UNDERWRITER REPUTATION AND AFTERMARKET PERFORMANCE OF CLOSED‐END FUNDS

I find a positive relation between underwriter reputation and the initial and long‐run aftermarket performance of closed‐end funds. This relation persists even after controlling for fund characteristics, types, and investment strategies. The positive relation between underwriter reputation and initial returns supports the notion that prestigious investment bankers tend to promote a price run‐up in the immediate aftermarket to enhance their reputation with the issuers and the investors. The better long‐run performance for funds underwritten by prestigious underwriters suggests that prestigious underwriters protect their reputation by underwriting only high‐quality issues that will perform well in the long run.     

The Agency Effect of Repurchases on Closed‐End Funds

Share prices rise after companies announce repurchases, but there are differing views as to why this happens. Repurchases are announced by closed‐end funds when their discounts are widening (market‐to‐book is falling). The immediate post‐announcement effect is a small jump in a fund's share price, but the main effect occurs over the next four years during which time there is significant outperformance both of the fund's price and of its investment portfolio. Liquidity of the shares does not change. Repurchases, if executed, reduce the size of a fund and therefore the manager's fees. Our findings are consistent with directors using the threat of repurchases to discipline managers whose investment performance has been poor, leading to a closer alignment of pay and performance.     

Stock Returns and Operating Performance of Securities Issuers

We examine long‐run stock returns and operating performance around firms’ offerings of common stock, convertible debt, and straight debt from 1985 to 1990. We find that pre‐issue abnormal returns are positive and significant for stock issuers, but not for convertible and straight debt issuers. The post‐issue mean returns show that common stock and convertible debt issuers experience underperformance during the post‐issue periods, but straight debt issuers do not. Consistent with these results, common stock issuers experience the best pre‐issue operating performance among all three types of issuers, and operating performance declines during the post‐issue periods for common stock and convertible debt issuers. Using a new approach in linear model estimations to correct heteroskedasticity and to adjust for finite sample, we find a positive relation between post‐issue operating performance and issue‐period stock price reactions. The results suggest that future operating performance is anticipated at the issue and that securities issues provide information on issuers’ future performance.     

Information and Long‐Term Stock Performance Following Open‐Market Share Repurchases

We find that firm managers have private information when they decide on open‐market share repurchases, and that this information is significantly correlated with announcement period and post‐announcement abnormal returns. We further find that long‐term post‐announcement abnormal returns are related to private information differently for firms that actually repurchase shares when compared to firms that announce a repurchase program but do not acquire shares. Our results indicate that managers’ private information is only ambiguously revealed by the repurchase announcement, and that the market waits for the firm's subsequent actions, such as actual repurchase, to further interpret the private information.     

The Information Content Of Calls Of Debt: Evidence From Long-Run Stock Returns

We examine the long‐run performance of the common stock of firms following calls of both straight and convertible debt from 1945 to 1995. Using a sample of 718 calls of straight debt, we find an average abnormal return in the five years following the call of between 0.16% and 0.34% per month, which compounds to an economically and statistically significant 11% to 22% over the five‐year period. This evidence of overperformance following calls shows a distinct symmetry between the straight debt and equity markets. Issues of debt and equity are both followed by long‐term underperformance, whereas stock repurchases and debt calls are both followed by long‐run overperformance. For our sample of 713 calls of convertible debt, we find little systematic evidence of abnormal performance following the call. Some researchers suggest that calls of convertible debt provide negative signals to the market. Our results provide no support for this claim. In contrast, our evidence of marginal positive long‐run returns provides weak support for the model that calls of convertible debt signal the realization of profitable investment options, and for the price pressure hypothesis.     

Long‐term Performance of Greek IPOs

We analyse the long‐run performance of 254 Greek IPOs that were listed during the period 1994–2002, computing buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over 36 months of secondary market performance. The empirical results differ from international evidence and reveal long‐term overperformance that continues for a substantial interval after listing. Measuring these returns in calendar time, we find statistical significance with several of the benchmarks employed. We also find that long‐term overperformance is a feature of the mass of IPOs conducted during a pronounced IPO wave. Cross‐sectional regressions of long‐run performance disclose several significant factors. The study demonstrates that although Greek IPOs overperform the market for a longer period, underperformance eventually emerges, in line with much international evidence. Our interpretation is that the persistence of overperformance over a significant interval is due to excessive supply of issues during the ‘hot IPO period’. Results associated with pricing during the ‘hot IPO period’ indicate positive short‐ (1‐year), medium‐ (2‐year) and negative long‐term (3‐year) performance.     

