with feudalism and ending with his unique vision of postcapitalist economy. It also discusses briefly some of the major applications of this typology to contemporary practice, notably to Soviet experience. Clarification and systematic examination of Marx's views on the basic organizational properties of socialism in the broader context of Marx's views on economic systems, although important in its own right, can also sharpen critical understanding of debates concerning relations between the classical Marxian vision and contemporary practice.     

Diversification and tunneling: Evidence from Indian business groups

We provide evidence suggesting an important yet largely unexplored motive for the diversified structure of emerging economy business groups is to facilitate expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling insiders through tunneling. Using firm level panel data from India, and defining the core firm of a group as the one with the largest asset base, we find that the relatedness of the activity of a group affiliate to the activity of the core firm is correlated with the wedge between control and cash flow rights of insiders as well as with the opacity in insider ownership. Firms with ownership-control wedge lower and ownership opacity higher relative to a group’s core firm are more likely to be in activities unrelated to that of the core firm. Our findings are strengthened by evidence of tunneling in the same direction, from affiliates with wedge equal to or higher than that of the core firm to affiliates with wedge lower than that of the core firm. Taken together this suggests an expropriation motive for diversification: affiliate firms are located away from a business group’s core firm to serve as destination points for funds tunneled from the group’s core.     

Marx on entrepreneurship: A note

This paper argues that in mainstream economics the concept of entrepreneurship is imposed by the theoretical framework adopted in order to justify the source of profits. In contrast, in Marx’s analysis there is a consistent theory of profit which inevitably leads to a specific theory of entrepreneurship. (JEL: B10, B14, B21)     

A new test for linear inequality constraints when the variance–covariance matrix depends on the unknown parameters

We extend Hansen’s (2005) test to testing hypotheses involving general inequality constraints where the variance–covariance matrix of the functions in the constraints depends on the unknown parameters. The test can be applied to a wider class of problems than Wolak’s (1991).     

Explaining foreign bank entrance in emerging markets

This paper provides a theoretical framework that can explain the empirical observation that foreign banks from industrialized countries tend to increase their involvement in emerging markets in periods of market instability. In this model, domestic banks have (through past lending operations) more soft information on their borrowers available compared to foreign banks. Foreign banks, however, have a superior screening technology that allows them to obtain more hard information about their borrowers’ investment projects. The model has an important implication: Foreign banks increase their market share when credit market conditions deteriorate. The rationale for this finding is that the comparative advantage of the domestic bank loses value in unstable credit market conditions. Thus, the advantage of having a screening technology becomes more important and allows the foreign bank to increase market share. In times of crisis hard information on projects is relatively more important than soft information on the borrower’s history.     

Relationship between management ownership and firm value among the business group affiliated firms in Korea

In this paper, we revisit an old issue on the relation between management ownership and firm’s value. The Korean panel data on the business group firms, allows us to compute ownership right and control right separately for each business group affiliated firm. Our measures are different from the similar measures on the Korean firms as in Baek et al. (2004) or Joh (2003). Rather than confounding the two offsetting effects, this paper tests convergence of interest hypothesis and entrenchment hypothesis separately. Empirical findings show that, given control right, there is no clear-cut relation between firm value and the inside management ownership for most firms with the inside management ownership less than 42%, that there is a positive relation between firm value and the inside management ownership for those firms with the inside management ownership higher than 42%, and that, given ownership right, profitability decreases as control right increases.     

On Hegel,imperialism, and structural stagnation

The essentials of the economic theory of imperialism à la Hobson-Luxemburg are anticipated in two paragraphs of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Marx did not pay attention to this aspect of Hegel's thought, perhaps because it implied a longer survival probability for capitalism than Marx cared to acknowledge. The second part of the paper shows the formal similarity between the economic theory of imperialism and the theory of structural stagnation that was proposed in Latin America in the 1960s. The blindspots and early demise of that theory have the same psychological root as Marx's neglect of Hegel's insights.     

Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment

We study a continuous-time version of the optimal risk-sharing problem with one-sided commitment. In the optimal contract, the agent?s consumption is a time-invariant, strictly increasing function of a single state variable: the maximal level of the agent?s income realized to date. We characterize this function in terms of the agent?s outside option value function and the discounted amount of time in which the agent?s income process is expected to reach a new to-date maximum. Under constant relative risk aversion we solve the model in closed-form: optimal consumption of the agent equals a constant fraction of his maximal income realized to date. In the complete-markets implementation of the optimal contract, the Alvarez–Jermann solvency constraints take the form of a simple borrowing constraint familiar from the Bewley–Aiyagari incomplete-markets models.     

Capital controls and welfare

This paper computes welfare levels under different degree of capital controls and compares them with the welfare level under perfect capital mobility by using the methodology of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007). We show that perfect capital mobility is not always optimal and that capital controls may enhance an economy’s welfare level. There exists an optimal degree of capital-account restriction that achieves a higher level of welfare than that under perfect capital mobility, if the economy has costly financial intermediaries. The results of our analysis imply that as the domestic financial intermediaries are less efficient, the government should impose stricter capital controls in the form of a tax on foreign borrowing.     

