Measuring the Connectedness of the Global Economy

We develop a technique to exploit forecast error variance decompositions to evaluate the macroeconomic connectedness embedded in any multi-country macroeconomic model with an approximate vector autoregressive (VAR) representation. We apply our technique to a large global VAR model covering 25 countries and derive vivid representations of macroeconomic connectedness. We find that the US exerts a dominant influence in the global economy and that Brazil, China, and the Eurozone are also globally significant. Recursive analysis over the period of the global financial crisis shows that shocks to global equity markets are transmitted rapidly and forcefully to real trade flows and real GDP.     

The exchange rate system and macroeconomic fluctuations in Sub-Saharan Africa

In this paper, we investigate the sources of macroeconomic fluctuations in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries with particular attention to the exchange rate system. We use a structural Vector Autoregression (VAR) model with limited capital mobility and long run restrictions to identify the shocks. Supply and terms of trade shocks tend to dominate output movements in the CFA and non-CFA countries alike. However, terms of trade shocks tend to influence the CFA zone to a greater extent and there seems to be a higher influence of demand shocks on output and the real exchange rates in the non-CFA countries.     

Oil structural shocks,bank-level characteristics,and systemic risk: Evidence from dual banking systems

By performing a structural VAR analysis on oil price shocks, we provide an evidence on how the origins of oil price shocks impact the risk level of banks in oil-exporting countries and whether bank-level characteristics can influence the sensitivity of risk to oil shocks. When conducting panel regression analysis, we document the following findings. First, not all shocks have the same effect on bank risk. Due to oil supply shocks, the increase in oil price raises bank risk, whereas the similar increase in price due to economic expansion or oil-market specific demand reduces that risk. Second, the business model (whether the bank is Islamic or conventional), size, income diversification, profitability, and financial leverage influence the bank risk exposure to oil shocks differently. Third, the two major recent crises (global financial crises and COVID-19 pandemic) magnified bank risk exposure to oil supply shocks and speculative oil demand shocks. Overall, the structural oil shocks explain a large fraction of the variation in financial stability in GCC countries.     

Global financial uncertainty

We estimate a novel measure of global financial uncertainty (GFU) with a dynamic factor framework that jointly models global, regional, and country-specific factors. We quantify the impact of GFU shocks on global output with a VAR analysis that achieves set identification via a combination of narrative, sign, ratio, and correlation restrictions. We find that the contraction in world output during the Great Recession would have been 13% milder in absence of GFU shocks. We also find support for a global finance uncertainty multiplier: the more global financial conditions deteriorate after a GFU shock, the larger the world output contraction is.     

The international transmission channels of US supply and demand shocks: Evidence from a non-stationary dynamic factor model for the G7 countries

We employ a multi-country non-stationary dynamic factor model to assess spillover effects and transmission channels of US supply and demand shocks on a variety of macroeconomic variables in individual non-US G7 countries. We find that trade, financial and confidence channels all play a significant role in the international transmission of US shocks. However, the results point to substantial heterogeneities of shock transmission across the individual G7 economies. In particular, we find negative transmission effects for Italy and Japan as the only two G7 countries not well integrated into global value chains. Moreover, the exchange rate responses of Germany, France and Italy turn out to be far less pronounced in comparison to the other G7 economies which we relate to their membership of the euro area and their coordinated monetary policies prior to the establishment of the euro. Whereas we document a close comovement of stock market dynamics across the G7 countries, we find credit and real estate markets to be less synchronized. We do not find the effects and transmission channels to be fundamentally affected by the post-2008 economic environment.     

