A THEORY OF WAGES AND LABOR DEMAND WITH INTRA‐FIRM BARGAINING AND MATCHING FRICTIONS*

This article provides a model of labor market equilibrium with search and within‐firm strategic bargaining. We yield explicit closed form solutions with heterogeneous labor inputs and capital. The solution exhibits overemployment. We show that higher relative bargaining power for some groups of workers may lead to overemployment relative to other groups, with such other groups being underemployed instead if they have a lower relative bargaining power. Similarly, the hold‐up problem between capitalists and employees does not necessarily lead to underinvestment in physical capital.     

VOLUNTARY WORK AND WAGES

The effects of voluntary work on earnings have recently been studied for some developed countries such as Canada, France and Austria. This paper extends this line of research to Italy, using data from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU‐SILC) dataset. A double methodological approach is used in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity: Heckman and IV methods are employed to account for unobserved worker heterogeneity and endogeneity bias. Empirical results show that, when the unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account, a wage premium of 2.7 percent emerges, quite small if compared to previous investigations on Canada and Austria. The investigation into the channels of influence of volunteering on wages gives support to the hypotheses that volunteering enables the access to fruitful informal networks, avoids the human capital deterioration and provides a signal for intrinsically motivated individuals.     

MINIMUM WAGES AND HEALTHY DIET

A healthy diet is often unaffordable for low‐income individuals, so income‐lifting policies may play an important role in not only alleviating poverty but also in improving nutrition. We investigate if higher minimum wages can contribute to an improved diet by increasing consumption of fruits and vegetables. Exploiting recent minimum wage increases in the United States and using individual‐level data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System we identify the causal effect of minimum wage changes on fruit and vegetable intake among low‐wage individuals in a triple‐differences framework. The estimated minimum wage elasticity of fruit and vegetable consumption equals 0.12. (JEL I12, I18, J38)     

STABLE SETS AND STEADY WAGES

This paper uses the notion of the Stable Set, in conjunction with a mild restriction on the extent to which a firm can quickly replace its entire workforce, to explain equal treatment across workers within a firm yet wage differentials across firms, and why a firm responds with quantity rather than with wage adjustments to shocks.     

COMPUTER SKILLS AND WAGES*

Data from the 1993 Survey of Training and Education show that 52 per cent of males and 60 per cent of females had at some time used a computer. An analysis using earnings functions reveals that computer usage is associated with a wage premium of between 12 and 16 per cent. Experiments show that omission of a variable recording computer usage from a wage equation will result in a bias of between 10 and 15 per cent in the estimated return to a year of schooling and similar distortion to the estimated return to experience.     

TRADE,WAGES, AND PRODUCTIVITY

We develop a general equilibrium monopolistic competition model in which wages, productivity, consumption diversity, and markups respond to trade integration. We structurally estimate the model and simulate the impacts of removing all trade barriers generated by the Canada–U.S. border. Firm selection gets tougher by 8.09% in Canada and by 0.80% in the United States. Markups that consumers face, which are central to welfare, fall by up to 12.11% in Canadian provinces and by up to 2.82% in U.S. states. However, changes in markups measured at the firm level are ambiguous, thus providing a different piece of information.     

SENIORITY WAGES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH*

Economies that lack well‐developed markets for mobilizing household savings may, in some instances, grow faster than those that are financially more developed, provided that their labour markets are also characterized by seniority rather than spot wages. This occurs because of a Kaldorian redistribution effect in a model where households have finite‐horizons and where older workers, as an endogenous feature, have higher saving rates.     

MINIMUM WAGES AND GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT

This study is the first to explore the relationship between minimum wage increases and state gross domestic product (GDP). Using data drawn from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1979 to 2012, I find no evidence that minimum wage increases were associated with changes in overall state GDP. However, this null finding masks substantial heterogeneity in the productivity effects of minimum wages across industries and over the business cycle. Difference‐in‐difference‐in‐difference estimates suggest that a 10% increase in the minimum wage is associated with a short‐run 1% to 2% decline in state GDP generated by lower‐skilled industries relative to more highly skilled industries. This differential appears larger during troughs as compared to that during peaks of the state business cycle. (JEL J3, J4, L5)     

CROSS SUBSIDIZATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR WAGES

ABSTRACT 1 : This study has examined wage determination in the presence of cross‐subsidization of firms in the telecommunications industry. How variations in cross subsidies received, via the separations mechanism used in the industry, influence some firms to pay a greater level of wages is assessed. The firms studied have been almost the entire population of local exchange carriers in the US telecommunications industry between 1995 and 2000. The analysis has established that firms which are able to obtain greater cross‐subsidies, on average, in fact pay higher wages and the elasticity of the relationship is quite high. The study is the first of its kind assessing the relationship between an important regulatory variable that measures a ubiquitous process, such as cross subsidization, and the impact on employee wages.     

TRAINING, JOB SECURITY AND INCENTIVE WAGES

This paper considers the optimal level of firm‐specific training by taking into account the positive effect of training on the expected duration of workers' current employment. In the framework of an efficiency wage model, a short expected job tenure represents a disamenity that reduces the penalty from shirking. As this disamenity increases, workers have an incentive to continue providing a positive level of effort only if they are compensated by a higher wage. We endogenize the employment separation rate by introducing firm‐specific training. Firm‐specific training creates a rent that is lost if the worker is separated from the firm. As a result, the firm will be more reluctant to fire its trained workforce in a recession. This implies that firm‐specific training can decrease current wages because it represents a commitment to lower future labour turnover.     

WAGES,PROFITS AND CAPITAL FLIGHT*

We model capital flight as the outcome of a non-cooperative differential game between workers (who control the wage share) and capitalists (who control investment at home and abroad). There are three equilibria for such a game. Along the interior equilibrium, the domestic economy becomes “decapitalized” as investors build up their holdings of foreign assets, in a situation reminiscent of the experience of several developing countries.     

PRIZES VERSUS WAGES WITH ENVY AND PRIDE*

We show that if agents are risk‐neutral, prizes outperform wages if and only if there is sufficient pride and envy relative to the noisiness of performance. If agents are risk‐averse, prizes are a necessary supplement to wages (as bonuses).