Corporate social responsibility and bank liquidity creation

Under the stakeholder theory hypothesis, reputable corporate social responsibility (CSR) banks are expected to attract more loans and deposits, which in turn strengthens their ability to create liquidity. Our findings support this view. Further analyses reveal that the positive effect of CSR on liquidity creation differs depending on bank size, bank capital, and type of financial crisis. In addition, deposit growth, loan growth, lending rate, and funding rate are potential channels through which CSR influences bank liquidity creation. The findings are not driven by an endogeneity issue.     

Liquidity creation and bank capital structure in China

This paper investigates the relationship between liquidity creation and bank capital structure in China. We test the so-called “financial fragility-crowding out” hypothesis and the “risk absorption” hypothesis on Chinese banks and find that bank capital is negatively related to liquidity creation, which supports the financial fragility-crowding out hypothesis. In contrast, we find that foreign banks in China have a weaker relationship between liquidity creation and bank capital, which is consistent with the risk absorption hypothesis and findings in prior studies.     

Climate risk and bank liquidity creation: International evidence

This study examines the impact of climate risk on bank liquidity creation in 56 countries over the period 1995–2012. Specifically, it investigates whether the relationship between climate risk and bank liquidity creation varies by bank and country characteristics. The results reveal that climate sensitivity and exposure have negative impacts on overall liquidity creation, whereas climate adaptation has positive effects. These effects are more pronounced for larger banks with lower capital, banks located in lower-GDP and developing countries, and those in Asia. The results suggest that policymakers should exercise caution when formulating and implementing climate-related strategies, as these can influence liquidity creation, which in turn can affect macroeconomic stability.     

Bank liquidity creation,monetary policy,and financial crises

This paper examines the interplay among bank liquidity creation (which incorporates all bank on- and off-balance sheet activities), monetary policy, and financial crises. We find that: (1) high liquidity creation (relative to trend) – particularly off-balance sheet liquidity creation – helps predict crises, controlling for other factors; (2) monetary policy has statistically significant, but economically minor effects on liquidity creation by small banks during normal times, and these effects are even weaker during financial crises; (3) monetary policy has very little effects on medium and large bank liquidity creation during both normal times and crises. These findings suggest that authorities may wish to monitor bank liquidity creation closely in order to predict and perhaps lessen the likelihood of financial crises. They might also consider other tools to control bank liquidity creation, such as capital and liquidity requirements.     

Liquidity creation,regulatory capital,and bank profitability

We examine the interrelationships among liquidity creation, regulatory capital, and bank profitability of US banks. We find that regulatory capital and liquidity creation affect each other positively after controlling for bank profitability. However, this relationship is largely driven by small banks and primarily during non-crisis periods. It is also sensitive to the level of banks' regulatory capital and how it is measured. Furthermore, we find that banks which create more liquidity and exhibit higher illiquidity risk have lower profitability. Finally, the relationship between regulatory capital and bank performance is not linear and depends on the level of capitalization. Regulatory capital is negatively related to bank profitability for higher capitalized banks but positively related to profitability for lower capitalized banks. Therefore, a change in regulatory capital has differential impacts on bank performance. Our findings have various implications for policymakers and bank regulators.     

互联网金融影响了商业银行流动性创造吗?

选取2010-2019年中国98家商业银行年度数据就互联网金融对银行流动性创造的影响及其作用机制进行实证分析.研究发现:互联网金融通过分流银行存款及理财资金对银行盈利形成冲击,由此引发的"鲶鱼效应"会倒逼银行加大存贷期限错配来缓解盈利下降压力,从而促进银行流动性创造.相对于国有银行与城农商行,互联网金融对股份制银行流动性创造的促进力度更大.金融脱媒仅在P2P网络借贷对银行流动性创造的影响中承担着中介作用,但"第三方支付-金融脱媒-银行流动性创造"的传导渠道无效.银行业景气度提高会加剧互联网金融对流动性创造的促进作用,银行流动性创造存在顺周期倾向.     

Do stress tests affect bank liquidity creation?

We examine the impact of Federal Reserve stress tests from 2009 to 2016 on U.S. bank liquidity creation. Empirical results show that regulatory stress tests have a negative effect on both on-and off-balance sheet bank liquidity creation and asset-side liquidity creation. As banks enter the stress tests, they reduce their liquidity creation to avoid failing the stress tests. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that banks manage their risk exposures to meet higher capital requirements. The negative effect of stress testing on liquidity creation continues to persist in the quarters after the stress tests. Finally, stress test banks appear to increase liability-side liquidity creation. These findings highlight that the enhanced financial stability from greater regulatory scrutiny may be achieved at the expense of financial intermediation.     