Regional or global shock? A global VAR analysis of Asian economic and financial integration

This study employs a global vector autoregressive (GVAR) model to empirically investigate the viability of regional monetary arrangements in Asia. In marked contrast to the previous studies, we analyzed whether recent regional economic and financial integration in Asia were driven by global (U.S.) shock or regional (Japanese and Chinese) shock, using the GVAR model that allows global inter-linkages between domestic and foreign variables. By estimating generalized impulse responses of Asian economies’ real outputs and interest rates to global and regional shocks, we found that the Chinese shock exerted more real and financial influences on Asian economies than the U.S. shock. Another regional shock, i.e., the Japanese shock, had a far smaller influence on Asian economies. The relative importance of regional shocks originating from China needs to be considered when establishing regional monetary arrangements in Asia.     

Transmission of US financial and trade shocks to Asian economies: Implications for spillover of the 2007–2009 US financial crisis

This paper describes an investigation of the transmission of US shocks to Asian economies with consideration of financial linkages and trade linkages. Using the sign restriction vector autoregression (VAR) approach during 2000–2012, our empirical results can be summarized as follows. First, both US financial and trade linkages exert a significant impact on production in Asian economies. Second, through both financial and trade linkages, US spillover shocks account for around 50% of the production fluctuation in Asian economies. Third, during the episodes of 2007–2009 US financial crisis, the impact of financial shocks is greater than that of trade shocks. Results suggest that (i) Asian economies are not decoupled with US; and (ii) different from conventional findings, financial linkages between US and Asian economies are strong, especially for highly developed Asian economies. Therefore, investors and policymakers of Asian economies should take account of US financial conditions.     

Global Impacts of the Automotive Supply Chain Disruption Following the Japanese Earthquake of 2011

This paper provides an input–output method to estimate worldwide economic impacts generated by supply chain disruptions. The method is used to analyse global economic effects due to the disruptions in the automotive industry that followed the Japanese earthquake and the consequent tsunami and nuclear crisis of March 2011. By combining a mixed multi-regional input–output model, the World Input–Output Database and data at the factory level, the study quantifies the economic impacts of the disruptions broken down by country and industry. The results show that the global economic effect (in terms of value added) of this disruption amounted to US$139 billion. The most affected (groups of) countries were Japan (39%), the USA (25%), China (8%) and the European Union (7%). The most strongly affected industries were transport equipment (37%), other business activities (10%), basic and fabricated metals (8%), wholesale trade (7%) and financial intermediation (4%).     

International business cycles and risk sharing with uncertainty shocks and recursive preferences

This paper analyzes the effects of output volatility shocks on the dynamics of consumption, trade flows and the real exchange rate, in a two-country, two-good world with consumption home bias, recursive preferences, and complete financial markets. When the risk aversion coefficient exceeds the inverse of the intertemporal substitution elasticity, then an exogenous rise in a country׳s output volatility triggers a wealth transfer to that country, to compensate for the greater riskiness of the country׳s output stream. This risk sharing transfer raises the country׳s consumption, lowers its trade balance and appreciates its real exchange rate. In the recursive preferences framework here, volatility shocks account for a non-negligible share of the fluctuations of net exports, net foreign assets and the real exchange rate. These shocks help to explain the high empirical volatility of the real exchange rate and the disconnect between relative consumption and the real exchange rate.     

The macro-financial factors behind the crisis: Global liquidity glut or global savings glut?

It has been argued that the global financial crisis 2007–2009 was intrinsically related to two largely unprecedented phenomena in the global economy: (i) exceptionally benign financial market conditions as mirrored in historically low risk premia and buoyant asset price developments as well as (ii) an unprecedented widening of external imbalances. This paper explores to what extent these global trends can be understood as a reaction to three structural shocks to the macro-financial environment of the global economy: (i) monetary shocks (“excess liquidity” hypothesis), (ii) preference shocks (“savings glut” hypothesis), and (iii) investment shocks (“investment drought” hypothesis). In order to uniquely identify these shocks in an integrated framework, we estimate structural VARs for the two main regions with widening imbalances, the United States and emerging Asia, using sign restrictions that are compatible with standard New Keynesian and Real Business Cycle models. Our results show that (US) monetary policy shocks explain the largest part of the variation in imbalances and financial market prices. We find that savings shocks and investment shocks explain less of the variation. Hence, a “liquidity glut” may have been a more important driver of real and financial imbalances in the US and emerging Asia that ultimately triggered the global financial crisis.     

