信用违约互换

信用违约互换(credit default swap,CDS)是指信用违约互换的购买者(以下简称买方)向信用违约互换的出售者(以下简称卖方)转移第三方信用违约风险的信用衍生产品.在信用违约互换交易中,买方定期向卖方支付一定费用,而一旦出现第三方信用违约(主要指债券主体无法偿付),买方有权利将债券以面值出售给卖方,从而有效规避信用风险.由于信用违约互换产品定义简单、容易实现标准化,交易简洁,自1990年代以来得到了迅速发展.目前国外信用违约互换市场规模相当庞大,而且流动性强.     

信用违约互换与债券市场发展

作为发展最为迅速的信用衍生品,信用违约互换为信用风险管理带来了革命性的变化。信用违约互换可以转移信用风险,从而降低信用债券发行难度,增加债市投资者的可选择空间和投资收益。在大力发展直接融资、银行担保退出的背景下,应当推出信用违约互换以促进我国信用债券市场发展。商业银行、证券公司、保险公司等都将是重要的市场参与主体。     

信用违约互换的变异分析及其风险防治

信用违约互换(CDS)作为一种新型的金融工具,在经历十多年的发展之后,从一种避险型保险产品转变为高风险的金融衍生品,并在本轮金融危机中造成了重大损失。本文从分析它性质与功能变异角度来提出相关风险防治的建议。     

信用违约互换

信用违约互换（creditdefaultswap,CDS）是国外债券市场中最常见的信用衍生品。在信用违约互换交易中,其中希望规避信用风险的一方称为信用保护购买方,而愿意承担信用风险,向风险规避方提供信用保护的一方称为信用保护出售方,违约互换购买者将定期向违约互换出售者支付一定费用（称为信用违约互换点差）,而一旦出现信用类事件（主要指债券主体无法偿付）,违约互换购买者将有权利将债券以面值递送给违约互换出售者,从而有效规避信用风险。     

信用违约互换的强度模型在我国应用的可行性研究

通过对信用违约互换强度模型的基本原理和两个重要参数的分析,提出我国具有信用违约互换定价强度模型应用的基本条件,但是该模型的定价精度和适用范围在一段时期以内还受到很大的影响和限制。     

信用评级中的违约率、违约概率研究

信用评级是对个人、经济体与金融工具履行各种经济承诺的能力及可信任程度的综合评价，本文通过对KMV评级模型的研究，指出在信用评级中的关键指标——“违约率和违约概率”在评级中的重要意义。     

流动性因素对信用违约互换价格的影响研究

本文从信用衍生品的定价模型入手,分析了影响信用违约互换价格的信用风险因素和流动性风险因素,利用美国信用违约互换市场上的数据,实证了流动性因素对于信用违约互换价格有着不容忽视的影响。     

信用违约互换与我国金融结构良性变迁

我国金融结构中一个突出的弊端是信用过分集中于银行并且在短时间内很难改变资金向银行集中的现实,因此通过信用衍生产品使银行的风险向非银行金融机构转移无疑是解决我国社会信用过于集中的有效方法。但我国现阶段推出的CDO信用衍生产品因定价复杂且具融资特性,并不适合在当前推广使用。比较而言,信用违约互换(CDS)不仅具有非融资性、结构简单等特点而且是构造“合成CDO”等其他信用衍生产品的基础工具,因此,应首先开发信用违约互换以促进我国信用衍生产品市场的建立,推动我国金融结构良性变迁。     

信用违约互换的引入对于股票流动性的影响研究

本文研究了信用违约互换的引入对于公司股票流动性的影响。一方面,在信用违约互换引入之后,债权人的违约风险得到转移,故对于债务公司运营以及对于债务管理的监管力度有所降低,增加债务的违约风险;另一方面,人们会对于信用违约互换的引入作为违约风险较高的一个信号。实证结果显示,引进信用违约互换会对公司股票的流动性产生负面的影响。     

信用违约互换定价机制的缺陷与金融危机的产生

在分析信用违约互换的定价机制在次贷危机中所暴露的缺陷的基础上,提出同时考虑会计信息和市场信息的综合模型,并加入流动性因素,对模型的有效性进行了实证检验,结果表明:综合会计信息与市场信息的模型比单纯依据某一种信息的模型对信用违约互换的定价因素解释程度更高,且加入流动性因素后模型的解释能力增强.     

金融双语信用违约互换

Credit default swaps can be thought of as an insurance against the default of some underlying instrument1, or as a put option on the underlying instrument. In a typical credit default swap, as shown in figure, the party selling the credit risk (or the "protection buyer") makes periodic payments to the "protection seller" of a negotiated number of basis points , times the notional amount of the underlying bond or loan.     

Pricing Property Index Linked Swaps with Counterparty Default Risk

This paper extends Bjork and Clapham (Journal of Housing Economics 11:418–432, 2002) model for pricing real estate index total return swaps. Our extension considers counterparty default risk within a first passage contingent claims model. We price total return swaps on property indices with different levels of default risk. We develop this model under same assumptions as Bjork and Clapham (Journal of Housing Economics 11:418–432, 2002) and find that total return swap price is no longer zero. Total return swap payer must charge a spread over the market interest rate that compensates him for the exposure to this additional risk. Based on commercial property indices in the UK, we observe that computed spreads are much lower than a sample of quotes obtained from one of the traders in the market.     