Inequality and development: Evidence from semiparametric estimation with panel data

Evidences from nonparametric and semiparametric unbalanced panel data models with fixed effects show that Kuznet’s inverted-U relationship is confirmed when economic development reaches a threshold. The model tests justify semiparametric specification. The integrated net contribution of control variables to inequality reduction is significant.     

The so-called “transformation problem” revisited: A comment

This comment shows that Lipietz's Marxist transformation theorem represents but a simple, though useful reinterpretation of obvious mathematical consequences of a standard Sraffa model—by making appropriate use of its known degree of freedom. Labor values are not involved in this new interpretation of conventional prices of production. A proposal is therefore made how their role in Marx's transformation may be investigated further on the basis of Lipietz's theorem and its interpretation of the “value of labor power”.     

A Blotto game with multi-dimensional incomplete information

We examine a multi-dimensional incomplete information Colonel Blotto game in which each player’s n-tuple of battlefield valuations is drawn from a common n-variate joint distribution function that is uniform on the non-negative orthant of the surface of a sphere.     

The optimal choice of central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty

This paper examines the optimal monetary delegation arrangement of central bank independence and conservatism in the presence of uncertainty about the central bank’s output objective. We show that full independence is no longer optimal with uncertain central bank preferences, and that optimal delegation involves the choice of both independence and conservatism. Further, we find that the usual trade-off between independence and conservatism no longer necessarily holds. Consequently, high central bank independence may also require a high level of conservatism.     

Post-privatisation ownership concentration: Determinants and influence on firm efficiency

With this study we aim to contribute to the empirical literature on privatisation processes by analysing the determinants of post-divestment private ownership concentration and its possible link to corporate efficiency. For Spanish firms, we find that the method of privatisation, the type of industry, the company’s size and its level of risk may help explain differences in private ownership concentration. We also find, after controlling for endogeneity, that ownership concentrated in the hands of private investors has a positive and significant effect on post-privatisation efficiency.     

Tariff liberalization and trade specialization: Lessons from India

This paper analyzes the effects of policy reform on the structure of India’s trade in manufactures, from 1990 to 2006. It computes comparative advantage indicators on the basis of disaggregated trade flow data and assesses the effects of trade liberalization on the evolution of India’s pattern of trade specialization. Industries where import tariffs have been reduced the most have experienced the highest increase in specialization. Moreover, trade liberalization has helped India improve its comparative advantage in industries with medium- to high-technology content, as well as in some of the industries enjoying the most robust growth in global demand. Liberalization policies have been instrumental in enhancing the international competitiveness of industries.     

R&D, risks and overreaction in a market with the absence of the book-to-market effect

Prior studies document that the book-to-market (BM) effect is absent in the Taiwan stock market. Using Taiwanese data covering from 1991 to 2006, we show that, after controlling for the size effect and the Fama and French's (1993) risk factors, the BM effect only exists for those firms with low R&D intensity essentially because these stocks suffer less from investors’ underreaction to R&D investment. The BM effect arises primarily from fundamental reversals acting as a proxy for investors’ overreaction.     

Remittances for economic development: The investment perspective

Based on the economic theory of the family, this paper constructs a model of remittances where the migrant, besides sending money to his family, also invests in his home country. The investment is looked after by a family member in return for some monetary compensation. The model focuses on two different cases: state-contingent transfers (transfers are tied to investment outcomes) and fixed transfers (transfers are mainly of altruistic motive). As the migrant derives utilities from consumption, his consumption-investment decision is driven by preferences and future investment prospects. The transfers are to increase with both business encouraging and income compensatory effects.     

State wage-payment laws, the Pension Protection Act of 2006, and 401(k) saving behavior

I show empirically that state wage-payment laws, which forbid deductions from wages and salaries without the written permission of the employee, constituted a binding constraint on firms’ choices to adopt automatic enrollment in 401(k) plans prior to 2006.     

Reallocation and restructuring: A generalization of the Balassa–Samuelson effect

Despite its strong theoretical position when it comes to explaining inflation in transition economies, the empirical findings of the Balassa–Samuelson (B–S) effect assign only a minor role to structural inflation – to the disappointment of analysts and policymakers. This article points to 3 theory-based contributing factors to these ‘weak’ findings and offers an alternative methodological approach. First, a short-term focus makes B–S prone to underestimating the magnitude of the productivity growth differential. Second, the conventional demand side CPI based definition of sectoral value added reduces the extent to which the productivity growth differential is passed through to inflation. Third, by ignoring the dependence between the 2 main B–S components, a further downward bias to the productivity growth pass through comes about. The key to our proposed alternative methodology centres on an endogenous relation between the productivity growth differential and sector sizes. Together with the long-run supply-side approach this allows us to capture inflation drivers that conventional B–S fails to incorporate. In our extension to the conventional B–S model a reduced productivity growth differential can be compensated by an increased productivity growth pass-through, or vice versa – with the effect of augmenting inflation pressure. Hence, the link between productivity growth differentials and the dynamics of structural inflation is shown to be more complex than previously assumed.