The Effects of Cash,Debt, and Insiders on Open Market Share Repurchases

The findings of the authors' recent study suggest, on balance, that stock repurchases function much like tax‐efficient special dividends, increasing when free cash flow is large and when debt levels are low, but not replacing regularly scheduled dividends. Repurchasing companies experience median event returns of about 2% around the repurchase announcements, with a related mean effect of roughly 3%. Companies with greater free cash flow and less debt are more likely than otherwise comparable companies to repurchase their shares. Furthermore, repurchasing companies that exhibit substandard preannouncement stock price returns and seek to buy back higher percentages of shares tend to elicit more positive stock price reactions. At the same time, the study provides some evidence that corporate managers attempt to use their inside information to profit from buybacks. For example, managing insiders in repurchasing firms decrease their selling activity and increase their buying activity two weeks before repurchase announcements to a greater extent than non‐managing insiders. But perhaps the most remarkable finding from this part of the study is how little insiders as a group seem to profit from their short‐term trading behavior—a finding that suggests that the market appears to anticipate much of this behavior.     

Stock‐Split Post‐Announcement Returns: Underreaction or Market Friction?

We explore the relationship between stock splits and subsequent long‐term returns during the period from 1950 to 2000. We find that, contrary to much previous research, firms do not exhibit positive long‐term post‐split returns. Instead, we find that significant positive returns after the announcement date do not persist after the actual date of the stock split. We also observe that abnormal returns are correlated with the price‐delay or market friction. We conclude that the stock‐split post‐announcement “drift” is only of short duration, and it is attributable to trading frictions rather than behavioral biases.     

WHAT DETERMINES SEO OFFER‐DAY RETURNS?

We examine seasoned equity offering (SEO) initial‐day returns after controlling for the dilution effect from the SEO discount and new shares offered. Contrary to the existing literature that ignores the effect of dilution, we find that initial‐day returns are not consistently positive. Modeling adjusted initial‐day returns, we show that dilution‐adjusted initial‐day returns respond to partial price adjustments reflecting both private and public information. Additional determinants of SEO offer‐day returns include lockup length, discount reversal, prior operating performance, and underwriter reputation. Long‐run tests reveal that adjusted initial‐day returns are not predictive of postissuance long‐term performance.     

An Analysis of Closed-end Fund Seasoned Equity Offerings

We examine the stock price reaction to seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) of closed‐end funds and the determinants of the issuance decision. We find that sample funds have negative and significant average announcement‐day returns that are less than the returns associated with industrial firm SEOs, most likely because funds have fewer information asymmetries. Issuing funds have higher pre‐issue returns, higher premiums, lower betas, and lower three‐year, post‐issue returns than nonissuing funds. The results of the study are consistent with the argument that fund managers time issues to take advantage of mean reversion in fund returns.     

Governance quality and privately negotiated stock repurchases: Evidence of agency conflict

This study examines the impact of shareholder rights on the wealth effects of privately negotiated stock repurchases. Our results show that wealth gains are lower when shareholder rights are more suppressed. We also find that the premium paid for shares is inversely related to the strength of shareholder rights, and this suggests that managers pay higher premiums when shareholder rights are more restricted. These findings imply that managers use shareholders’ funds to eliminate blockholders who are more likely to monitor them when shareholder rights are relatively weak, thereby entrench themselves. Consistent with this view, we further show that significant positive abnormal long-run returns after private stock repurchases are limited to firms with stronger shareholder protection. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the predictions of agency theory.     

R&D Increases and Long‐Term Performance of Rivals

We examine how a firm's research and development (R&D) increases affect its intra‐industry competitors in the long run. Consistent with the R&D spillover hypothesis, when a firm unexpectedly increases its R&D spending, its intra‐industry competitors experience improvements in operating performance and analyst forecast revisions and earn positive abnormal stock returns in the long run. The industry concentration, which is related to the firm's strategic reaction, is crucial in determining the magnitude of the R&D spillover effect.     

Valuation and Performance of Reacquisitions Following Equity Carve‐Outs

While existing literature reports a positive market reaction to parent companies conducting carve‐outs, we find that the response to carve‐outs that are ultimately reacquired is negative or insignificant. Reacquired units perform considerably worse than those that are not reacquired. Thus, parents may perceive that the market does not recognize the potential of these poorly performing units, and reacquires them to capitalize on the parents' private information. The reacquisition announcement results in a favorable market reaction for the parents and the units. However, parents experience negative long‐term buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns when they reacquire less than 100% of units' shares.     