ESG投资能够促进银行创造流动性吗?——兼论经济政策不确定性的调节效应

当前在我国致力于实现“碳达峰、碳中和”目标的大背景下,银行能否通过ESG投资促进流动性创造,进而推动高质量发展具有重大战略意义。本文利用2009年第一季度至2020年第二季度中国36家上市银行的面板数据,实证分析ESG投资对银行流动性创造的影响,并将其置于经济政策不确定性条件下予以讨论。研究发现:第一,ESG投资整体上促进流动性创造,表现为对资产端和负债端流动性创造的促进作用,以及对表外流动性创造的抑制作用。从ESG投资结构看,环境保护投资和社会责任投资均抑制流动性创造,而公司治理投资则促进流动性创造。异质性分析表明,地方性银行和资本短缺银行的ESG投资对流动性创造具有更强的促进作用。第二,中介机制分析发现,ESG投资主要通过“盈利”和“风险”渠道促进流动性创造。第三,在经济政策不确定性上升时期,ESG投资对流动性创造的促进作用更加显著。从ESG投资分项看,经济政策不确定性会增强环境保护投资和社会责任投资对流动性创造的抑制作用,以及公司治理投资对流动性创造的促进作用。本文结论为充分发挥ESG投资作用并以此推动高质量发展提供了政策启示。     

Funding liquidity and bank risk taking

This study examines the relationship between funding liquidity and bank risk taking. Using quarterly data for U.S. bank holding companies from 1986 to 2014, we find evidence that banks having lower funding liquidity risk as proxied by higher deposit ratios, take more risk. A reduction in banks’ funding liquidity risk increases bank risk as evidenced by higher risk-weighted assets, greater liquidity creation and lower Z-scores. However, our results show that bank size and capital buffers usually limit banks from taking more risk when they have lower funding liquidity risk. Moreover, during the Global Financial Crisis banks with lower funding liquidity risk took less risk. The findings of this study have implications for bank regulators advocating greater liquidity and capital requirements for banks under Basel III.     

Limited liability and bank safety net procedures ∗

A model is presented of bank behaviour which identifies the factors determining a bank's optimal capital/asset ratio, its optimal liquidity ratio, the expected value of non-performing loans and the probability of bank failure. We propose that this last variable can act as an index of bank credit-worthiness. The main factors determining this index are (i) the risk associated with bank asset returns, (ii) the variability of bank deposits, (iii) the costs associated with bank failure and (iv) the implicit or explicit government subsidy involved in depositor protection schemes. The principal general conclusion of the paper is that regulations governing capital requirements, liquidity requirements and depositor protection should be (a) risk related and (b) integrated. Depositor protection can be improved through relatively high capital requirements. However, the optimal strategy is for all bank safety net procedures and incentive mechanisms to be related to the riskiness of individual bank portfolios.     

Bank regulatory capital and liquidity: Evidence from US and European publicly traded banks

The theory of financial intermediation highlights various channels through which capital and liquidity are interrelated. Using a simultaneous equations framework, we investigate the relationship between bank regulatory capital and bank liquidity measured from on-balance sheet positions for European and US publicly traded commercial banks. Previous research studying the determinants of bank capital buffer has neglected the role of liquidity. On the whole, we find that banks decrease their regulatory capital ratios when they face higher illiquidity as defined in the Basel III accords or when they create more liquidity as measured by Berger and Bouwman (2009). However, considering other measures of illiquidity that focus more closely on core deposits in the United States, our results show that small banks strengthen their solvency standards when they are exposed to higher illiquidity. Our empirical investigation supports the need to implement minimum liquidity ratios concomitant to capital ratios, as stressed by the Basel Committee; however, our findings also shed light on the need to further clarify how to define and measure illiquidity and also on how to regulate large banking institutions, which behave differently than smaller ones.     

Does bank capital reduce liquidity creation?

This paper investigates the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation against the backdrop of the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Analyzing an unbalanced panel of 11,617 U.S. commercial banks from 1996 to 2016, we find a negative association between regulatory capital and on-balance-sheet liquidity creation, but positive associations for small banks and after the financial crisis. Further, we observe lower liquidity creation among banks that participated in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The results are largely robust to several alternate variable proxies and model specifications. Our findings suggest that “one-size-fits-all” policy may have some unintended consequences for banks.     

利率市场化视角下货币政策对银行流动性创造的影响——基于银行风险承担的中介效应检验

运用1997-2015年中国186家银行的非平衡面板数据,实证检验银行风险承担在货币政策影响银行流动性创造过程中所发挥的中介效应.结果发现:货币政策通过影响银行风险承担而对银行流动性创造产生影响,即银行风险承担在货币政策影响银行流动性创造的过程中起到了中介作用.此外,货币政策通过影响银行风险承担对银行表内流动性创造和表外流动性创造都会产生影响.采用四种货币政策度量指标、两种银行流动性创造度量指标和两种银行风险承担度量指标的稳健性检验均支持了以上结论.进一步的实证研究表明:货币政策对银行风险承担和银行流动性创造的作用都会受到利率市场化水平的影响,即随着利率市场化水平的提升,货币政策对银行风险承担的影响会有所减弱,价格型货币政策对银行流动性创造的影响也会降低.     