Do U.S. macroeconomic surprises influence equity returns? An exploratory analysis of developed economies

Given the dominant role the U.S. economy plays in global trade, we explore how U.S. macroeconomic surprises affect stock markets in ten major developed economies as well as in China and India. We do not find strong enough evidence to conclude that U.S. macro shocks materially and consistently influence equity returns and volatilities in the economies studied. Consistent with previous research, it appears that only in few markets are return levels materially influenced by macro surprises generated in the U.S. Also, only a small number of macro shocks seem to be of any consistent significance. For returns levels, inflation, productivity, consumer confidence, and retail sales seem to matter. At the same time, conditional volatilities appear to be influenced by inflation, retail sales, durable goods, industrial production, consumer confidence, gross domestic product, and trade balance surprises. Finally, our exploratory analysis indicates that the degree of bilateral trade connectedness may partially explain the extent to which macroeconomic surprises are transmitted across countries.     

CALL FOR PAPERS

This paper is devoted to an analysis of financial ratio adjustment in European financial statements. To that end, we use an hierarchical model based on the partial adjustment model. This model allows us to distinguish between adjustments that are due to external shocks and which affect all countries, on the one hand, and those resulting from internal shocks which affect the relative position of one country with respect to the rest, on the other. In addition to estimating the average adjustment coefficients of each ratio, we locate those countries that have a behaviour which is significantly different from the rest. We find that, in general, the evolution of the ratios analysed is mainly determined by their adjustments to external shocks, with the ratios related to the profit and loss account demonstrating a greater sensitivity to all types of shocks. By contrast, the debt ratios show the least sensitivity. When considered on a country-by-country basis, the most significant differences appear in the results ratios, with Spain being the country that is most sensitive to external shocks, and Denmark and Germany being least sensitive to all types of shocks.     

By force of demand: Explaining cyclical fluctuations of international trade and government spending

This paper explores the role of demand shocks, as an alternative to productivity shocks, in driving both domestic and international business cycles within the international real business cycle (IRBC) framework. In addition to those well-documented domestic business cycle fluctuations (e.g., the volatility and cyclicality of output, consumption, investment, labor hours, and labor productivity) and international business cycle properties (e.g., the countercyclical net export and the comovement puzzle), this paper focuses on two additional stylized facts in the industrialized countries: the procyclical trade openness (the GDP fraction of trade volume) and the countercyclical government size (the GDP fraction of government spending). Using a parsimonious dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, we show that the model׳s predictions under productivity shocks are not consistent with these facts. Instead, a demand-shock-driven model replicates the above facts while matching other domestic and international business cycle properties. An estimated version of the model confirms the quantitatively important impacts of demand shocks.     

On the feasibility of monetary union among Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries: does the symmetry of shocks extend to the non-oil sector?

GCC countries’ output is heavily dichotomized into oil and non-oil. Oil shocks have similar effects on all member countries but little is known about their responses to non-oil shocks. This paper sets out to determine (1) whether aggregate demand (AD) and non-oil supply shocks (AS) are symmetrical across these countries to justify their suitability for monetary union; and (2) whether there is any commonality of shocks with the United States and the three major European countries, namely France, Germany, and Italy, which can warrant the choice of either the US dollar or the Euro as the anchor for the expected common currency of the bloc. We use bivariate structural vector autoregression models identified with long-run restrictions to extract the shocks. Our results show that (a) AD shocks are unequivocally symmetrical but non-oil AS shocks are weakly symmetrical across GCC countries thereby suggesting a monetary union is feasible, but not overwhelmingly; (b) neither AD nor AS shocks are symmetrical between GCC countries and the selected European countries; (c) GCC’s AD shocks are symmetrical with the US but non-oil AS shock are not. Furthermore, there are no significant changes in the results when we aggregate the GCC countries as a bloc. We therefore surmise that the US dollar is a more appropriate anchor for the new currency than the Euro since US monetary policy can at least help smooth demand shocks in GCC countries.     