Asset Securitizations and Credit Default Swaps

This study examines the effects of off‐balance sheet versus on‐balance sheet securitizations on the originator's credit risk in the default swap (CDS) market across the recent business cycle from 2002 to 2009. I find that on‐balance sheet securitizations demonstrate greater effects on the originator's CDS premium than off‐balance sheet securitizations in the business cycle. While off‐balance sheet securitizations’ effects on the originator's CDS premium become significantly stronger after 2007 when the economy declines, on‐balance sheet securitizations’ effects on the originator's CDS premium do not experience a significant change with the onset of the recession. The results suggest that the CDS market views originators as having greater probabilities not to honour their implicit guarantees for off‐balance sheet securitizations during the economic downturn. The results also indicate that on balance sheet and off‐balance sheet securitizations have distinctly different risk properties. It would be beneficial to investors if regulations take into considerations the changing credit risks of off‐balance sheet securitizations and the different structures of asset securitizations.     

Optimal Portfolios with Credit Default Swaps

Using a continuous-time, stochastic, and dynamic framework, this study derives a closed-form solution for the optimal investment problem for an agent with hyperbolic absolute risk aversion preferences for maximising the expected utility of his or her final wealth. The agent invests in a frictionless, complete market in which a riskless asset, a (defaultable) bond, and a credit default swap written on the bond are listed. The model is calibrated to market data of six European countries and assesses the behaviour of an investor exposed to different levels of sovereign risk. A numerical analysis shows that it is optimal to issue credit default swaps in a larger quantity than that of bonds, which are optimally purchased. This speculative strategy is more aggressive in countries characterised by higher sovereign risk. This result is confirmed when the investor is endowed with a different level of risk aversion. Finally, we solve a static version of the optimisation problem and show that the speculative/hedging strategy is definitely different with respect to the dynamic one.     

The Default Risk of Swaps

We characterize the exchange of financial claims from risky swaps. These transfers are among three groups: shareholders, debtholders, and the swap counterparty. From this analysis we derive equilibrium swap rates and relate them to debt market spreads. We then show that equilibrium swaps in perfect markets transfer wealth from shareholders to debtholders. In a simplified case, we obtain closed-form solutions for the value of the default risk in the swap. For interest-rate swaps, we obtain numerical solutions for the equilibrium swap rate, including default risk. We compare these with equilibrium debt market default risk spreads.     

Subprime Mortgage Defaults and Credit Default Swaps

We offer the first empirical evidence on the adverse effect of credit default swap (CDS) coverage on subprime mortgage defaults. Using a large database of privately securitized mortgages, we find that higher defaults concentrate in mortgage pools with concurrent CDS coverage, and within these pools the loans originated after or shortly before the start of CDS coverage have an even higher delinquency rate. The results are robust across zip code and origination quarter cohorts. Overall, we show that CDS coverage helped drive higher mortgage defaults during the financial crisis.     

Trading Credit Default Swaps via Interdealer Brokers

Credit default swaps (CDSs) are among the most successful financial innovations of recent years, which is reflected in the rapidly expanding market. CDS trading occurs in the over-the-counter market, which relies heavily on broker intermediation to arrange trades. We provide empirical evidence that liquidity in the voice brokered market varies with the particulars of the CDS contracts and that the differences in market structure is reflected in the costs of liquidity. Moreover, the brokered and direct interdealer trading markets seem to be well integrated; thus the higher liquidity costs in the brokered market may reflect the value of intermediation. Hybrid market structures, which combine voice brokerage with an electronic platform, are discussed as a viable alternative to fully automated trading systems.

主权信用违约互换的运作及启示

欧洲各国主权债务危机的频发,使得主权CDS在全球范围内备受瞩目。本文分析了主权CDS的市场发展状况、运作及定价机制;考察欧洲主权债务危机中主权CDS的行为;提出对我国地方政府债务问题的启示。研究发现:(1)主权CDS息差变化受到了欧元区因素、本国因素、投机和代理对冲的影响;(2)短期主权CDS供不应求;(3)禁止主权CDS的裸卖空交易存在不合理性;(4)西欧主权风险外溢使得东欧及新兴市场国家的主权CDS市场波动加剧。     

Credit Default Swaps and Managers’ Voluntary Disclosure

We investigate how the availability of traded credit default swaps (CDSs) affects the referenced firms’ voluntary disclosure choices. CDSs enable lenders to hedge their credit risk exposure, weakening their incentives to monitor borrowers. We predict that reduced lender monitoring in turn leads shareholders to intensify their monitoring and demand increased voluntary disclosure from managers. Consistent with this expectation, we find that managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts and forecast more frequently when traded CDSs reference their firms. We further find a stronger impact of CDS availability on firm disclosure when (1) lenders have higher ability and propensity to hedge credit risk using CDSs, and (2) lender monitoring incentives and monitoring strength are weaker. Consistent with an increase in shareholder demand for public information disclosure induced by a reduction in lender monitoring, we find a stronger effect of CDSs on voluntary disclosure for firms with higher institutional ownership and stronger corporate governance. Overall, our findings suggest that firms with traded CDS contracts enhance their voluntary disclosure to offset the effect of reduced monitoring by CDS‐protected lenders.