公司治理机制下独立董事功能分析

独立董事具有监督公司管理层,评价董事会,树立公司形象等功能,但其自身存在信息不灵、缺乏动力及不能真正独立等缺欠。应从对其功能合理定位,完善选拔机制与选聘程序、完善激励与约束机制,建立健全相关法律法规体系等方面施以对策,以更好地发挥独立董事的功能及作用。     

公司治理中推行独立董事制度的必要性

随着所有权与经营权的分离 ,公司的健康发展与公司有效治理直接相关 ,而董事会的运作效果是公司治理的核心 ,推行独立董事制度对于建立高校运作的董事会 ,保护中小投资者的利益及实现公司有效治理意义重大。     

Galvanising Shareholder Activism: A Prerequisite for Effective Corporate Governance and Accountability in Nigeria

Shareholder activism has been largely neglected in the few available studies on corporate governance in sub Saharan Africa. Following the recent challenges posed by the Cadbury Nigeria Plc, this paper examines shareholder activism in an evolving corporate governance institutional context and identifies strategic opportunities associated with shareholders’ empowerment through changes in code of corporate governance and recent developments in information and communications technologies in Nigeria; especially in relation to corporate social responsibility in Nigeria. It is expected that the paper would contribute to the scarce literature on corporate governance and accountability in Africa. Olufemi Amao (LLM, Warwick; LLM, Ibadan, Nigeria; LLB, OAU, Nigeria; BA, Ilorin, Nigeria; BL, NLS) is a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Law, University College Cork, Ireland. He is a recipient of the President PhD Scholarship and the Department of Law Scholarship. His current research interests include Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Governance, Multinational Corporations and Human Rights. Kenneth Amaeshi is a Research Fellow at Warwick Business School. His research interests include commercialisation of intellectual property assets; governance of global innovation networks; R&D partnerships; sustainable innovation; multinational corporations and corporate social responsibility in developing economies. He is currently studying comparative political economy of corporate stakeholding and corporate social responsibility. He is the 2007 winner of the International award for excellence in the field of interdisciplinary social sciences, awarded by the international journal of interdisciplinary social sciences (Australia/USA).     

Corporate Governance Reform and CEO Compensation: Intended and Unintended Consequences

Recent scandals allegedly linked to CEO compensation have brought executive compensation and perquisites to the forefront of debate about constraining executive compensation and reforming the associated corporate governance structure. We briefly describe the structure of executive compensation, and the agency theory framework that has commonly been used to conceptualize executives acting on behalf of shareholders. We detail some criticisms of executive compensation and associated ethical issues, and then discuss what previous research suggests are likely intended and unintended consequences of some widely proposed executive compensation reforms. We explicitly discuss the following recommendations for reform: require greater independence of compensation committees, require executives to hold equity in the corporation, require greater disclosure of executive compensation, increase institutional investor involvement in corporate governance (including executive compensation), and require firms to expense stock options on their income statements. We provide a brief summary discussion of ethical issues related to executive compensation, and describe possible future research.     

Corporate Governance and Institutional Transparency in Emerging Markets

This paper posits that differences in corporate governance structure partly result from differences in institutional arrangements linked to business systems. We developed a new international triad of business systems: the Anglo-American, the Communitarian and the Emerging system, building on the frameworks of Choi et al. (British Academy of Management (Kynoch Birmingham) 1996, Management International Review 39, 257–279, 1999). A common factor determining the success of a corporate governance structure is the extent to which it is transparent to market forces. Such transparency is more than pure financial transparency; as it can also be based on factors such as governmental, banking and other types of institutional transparency mechanism. There may also be a choice for firms to adopt voluntary corporate disclosure in situations where mandatory disclosure is not established. The Asian financial crisis of 1997–1999 and the more recent corporate governance scandals such as Enron, Andersen and Worldcom in the United States and Ahold and Parmalat in Europe show that corporate governance and business ethics issues exist throughout the world. As an illustration we focus on Asia’s emerging¹ markets, as, both in view of the pressure of globalization and taking into account the institutional arrangements peculiar to the emerging business system, these issues are important there. Particularly for those who have to find an accommodation between the corporate governance structures and disclosure standards of the Emerging system and those of the Anglo-American and Communitarian systems.     

