Noncooperative,cooperative, and delegative R&D

We discuss alternative organizational forms of research and development in a symmetric duopoly framework. Firms play a noncooperative game at the output stage but can collaborate at the R&D stage. In the absence of patent protection, technology licensing that prevents imitative R&D may emerge as an equilibrium outcome. In general, greater probabilities of success in R&D rule out noncooperative arrangement at the R&D stage. Delegative R&D, where firms move sequentially, tends to dominate the cooperative form of R&D.Department of Economics, Monash University     

Science and Technology Take-off in China?: Sources of Rising R&D Intensity

China's ratio of research and development (R&D) spending to its gross domestic product (GDP) more than doubled from 0.6 per cent in 1996 to 1.4 per cent in 2005. This study documents the pattern of science and technology (S & T) take-off, characterized by an abrupt increase in the R&D to GDP ratio. This abrupt increase, observed in many of the now Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, typically drives R&D intensity from below 1 per cent to the range of 2–3 per cent. The question addressed in this work is whether China has begun a similar S & T take-off. The study reviews several conditions identified in the endogenous growth literature that drives R&D intensification and notes their emergence in China during the past decade. It also speculates why China's R&D intensification appears to be starting at such a low level of income per capita.     

Effectiveness of R&;D tax incentives in small and large enterprises in Québec

In this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives in Quebec, using manufacturing firm data from 1997 to 2003 originating from R&D surveys, annual surveys of manufactures and administrative data. The estimated price elasticity of R&D is –0.10 in the short run and –0.14 in the long run, with slightly higher elasticities for small firms than for large firms. We show that there is a deadweight loss associated with level-based R&D tax incentives that is particularly acute for large firms. For small firms it is not sizeable enough to suppress the R&D additionality, at least not for quite a number of years after the initial tax change. Incremental R&D tax credits do not suffer from this deadweight loss and are from that perspective preferable to level-based tax incentives.

R&;D in SMEs: a paradox?

This paper has three objectives: (1) to survey the relevant literature addressing the (apparent) paradox of Research & Development investments carried out within Small and Medium Enterprises; (2) to provide focused summaries of the articles in this special issue; (3) to draw some general conclusions in terms of policy implications.

Absorptive capacity and R&;D tax policy: Are in-house and external contract R&;D substitutes or complements?

Firms fund research and development (R&;D) to generate commercializable innovations and to increase their ability to understand and absorb knowledge from elsewhere. This dual role and opposed incentive structure of internal R&;D create a significant question for both theory and R&;D policy: Is internal R&;D a complement or substitute for external R&;D? We develop a model and novel technique for empirically estimating R&;D substitution elasticities. We focus on bio-pharmaceutical and software industries in California and Massachusetts, where tax credit rates changed differently over time for the two types of R&;D, creating a natural experiment. The effective tax prices for the two R&;D types differ from type to type, firm to firm, state to state, and year to year. This allows us to examine changes in the composition of firms’ R&;D budgets between in-house R&;D and external basic research when the relative tax prices of each category of research change. We find evidence of a substitute relationship both for a sample comprising exclusively small firms as well as for a more general distribution of firm sizes.     

The Effects of Integration on R&D Incentives in Systems Markets

We consider a systems market where two complementary components must be used in combination to provide valuable services. The market for the first component is monopolized whereas the market for the second is potentially served by multiple firms. We show that integration of the monopolist into the competitive complementary market may distort incentives for R&D, reducing total economic welfare.     

R&;D,Size and Firm Growth in Taiwan‘s Electronics Industry

This paper documents the relationship between R&D, firm size, and growth rate for a panel data of Taiwanese electronics firms. Using GMM method to control for endogeneity of R&D, the main finding is that an increase in R&D induces a higher growth rate and this impact is particularly higher for small firms. Testing Gibrat’s law shows that small firms indeed have a higher growth rate than their larger counterparts, while size is independent with firm growth in the group of large-sized firms, supporting the weak form of Gibrat’s law.     