Long‐Run Stock Performance and Its Determinants for Asset Buyers

This paper examines the long‐term stock performance of asset purchasers and the determinants of cross‐sectional differences in performance. Our findings show that buyers’ stocks, on average, underperform following purchases. Buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns of buyers acquiring related assets are significantly higher than those acquiring unrelated assets, consistent with the focus hypothesis. Asset buyers with superior prior stock performance experience poorer long‐run performance than buyers with inferior prior stock performance, consistent with the prior performance hypothesis. Asset buyers that manage earnings upward, experience poorer long‐term abnormal stock performance than acquirers with downward earnings management, consistent with the earnings management hypothesis. The long‐term return evidence is to some degree consistent with the governance hypothesis but we find little support for the free cash flow hypothesis.     

A Long‐Run Performance Perspective on the Technology Bubble

The events surrounding the stock price peak of March 2000 are commonly interpreted as the bursting of a technology or Internet bubble, with some researchers pointing out that the pattern could also arise in fundamental models. We inform the debate by studying the long‐run performance of Internet and technology stocks from March 2000 onward. Using calendar‐time regressions, we do not find conclusive evidence of negative abnormal returns. The results are consistent with a new interpretation of the events; namely, the price drop of the early 2000s was not warranted in light of future cash flows and risk.     

Consolidation and value creation in the insurance industry: The role of governance

We examine the long run performance of M&A transactions in the property–liability insurance industry. We specifically investigate whether such transactions create value for the bidders’ shareholders, and assess how corporate governance mechanisms, internal and external, affect such performance. Our results show that M&A create value in the long run as buy and hold abnormal returns are positive and significant after 3 years. While tender offers appear to be more profitable than mergers, our multivariate evidence does not support the conjecture that domestic transactions create more value than cross-border transactions. Furthermore, positive returns are significantly higher for frequent acquirers and in countries where investor protection is weaker. Internal corporate governance mechanisms, such as board independence, and CEO share ownership, are also significant determinants of the long run positive performance of bidders.     

STOCK PRICES AND INFLATION

Numerous empirical studies establish that inflation has a negative short‐run effect on stock returns but few studies report a positive, long‐run Fisher effect for stock returns. Using stock price and goods price data from six industrial countries, we show that long‐run Fisher elasticities of stock prices with respect to goods prices exceed unity and range from 1.04 to 1.65, which tends to support the Fisher effect. We also find that the time path of the response of stock prices to a shock in goods prices exhibits an initial negative response, which turns positive over longer horizons. These results help reconcile previous short‐run and long‐run empirical evidence on stock returns and inflation. Also, they reveal that stock prices have a long memory with respect to inflation shocks, such that investors should expect stocks to be a good inflation hedge over a long holding period. JEL Classification: G12     

MODELS OF STOCK MARKET PREDICTABILITY

I briefly review the success of past studies purporting to explain equity valuations and predict future equity returns. The Campbell‐Shiller mean reversion models are contrasted with an expanded version of the so‐called Federal Reserve model. At least from 1970 to 2003, Federal Reserve–type models did somewhat better at predicting long‐horizon returns than did a mean reversion model based on dividend yields and price‐earnings multiples. However, timing investment strategies based on any of these prediction models do no better than a buy‐and‐hold strategy. Although some predictability of returns exists, there is no evidence of any systematic inefficiency that would enable investors to earn excess returns.     

A Tale of Two Anomalies: Higher Returns of Low‐Risk Stocks and Return Seasonality

Prior studies have shown that low beta and low volatility stocks earn higher average returns than high beta and high volatility stocks, contradicting the prediction of the capital asset pricing model and the fundamental relationship between risk and return. In this paper, we demonstrate that this phenomenon is driven by the seasonality of stock returns. We show that the risk‐return tradeoff does hold in the nonsummer months, and that switching to a portfolio of low‐risk stocks in summer outperforms—both in terms of absolute and in risk‐adjusted returns—buy and hold strategies as well as the Sell in May strategy of switching to treasury bills in summer.     

THE LONG‐RUN PERFORMANCE OF COMPANIES THAT WITHDRAW SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS

We examine the long‐run stock price and operating performance of companies that withdraw seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Firms that withdraw an offering provide an opportunity to examine whether markets fully adjust to the information conveyed when managers announce the intent to issue shares, independent of any agency problems that might be intensified by the completion of the offering. As in completed seasoned equity offerings, long‐horizon event‐time operating and stock price performance in sample firms is substantially lower than what is observed among control firms. Underperformance is also observed in an equally weighted calendar‐time analysis. Results are consistent with overpricing among small firms that attempt, but then withdraw, SEOs.