Does Good Governance Matter to Institutional Investors? Evidence from the Enactment of Corporate Governance Guidelines

Corporate governance guidelines are a mechanism that a firm can enact which should reduce agency costs and better align the interests of boards and the suppliers of capital. This study examines stock price reactions primarily attributable to institutional investors occurring when corporations announce the enactment of corporate governance guidelines. A final sample of 77 firms was derived from the first announcement of corporate governance guidelines exclusive to the SEC-EDGAR database. The results indicate that good governance does matter. Firms that announced the enactment of corporate governance guidelines experienced increased stock prices following the announcements. There was an immediate (days 1–4) reaction for firms that provided all or part of the guidelines’ substance; a delayed (days 8–10) reaction occurred for those firms that only referenced the guidelines’ enactment. Additionally, firms with either a potentially greater following or that had a previous history of acrimonious relations with stakeholders were rewarded by the announcement of the enactment of guidelines.     

完善公司治理结构 强化企业内部控制

企业内部控制和公司治理结构关系密切,二者产生的基础都是委托代理关系,公司治理结构是内部控制的外部制度环境。由企业内部控制失效很大程度源于公司治理结构不健全,所以应从完善公司治理结构角度出发,加强企业的内部控制。     

Corporate Governance Reforms in Developing Countries

Corporate governance reforms are occurring in countries around the globe. In developing countries, such reforms occur in a context that is primarily defined by previous attempts at promoting "development" and recent processes of economic globalization. This context has resulted in the adoption of reforms that move developing countries in the direction of an Anglo-American model of governance. The most basic questions that arise with respect to these governance reforms are what prospects they entail for traditional development goals and whether alternatives should be considered. This paper offers a framework for addressing these basic questions by providing an account of: 1) previous development strategies and efforts; 2) the nature and causes of the reform processes; 3) the development potential of the reforms and concerns associated with them; 4) the (potential) responsibilities of corporate governance, including the (possible) responsibilities to promote development, and; 5) different approaches to promoting governance reforms with an eye to promoting development.     

公司治理模式中审计监控体系的比较研究

公司治理是当前一个世界性的理论研究和实践课题,良好的公司治理是现代市场经济健康运作的微观基础。两种典型的公司治理模式分别是英美模式和德日模式,这两种模式都存在着巨大差异,其审计监控体系也体现出不同的特点。通过比较,得到两点启示:公司治理理念是影响审计监控结构的重要因素;内部审计监督及注册会计师审计的关系清晰、分工明确是构建有效的审计监控体系的关键。立足本国,以期改善我国的公司治理结构,建立与之相适应的审计监控体系。     

商业伦理的构建——公司治理的一个视角

在经济飞速发展的今天,商业伦理正越来越受到高度重视。商业伦理本身并不具有法律意义上的强制性,但它具有道德意义上的导向性和自我约束性,是一个企业乃至一个商业社会和谐、长远发展的基石。同时,商业伦理也是人们在追求商业利益过程中应当遵循的道德原则。     

安徽省上市公司董事会治理与公司绩效关系的实证研究

以安徽省上市公司为研究样本,对董事会治理与公司绩效的关系进行实证分析,结果表明:适当的董事会规模、董事薪酬与董事持股比例对公司绩效有积极作用;独立董事比例、董事会领导权结构与董事变更对公司绩效影响不显著;过多的董事会会议不利于公司绩效的提高。     

关于完善我国独立董事制度的探讨

在我国二元制公司治理结构下,独立董事制度的引入有利于解决我国上市公司长期以来存在的“内部人控制”现象,更有效地保护中小股东的利益,完善公司治理结构。如何进一步完善与发展独立董事制度,须在具体引进过程中明晰独立董事的“独立性”、权利与义务、激励和约束机制以及与监事会职能的协调等问题。因此,应借鉴国外的经验,并结合自身的实际情况,合理的构建我国的独立董事制度。     

董事会结构与公司治理绩效的实证分析

独立董事制度为公司的权益资本和管理雇佣契约提供了更为安全的治理措施。但分析表明,那种认为董事会独立性越强,公司治理效率越好的想法是不恰当的。信息获取能力的约束以及非执行董事和执行董事之间的博弈水平使得董事会结构与公司治理绩效之间存在显著倒U型关系。     

股权分置改革对上市公司治理优化的影响研究

股权分置的制度缺陷导致了上市公司治理缺乏共同的利益基础,扭曲了资本市场发挥作用的机理。股权分置改革有利于上市公司逐步形成共同的治理基础。从股权分置改革对上市公司治理优化的影响关系框架可以看出,指出股权分置改革通过上市公司股东行为、董事会作用及经营者激励约束机制等内部治理因素和资本市场定价机制、控制权市场并购重组机制及监督约束机制等外部治理因素影响着上市公司整体治理的优化,从而使后股权分置时代促进上市公司治理优化。     