Bank Capital and Liquidity Creation: Granger-Causality Evidence

We examine the relation between capital and liquidity creation. This issue is interesting because of the potential impact on liquidity creation from tighter capital requirements such as those in Basel III. We perform Granger-causality tests in a dynamic GMM panel estimator framework on an exhaustive data set of Czech banks, which mainly includes small banks from 2000 to 2010. We observe a strong expansion in liquidity creation until the financial crisis that was mainly driven by large banks. We show that capital negatively Granger-causes liquidity creation in this industry, where majority of banks are small. But we also observe that liquidity creation Granger-causes a reduction in capital. These findings support the view that Basel III can reduce liquidity creation, but also that greater liquidity creation can reduce banks’ solvency. Thus, we show that this reverse causality generates a trade-off between the benefits of financial stability induced by stronger capital requirements and the benefits of increased liquidity creation.     

Capital and liquidity ratios and financial distress. Evidence from the European banking industry

Using a large bank-level dataset, we test the relevance of both structural liquidity and capital ratios, as defined in Basel III, on banks' probability of failure. To include all relevant episodes of bank failure and distress (F&D) occurring in the EU-28 member states over the past decade, we develop a broad indicator that includes information not only on bankruptcies, liquidations, under receivership and dissolved banks, but also accounts for state interventions, mergers in distress and EBA stress test results. Estimates from several versions of the logistic probability model indicate that the likelihood of failure and distress decreases with increased liquidity holdings, while capital ratios are significant only for large banks. Our results provide support for Basel III's initiatives on structural liquidity and for the increased regulatory focus on large and systemically important banks.     

Crises,Liquidity Shocks,and Fire Sales at Commercial Banks

If liquidity shortages cause financial crises, a lender of last resort can provide funds to banks facing potential fire sales. However, if funding problems primarily occur at banks with existing solvency problems, then government liquidity programs may not spur bank lending. We find that commercial bank funding does not typically dry up in a crisis, not even during the subprime crisis. Rather, weak banks are more likely to borrow less. Furthermore, banks rely more on deposits and newly issued equity than fire sales. When they do sell assets, they cherry pick assets in order to alleviate pressure from capital regulations.     

Bank business models and liquidity creation

Using a large panel of US bank holding companies from 2001 to 2015, this study investigates the association between functional diversification and bank liquidity creation. I document evidence of lower liquidity creation for higher diversification. The effect of moving into nontraditional activities on liquidity creation is more apparent with large banks and less pronounced with small banks. The impact of diversification on liquidity creation is less significant during the late stage of crisis and is more clearly observed in small and medium-sized banks. Low liquidity creation banks, leveraged by a higher share of non-interest income, are more likely to further decrease their liquidity creation. The study is of interest to regulators and policymakers who are concerned about bank business models.     

Why do banks choose to finance with equity?

A majority of U.S. banks between 1973 and 2012 held equity capital significantly beyond the required minimum. We study the risk-return tradeoff in connection with a bank’s capital structure, and identify several new significant market factors that drive the level of equity capital in banks. During normal growth periods, bank leverage is negatively related to a level of competition and loan portfolio diversification, while high bank leverage is associated with low past liquidity. During recessions and expansions, the roles of those factors change following distortions in risk-return tradeoff. In distress, when banks approach regulatory capital requirements, market determinants of book leverage lose their significance; however, leverage does not decrease until a bank is within 1% of the minimal capital threshold.     

Liquidity and bank capital structure

Bank capital requirements reduce the probability of bank failure and help mitigate taxpayers’ sharing in the losses that result from bank failures. Under Basel III, direct capital requirements are supplemented with liquidity requirements. Our results suggest that liquidity provisions of banks are connected to bank capital and that changes in liquidity indirectly affect the capital structure of financial institutions. Liquidity appears to be another instrument for adjusting bank capital structure beyond just capital requirements. Consistent with Diamond and Rajan (2005), we find that liquidity and capital should be considered jointly for promoting financial stability.     

Bank regulation,property prices and early warning systems for banking crises in OECD countries

Early warning systems (EWS) for banking crises generally omit bank capital, bank liquidity and property prices. Most work on EWS has been for global samples dominated by emerging market crises where time series data on bank capital adequacy and property prices are typically absent. We estimate logit crisis models for OECD countries, finding strong effects from capital adequacy and liquidity ratios as well as property prices, and can exclude traditional variables. Higher capital adequacy and liquidity ratios have a marked effect on the crisis probabilities, implying long-run benefits to offset some of the costs that such regulations may impose.