Does foreign aid procurement in resource-rich countries depend on these countries’ financial development and institutional quality? Evidence from PVECM and quantile-on-quantile regression

The underlying structure of the global economy has undergone major structural changes over the last two decades. These transformations have been powered by globalisation, technological development and multilateral trade agreements. The more open global economy has benefitted the global community, but many resource-rich developing countries are struggling to keep pace with more developed countries. As these resource-rich countries attempt to catch up with more developed economies, many rely on foreign aid to develop their institutions of governance and financial sector for a more knowledge-intensive economy. This study analyses the long- and short-run associations between foreign development aid procurement, financial development, and institutional quality in resource-rich countries from 2005 to 2020, employing the panel vector error-correction (PVECM) model and Quantile-on-Quantile Regression (QQR). Our analysis shows that, in the short run, there is a strong endogenous nexus between foreign aid procurement, quality of institutions and financial development. Furthermore, the results reveal that financial development and higher institutional development assist resource-rich countries in procuring foreign developmental aid in the long run. These findings suggest that a financial system which functions well, and favourable institutional governance are critical for these countries to secure foreign aid to put them on a path to sustainable development.     

Long‐term Effects of Fiscal Stimulus and Austerity in Europe

We analyze whether there are ne gative (positive) long‐term effects of austerity measures (stimulus measures) on potential output growth. Based on the approach of Blanchard and Leigh ( 2013 ) and Fatás and Summers ( 2018 ) and using a novel data set of narratively identified fiscal policy shocks, we estimate the impact of these shocks on potential output. We robustly find a considerable underestimation of multiplier effects and their persistence for most European countries in the early years after the financial crisis and subsequent Euro Area crisis. We conclude that fiscal consolidation was badly timed and thus not only deepened the crisis but may have caused evitable hysteresis effects.     

金融危机下自由贸易与贸易保护的选择

随着国际金融危机的蔓延与扩展,贸易保护主义也开始抬头,一些国家纷纷采取贸易保护措施。本文根据应对世界经济危机的历史经验和教训,同时运用国际贸易的比较优势原理,分析了在当前国际金融危机下,贸易保护主义将引发国际经济贸易的恶性循环,加剧全球经济的严重衰退,而自由贸易则是各国应对国际金融危机的正确选择。     

The transmission mechanism in a changing world

The paper aims to identify those factors that cause changes in the speed and strength of the international transmission of output shocks from the USA to specified European economies. These factors are identified through the use of generalized impulse response functions conditioned on histories defined by an abrupt transition VAR. The chosen transition variables comprise changes in exchange rates, financial prices, international capital flows, trade links and monetary policy instruments. Besides the identification of asymmetric responses, the proposed model is useful in analyzing the strong effect of the recent US recession on the European economies and changes in business cycle synchronization over time. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Exogenous uncertainty and the identification of structural vector autoregressions with external instruments

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the identification (point‐identification) of structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) with external instruments considering the case in which r instruments are used to identify g structural shocks of interest, r ≥ g ≥ 1. Novel frequentist estimation methods are discussed by considering both a “partial shocks” identification strategy, where only g structural shocks are of interest and are instrumented, and a “full shocks” identification strategy, where despite g structural shocks being instrumented, all n=g+(n?g) structural shocks of the system can be identified under certain conditions. The suggested approach is applied to investigate empirically whether financial and macroeconomic uncertainty can be approximated as exogenous drivers of US real economic activity, or rather as endogenous responses to first moment shocks, or both. We analyze whether the dynamic causal effects of nonuncertainty shocks on macroeconomic and financial uncertainty are significant in the period after the global financial crisis.