全流通下的恶意并购——一种有效的外部治理机制

随着股权分置改革的结束,我国资本市场进入了全流通时代。恶意并购作为一种有效的外部治理机制,将在公司治理中发挥越来越重要的作用,恶意并购对于帮助股东监控经理人是有效的。具体来说,恶意并购一方面可以改善企业效率,增加股东财富,另一方面可以解决或缓解代理成本问题和内部人控制问题。同时,也应注意恶意并购机制的消极影响,它可能导致恶意并购机制运行的失效。恶意并购机制作为一种市场经济中的游戏规则,本身是中性的。如何发挥其积极作用并遏制其消极作用,将是政府关于恶意并购立法的中心思想,政府应尽快建立健全相关的并购法规体系。     

The Economic Inefficiency of Secrecy: Pension Fund Investors’ Corporate Transparency Concerns

In the wake of recent corporate scandals, this paper traces the growing power of pension funds to provide managerial oversight of the firms they hold in their investment portfolios. Increasingly pension funds are exercising their legitimate rights as owners to raise the corporate governance standards of the firms they invest in. Within corporate governance generally, pension funds are shifting their attention away from managerial accountability and toward measures that increase transparency in firm-level decision-making. Pension funds use transparency to ensure that shareholders are the primary interest being served by the firm. Transparency not only aligns managers and owners, it also raises issues of firm behaviour that allow other stakeholders to engage the corporation more broadly. I contend that secrecy is economically inefficient. When organizations are opaque and interests are secret, decision-making can and does distort efficiency. I examine recent pension fund corporate governance campaigns with particular reference to the California Public Employees Retirement System. Dr. Hebb is a senior research associate at the Labor and Worklife Program, Harvard University and the Oxford University Centre for the Environment. She is researching the role of US public sector pension funds and urban revitalization as lead investigator on a two-year Rockefeller and Ford Foundation grant. Her doctoral work at Oxford University examined the impact of pension fund corporate engagement on the corporate governance, social and environmental standards of firm behaviour. She was a Clarendon Scholar at Oxford University and was awarded the prestigious William E. Taylor Fellowship (2003) from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, Government of Canada. Dr. Hebb is also a recipient of the York University Schulich School of Business National Research in Financial Services and Public Policy Scholarship (Canada). Dr. Hebb is also the Director of the Capital Strategies Program at the Carleton Centre for Community Innovation (3ci), Carleton University, Canada. Here her work focuses on the financial and non-financial impact of pension fund economically targeted investment in Canada as part of a three-year SSHRC Initiatives in the New Economy grant.     

公司治理模式融合论的分析与质疑

经济的全球化带来了公司治理模式的融合。但是有的学者提出 ,这种融合将导致公司治理模式的趋同。但并没有足够的数据加以证明。为此 ,在分析这种观点 ,并对“趋同”提出了质疑     

公司治理与公司管理的关系研究

理顺公司治理与公司管理的关系是企业保持持久生命力的关键。两者相互依存,又互有区别。公司治理与公司管理的相互依存来自两者之间的匹配协调,两者的区别根源在于现代企业所有权与经营权的分离。公司治理与公司管理之间的匹配协调是动态的,随着企业内外部环境的变化,两者需经适时调整,以达到新的平衡。     

公司治理与企业内生风险

本文在整理有关公司治理文献的基础上,指出公司治理与企业内生风险的关系;对企业委托人层面上的权力重构做出合理的静态分析,认为委托代理关系的融合是降低企业内生风险的关键;研究还表明,若干时期内,委托代理关系不可能调整到均衡状态。因此,委托人必须预设一个相对弹性的空间,使得内在风险与外在风险可调和,在“共同治理”模式下,当委托人与代理人拥有的信息随着时间推移互为“内外双层气泡”时,企业内生风险可以降低。     

建立现代公司法人治理结构之理论基石

现代公司组合主体的多元性必然导致公司权力与利益分配的不平衡,并可能降低公司的经济效益。因此,要提高公司经济效益并对现代公司各主体之间分配权力与利益实现制衡其最有效途径是建立“高效优质”的法人治理结构。由于公司法人治理结构是法学与经济学共同研究的一个基本问题,所以分别从法学和经济学两个角度对其理论基石进行了探讨。