Testing the principle of ‘growth of the fitter’: The relationship between profits and firm growth

This paper is an empirical investigation of the evolutionary principle of ‘growth of the fitter’. Previous studies suggest that growth does not discriminate between firms according to their fitness, when this latter is proxied by productivity. We use the profit rate (operating surplus/value added) as a proxy for fitness and explore its influence on subsequent growth rates by tracking 8405 French manufacturing firms over the period 1996–2004. We overcome problems of unobserved firm-specific effects, persistence and endogeneity by using the ‘system GMM’ estimator developed by Blundell and Bond [Blundell, R., Bond, S., 1998. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics 87, 115–143]. Whilst non-parametric plots do not reveal any obvious relationship between profit rates and subsequent growth, regression analysis identifies a small positive influence. Considering the reciprocal influence of growth on profit rates, positive and significant results suggest that ‘Penrose effects’ are not a dominant feature of firm dynamics.     

The democratic transition

Over the last two centuries, many countries experienced regime transitions toward democracy. We document this democratic transition over a long time horizon. We use historical time series of income, education and democracy levels from 1870 to 2000 to explore the economic factors associated with rising levels of democracy. We find that primary schooling, and to a weaker extent per capita income levels, are strong determinants of the quality of political institutions. We find little evidence of causality running the other way, from democracy to income or education.     

Are corporate social responsibility and advertising complements or substitutes in producing firm reputation?

A firm’s reputation is one of the critical drivers of success, and two of the key levers firms use to influence their perceived reputation are corporate social responsibility (CSR) and advertising. The relationship between CSR and advertising is important because whether they are complements or substitutes has different implications for how firms use these activities. Using a unique panel dataset of US-listed companies between 2005 and 2014, we estimate flexible production functions to identify whether CSR and advertising act as complements or substitutes in the production of firm reputation. A secondary motivation of this paper is to examine whether the use of different stakeholder ratings of firm reputation matters. We find evidence consistent with advertising and CSR being substitutes toward the production of firm reputation. Our results also show that advertising, own-firm CSR activities, and industry-level CSR spillovers contribute positively to firm reputation. Lastly, we find that the effects of CSR and advertising vary across the stakeholder groups (general public, business executives, or CSR experts) used in the analysis.     

The effect of crises on firm exit and the moderating effect of firm size

The liability of smallness assumption suggests that smaller firms face higher exit risks. However, does it apply during crises? We show that during downturns size reduces firms’ exit risk by less; the hazard rate increases more rapidly in size.     

The capital-based view of the firm

We offer here a capital-based view (CBV) that incorporates, and goes further than related views, (like the resource- and the knowledge-based view) of the firm. This general approach uses ideas about capital and its structure to examine the nature of heterogeneous resources and their attributes and how they are organized by entrepreneurs (individually and in teams). These entrepreneurs exercise judgment in valuing these heterogeneous resources in productive combinations that they attempt to create. This article uses insights gained from this understanding of the nature and function of capital to draw further propositions about the role of knowledge, management, and economic organization. We survey the main components of the CBV of the firm and examine management and organizational topics looking through the lens of the CBV. The capital dimension adds new insights and provides a powerful unifying framework.     

The evolutionary firm and Cournot's Dilemma

Recently, competence/capability has been introduced as a rivaland as a complement to the idea of transaction-costs as thefoundation for a modern theory of the firm. However, while thecompetence-based approach may be inspired by evolutionary economics,it does not, in its current form, provide an evolutionary theoryof the firm. To transform this competence-based approach intoan evolutionary theory, the connection between the firm andVeblen's concept of social knowledge is more fully developed.Once established, the evolutionary theory of the firm is utilisedto bypass Marshall's reconciliation problem and solve Cournot'sDilemma.     

Technology and the firm

The globalization of the economy is a process driven by the enterprise. As enterprises form networks of alliances they tend to create huge oligopolistic structures on a global scale. Although these global enterprises are not subject to national norms, it is evident that a new alliance is growing up between the enterprise and the state. In the context of fierce international competition, enterprises need the support of the state, which is able to ensure that its 'national champions' enjoy optimum conditions for development; in return, successful enterprises are the state's best guarantee of national independence. But through this alliance the enterprise has acquired a totally new legitimacy, approaching that formerly reserved for the state, while the state finds itself engaged in global economic competition, which lacks adequate regulatory procedures. There is also a growing disassociation between globalized economic power on one hand, and political power conjned within national borders, on the other. There is a need to formulate a new regulatory framework, in order to overcome a situation where actors representing particular interests impose their own rules on actors representing the public interest. Such a framework would encourage the emergence of a transnational civilian society able to mobilize itself in the face of global economic, technological and environmental problems.     

Technology and the firm

The globalization of the economy is a process driven by the enterprise. As enterprises form networks of alliances they tend to create huge oligopolistic structures on a global scale. Although these global enterprises are not subject to national norms, it is evident that a new alliance is growing up between the enterprise and the state. In the context of fierce international competition, enterprises need the support of the state, which is able to ensure that its 'national champions' enjoy optimum conditions for development; in return, successful enterprises are the state's best guarantee of national independence. But through this alliance the enterprise has acquired a totally new legitimacy, approaching that formerly reserved for the state, while the state finds itself engaged in global economic competition, which lacks adequate regulatory procedures. There is also a growing disassociation between globalized economic power on one hand, and political power conjned within national borders, on the other. There is a need to formulate a new regulatory framework, in order to overcome a situation where actors representing particular interests impose their own rules on actors representing the public interest. Such a framework would encourage the emergence of a transnational civilian society able to mobilize itself in the face of global economic, technological and environmental problems.     