Objects and Subjects in Technological Interdependence. Towards a Framework to Monitor Innovation

Technology, even more than other aspects of economic life, is characterized by a strong interdependence across both sectors and organizations. However, we still know little about the determinants and impact of technological interdependence. The standard input-output analysis is unable to explain interdependence in technological life since a large proportion of innovations are either untraded or are disembodied from products. Innovations which are not appropriated by the innovators are not signalled by prices. Moreover, input-output tables do not systematically consider exchanges within economic organizations, such as firms. This paper proposes a more complex accounting framework for innovation which would monitor the technological field of the innovation and the product where it is used, as well as the producer-user interrelationship.     

Measuring Innovation in European Industry

This paper analyses the results of the 1993 Community Innovation Survey (CIS). Fifty per cent of European firms introduced a product or process innovation during 1990-92. The share of innovating firms varies between industrial sectors and firm size. The percentage of innovating firms is higher for large firms than for smaller ones. In high-tech sectors this share is two thirds and for traditional ones is one third. The largest part of firms' expenditure for innovation is linked to the adoption and diffusion of technologies through machinery and equipment, which absorbs 50% of firms' innovation expenditure. R&D activities represent, on average, 20% of total innovation expenditure while other innovative activities, such as design and trial production, account respectively for 10% and 11%. The mix of innovation inputs, especially R&D and investment, is strongly correlated with firm size, displays little change across countries and varies greatly across industries.     

Cooperative and non-cooperative R&D and trade costs

We examine the effect of trade liberalization on the level and mode of R&D in an international duopoly setting. Firms have the choice to invest in R&D either independently or cooperatively. A reduction in trade cost increases R&D irrespective of the mode of R&D. However, an increase in spillovers has ambiguous effects on R&D. More precisely, we find that an increase in spillover leads to higher R&D activity under cooperation but lower R&D activity under non-cooperation. Concerning cooperation versus non-cooperation, we find that firms prefer cooperation only if trade costs are low. Consumers are better off under cooperation if spillovers are high. We find that there can be a mismatch between private and social incentives. If spillovers are low and trade costs are low then cooperation might be privately profitable but socially undesirable. On the other hand, if there are large spillovers and high trade costs then cooperation may be socially desirable but not privately profitable.     

Horizontal Agreements and R&D Complementarities: Merger versus RJV

We study the decision of two firms within an oligopoly concerning whether to enter into a horizontal agreement to exploit complementarities between their R&D activities and if so, whether to merge or form a research joint venture (RJV). In contrast to horizontal merger and motivated by real-world evidence, we incorporate a probability that an RJV contract will fail to enforce R&D sharing. We find that a horizontal agreement always arises in equilibrium, which is consistent with empirical findings that R&D complementarities between firms positively influence the formation of horizontal agreements. The insiders’ merger/RJV choice involves a trade-off: While merger offers certainty that R&D complementarities will be exploited, it leads to a profit-reducing reaction by outsiders on the product market, where competition is Cournot. Greater contract enforceability (quality) and R&D investment costs both favour RJV. Interestingly, the insiders may choose to merge even when RJV contracts are always enforceable, and they may opt to form an RJV even when the likelihood of enforceability is negligible. We also explore the welfare implications of the firms’ merger/RJV choice.     

The Localization Choice of Multinational Firms’ R&D Centers: A Survey in the Piedmont Area

Research on the linkages between R&D, environment, strategy, and localization choices is quite new and often lacks empirical investigation. The aim of this article is to study the localization choices of MNE R&D activities in Piedmont. Specifically, it investigates the extent of locating in a specific place on the strength of several drivers and the level of satisfaction of the choice after 3 years from the settlement. The findings aim to verify the main drivers that led 51 MNE to choose Piedmont as the ideal area for their R&D activities and also to show how the high level of presence after 3 years from the settlement confirms the result.