The Austrian theory of the cooperative firm

This paper draws on Wicksell's Value, Capital and Rent. The (comparative-statics) response of the cooperative to a change in its parameters (capital stock, rate of interest paid on capital stock, and production function) is examined. Severe employment problems may be expected if, in a cooperative setting, the rate of interest is, by macroeconomic management, kept at a relatively low level. Technological progress also may lead to a contraction in employment and even, under some circumstances, cause a decline in output per man. The cooperative is throughout contrasted with its capitalist counterpart.     

The strategic alliance of the biotechnology firm

This article applies the relevant theories of firm organization and inter-firm relationships in the high-tech environment to explain the institutional reasons that firms choose between internal or external approaches. Particularly, this study tries to understand to what extent and in what way strategic alliances have impacts on individual firms’ organizational structure, financial structure and firms’ activities. Also it tries to find out what type of firms tend to benefit most from alliances, and thus use more inter-firm agreements. The theoretical findings are that due to liquidity constraint and asymmetric information reasons, young, research-intensive firms need to use more alliances to survive in the fast changing high-technology industry. The empirical analysis employs 3 year panel data and finds that the results are consistent with the theoretical predictions.     

The effect of remittances on democratic institutions

Do remittances promote stronger democratic institutions in developing countries? We study the effect of workers’ remittances on the quality of democracy in developing countries, and examine how government spending mediates the effect of workers’ remittances on the quality of democratic institutions. Using a dynamic panel estimator on data from 133 developing countries over 1972–2012, we find that workers’ remittances improve the quality of democratic institutions. We also find that workers’ remittances are more effective in promoting democratic institutions in developing countries with low government spending.     

The partisan policy cycle and firm valuation

Our research probes the firm valuation impact of partisan-motivated policy cycles. We first identify the micro-channels of policy transmission that link partisan policy disturbances to firm value. Then, we draw on firm-level data from 21 industrial democracies for the period extending from 1989 to 2008 to examine whether government partisanship has any distinct impact on firm value. We identify a surprisingly large and consistent positive relationship of left-oriented governments with firm value. Additionally, our research finds that the partisan impact on firm value is appreciably conditioned by factors like economic openness.     

The multifactor Illyrian firm revisited

Comparative static results for the single output, multifactor, short-run dividend-maximizing firm are derived and classified. Two determinate situations are identified; first, if the production technology is Hicksian-normal and homogeneous, both Ward perversions (negative responses of both labor and output to an increased product price) follow and, second, if labor is inferior, a positively sloped supply curve but a perverse labor response result. The possibility of labor responding positively to a price increase is demonstrated in which case the supply curve will be positively sloped. A distinction between labor-intensive and materials-intensive technologies indicates that the latter is more likely to exhibit Ward perversion. Implications for empirical work are discussed.     

The business environment and Moroccan firm productivity

The paper focuses on the role of the business environment in understanding differences in the total factor productivity of Moroccan firms. The business environment is captured by measures which include the investment climate in which firms operate, i.e. access to credit, regulatory and institutional environment and infrastructure. The evidence on the relationship between credit and productivity is strongly indicative of credit resources misallocation in Morocco. We also find that, heavier bureaucracy and differences in regulations appear to have a negative effect on firm productivity. This last result is particularly relevant for small firms, and/or those that do not export and/or those with no access to foreign capital.     

The firm as a subeconomy

This article explores the economic role of the firm in a marketeconomy. The analysis begins with a discussion and critiqueof the property rights approach to the theory of the firm asexposited in the recent work by Hart and Moore ('Property Rightsand the Nature of the Firm'). It is argued that the Hart-Mooremodel, taken literally, can only explain why individuals ownassets, but not why firms own assets. In particular, the logicof the model suggests that each asset should be free standingin order to provide maximal flexibility for the design of individualincentives. These implications run counter to fact. One of thekey features of the modern firm is that it owns essentiallyall the productive assets that it employs. Employees rarelyown any assets; they only contribute human capital. Why is theownership of assets clustered in firms? This article outlinesan answer based on the notion that control over physical assetsgives control over contracting rights to those assets. Metaphorically,the firm is viewed as a miniature economy, an 'island' economy,in which asset ownership conveys the CEO the power to definethe 'rules of the game', that is, the ability to restructurethe incentives of those that accept to do business on (or with)the island. The desire to regulate trade in this fashion stemsfrom contractual externalities characteristic of imperfect informationenvironments. The inability to regulate all trade through asingle firm stems from the value of exit rights as an incentiveinstrument and a tool to discipline the abuse of power.     

Cooperative research and the firm

This paper models cooperative R & D involving the university, the government, and the firm, using a linear programming format to determine the optimal cooperative structure or, “Who does what?” Both prime and dual are discussed. Sensitivity and simulation techniques are discussed as analytical tools to evaluate the effect of uncertainty and returns to scale on the optimal mix or structure of cooperative R & D. The value of the approach is both heuristic and analytical. Some problems and limitations of the approach are discussed briefly.     

The Austrian theory of the firm: Retrospect and prospect

Using as a focusing device the famous arguments of Coase (Economica 4(16), 386–405 1937) and Hayek (The American Economic Review 35(4): 519–530 1945), I sketch in bold strokes what an Austrian theory of the firm would look like. Such a theory would pay serious attention to issues of knowledge, uncertainty, change, and complementarity. I describe a literature in which much of this theory has already been constructed; make connections to closely related literatures in economics and management; and suggest directions for future development.